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A B S T R ACT 
A misapprehension of the concept of education is documented. 
This reflects a weakness in our grasp of the concept of the concept 
of education and a faulty understanding of the nature of thought and 
argument. This misapprehension involves the essentially Kantian 
view of examples as intuitive aids to understanding. Against this 
it 16 argued that examploo a.re nbaolutl:lly fundClffiental to thought. 
Even deduction, our paradigm of good rea.soning, reduces to case by 
case a.rgument. This misapprehension is embodied in 'criterioloeical' 
approaches to the concept which assume that to be justified in 
calling something an example of 'education' necessitates giving 
'criteria'. But justification may take the form of case by case 
'argument'. This alone can give increased grasp of a concept. 
The 'criteriological' approach derives from Wittgenstein. The 
notion of 'rules' of language functioning as intermediaries between 
'criteria' and 'conditions' for the use of terms provides no support 
for the approach. There are no 'rules' in the special sense 
required. A reading of Wittgenstein suggests no 'theory of criteria' 
but. a methodological injunction to consider the details of what it 
makes sense to say in particular cases. Three interrelated metaphors 
'family resemblance', 'games' and 'grammar' have been misinterpreted 
by being interpreted systematically. They are intimately connected 
with case by case procedure and offer an essentialism without 
universals. 
A 'family resemblance' approach to the concept is developed and 
discussed. The notion of 'aspect change' is employed to illuminate 
some examples of education. A case by case procedure is sketched 
utilising examples from Tolstoy, Dickens, Golding, Austin and others. 
'Criteria' extracted from these examples would be clumsy and 
unilluminating. Seeking 'criteria' is a habit of thought. If these 
examples are taken as intended we may detect increased grasp. 
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Chapter One INTRODUCTION 
, "You must'nt tell us about the ring, here. Very well, 
then. Describe your father as a horsebreaker. He doctors 
sick horses, I dare say?" 
!lOh yes, Sir." 
"Very well, then. He is a veterinary surgeon, a farrier, 
and horse breaker. Give me your definition of a horse." 
(Sissy Jupe thrown into the greatest alarm by this demand.) 
"Girl number twenty unable to define a horse!" said Nr 
Gradgrind, for the general behoof of all the little pitchers. 
"Girl number twenty possessed of no facts, in reference 
to one of the commonest of animals! Some boy's definition 
of a horse. Bitzer, yours." •••••••••••• 
!IQuadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely, bventy 
-four grinders, four eye-teeth, and twelve incisive. Sheds 
coat in spring; in marshy countries, sheds hoofs, too. 
Hoofs hard, but requiring to be shod with iron. Age known 
by marks in mouth." Thus (and much more) Bitzer. 
"Now girl number twenty, II said fir Gradgrind. "You know 
what a horse is.'" (1) 
Dickens Hard Times 
1.1. The Kantian View of Examples. 
'Certainty and clearness', according to Kant, are the two 
essential requirements of critical philosophy. To meet the demand 
of certainty he considered it nece3sary to reject all modes of 
opining. To meet the demand of clearness it was necessary to 
achieve a discursive (or logical) clearness through concepts 
and an 'intuitive (aesthetic) clearness through intuition, that 
is, through examples and other concrete illustrations.' (2) 
Intuitive clearness, for Kant, is a subsidiary business which is 
only necessary 'from a popular point of view.' (3) Examples are 
merely illustrative and in giving too many vie may' cover over 
and conceal the articulation and organisation of the system, 
which, if we are to be able to judge of its unity and solidity 
( 4) 
are "/hat chiefly concern us.' In these passages Kant is not 
merely ÜŲẀŸÙŪŦĚ eXEUses for the paucity of examples in the Critique. 
l/,'hat he says in the First Introduction is quite compatible with 
his view of examples in enabling us to make judgements. He saw 
the understanding as the 'faculty of rules' and judgment as 
'the faculty of subsuming under rules'. (5) It is the ability 
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to see whether something is a case of something else. It is 
a 'natural power' a 'mother wit' which cannot be assisted by 
logic. Logic, by definition, only gives us general rules, and if 
we cannot apply tllem 'logic' cannot help us. If we are wanting 
in judgement Kant believes that there are two possible reasons 
for this. Firstly we may have an abstract power of comprehension 
which finds ŠŮŸŨÙȘŠWÙŬŪĚto particular instances difficult. 
Secondly, we may not have received 'through examples and actual 
practice adequate training for this particular act of judgement.' 
Such a GVUŠŲŸŤŪÙŪŦĚo£ the judgement is indeed one great benefit 
(6) 
(7) 
of examples.' There are, however, great drawbacks to examples. 
They impair the correctness and precision of intellectual insight 
because they do not enable us to comprehend the uni versali ty of rules. 
'Examples are thus the go cart of judgement; and those who are 
lacking in natural talent can never dispense with them.' (8) 
I begin an essay on the concept of education \vi th a brief 
exegesis of a very minor theme of the Critique not because I think 
Kant's arguments are important or sound, for they are neither. (9) 
Nor because I believe that contemporary philosophy of education is 
explicity neo-Kantian, but because in the passages I have referred 
to he makes explicit the narrow conception he has about the role 
of examples in thought. This attitude, as I will show, is implicit 
in much of the recent work done on the philosophy of education and 
vitiates all of the recent work done on the concept of education. 
Crudely put, the central arguoent of this thesis is that what Kant 
says is an inversion. Examples are absolutely fundamental to 
( 10) thought. 
What I shall venture to call the 'Kantian view of examples' 
is not absolutely wrong but it is inadequate. It is a philosophical 
malaise brought about by the search for a systematic philosophy 
and a philosophic system. Educational philosophers like other 
philosophers have generally given up the search for philosophical 
systems. However, they s'cill feel the pull of thecnalogy between 
what they are doing and the system building activities of scientists. 
Perhaps many educational philosophers would repudiate this analogy 
in favour of one vii th literature and the arts. (11) The documentation 
I "',ill present in this th8sis v/ill show any such repudiation to be 
merely rhetorical. 
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The inadequacy of the Kantian view of examples leads to an 
inadequate notion of what it is to think, to reflect, to argue. 
It leads to an inadequate notion of Hhat is involved in 'having' 
a concept and hence to an inadequate treatment of any particular 
concept. In discussing the concept of education in the light of 
this malaise it is important to recognise that the inadequate 
apprehension of the concept of a concept which is symptomatic of 
an inadequate apprehension of the nature of thought and argument. 
Of course, to say that something is inadequately apprehended is not 
to say that it is not apprehended. 
1.2. Documention (p.) 
To document my claim that the concept of education has been 
inadequately apprehended I adduce the persistence of the following 
two related sets of 'questions' and the corresponding affirmative, 
negative, or contrary 'answers' to them: 
. (12) (a) Is there one concept of eductlon? Is there 
concept of education? (13) Are there two concents of 
Are there three, four, or five concepts of education? 
one aP.1biguous 
education? (14) 
(15) Are there 
(16) 
many concepts of education? Do different people have different 
concepts of education? (17) Do particular social groups have 
different concepts of education? (18) ŸÍẀVWĚ every human being 
necessarily have a certain concept of, education? (19) Are there 
historically independent concepts of education? (20) Is there a 
super concept of education er.1bracing possibly incompatible concepts 
(21). (22) 
of education? Is educatlon a vague concept? Is there an 
essence to the concent of education? (23) Is education a family 
,. (24). ( 25 ) 
resef.1blance concept? Is educatlon a core concept? Is 
.education an essentially contested concept? (26) 
(b) Is it possible to define the term 'education'? 
several 'definitions' of the term 'education'? (28) 
(27) Are there 
Are there 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of the term 
'education'? (29) Are there necessary conciitions for the use of 
. (30) the term'educatlon'? Are there sufficient but not necessary 
conditions for the use of the term 'education'? (31) Are there any 
sort of conditions for the correct application of the term 
'education'? (32) Are there criteria for the application of the 
term 'education'? (33) Has the term 'education' evaluative 
meaning? (34) Has the tero 'education' descrintive meaning? (35) 
Are there central and peripheral uses of the WŸŲÜĚ 'education'? (36) 
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Has the term 'education' changed in meaning? (37) Is the meaning 
of the term vague? (38) 
This seemingly straightforward concatenation of interrogatives 
is meant to 1:e indicative of the sorts of 'questions' asked by 
philosophers of education during the last decade or so. It is not 
exhaustive as it ignores such 'refinements' as talk of 'strong' or 
'weak' definition. That it reveals a certain amount of cOLfusion 
might be more apparent if the inscriptions are rewritten in declarative 
form i.e. 'There is ŸĚconcept of education.'; 'There are two concepts 
of education', and so on. Hany pairings of questions from both 
sections \rill seem to be incompatible if not inconsistent. Occasionally 
an incompatible pairing is found in a single treatment of the concept 
of educ.3tion. (39) Incidental, or even thorough going inconsistency 
is of marginal importance. Hhat I lrrish to stress at the outset is 
sinply the persistence of these 'questions' and of 'questions' about 
these 'questions'. 
Though my lists are restricted to 'questions' about the 'form' of 
the concept or term a similar list could be drawn up which covered the 
(40) 
'content' of the concept or term. Reference would be made, for 
example, to philosophers who cmcnected the cO:lcept essentially with 
learning and those who argue that this relation is contingent, and to 
philosophers who consider 'education' to have ŠŪŚŸŠŨẀŠWÙẂŤĚcomponent 
and to those who deny this. For this purpose of preparatory 
documentation the list will suffice. \-Jhat they show is that something 
is wrong in the 1rlay that phiJosophers talk about the concept of the 
concept of education. To say that something is vlrong and to give 
evidence that a certain amount of confusion exists is not, of course, 
to establish that this confusion is a result of the Kantian as,sumptions 
discussed above. It way be that these 'questions' are held to be 
meaningful out that the correct answers to them have not been 
Satisfactorily given. It will be my aim in the balance of this thesis 
to establish that such continual and repeated questionings are 
sterile and fruitless, because they embody the Kantian view of examples. 
In correcting this Kantian misapprehension I hope that the need to ask 
such 'questions' ;tiill disappear and be replaced by an approach to the 
concept which is more instructive and enlightening. 
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Set (a) contains examples of 'questions' about the concept of 
education and the concept of the concept of education. Set (b) 
contains 'questions' about the meaning of the term 'education'. 
The misapprehension I am referring to is not a trivial one which 
would occur if sets (a) and (b) vlere somehow confused. John 
'\vilson is intolerant of phiJosophers of education who talk in an 
. (41) 
'incoherent' way of both 'the use of concepts' and 'the use of terms'. 
In philosophy and in ordinary conversation we move from one expression 
to the other without qualm. The distinction doesn't matter unless 
you are concerned with distinguishing between the nature of concepts 
and the use of terms. \vilson considers such loose speaking as 
important because he sees it as resulting from a tension between a 
personal possessive (or 'psychological') use of the term 'concept' 
and the meaning of any given term. He argues that there is no 
intelligible first person ŮŬVVŤŸẂŤĚuse of the term 'concept' so 
that all we are left with is the meaning of a term. The misap-
prehension highlighted here is wide ranging enough to cover the 
confusion involved in seeing concepts as a half way house between 
some sort of mental entity and the meaning of terms, and the 
confusion involved in the simplistic reductionisn: of the Wilsonian 
kind which involves in a search for the meaning of terms. (42) One 
might also add that the misapprehension is also evinced by those 
who argue that viilson has a non-dynamic view of language, a fido-fido 
theory of meaning, and that his approach amounts to an attempt to 
kill discussion by definition. (43) 
vii Is on 's suggestion that we encapsulate bits of the world as 
we distinguish it in sets of rules and that these constitute our 
'concept' is reminiscent of Kant's position. For both philosophers 
categorising is forming 'rules'. Philosophical argument consists of 
attempts to make meanings or sets of 'rules' explicit, or it consists 
of resolving categorisation problems such as asking if A is a case of 
X or a case of Y, or it evaluates concepts i.e. it asks whether the 
concept Y is needed. The 'grasp' of such 'rules' is not an issue. 
Both philosophers would arG,lle that that is a 'psychological' r:latter. 
'Laying out cases' is merely a preliminary procedure to conceptual 
(44) 
clarification, a guide to those lacl:ing in 'mother wit'. viilson, 
therefore, exemplifies the OŠŪWÙŠŸĚview of examples. To show that his 
views are not eccentric or atypical it is necessary to adumbrate the 
way in which the Kantian view finds expression in the arguments of 
",-- h f d t" (45) ŮUŨŸŸÖĚers 0 e uca lone 
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Consideration of Hilson's argument clearly reveals that 
philosophers of education are active on the three levels indicated 
above. Indeed this could not be othenJise. They are concerned with 
the concept of education, with the concept of that concept and with 
the nature of thought and argument. To begin to understand the 
nature of the Kantian misapprehension the least concrete level must 
be considered first. 
The following characterisation is not given a'.priori. Nor does 
the presence of any or all of the following features do more than 
indicate the adoption of the Kantian view. They proceed from the 
most general (often merely implied) features to the slightly less 
general: 
1) The assumption that the only tru1y valid form of reasoning 
is that which approximates to deduction. 
2) The belief that there is one single feature or set of 
features that che.racterise a concept or give the meaning 
of a term. 
3) An excessivep-eoccupation with definition. 
4) The production of 'universal' or 'conceptual truths'. 
5) An obsession with giving 'rules', 'criteria', or (logically) 
necessary conditions. 
6) An on-going argument about method. 
7) A constant need to reformulate analyses. 
8) A dearth of examples. 
This latter feature is ex hypothesi the most obvious. 1) and 2) 
give expression to the pull of the analogies with mathematics and 
science. All these features result from a concern 1r/i th the general 
rather than the particular. They are the manifestations of certain 
confusions or tendencies with a ȘŬŪŸŬŪĚroot. Familiarity 1rath them 
make an insistence on documenting their appearance in the arguments 
of philosophers of education seem otiose. But these simply stated 
points are not merely the well knoiom truisms of a plethora of 
introductory textbooks. They are evidence of a flawed apprehension 
of what it is to have a concept. Familiarity \.Ji th their denials 
may make a persistence in documenting them appear perverse. 
ĻVVŤŲWÙŬŸTŤŪÙŠŨHĚ reformulation and endless qualification is 
precisely what is being' sighted as evidence of a flawed apprehension. 
Or rather, they are evidence of a flaHed apprehension of a flawed 
apprehension of the concept of education, which results from a flawed 
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apprehension of a flaued apprehension of the concept of the concept of 
education, which is the result of a flawed apprehension of a flawed 
apprehension of the nature of thought and argument. TheBe iterations 
indicate the complexity of the matter. ŸUŤVŤĚ tendencies, like the 
'truism' that man is mortal and must therefore die are both known 
and not known. 
My first point is the easiest and the hardest to document. It is 
the easiest because the presence of all the other features establish 
it. It is the hardest because the contradictory thing is often 
asserted. Occasionally philosophers will reveal themselves in off-
hand comments. Mary ',Jarnock, for example, in her article 'Towards a 
Defini tion of GŸĴẀŠŨÙĚty mn Education' begins ".,ri th a remark to the effect 
that 'It must be agreed from the start that in this particular field 
. (46) there is no such thJ.ng as proof.' Ivarnock gives us a picture of 
proof ldhich we could encapsulate in the expression to an attitude 
which penetrates our whole way of thinking. For deductive proof gives 
us absolute cogency an unconditional certainty derived from the la\.,s 
of logic. This may seem unfair as l;iarnock is only attempting to be 
just, but in giving philosophy of education its due, in setting its 
place, she denies that we can have proof and this distorts our whole 
view of reasoning. Heasoning need not be deductive and yet can still 
be a priori. It need not be inductive either. There can be logical 
connections which are ŸĚpriori but non-necessary. This needs to be 
shown. Perhaps Aristotle had this in mind but expressed it in a 
misleading \.,ay? The misleading expression is what we must focus upon. 
The assumption conte.ined in this misleading way of putting things in 
a (correct) picture of the unassailable nature of deductive reasoning. 
This general picture when taken as a model of comparison or paradigm 
of reasoning forms the ŸŠVÙVĚ for the other misapprehensions and 
confusions. The acceptance of this picture is a habit of thought 
with philosophers. They do not, as it were, say it to themselves. 
The second feature is meant to characterise essentialism without 
gi ving expression to any pe.rticular form of essentialism. Thus it 
does not distinguish behleen \.,hat we can call 'vulgar' essentialism 
the idea that there ŰŸȘŤŲWŠÙŪĚcharacteristics that are necessarily true 
of certain objects, and more sophisticated forms of essentialism which 
allow any of a varying but given subset of a range of different 
features to be necessarily true of certain objects. Peters once 
declared that he did not mind if he put his 'foot on the primrose path 
that leads to essentialism'. (47 and the essentialist method has 
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been rife ever since. (48) 
The third, fourth and fifth features are a consequence or are 
concomitants of the second. Definition; dictionary definition; 
general definition; scientific definition; strong definition; weak 
definition; descriptive definition; stipulative definition; 
prescriptive definition; programmatic definition; inventive and non-
inventive stipulative definition; descriptive-programrJatic definition, 
all these are familiar terms to philosophers of education. Often 
they deny that there is any 'dictionary' definition of the term 
(49) 
'education' • Yet they con,stantly turn to the Oxford English 
Dictionaries to extract 'exhaustive categories' of education, (50) 
or to distinguish between a 'general' and a 'specific' meaning of the 
term. (51) Hore typically they sUTmlarise the 'familiar' objections 
to beginning their enquiry Hith definitions of central terms and 
then to argue that, nevertheles,s, this approach is not unprofitable 
d '1" f" t tt t" 't k t "" t" f" d (52) an some c arl lca ory a en lon 0 ,ey erms lS JUS l le • 
A specific objection to using the dictionary 1:1hich is not covered by 
the usual philosophical objections is that the dictionary has been 
(53) 
shmvn in SOrle infaelous cases to be 'Trong. And this is something 
which cannot be shown by reference to the dictionary. Concern with 
definition results partly from the axiomatic model ŮŲŬẂÙŸŤTĚby 1) and 
the method of 2). This latter feature results in a theory of 
meaning. For the method is held to produce 'conceptual truths' \vhich 
look very much like definitions of the sort found in dictionaries. 
Thus 'to be educated' is said to mean 'to :earn to be a person'; (54) 
'Teaching' is said to mean 'the intention to bring about learning in 
(56) 
another'; and so on. These are said to be 'conceptual truths' 
'lhich mark conceptual connections. In a less material mode we are 
said to have '(logically) necessary conditions' for the use of the 
term 'education'. These provide us 'dith 'criteria' for the use of 
terms. Peters' statement of the (three) 'criteria' of education in 
Ethics and Education or Hirst and Peters' statement of the (two) 
" t" d t " " mh T " f ŸTĚ t " (57) " 11 crl erla of e uca lon In 1 e .wOglC 0 .t'., uca lon I'll serve as 
examples. The presentation of 'criteria' of this general sort 
follows from features 1) - 3). Often the notion of a 'rule' or 
'rules' for the use of the term is introduced to expedite the 
statement of '(logically necessary conditions' and 'criteria'. 
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Terms such as 'criteria' and 'rule' are often explicitly said to 
derive from Uittgenstein. 3ven terms "rhich do not are incoruorated 
into an interpretation of his Hritings. But the use of these terr.Js in 
the \\Titings of i.'Iittgenstein are highly problematic. They are used as 
explanatory devices when they are in need of careful explanation 
themselves. 
The sixth feature, the constant need to reformulate analyses is 
(58) 
something that Peters comments upon. The seventh feature, the 
ongoing argument about method, follows from the sixth point. 
Philosophers of education stick to the idea that they have to set out 
'conceptual truths' despite the seeming impossibility of producing 
any true 'truths', and despite substantial criticism. The critics 
fall into two sorts. There are 'internal' critics such as Reddiford (58) 
and Dunlop (60) who ,.,.ish to explore the possibilities of non-analytic, 
non-contingent truths connected "'lith the concept of a 'human being'. 
i;Je can also include in this group all those critics 1,..rho ,..rant to push 
all such truths into the contin,';;ent camp. (61) Then there are 
'external' critics such as ÑŠŠȘŸĚĜĬŠĞŠŪŸĚNidditch (63) who are much 
more uncompromising. Nidditch, for example, rejects the method of 
'conceptual analysis' which he calls 'ITeo-Ramism' on three grounds: 
Firstly, he objects to an Aristotelian assumption about the uniformity 
of hUr:1an beings that the t:J.ethodoloE';y requires. (64) Secondly, he 
objects to the unargued nature of many of the assertions made by the 
practitioners of Neo-Ramasm. (65) And finally, he objects to the 
. (66) 
values and preferences of the authors masqueradlng as 'truths'. 
\fuatever the validity of these points, \.,.hich have been made by many 
besides Nidditch, there is clearly a debate about method. 
The final point is a surprising one, as it is often baldly 
asserted th8.t one of the cardinal points in philosophical method is to 
(67) 
show points by means of examples.' This leaves the giving of 
examples in philoso"Jh;y of education as no more than a curiosity. It 
is an entirely accidental or contingent feature of the subject. As it 
stands the remark is ambiguous. No attempt is made to clarify or 
expand it. It could refer to the Kantian view "jhich sees examples as 
having an important illustrative function. Or it could refer to some-
thing more fundaJ!lent:aL _ That. it does not is apparent when you start 
to count examples. Not that there is something in the sheer quantity 
of examples that makes them important, but merely that their absence 
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is more likely to be indicative of the Kantian view than otherwise. 
If an instructive comparison is sought it might be useful to compare 
Paul Ziff's discussion of 'The ',\ford "Good'" in Semantic Analysis (68) 
with Peters' discussion of education in Ethics And Education. Both 
are about forty pages long. Ziff considers in detail over 160 
examples of the use of the term 'good'. There is nothing like a 
quarter of this number in Peters' section, and to say this is to be 
very generous in what we take as an example. 
The paradoxical nature of these tendencies is now apparent. The 
pull of the mathematical analogy is resisted even in the piece of 
documentation produced to support it. Essentialism is decried while 
essentialist methods of attempting to see 'behind' our use of terms 
are retained. Definitional approaches are substantially criticised 
and vigorously attacked while definitions, of a sort, are given. 
Universally ŠŸŮŨÙȘŠŞŨŤĚ 'criteria' are sought while their multiplicity 
is recognised. Analyses are constantly altered and reformulated and 
the method of 'conceptual analysis' attacked and defended. Examples 
are held to be important but are not extensively used. And this 
situation is held to be a 'healthy' state of affairs. 
All this is not new and 1.·.rill not be news to philoso:phers. It 
is only to be expected given a certain view of the task of a 
philosopher. This view is that what is characteristic of philosophy 
is its 'quest for generality' its seeking after a 'general perspective'. 
These remarks come from Scheffler's seminal work The Language of 
Education. (70) I know of no evidence that suggests that the 
conception of philosoJlr,y of education he gave expression to there has 
been overthrown. Indeed, philosophers never tire of reminding us 
that 'by its nature, in looking to universal principles, the 
(71) philosophy of teaching is abstract as philosophy is always abstract'. 
The consequences of this perspective are disastrol.4s when 'vIe move 
from the 'healthy' self-reflective monents of the philosopher of 
education on his subject to his attempts to solve particular 
problems. In a primary school where explanations, in the early years 
at least, may often seem to WŸŸŤĚ the form of ostention or exrunple-
giving and in this way be 'radically different from explanations in 
other institutions', (72) they are seen by one philosppher of 
education as involving only universal or general elements 'principles', 
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'definitions', 'standards', 'norms', 'criteria' and so on. The use 
of examples is not mentioned and there is certainly no indication 
that consideration of them is necessary. The use of examples is 
implied for instance in the giving of some procedural explanation 
of a piece of know-how. But the use of examples is not held to be 
worthy of treatment parri passu. The efficacy of a satisfactory 
veroal explanation is such that examples seem only an indirect 
way of reaching the duller vessels who cannot dispense with them. 
The consequences of this view could be the misconduct of education. 
For the moment we are concerned with the Kantian malaise at the 
most general and academic level. And at this level there is no 
evidence that this conception of philosophy has been overthrovm. 
The appearance of these tendencies ŠŸTĚconfusions listed above are 
obvious manifestations of what has been called a 'craving for 
generality'. An alternative formulation of this remark would be 
to say that these philosophers have a 'contemptuous attitude 
, (74) towards the particular case • Expressions such as 'craving' 
and 'contempt' are not intended to be insolent or unsavory which 
they could seem to be if taken out of context. They are not 
superlatives. They indicate precisely that what is at issue is 
not a mistaken analysis, a false assumption, or a mistake in 
argument, but a way of WUÙŸŸÙŪŦĚthat is habitual and unreflective. 
It may involve false assumptions and mistakes at another level but 
these are merely SY;l1ptoms of a flawed apprehension. \'lhat follows 
may be considered as a plea for particularity. 
1.3. Documentation (B) 
1:1e have been concerned to document what seems to be a flawed 
apprehension of the concept of education amongst philosophers of 
education. This flawed apprehension will be the theme of this 
essay. Such an activity as discussing a flawed apprehension of a 
concept may seem academic, frivolous and remote. This is a 
serious accusation and there are two replies to it, one which is 
frivolous, and derives from John '.hsdom and runs like this 
, ••• it's a free country. Everyman to his taste. Some go to 
the dogs and some consider the concept of having the concept of 
Doghood, ••• ' (75) The second, -,",hich derives from the same source, 
concerns the importance of 'documentation'. By 'documentation' 
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1,visdom means that \'1e should 'produce evidence that the confusions 
th t t " h'l h' I d' , ( 76 ) a concern us are ac 1 ve ln non-p 1 oso:9 lca lscour .. e. 
Upon the production of such evidence depends the meaningfulness 
and relevance of my claim that there is something wrong with our 
concept of the concept of education. h'e can do no more here than 
hint at how we could go about such documentation. It seems to me 
that the flawed apprehension of the concept of education is 
apparent in the following sorts of instances: (77) 
(1) In the existence of demands for the definition of 'education'. 
Perl1.aps a classic illustration of this is provided by a 
letter to The Guardian which announced that as the editor of 
the 'education' section had not defined what he meant by 
'education' people ha(73) 'blank in their minds' as to the 
meaning of the term. 
(2) In the existence of the paradoxical situation that it is 
often claimed that we are all experts on education and yet 
at the same time we are ignorant of its nature. This sort 
of argument is regularly produced and commented upon. 
See for example an article 'Educating the Educators' 
published in the New Statesman. (79) 
(3) In the existence of a popular debate about how to talk 
about education. 'Popular' in the sense that it is not 
restricted to academics. Here we could refer to discussions 
about what goes on in primary schools. (80) Bore specific-
ally a group calling for 'Education for Capability' has 
recently set out to alter our education system at least 
partly by altering the way we talk about education. They 
explicitly state that they wish to alter our concept of 
education not merely to include but to stress 'training'. 
ŸUŤĚ trend of phllomphy of education has been to stress 
that since the nineteenth century the concept of education 
had been progres,si vely separated from that of training. 
This they would argue is a deba"sement of the concept of 
education. As evidence of this they point out that we 
have no word for the culture the Germans describe as 
'Tecknik' or for the mode of working the 5'rench describe 
as 'Metier'. In Emile, of course, the concepts of 
education and training are almost synonymous. Of a heter-
ŬŦŤŪŸĚcollection of some one hundred and forty signatories 
to a letter in The Guardian setting out the aims of the group 
none are philosophers of education. (81) 
(4) In the continuance of a public debate about the nature of 
education. 'The then Prime lJiinister, Hr. James Callaghan, 
introduced just such a debate on 18th October 1976. (82) 
(5) In the misconduct of the process of education. Perhaps, 
the 'Tyndale' affair provides a good example here. At 
least one commentator sa", it as a result of confusion 
about what education 1'Tas. (83) 
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No attempt is made to deal with all the possible permutations of 
these instances. ]'.jany other examples could he produced from newspapers, 
magazines, television and radio, as 'dell as from everyday life. This 
limited gesture towards such documentation demonstrates the extent of 
what seemed prima facie a purely academic or philosophical misapprehension. 
1.4. Examples and Counter-Examples 
I have been indicating "'That seems to be evidence of an inadequacy 
in the treatment of the concept of education by philosophers of 
education. I have called this inadequacy a result of the 'Kantian 
vie,,, of examples'. Under this view of examples they have a clear 
function. They illustrate a general hypothesis. This belongs to 
a whole style of philosophising which is well illustrated by 
Scheffler's method. Typically Scheffler makes a few general remarks 
d th d t . " 1 t d 1 (84) All an en procee s 0 conSlaer se ec e examp es. our 
attention is focused on the general. 1'·low this is clearly a role 
for examples and a useful one. As I have said, the Kantian view is 
not all wrong. 
This typical way of thinldng has a corollary in the giving of 
counter-examples. It is usually held pace the treatment of 
scientific hypotheses that one counter-example is sufficient to 
refute a thesis. (85) Let me illustrate this method with an 
imagine.ti ve counter-exarnple to the epistemological hypothesis 
that 'Knowledge is justified true belief'. The counter-example to 
this well entrenched thesis was thought up by Colin Radford and 
goes as follows: 'Imagine the ca.se of a French-Canadian who believed 
he knew nothing of English history. In the course of a game he 
makes several correct guesses about dates in iliglish history, 
including the date of the death of Queen Elizabeth in 1603. At 
the time they seem to be merely guesses, but he subsequently 
remembers what he had forgotten, namely, that he once had to 
learn these dates in school. So he did in fact know the dates, 
although he did not believe he did. Giving this sort of counter-
example is clearly a useful role for examples. ,(86) 
This brief sketch does not start with an over-simplistic view 
of scientific method. What we are presenting is part of a picture 
of scientific methodology and one of mythological proportions •. !.,It 
could be argued that whatever fails to fit our systems or breaks 
universal rules is not rejected but is an exciting challenge for 
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scientists to develop new theories. By examining cases of how 
scienb.sts actually proceed Feyerabend has convincingly shown 
that the gauntlet is not taken up and 'vlhatever fails to fit 
into the established category system or is said to be incompatible 
with this system is viewed as something quite horrifying or, 
more frequently, it is simpl;y declared not to exist. , (87) 
General theses and counter-examples also fe3.ture largely in 
literature on the conceut of education. The trouble is we are 
reluctant to give theses up. Just as there have been desperate 
attempts to rescue that famous definition of what we mean by 
(88) knowledge. There have been equally desperate attempts to 
rescue the infamous definition of 'education' as 'initiation into 
a worthHhile way of life'. Obvious counter-examples to this are 
someone undergoing an education in a 'Robinson Crusoe' sort of 
situation, or someone's saying 'Travelling vlhith him was a real 
education.' (89) Desperate ŠWWŤŲŸŮWVĚ are made to save the general 
thesis. The concept is battered, re-shaped, cut up, squeezed and 
forced into the required form. The methodology of this metamorphosis 
has been illustrated. But this way of dealing \,ri th counter-examples, 
by shuffling them off the stage, is so ȘŬĴGŸÜŬŪĚ place that it is rarely 
questioned. It has indeed been called the 'Classic Hove' of the 
(90) 
conceptual analyst. Again, there is clearly some validity in 
such a move at some tir:Jes in an argument. It CB.n be a way of 
focusing someone's attention on the cases you Ivant therr. to consider. 
But to persist in making this move is to risk conceptual distortion. 
'Examples', 'Instances', and 'Cases' are used as if they were 
interchangeable. But there are important differences which we can 
indicate in a rough and ready fashion. An example suggests something 
imaginative and creative. lde give examples when we are struggling 
to understand or to challenge a received ẀŪTŤŲVWŸŸTÙŪŦĚas in the 
Radford example. An instance is evidence for a general argument or 
hypothesis. An instance must be an instance of something, as in 
philosophy ""e talk of all instance of some universal or other. 
'Case' is a more neutral and general tern referring to events, 
happenings, instances and examples. Equivocation between 'instances' 
and 'examples' is fadli tated by the use of the more neutral term 'case'. 
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Thus to defend the conceptual analyst's belief in the existence of 
something 'behind' our use of terms against those who stress the 
importance of a consideration of a manifold of cases it is claimed 
that 'An example must be an example of something'. And this is true, 
but not in the sense intended. liie shall return to this last point. 
Examples as they feature in the abundant literature on the 
concept of education are cursory, hackneyed and restricted. Cursory 
examples are a result of seeking a 'general form' for 'education' 
which makes no reference to content. Connections between 'education' 
and 'knowledge' and 'understanding' can be made explicit without 
committing oneself to any particular content. Thus we get offhand 
references to 'experiences being transformed' and to people still 
listening and learning even in middle age ŸŸTĚwhen it does them no 
financial or other extrinsic good. Or to a man who only knew 
mathematics or who was trained in military skills and habits. 
Hackneyed exrunples abound Spartan Education, Robinson Crusoe, 
anamnesis as demonstrated in the Heno, and so on. The lack of 
specificity in examples results from the concept itself which demar-ds 
the development of knowledge and understanding in breadth. This 
restricts examples ŤẂŤŸĚmore than the restriction on 'content' and 
presents an illusion of understanding. 
A defence of 'trivial' or 'simple' examples seems possible in 
philosophy of education as in philosophy of morals or religion. An 
argument that education is necessarily a non-trivial thing would have 
equal force in the case of these other branches of philosophy where 
the suggestion is often made. By 'trivial' philosophers mean to 
indicate that the examples must be such as not to enbroil you 
immediately in a heated and emotional dispute. To be 'simnle' they 
must be transparent in a sense which will be made clear. Philosophers 
who consider such examples do not VŤŮŠŸŠWŤĚ the 'trivial' from the 
'simple' but it is useful to distinguish them to meet the obvious 
objection that a trivial example is going to be simple, but a simple 
example need not be trivial. 
The giving of trivial examples in ['loral philosoDhy is held to be 
not only necessary but desirable. Thus exwjples such as whether we 
ought to return our overdue library books, or pay for our groceries 
are held to illuminate the nature of moral judgements because what 
we ought to do in these cases is obvious. The suggestion is that 
we can illuminate the nature of moral judgements without reference to 
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the content of those juagements. This is consonant with the thesis 
that moral judgements are ẀŪÙẂŤŸÙVŠŞŨŤĚi.e. that I hold that X is 
the right thing for me to do in situation S commits me to holding 
that it is the right thing for Y to do in a not dissimilar situation. 
A consideration of a full and complex example will show that this 
thesis is false at least for a class of moral judgements and in doing 
so will show the necessity of considering fully fledged examples. 
The counter-example comes from Jilel ville • s noveJ2.tle. Billy Budd. (91 ) 
Captain Vere after hearing the case decides that budd is guilty of 
murder and should be put to death. This is not a simple rule-book 
decision it involves considerable reflection on Budd's actions, the 
si tuation he found himself in on the H M S IndomH::ah£e... A 
different Captain or even Vere himself at a different time may 
reach a different decision about \IThat is morally right. There 
may appear to be no difficulty here. The difficulty becomes 
apparent when it is claimed that both judgements can be morally 
right. This may seem to establish that moral judgements are 
ineluctably particular only at the cost of contradiction and 
inconsistency. But this is not the result and we can see this if we 
represent the matter schematically. V's decision that X is the 
right thing to do in situation S does not commit him to holding that 
H in a not dissinilar situation S should also decide that X is 
right. For things may weigh quite differently with T,,,'. He is a person 
with different inclinations and a different dis:position. This only 
comes out when a complex example is considered. It must be pointed 
out that the decision is not a problematiC one. The facts of the case 
are not in question. It is only in such complex or full-blown 
examples that \ITe can see this feature of moral jUdgements. In the 
trivial cases we have extracted 'universalisability' as a character-
istic of moral judgements precisely because the cases we are 
considering ŸĚtrivial in th2.t they lack exactly that which makes 
our concerns moral. In the case of 'Starry' Vere this could be said 
to be a conflict between a strict naval code and humanitarian 
feelings. If we remove this content \ITe are not dealing with a 
recognizable moral problem. 
Bambrough makes out a strong case for considering 'simple' 
examples. He argues that they have two advantages. Firstly they 
provide us with unquestionable cases of knowledge, and secondly, 
20 
they are transparent in the sense that they allow us to see the 
patterns which connect these cases with more complicated ones. 
This is possible because they lie in an absolute unbroken continuum. 
He warns that we must not think that simple cases allm..r us to see more 
clearly a single element cornmon to all cases, rather that we look for 
'patterns of analogy or family resemblance'. (92) Bambrough comments 
that his remarks are quite general in their application. Drawing 
on arguments familiar to those who have read his influential paper 
on GǾŪÙẂŤŅŐŠŸĚand Family Resemblances' Bambrough argues that in 
the case of religion there must be such patterns of reser:lblance 
because vIe do after all call the Gods of Olympus and the God of 
Hoses 'Gods'. As 1I1e shall see in Chapter Three Bambrough is repeating 
a mistake of his earlier paper. The position he is maintaining is 
simply a sophisticated version of the essentialism he TÙVŮŠŲŠŦŤŸĚ This 
explains why so many diselaimers appear in his argument to the effect 
that differences are as important or more important than similarities. 
But Bambrough also equivocates between 'trivial' and GVÙŸŮŨŤGĚ cases. 
The examples he gives are far from trivial. Thus he dwells at 
length on Homer's account of Athena appearing before Telemachus in 
the guise of Nentor. This is not trivial in the way that not 
returning your library books is. And indeed Bambrough admits that 
his simple examples are not so simple after all. 'Simple' seems to 
mean a :oerspicuous or even good example. However we interpret the 
appearance of Nentor this interpretation will be coloured by the fact 
that we don't believe in these gods. ljJhatever account ,. 1.ole give will 
shmw.that we have ŸÜXWUŬŨŬŦÙVŤTĚwhatever was intended by the writer. 
Bambrough then proceeds to sholtl hOlt' certain 'theologians' such as 
the Bishop of lj!oolwich have demythologised Christiani ty in a similar 
fashion. ŊẀẄŸŠŮŬVÙŪŦĚsuch GVÙŸŮŨŤGĚ cases may indeed illuminate but 
this illumination is not a function of their simplicity. 
Examples in philosophy of education have a contrived air. 
Consider Johanna Burgess' attempt to construct an 'academic paradox' 
out of Peters' analysis of 'education'. She gives the example of a 
professor who is doing beneficial 1!lork but receiving payment from a 
dubious source something which as a moral man he should reject. 
Have we here a case of a man vlho is doing something worthwhile and 
yet not worthwhile, and therefore a man who is educated and not 
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educated? And is it an answer to say that this exploits two senses 
of 'worthwhile' and that a man can be educated ŠŸTĚnot live up to 
his ideals? (93) Doesn't this just fail to see the force of the 
paradox in the way that St Paul failed to see the force of the 
paradox of the Liar \"rhen he considered the fact that they always lie 
just another indication of \"rhat a bad lot Cretians were? 1.vnat are we 
to say about this example? It illustrates a further feature of the 
kind of examples that 'tIe find in philosophy of education. They are 
hopelessly indeterminate and this indeterminacy precludes the 
possibili ty of any sound judgeme:'lt. IIore than this, an indeterminate 
example lends a spurious credibility to whatever argument is being 
advanced. (94) 
That examples are often cursory, UŠȘÛŪŤXŤTĤĴŸĚ trivial, and 
indeterminate is a result of the Kantian view. If we primarily 
seek 'conceptual truths' of one sort or another, or 'criteria', or 
'rules', or 'logically necessary conditions' for the use of terms 
then the use of examples Hill remain simply a matter of presenting 
'instances' to indicate whatever 'universal' we have in mind. To 
drive this point home, consider an analogous case from literature. 
Turning our discussion of trivial and poor examples on its head we 
may point out that any set of general considerations that establish 
that King Lear is sad will do the same for the death of Little Nell, 
and, as Oscar Wilde remarked, it \vould talce a heart of stone to read 
the latter without laughing. 
NẄŲẀŸŮŨŤVĚ can be disparaged for non-philosophical reasons. In 
politics the;yrcan mislead Hhen uroduced as evidence or counter-
evidence for hypotheses requiring quantitative consideration. An 
instance would b'2 the suggestion that unemployment benefit is 
claimed by people who nearly all have clandestine jobs. Instances 
of dramatic abuse may even have effect at the level of social policy 
making. The use of ŤẄŠŸŮŨŤVHĚ analogies and allusions in such cases 
leads to vagueness and irr:precision. This mayor may not be 
consciously contrived. It remains a common misuse of ŤẄŸŪŮŨŤVĚ
1Ilhich could be fairly listed in some loose pb:i:LloSJ]hical categorisation 
such as Bentham's political fallacies among other'arguments' used by 
demagogues to mislead and prejudice the ÙŦŪŬŲŠŸWĦĚ (95) 
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Another danger in giving examples in the eyes of educationalist 
Herbert Kohl is that people use them as ÜŬTŸĚto imitate. An example 
becon:es an exemplar. A familiar danger mentioned by Wi ttgenstein 
is that one feeds one's mind with 'a one-sided diet' of examples of a 
single kind (P.I. s 593). (97) This remark is ,'lOrth re"oeating as one 
h " ,- h h t d -'-h t . t' d' t -d t' (98) p LwSOP er as sugges e "a 1 lS a 18 ary recommen a 10n. 
Again examples can be seen as something akin to the phenomenologist's 
'pure situation' which you have to consider carefully if you wish to 
th 1 . f . th,' ŸĚ (99) Th d f 1 see e rea meClnlng 0", sO,l1e ---nES. ese angers 0 exarnp es 
result from the Kantian view. In the first case we simply generalise 
from a single instance in a classically fallecious ',ay. In the ,second 
case He give credence to one particular view by selecting only examples 
which exemplify that perspective. In the last case 'lIe have simply 
another variant of essentialism. 
The Kantian view leaves us vJith a distorted practice. We give 
examples in ways ,,,hich exhi bi t our prior concern vIi th more general 
features of our concepts. CritiCising this view does not mean that 
we should simply consider more counter-examples or borderline cases. 
To do this would be to invoke in philosophy of education something 
analogous to Feyerabend's 'counter inductive' procedure. This 
involves the construction of hypotheses inconsistent with both 
accepted theories and established facts. This is necessary in 
science because a counter example to an orthodox theory is only seen 
as a counter-example i ... e. a refutation if it is enmeshed \"ithin a 
theoretical system. This means that 1-1e remain at the level of theory 
(100) 
construction no matter hot". \'Ie increase and maximise discrepa."'1cies. 
Therefore the GŠŪWÙĤÜŤWUŬTŬŨŬŸŊGĚ of 'anything goes' ,vill not serve 
to \"eaken the misap:9rehension brought about by the Kantian view. 
It has been claimed that this view involves a contempt for the 
particular case. At its most extreme it errs in not even considering 
the giving of exaT!l1Jles a preli:nL'lary way of answering questions about 
(101) -
a concept. Or, if this is granted, it is granted grudgingly. 
For example, Elizabeth Hindess in her article 'Teaching the ŨGŸŤŠŪÙŪŦĚof 
Hords' discussed the questio:l of what it is to know the meaning of a 
\,'ord. She allO\".s that there are different senses in which '.-Je can give 
an account of the meaning of a word. She argues that there are 'less 
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demanding' senses in which we can give an account of a lrJord' s meaning: 
'It could be no more than giving examples of how the word is used on 
(102) 
any occasion.' This is a clear instance of the Kantian prejudice. 
Presumably the more demanding way of giving an account of a word's 
meaning would be to produce 'criteria' or 'definitions'. In this essay 
I want to correct this sort of misapprehension about the role of 
examples. I ,;rant to stress their fundamental importance in giving 
an account of a concept. The view expressed by Hindess is that the 
giving of examples is an indirect or barely adequate way of explaining 
the meaning of a term. Our knowledge of what it means is something 
unformulated, perhaps a definition. The hard work comes in formulating 
this 'defini tion '. Against this I want to argue that the term 
'concept' is vague and that to mal-ce clearer '''hat we mean when we talk 
of any particular concept including the cor..cept 'concept', 'de must 
proceed by examples. This is how we make things more determinate. 
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To seek clarification of any other sort '''ill only get us into trouble. (103) 
In the Philosophical Investigations Hittgenstein presents a critique 
of the Kantian view. So much has been written and said about this that 
VJisdom and others have had to warn us that a distaS-te for simplification, 
for definitions and the like can be too simpliste. ŘŸØŤĚ shall see why 
later. For the moment, let us take up once again the 'question' that 
\'Ji ttgenstein asks his interlocutor in just the sort of situation I have 
been discussing: 
'Isn't my knowledge, my concept of a game, completely 
expressed in the explanations that I could give? That 
is, in my deseribing examples of various kinds of game; 
shewing how all sorts of other games can be constructed 
on the analogy of these; saying that I should scarcely 
include this or this among games; and so on.' (P.I. s.75) 
It should be noted that it is not asserted that the giving of examples 
is sufficient. :Nor is this denied. A consideration of \rIi ttgenstein' s 
style lrJould reveal that the suggestion is entertained or exhibited 
rather than asserted. r:::'hus it is not open to a facile form of 'refutation' 
that has become commonplace. But for the moment we ,,,ill take it at face 
value. There are dangers of misinterpretation that result from doing 
this. To see the passage as more assertive than its form suggests may 
avoid the Kantian malaise at the risk of appearing to begin to justify 
some sort of mad particularism. nut the Kantian view is so rife that 
the dangers are minimal and the prophylactic possibilities considerable. 
This qualification aside we can put positively the argument that 
examples are absolutely fundamental to thought. 7his thesis is not an 
original one but it ÙŸĚ entirely misunderstood at least by philosophers 
of education. It derives from the l.jork of John Wisdom who in the 
closing paragraphs of his article 'A Feature of \iittgenstein's 
Technique' puts the corrective to Kant's view succinctly: 
'Kant said that examples are the go-cart of the human 
understanding. But this is not enough. Examples are the 
final food of thought. Principles and laws may serve us 
well. They can help us to bring to bear on what is now 
in question what is not now in question. They help us to 
connect one thing with another and another. But at the 
bar of reason, ah/ays the final appeal is to cases.' 
Vlisdom's remark, though colloquial and simple in its presentation, is 
laconic and difficult. He had developed his ideas about the role of 
'examples' or 'Instances' or 'cases' in his 1957 lectures on 'Proof 
and Explanation' delivered at the University of Virginia. In these 
lectures, cOf!lmonly known as The Virginia Lectures, he defends in 
detail the idea that examples are fundamental to thought. In doing 
so he utilises the notion of what he calls 'Case by Case Procedure' 
or 'Case by Case Argument'. I-.'hat I have to say about the importance 
of examples derives entirely from a careful reading of these lectures 
supplemented by consideration of Hisdom's other writings and of the 
relevant work of \ii ttgenstein. As the lectures are not widely 
available, I will sumr:larise the most relevant passages and arguments 
before going on to apply them in an effort to rectify the inadequate 
apprehension of the concept of education which exists in the recent 
literature. (105) 
1.5. Case By Case Argument 
The aspect of the Virginia Lectures that I want to concentrate 
upon is viisdom' s claic1 that 'j,ll reflection comes in the end to a 
case by Case procedure.' (VL. IX. 1.) Time after time he suggests 
that failure to recognise just this point is the root cause of many 
philosophical misunderstandings. Yet Yalden-Thomson, in the only 
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freely available su'nmary of the Lectures, remarks that this 'does 
(106) 
not need to be laboured.' This dismissive attitude is 
thoroughly wrong-headed. In this account of what I believe to be 
h'isdor:1's central theme I want to stress how radical and original this 
thesis is. 
Passmore describes Hisdom's philosophical method as consisting 
in his 'first making a distinction •••• as if it were a sharp one 
( 107) 
and then blurring its edges.' This puts him at odds with Kant 
and contemporary philosophers like Quine. For example, Kant sought 
for a 'criterion by which to distinguish ,.nth certainty between 
d "" al kn 1 d ,( 108) I ""1 . pure an ŤÜŮŸŲŸȘĚ ow e gee n a VŸÜŸĚar manner ŸŸŪŤĚ
cri ticises empiricists for their metaph::Tsical belief in the 
analytic/synthetic distinction because 'a boundary behJeen analytic 
and synthetic statements simply has not been drawn.' (109) ŸẀÙWŤĚ
clearly r:',ruine is working with Kantian assumptions. The existence 
of borderline cases seems to show, as far as he is concerned, that 
we cannot distinguish with certainty between the two sorts of 
statement and therefore the distinction is a 'dogma'. i"lisdom is 
not troubled by such demands for 'certainty'. Is a satyr a man or 
a goat? He may hesitate over the answer 'but that doesn't mean 
that there is no difference between a goat ŸŸTĚa man. So if it is 
the fact that we hesitate over borderline cases that is being 
referred to, I shouldn't put it in the form that a boundary has 
not been drawn.' 
Wisdom's method may seem like Quine's but i:)line takes the 
existence of borderline cases to show that the distinction is a 
metaphysical dogma. Wisdom, on the other hand, questions the 
underlying Kantian assumptions at l'lOrk when this sort of move is 
made. He shows that such demands for 'certainty' must be rejected 
because they embody a false picture. Nor is Hisdom introducing 
the concept of 'broad borderlines' as a modification of the Kantian 
viel-.r. 'rhis interpretation, though tenable, and seemingly supported 
b "h V" ". L t ( 110 ) . th ttl ŸĚ. t 1 Y passages ŸŪĚ t e ŸŲŦŸŪŸŠĚ ec ures, ŸVĚ one a mus u ĤHŚŸÜŠĚ e y 
be rejected. l;lisdom' s point goes much deeper and challenges a whole 
way of thinking about such question. 
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Let me give another example ,"hich will be useful to have at the 
back of our minds when discussing the Lectures. This example is 
d . d f lJ' d' l' " t' (111 ) h h k h erlve rom vlS om s ear ler IVTl lngs, were e as s t e 
question ',:Jhat sorts of questions are there?' Four clear cut and 
diEtinct sorts of question emerge:(a) Empirical questions; 
(b) Questions of strict logic; (c) Conflict questions; and Cd) Paradoxical 
questions. ŸŸŠWĚsorts of question are these? (a) are questions like 
GŸHGŨÙŨŨĚ the gas explode?' or 'Is this poisonous"?' where if ",e are in 
disagreement vTe know that would settle the matter for or against. 
(b) are questions like 'Is this a thorough;Jred horse?' or 'Does 
12 x 12 = 148?' where there is a convention in the matter or a generally 
accepted and fixed usage. (c) are questions \"hich call for a 
legislative decision such as GĿŸŨĚone love ẀŸŸŪŬŴÙŪŦŨXĹGĚ or 'Can one 
keep a promise unintentionally?' or '\r/as there negligence in the Case 
of so-and-so?' In these cases there is no settled convention. (d) 
are the sort of cases where we know the convention but still ask the 
question. The questions therefore have an air of paradox about them 
'Aren't we all mad really?', 'Can one never know the real world?' In 
these examples borderlines are being crossed and broken down. If we 
take an_example of this group 'Is love a process in which one person 
devours another?' Yet consider it as an examnle of group (b) or (c) 
then the affirmative answer is false. In such questions the logic 
of our concepts is oeing rewritten. 
Typically WisdoiYl shows hO\lT such easy distinctions break down 
again and again. Three ŤẄŠÜŸJŨŤVĚwill have to suffi ce. Firstly, 
questions of strict logic (b) may turn out to have no settled 
conventions, and appearances to the contrary, a decision may be 
called for. The whole problem of borderline cases is raised here. 
These questions may therefore resemble questions of type (c). 
Secondly questions of types Ca), (c) and (d) may become mixed, for 
example in the question 'Is this whooping cough without the whoop?' 
Here there may be some argument about the symptoms, or some test not 
having been carried out, or WŸŤĚpossibility of a ne\. test. The issue 
is partly a priori, being the request for a decision Cc) and partly 
empirical Ca), and yet paradoxice_l Cd). The question may begin as an 
ŸĚpriori one and end up as an empirical one or vice-versa. And 
finally, cases of (a) and Cd) can be ÜÙẄŤTŸĚ Someone might say to us 
'ide 1 re all mad really.' anc_ ItThen '"e look at people we find ther:l to 
resemble mad people moY'e than 'lie thought. This, and p.lUch more is 
',,jisdom's method. Such distinctions are em.ployed in the Lectures and 
broken down over and over to reveal an account of thipJcint; much more 
radical than anything that appeared in the earlier \vritings. I now 
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turn to this account. 
I have suggested that Yalden-Thomson does not do justice to 
'"iisdom's central thesis. Part of the reason for this is that he 
quotes it out of context. Consider how it occurs in the summary of 
'.,Jisdom's 'argllments so far in Lecture V: 
'10. Every statement calls for reflection. 
11. All reflection comes in the end to no more than 
procedure by parallels. 
12. Then if any reflection \<[hich came in the end to no 
more than proof by parallels isn't really reasoning, 
isn't rational, it follows that nothing can be 
rationCl.lly established, nothing knmm.' (VL. V .6.) 
It would be wron.g to think of Hisdom as asserting something like 
Blake's 'To particularise is everything to generalise is to be an 
idiot. ' liJisdom always gives generalisation its due but no more. 
Vhat is at issue is a very radical for:'" of scepticism. Ordinary 
inductive scepticism arises from noting WŸŠWĚstatements like 
'This is a table' involve an infinite amount of investigation. 
Hadical scepticism, lrlllich is 1"hat ·liisdorc. is concerned with, arises 
from noting the infinite amount of investigation that any and every 
statement involves. This scepticism is scepticism about the very 
nature of rea.soning itself and it is tied UD with the Kantian view of 
examples. idisdorl develops his notion of 'Case by case procedure' in 
order to deal with this scepticism and \.,i th ordinary scepticism. 
Radical scepticism is scepticism about both induction and deduction. 
I shall briefly try to summarise ŸÙÙVTŬŲĦŲŊGĚs treatment of induction and 
deduction in order to indicate hO\"l he deals vii th 1)oth sorts of sceptic. 
It '."Iill also be clear that ',Jisdom is att2,cking this dichotomy. 
1,rlisdom does, of course, apply his central thesis in other realms, 
the law, literature, religious belief and psycho-analysis. I will not 
touch on his application of case by case procedure to these areas. The 
reason for this is that one result of the failure to understand and 
appreciate the role of examples in thinking is the belief that if a 
problet1 is not amenable to er:l:pirica.l investigation, and deduction was 
no use, then the question was just a matter of words. Induction, 
deduction or words. To attack this trichotomy it is necessary to show 
that all reasoning comes in the end to case by case argument. 
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Induction 
J.H. Keynes saw the close connection between analogy and induction. 
Induction could b'2 brought under analogy in the sense that its force 
rested on its approximation to perfect analogy. ŸHGUŠWŤẂŤŲĚ the truth of 
this I shall accept Keynes' assimilation for the time being as it 
allovlS me to make an important distinction between '1'lisdom' s treatment 
of induction and his treatment of deduction. 
At one point in the Lectures ltJisdom suggests 'a priori analogy' 
as an alterno_tive name for case by case argument. (VL. VIII. 6.) 
However, argument by analogy is 'extremely different, because in 
ordinary cases of argument by analogy, the instances, if they are to 
be of any use, must be actual instances.' (VL. VIII. 6.) Furthermore, 
vii th the in:agina ti ve or fictitious examples used in case by case 
argument, there is no further WE_y of finding out whether the parallelism 
suggested is or is not the case as there might be with actual instances. 
Essential to li1iisdom' s treatment of induction is the notion that when 
we are justifying a claim about a supposed causal connection an a9peal 
winstru1ces is necessary. He argues that saying there is a causal 
connection here is a matter of ŠŮŶŊŤŠŨÙŪŸJĴĚ to instances. In inductive 
cases we are concerned with a connection ree,lly being there, whereas 
in apriori or deductive cases "Ie are concerned only with what it makes 
sense to say. 
The first stage in the inductive process is supposed to be the 
direct apprehension of the relevance of some generalisation or 
other to a particular instance. As \Jisdom puts it ,Je 'see in an 
instance a universal'. (VL. IX. 7.) The accounts most philos09hers 
give of this are misleading. They represent it as a psychological 
act. The same is true of their treatment of causal connections. They 
leave the cognition of the ẀŪÙẂŤŲVŠŸHĚ or causal connection, as something 
mysterious. One of the reasons for this obfuscation is that claims 
about these sort of thing involve 'a certain feature that \'I'e are 
reluctant to recosnise, namely, that the verification of -i:he statement 
about a given time may involve logically what happens outside that 
period of time.' ('lL. ŅŸŊĦĚ 6-7.) Seeing a connection logically 
involves looking at other instances. There may be nothing surprising 
in this as induction is about generalisations covering several instances. 
Hisdom goes further than this in two wa.ys. Firstly he establishes by 
looking at a number of examples of recognising things such as 'the stars 
stripes', GŸÙŪÛHĚ green, large, small, Quite considerably archaic 
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crosses', and ŸWŲÙŠŪŦŨŤVHĚ dogs ŸÙÍTĚmice', (VL. IX. 7-9.) that there is 
no psychological penumbra passing from the instance to your mind. 
Vnlat UŠŸŊŮŤŪVĚ is a sirrple act of comparing Lie instance now present 
with familiar instances. That they may be so fanilio.r that we 
hardly reflect upon them is of no consequence. Secondly, when the 
question of the justification of inductive procedures is raised, 
1.visdom establishes that this too is 0_ matter of cOr.lparing inst,ances 
with instances. A striking example of this is his treatment of one-
termed proposi tioEs such as 'This is a spade'. Vlisdom argues that 
even this statel!lent 'involves reflection, as \-lell as verification 
of enormous complexity running over the whole of time and space.' 
(VL. VI. 4.) Reflection is, for \iisdom, the ȘŬŸÜŊŠŲÙVŬŪĚof a case 
wi th case after case. This ca;3e by case procedure is the process of 
proof'. (VL. VI.4.) The process of proof is 'the process of learning 
carried out in reverse'. (Vi. IV. 5.; No doubt the feeling that 
this sort of procedure 'isn't reasoning' (VL. IV. 3.) beca-lJse it is 
net induction or deduction (VL. IX. 8.) \vill come back at this point. 
But if it does it is vorthwhile to recall that one of Hisdom's aims 
was 'to get away from calling unprovable those cases that can only 
be proved by a case by case procedure.' (VL. VI. 5.) Hisdom therefore, 
establishes that induction is a case by case procedure and justifies 
induction through a case by case procedure and shQ1;.fs that justification 
is a case by case procedure. This way of proceeding is brought into 
question through an implicit comparison with deductive methods of 
reasoning. Deduction, with its strict rules and definitions, serves 
as a paradigm of valid reasoning. It is, therefore, of fundamental 
importance to see how Vlisdom shows that deduction reduces to a case 
by case ŸŲŬȘŤTẀŲŤĦĚ Everything else rests upon this. 
Deduction 
vlisdom's claims about deduction 2_re twofold. Firstly, as we have 
seen, he claim.s th2,t deductive reasoning comes to, or reduces to case 
by case argument. Secondly, there is the related claim that case by 
C2-se argument is parallel to deduction in that it is just as valid and 
sound. I will illustrate how iiJisclorl' establishes these bvo claims by 
reference to two of the many imures,sive examples he discusses. 
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Example 1 
/l. child is struggling 1!Ji th the following question: 'There are 
six airlines froE! England to I'rance, and for e,:;tch of these six \vays 
of going to France by one airplane of a given a.irline and coming 
back on an airplane of that same line. HOI" many ways are there of 
going to France on one airpla!J.e of a given line and coming back on 
a different ŠÙŲŮŨÎŸŤĚof that line?' (VL. IV. 3.) His mother helps 
him by a lengthy case by case }')rocedure. She starts Hi th questions like 
'You have two boxes and in each box two beads. How many beads have you?' 
The child anSHers 'TvJO times two'. Hare cases are presented. There 
are two ferries to the otherside of a river and for each ferry there 
are two ways of crossii1g the river by one boat and coming back by 
another. Hmv many vJaYs are there of crossinG the river by one boat 
and corr,ins; back by another?' 'Two times bra' says the child. And 
so on ,·ri til progressively more complicated cases until we get 'Six 
times six' as an answer to the first problem. 
In this example there is no a]Cpeal to anything general. But <loes 
this mean that no proof has been given? Suppose nm·r that the father 
takes a hand a.'1d says: 'Look here, if there are N things of sort X 
and for each of these things there are N things of sort Y, then there 
are N times N things of sort Y. Therefore if there are six airlines 
to France, and if for each of these there are six ways of going to 
France by one air;Jlane and coming back by another, then there are 
six times six ways of going to France on one airplane and coming 
back by another one.' (VL. IV. 3-4.) However, the child is a bit 
of a philDsQ'lJher and asks the father if the instance in question is 
included in the general principle? If it is, then the argument is 
circular, and if it isn't, then its inconclusive. The fat:1er can 
then resort to more general principles to establish what he says. But 
the philosppher-child can still go on to queE,tion his father in the 
saTIe way. His father will at some stage be able to go no further and 
vIill resort to examples. \'J'isdom con,ments that the father's procedure, 
of 'bringing to bear all the cases covered lJy the principle except 
the case in question ••••• does as mUGh as the mother's procedure, 
but no more. And that is 1!lhat I mean by saying that the father's 
procedure comes in the end to proof by parallels.' (VL. IV. 4.) 
This result, according to '1oJisdom, is perfectly general with the 
consequence thCi,t case,s which seen the last '.vord in good reasoning 
turn out to be no more than a repetition of case by case argument: 
"1'he point is that if C follows from P, then any distance from 
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another particular case which is required for the truth of C, vlill 
also be required for the truth of P. It may nevertheless be much 
easier to carry out the compa::-:'ison when our conclusion is stated in 
the form C.' (VL. IV. 5.) To grasp this pcint it is necessary to 
understand that Tile are dealing 1t!ith an intern2.1 relation. T,Je do not 
need to appeal to anything exteTnal like a ,.,eneral principle. 'de 
are concerned with what something means. A general ŸŲÙŪȘÙŮŨŤĚmay 
h 1 'f th " 1 b t '.1.' t t· 1 (112) e p us 1 e reason1ng 1S cornp ex u 1 L- 1S no es,sen 12- • 
Suppose someone asks a Logician the question '1)hen are 
iU'guments in the fourth ȚÙŦẀŸĒŤĚ of the syllogism and when not?' 
('n. XI. 1.) He might be satisfied with all answer like: 'If the 
conclusion is universal the minor must be negative; if the conclusion 
is affirmative the minor must be universal; or if the conclusion is 
negative the minor must be universal. If these conditions are 
fulfilled the argument is good, if not, not.' This anSVier may 
suffice but it may not. Someone might still ask 'But when is a 
syllogism in the fourth figure and when not?' 1m answer along the 
lines of the first answer may be given to this question. And again 
this ansvrer ŸĒŠXĚ suffi ce and it may not. Someone may EO till ask a 
question like 'But what is a minor premise?' And so on. (VL. XI. 1.) 
T,Jhat happens in this exarnlJle, ' .. ,hich is ;'iven step by step by 'i1isdom, 
is that in each alS1:ler the log'ician sets out the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for each expression he uses. Perhaps he goes 
as far as 'premise'. At sone point he may give up this procedure 
and resort to examples. Indeed he may use theD from the start. 
These exam]les vrill be draTi,-n from an infinite range of conceivable 
instances. However, there is no necessi WJŸĚ for him to give examples. 
(VL. XI. 2.) His ,seneral ŸGQŊĦVẂËŤŲVĚ are perfectly satisfactory. 
'disdom makes the point that tbere is an equally satisfactory 
alternative w87 of proceeding. A logician may reply continually 
with examples. Examples of oed 3llQ bad fourth figure syllogism, 
minor IJremises etc. Though such a procedure is not ŠTŬŸŸĞWŤTĚ in many 
textbooks of logic, it is perfectly accel:table. (VL. IV. 3.) Two 
qualifying cor.,ments are needed or this ',fill be misunderstood. Firstly 
the distinction between deductive reasoning and case by case reasoning 
seems to have become, or seems to be, a matter of form. \Jisdom gives 
a reply to this suggestion which is worth quoting at length: 
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'One might well say that the difference is merely a matter 
of form; and that is the reason why I'vesaid "reduces to". 
On the other hand, suppose that one has a deductive proof. 
"This is K", therefore this is "Ki! where K' is narrower 
than K (that is, K' implies K, but K doesn't imply K'). 
Then this can hardly ŸŊŤĚ said to bring to bear all the cases 
that would '8e brought to be2T by a complete TŸWĚ
procedure. It's only ,·,hen Ie' is equivalent to K that one 
might say that the whole case by case procedure here differs 
from the deductive procedure only in form.' (VL. VIII. 2) 
And he continues: 
'The eXpression "comes to", or "reduces to", can very 
'llell be put "differs only in form from", provided one 
remembers that the deductive argument may present only 
part of the Ivhole scope of the justifica.tion that could 
be prOVided by a complete case by case procedure, 1rlhen 
the premise entails the conclusion but the conclusion 
doesn't entail the premise. But if you put in the 
proviso that the conclusion is equivalent to the 
premise then you may indeed speak of the performances 
as differing only in form.' (VL. VIII. 3.) 
The second is one which vlill expand the discussion slightly. It 
may be that I, like ',hsdom in the Lectures, have given the impression 
that all case by ca,se argument is good case by case argument. That 
case by case argument is someho\-T valid per se. This vlOuld be quite 
wrong. There is good a.'1d bad case by case argument. 'Hell! it might 
be asked, 'i'men is it good and \-Then is it bad?' Uisdom G.emolishes 
this question. ŅŸĚ 'conceals en oppositon to the case by case 
procedure'. (VL. X. 5.) ĻVŸÙŪŦĚthe que'ition is the :irst mistake 
answering it \-Tould be worse. \lhat sort of answer could be given? 
lrfl1at sort of ans\ver is expected? c!Ui te clearly one of the form 'Uhen 
conditions A.B.C •••• X are fulfilled.' This sort of anSHer is what 
we are used to. The question is a request for some general criterion 
by "'hich to disting'Uish Hi th certainty between argument which succeeds 
and argument which doesn't. But there is another alternative and one 
which mu,st be adouted. here, that is, to give examples. A question 
about the distinction between good and bad case by Case procedure can 
be answered by a case by case procedure. Let r:Je give just two exarc:;Jles 
of bad ca,se 'J:" case argument. During wartime a man may say of a 
soldier who has killed his enemy that 'He had cOr:Jmitted t:1urder.' 
Suppose that he reasons like this. He starts from a paradigm of murder 
such as the killing of Cain by Abel. Then he moves on till he reaches 
cases of shooting. He considers "vhat a sniper cloes, and then arrives 
at the regular soldier. 'Chis is bad case by case argument because 
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the proponent of it has ignoreG. important differences between the 
cases in favour of some similarity which for some reason has 
impressed itself upon him. (VL. j:. 6.) Another famous example may 
be Eussell's chicken. In this classic case 111s8ell assimilates 
the chicken'8 feeding pattern to Rutherford's scientific procedure. 
Again this misleads in the same way. 
i.rJhat is an exs.mple of good case by case procedure? Hisdom 
gives a fine illustration from the Bible. I shall discuss it in 
terms of the distinctions between t;yrpes of que,stion that I 
mentioned earlier. 
The GÚŸTẀŨWŤŲXGĚ Example 
The question of adultery Has once a fairly simple question of 
fact. 'Did the act A occur or not?' It \"Jas therefore a question 
of type (a) we knew what ',VQuld count as adultery and. \'lhat not. The 
matter 1rlaS legalistic and empirical. The terms also had a clearly 
defined uce so the question "las a.lso one involving section (b) of 
\'lisdom's classification. The term haC: a strict logic. But ':lhen 
Christ said: 'But I say unto you, any man that looks lustfully on a 
womEn has already coornitted adultery with her in his heart.' The 
question became a question of type (c). A decision is now called 
for. As ',hsdom put it, Christ 'Gave us a new geometry of adultery, 
and of sin'. (VL. V. 7.) Christ's statement leaves our heart's 
desires as the ultimate verification of our adulterous natures, of 
vlhat state of immor2,lity \"re are in. But our truthful stateQents of 
our heart's desires are incorrigible. Freud's notion of unconscious 
desires Dakes the question of 2,dul tery more difficult still. For 
now i:re cC'.n ask 'Did I conceal the desire from r.Jyself?' Freud 
pushed psychological statements 'in the direction of the ȘŬŲŸÙŦÙŞŨŤĦGĚ
(VL. XIII. 16) He rer'oved the asymmetry involved in Christ's 
}:losi tion. Someone may argue that al thon,S'h Freud's remarks seen: to put 
the question of -adultery into the class of paradoxical questions (d), 
they do in fact B-1so put tiler' once aE:;ain Quite close to (a). For I 
may not al'.vays know my heart's desires best. Someone else rcay know 
them better for he may kn01.'i me be'cter th2,n I know myself. But this 
state of affairs is quite clearly paradoxical. It reoains so even 
though the paradoxical air com quite e2,sily be reIi'oved. The sort of 
shifts outlined here in this example alter our \,!hole concept of 
adultery, and indeec_ of human nature. T'Te get out of them a deeper 
appreciation of man's nature. However, some peoDle ma-y feel that 
the insight offe:::-'ed by Christ and Freud, th.'.c.t is ':Jy questions of types 
(c) and (d) respectively, bring \-,ith them a sort of conceptual fog, an 
obscuring of vision 'so that ,'Ie will have to go back to the old 
expression.' (VL. VI. 6.) 
All this has important ramifications as far as the meanings of 
terms are concerned. Before Christ said T!lhat he did it was quite 
possible to take a GTÙȘWÙŬŪŠŲXĤŸÙÛŤGĚ view of the mec.ning of the term 
'adultery'. It could be held to me,m something like 'Voluntary 
se)."Ual intercourse of a married person with one of the opposite sex 
other ttan his or her spouse.' This woule. }je the 'strict logic' 
of the term. Christ lJushed and stretched the use of the word 
breeking dO\m its strict logic. It can't be arguea that he didn't 
know or had misunderstooci the mea.ning of adultery. Yet, if 
conventional use is taken to be the yardstick of [0.eaning then what 
Christ said, taken as a comment on the mee.ning of the term 'adultery' 
was str:'ctly speC'-.king false. Such an argument "lOuld be absurd. This 
is how l.!inch tal-:es the exa;;1:91e. He c:.rgues that it only makes sense 
in the light of Christ's other remarks, in particular, Luke 6. 37 
where Christ says 'Judge not and you l-lill not be judged'. Seen in 
this way Hark 4. 27 becomes 'a Harning against Pharisaism and a 
reminder of what He all have it in us to do, but for the grace of god: 
Christ does not say, absurdly that !lcommitting adultery in one's heartH 
is just the ,::::aC1e as "committing adultery." (113) l!linch's claim that 
the sameness here 1;Jould be absurd simr).Y reveals his mm lack of 
res:9or..se to the exarc:ple. Unpacked in the \'JaY ŅUŸÍĦȘUĚ suggests the 
remark loses all its force. It is ea:3;Y to see ŴŸXĚ i,/inch takes this 
line as he is trying to establish an important moral distinction 
behJeen \vhat a person was before a crime all.d ŴŸŠWĚ he becomes by 
virtue of cocmitting that crime. ',Vhatever distinction there is here, 
and l)inch adoi ts that it is problematiC, Christ seems to be blurring 
it. But that is the essence of Daradox. Christ could accept that 
V'_ere are releva!lt moral dis'::inctions between the two CD,ses and yet 
press home his remark as postulating an identity. 
Christ noted and 'orought to our attention in a striking way those 
cases in Heich we 10 h2,ve:<hysical signs of adultery and those cases 
in which ,-1e do not. As ŸŊÙVȘHŬÜĚputs it he 'b:.:--oug-ht them together 
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1tli th a shock.' (VL. 'JI. 6.) He ŤẄWŤŸÍTŤTĚour conceIt of adultery. 
What "lent on before, say in a court of law, vlaS almost deductive. 
If act S with U, then A. Act S. loJ'i th U. Therefore A. ',')hen Christ 
!Llade the question a conflict question he made it necessary for us 
to look "t each individual before vIe could decide, even at individuals 
who had no intention to do anytJjing. \}hen Freud's notion of the 
unconscious is applied to this case of adultery no one is safe from 
the charge. 'The scope for adultery DecolLes infinite.' (VL. VI. 6.) 
Every ca,se has to be exarr,ined, even the cases where there was neither 
thought nor intention. However, everything has become so complex and 
anxious that people may feel the need to assert forcefully and at 
length that adultery really me3ns the physical act. There is endless 
scope for argument here and argument goes on and on giving us 
increased grasp of the concept. 
This account of Hisdom's defence of his claim that 'All reflection 
comes in the end to a case by case procedure' undoubtedly misrepresents 
his position in many ways. iiIisdom hil:1s elf is known to be very unhappy 
about the Lectures and has so far refused to let them be published. 
Let us VẀŸŲŲŊŠŲÙVŤĚ the central argument befoFe entering a caveat 
ŸŦŠÙŪVWĚit. \,ie o:ten feel that VIe [;1Ust anS;!ler questions in certain 
ways. The train of our thoughts runs on regule.r and straight line,s. 
VJisdom attacks this hc::bit of thought at its strongest point. Deduction 
is held to be the paradigm of rec.sonin,;. IIo1dinC; this paradigm 
results in ordinary Ecepticism. ÍHŸGÙVTŬÜĚ goes further and shoVls that 
if 1:re hold to this paradij,\ the result is radical scepticism. If 
deduction reduces to case by case arSLlment and if ca'Ce b;.c case 
argLlment is held not to be argument then our ]aradigm of good reasoning 
is not lI?easoning. That is radical sceptiGism. 1:!isdom shows in 
eX2.mple after eXSJllple that case by case 2.rgument is argument. I have 
sketched a fe,v of his exar.1pleG to shoH 11ml r.e does this. All these 
points are general. The adultery eXiltmle S;'O'.\[S how good case by case 
argument can modify our concepts. It shows that to understand fully 
a concept it is not sufficient to be interested in its 'strict logic'. 
It shows that the appeal to ca::3es is fundarrental. 
I 1tlOuld suggest that what is unsatisfactory Vii th my, and perhaps 
Hisdom's account, is that it succeeds too well in presenting case by 
case argument as argument. It makes the consideration of cases seem 
too much like the arguments vlhich form the basis of the study of logiC. 
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As we have seen Tdisdom faces at one point the question of how you 
discriminate good from bad ca,3e by case argument. He ss.ys this 
conceals an antipathy towards case by case procedure. (VL. ŸJĦĚ 5.) 
The systematic discrimination of good from bad argument is a cornmon 
(114) 
view of the nature of logic. The que,stion therefore assimilates 
the procedure to a deductive model. The issue is partly a matter of 
"'lords, and l;.'isdom does give altern8.tives such as 'procedure by 
parallels'. But words are important: ŘŸGŊŘŪĚ unsuitable type of 
expression is a sure means of rema.ining in a state of confusion. It 
as it were bars the 'Hay out' (P.I. s 339) Althouch VJisdom achieves 
his end of shmving that appeals to instances constitutes reasoning 
of a non-deductive and non-inductive sort calling them 'reasoning' 
and GŠŲŸẀÜŤŪWGĚ may seem metaphorical. I'Jhat "iiisdoll1 is doing, of 
course, is stretching or modifying our concept of argument. 
T\vo examples \-Jill illu,strate how opposi fun to the Kantian view can 
b2 ÜÙŸŮŲŤUŇŪTŤTĚby representing the form of this ŬŮŮŬVÙŸŪĚas 
argument. The first exam':Jle is the briefest and serves merely as an 
example of a general tendency. J:'he second example lilill be developed 
at length as it will serve to distinguish central argument being 
advanced here from the notion that He procee::i in philosophy by 
giving examples of ordinary or everyday speech. 
The first exar:1ple concerns 'Jlhat ?assrJore calls 'the excluded 
opposites argument'. (115) GŸGUÙVĚ is argument of the 'ice could not 
be thick if ice could hot be cold' sort. It is held to be a feature 
of lleo-\rli ttgensteinian philosophy. And there are passab'es like this 
in Iii ttgenstein' s writings. Let us WŸŤĚone example. Discussing the 
possession of a unique visual field he writes 'And this too is clear: 
if as a matter of logic you exclude other people having something, it 
lOSeS its sense to say that you have it (P.I. s 398). As an 'argument' 
this is almost an uninforme.ti ve truism. Standing alone it might 
!li,ppear silTI:!.)ly to beg the question. But it does not stand alone. In 
context it S3.yS much more. It occurs at the enc'. of a lengthy 
discussion of the notion of a private language a.."ld the way in which 
mental conceI,ts in general are affected by idea of a private or 
internal ostensive defini WŸGĚon. This notion is irremediably confused. 
It is not simply a ȘŬÜŸŊŨŤẄĚ 'arfjument' 'vi th numerous fla'"vs and false 
8ssumptions. It is a picture of the ØĒȚŬŲŸTŪŦĚ of language that He find 
compelling. ';'0 lead us away ȚŲŬŸËÍĚ this picture analogies, metal')hors, 
similes'-} and imagin2tive examples ar2 invoked. 'Arguments' of this 
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sort are exhi bi tea. in an attempt to direct us away ȚŲŬŸŊŊĚ this picture. 
It is only one of numerous perspectives that are being offered. It 
ȘŸŸĚbe argued that what is involved here is a different conception 
of philosophy which manifests itself in a different style of 
philosophising. To grasp the difference bc::tween the two styles we 
might say that loIittgensteins use of this 'argument' is like that of a 
poet who might use a fa.miliar syllogism about the mortality of man to 
say something new about death. 
The importance of:-.style is ap;Jarent in the second example. I 
refer to the representation of a technique of 'linguistic' philosophers 
as a form of argument. Hittgenstein is often said to have held that 
philosophy consists in assembling reminders of how we ordinarily speak. 
It can be quickly shown that this does not amount to the same thing as 
the consideration of examples. Exaoples are more imaginative than 
instances of hm., we sneak. As usual an example is appropriate, and a 
striking one is Wittgenstein's 'assertion' that 'meaning something is 
like going up to someone.' (P.I. s 457) This proposition is clearly 
not an instance of ordinary usage, nor is it asserted. Simple and 
perspicuous examples like this encapsulate pictures of the working of 
language that influence our thought. But GHŸGÙWWŦŤŪVWŤÙŪĚ is also 
reported to have told his students that propositions such as 'I see a 
chair' uttered when a chair is clearly visible in front of us have a 
use similar to that of the necessary propositions of mathematics. The 
use of such reminders of how we speak to rebut the sceptic \vho claims 
that \ve cannot have knowledge of such things as the existence of 
material objects has been called Paradigm Case Argument (PCA). The 
name if not the idea is held by Catherine Beattie to derive from an 
earlier paper on G.E. Noore written by Norman j'iialcolm. Beattie makes 
several criticisms of i'ialcolm's PCA. 1) It is untenable; 2) It is 
unsatisfactory; 3) It incorrectly represents all stateme::lts about the 
world as disguised statements about ŨŠŪŦẀŠŸJHĤŤĚ use; 4) It incorrectly 
suggests that ordinary language is a model to which we should conform; 
5) It fails in giving bite to its anti-sceptical thesis if its 
utterances are empirical; And 6) It fails again if they are a priori 
as they are not vindicated by the practice of language users. 
Finally 7) It ÜŸŸŤVĚunsubstantiated claims to give insights into 
ontology. As an 'argument' the PC';:, is irrelevant, inconclusive, trivial, 
inapplicable, and uselesl3. The only role for examples from ordinary 
language is the restricted one of providing a starting point for 
d " . (116) l.SCUSSlon. 
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This gives the kernel of Beattie's argument against the peA. But 
its illusion of effectiveness is entirely a function of its brevity. 
Let us analyse the PCA in the quite literal sense of taking it apart. 
Thus we have to see it as and consisting of the presentation of 
'cases' 1rlhich are held to be 'paradigms' and which are said to 
consti tute 'argument'. It i.3 hard to quarrel \vi th -:he suggestion that 
'cases' or instances of ordinary language are exhibited. Therefore 
Beattie's conclusion that these cases have only a restricted use is 
a function of her arguments against these cases being 'paradigms' and 
constituting 'argument'. 
If paradigm case 'argument' is argument then it is untenable 
argument. If an appeal to 'paradigm' case is intended to rebut 
certain sceptical claims without further argument, then this is 
unsat:i$factory. If all claims about "ihat is the case in the world 
are rec.uced willy nilly to elaims about how language is used when 
descrintive statements about language use can be distinguished from 
descriptive statements about the language "ve use to describe what is 
the case in the world, then we have here a paradoxical and probably 
inconsistent philosophical position. If so-called paradigm lint,-uistic 
statements are empirical then they do not provide hi t.e for a general 
thesis rebutting scepticism. If they are seen a providing bite for 
a general thesis rebutting scepticism, then whether empirical or not, 
they fail to do so. If these linguistic statements are a priori then 
they are not validated by the practice of language users. If the 
argument provides us ivi th a model in orciina.ry langu.a.ge to which we 
should conform then this is (if it is meaningful) an improper 
injunction. If the 'ar,::,:ument' is sUp7Josed to give us insights into 
ontology which are not substantiated then this is to be deplored. 
Furthermore if this 'argument' is essential to the method and outlook 
of 'linguistic' philosophy then linguistic ŮUÙŨŬVŬŸUXĚis threatened. 
All the points that Beattie makes would be rue if the antecedent of 
all these hypotheticals were true. But if they are not then her 
critique is a failure. Let us look at the 'paradiGm' nature of these 
cases. 
It is unfortune.te that ŲŸŠŨȘŬŨÜĚ is taken as the progenitor of 
this putative 'argument'. For Halcolm had admitted that what he 
argued in 1942 was wrong. '.Jri ting on l':oore again some t'llen ty years 
later he says this of the 'paradigm' nature of his cases: 
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'I misunderstood this point 1IIhen I first wrote on Hoore. 
In "Hoore and Ordinary Language", I said that Noore's 
replies to various sceptical assertions consist in 
presenting paradigms of knowing something for certain, 
seeing bor':_ies and so on.' (117) 
and again: 
'Hoore did not have to present a paradigm of seeing a body 
as I once thought. He had merely to remind his listeners 
that the sentence "I can see a door over there" has a 
correct use and, ŸĚexpress a true statement. On one 
famous occasion Boore was actually in error in his 
example. This delighted the sceptics in the audience. 
On my view he was right even when he was wrong.' (118) 
The majority of points that Beattie raises as objections against 
Halcolm are in fact dealt ,vi th in his early paper. Thus he suggests 
that Hoore's method may fail to convince because he fails to bring 
out sufficiently the non-empirical nature of the paradoxical 
utterances of the sceutic. It seems as if he were 'opposing one 
empirical proposition with another, contradictory empirical 
"t" , (119) M':"colm thus 1" "tl d" th' t proposl lon • ŸĚ exp lCl y enles ŠŸĚ coun er-
theses are being put forward. He denies that his 'paradigms' are 
empirical. Are they therefore ŸĚpriori? If we are being forced 
into a simple dichotomy then a Kanti311 move seems appropriate. The 
nearest we can get to a ȘUŠŲŠȘWŤŲÙVŠWÙŬŸĚ in terms of this very 
dangerous dichotomy ,lould be that such propositions ",ere synthetic 
ŸĚpriori. Or to adopt a more fashionable terminology we might say 
that they are like 'grammatical' propositions in that they are reminders 
of what it makes sense to say. They are quite different from the 
usual sorts of things that are offered as examples of 'grammatical t 
proposi tions such as 'rJo surface is both red and green allover'. 
But this proposition is only a short hand for the fact that it makes 
sense to talk of 'Seeing a red chair' and 'Seeing a green ,chair' but 
not to talk of 'Seeing a chair that is red and green allover'. 'de 
are talking of two different levels. 'Grammatic"l propositions' are 
frozen records of what it makes sense to say. Instances of ordinary 
language reoind us of what it makes sense to say. 'They are not, of 
course, reminders of any thin , empirical e.g. 'Grass is green'. This 
deals with Beattie's uoints 2), 5) and 6). 
Points 3) and 4), the VẀŮŸŬVŤTĚ 'inconsistency' and the suggestion 
that ordinary language is a model to which we should conform are both 
dealt with in Malcolm's later paper, although what he says there is 
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merely an elaboration of his earlier argur.:lents. 11alcolm shows by 
extensive reference to the arguments of Pritchard that there is 
no other vlay in "fhich "That he Vias attempting to say could be 
understood. Pritchard was not blind to the fact that we see bodies. 
His denial is the claim that it is impossible to see bodies. Eoore's 
assertion is only a reply if it is understood as the asser-':ion that 
th . 1· 1 1 .....:I:t . th t· f . 1 d ,( 120) ere ŸVĚno ŬŦŸȘŠĚ a::suJ.UL y ŸŪĚ e no ŸŬŪĚ0 VŤŤŸŪŦĚa 00 y. 
In cases like this there is no alternative to vieViing the scepti2s 
claim as a claim about language. Nor is it a matter of begging the 
question by an appeal to ordinary language. The point is not that 
the utterances of ordinary language are correct without question 
but that it is not even a question whether the utterances of ordinary 
language are correct. 
Halcolm has suggested that the confusion in his early paper 
reflected a confusion of Hoon!.' s about what he vIas doing. lIoore 
thought that he Vias presenting true perceptual statements. But 
Nalcolm Vias confused about ['lore than this. He attempts to set up 
the assembling of reminders of how Vie ordiC'l'3.rily spealc as 'refutations'. 
As we have seen he sees Hoore as arglling that ttere is 'no logical 
absurdity in the notion of seeing a body. This almost makes the 
argument seem as if it could be formulated in a ŦŤŸŤŲŠŨĚand formal 
fashion. And li',.;:e Beattie he sees the giving of such instances as 
a preliminary step. TheJ allovf us to see that the view in question 
is false before vie begin to examine it. Halcolm does not refer to 
the giving of such instances as constituting 'argument' but the 
impUcation is clearly there. Halcolm is the first in a long line 
of philosophers who vulgarise the assembling of reminders of hoVi we 
speak. Beattie mentions many others in ad baculum fashion to support 
her contention. She correctly shows that an even more vulgarised 
notion of the PCA allm"rs ideologically motivated philosophers of 
education to illegitimately extract 'necessary conditions' for the 
use of terms. That they do extract such conditions in an illegitimate 
way >"rill be an argument in Chapter Two. To show vlhy the peA is a 
vulgarisation of a method of 'linguistic' philosophy and sho"., how the 
assembling of reminders of hoVi ,'Ie ordinarily VŮŤŠÎŸĚ is fundamental it 
is necessary to have some inkling of the major step forViard they 
represent in philosophy. neattie's amazement at the continuance and 
influence of the PCA in philosophy shoVis that she is unaware of this. 
In giving an account of this 'step fonrard' we will also provide some 
substantiation for the cle.im that the assembling of reminders provides 
insight into ontology. 
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The question at issue is that of our entitlement to ŸŤŠÛĚand 
think in the way 'de do about ·:)henomena. Various J:lre-Kantian 
philoso::Jhers attempted to say that our entitlement was due to the 
nature of things. OŠŸWGVĚ 'Copernican Jevolution' in philosophy 
was to show that our entitlement to speak and think in the '"ray we 
do about phenomena rested in the naturG of our thiru[ing about things. 
It is an inescapable feature of our thinking that we conceive of the 
world as consisting of substances and attributes. No account -is_si.en of 
these conceptual necessities except as 'Principles of the Understanding'. 
Here as the gears of a super-empirical mental mechanism they become 
vWnerable to Kant's own arguments against the introduction of a supra 
sensible mode of avrareness of the real nature of things. \\'i ttgenstein 
tal-ces a major step forward in the investigation of the entitlement 
question. wnereas ICant hypostatized the understanding to account for 
our ŸĚpriori knowled::;e of matter. \IJi ttgenstein identifies the nature 
of our thillicin2; vIi th hO\v He can intelligibly speak. The consequence 
of this that concerns us is th2t -vii ttenstein is claiDing that the 
ways in which \ve speak are basic. This does not mean that 'grammatical 
propositions' are basic for these merely encapsulate what it ÜŸŸŤVĚ sense 
to say. To give an account of the nature of things to S8_y such things 
as 'Tables are su"!:Jstances' is to remina. someone (who may have said 
something incoherent) of what it makes sense to say. And this is to 
do no more than remind him that it [Jakes sense to say 'Two of us 
picked up the table', 'The table \-laS so heavy we drol.)ped it'. The 
assembling of reminders of hovl vIe speak is a result of i_'"i ttgenstein' s 
1 " d t" f -r t ' 1 t" -: h"l h ( 121 ) "'h "t" conso l 2" J.on 0 c\.an S revo u lon In p l osop y. 1 at l lS 
revolutioni3.ry in the way inc.icated explains ",rhy it persists and why it 
cannot be identified Hith the PCA. 
The PCi, is a vulgarisation of a ŮUÙŨŬVŬŸUÙȘŠŨĚmethod that has its 
roots in a metaphysical question. This method of assembling reminders 
of how we ordinarily speak does not give us 'paradigms' nor does it 
constitute' argument' in a strict sense. The nascent PCA was 
presented as an attempt to refute the sceptic's denial of our 
enti tlement to s peak and thiru: in the We.y we do about things in a 
straightforward counter-argumentative way. Hencs the feeling that as 
an 'argument' reminders do not appear tenable. Case by Case Argument 
was introduced not to deal ,'lith the ordinary form of scepticism but 
with a radical foro of scepticism. Is it therefore open to similar 
objections? Al though it has a ',,-Jider scope it certainly is not 
concerned Hi th 'paradigms'. A philosoph2r 1,/ho restricted his interest 
to the use of terms ';lQuld in Hisdom' s eyes be lacking in 'the very 
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spirit of philosophy'. (VI,. II. 7) To keep us wedded to ordinary 
language \vhen not considering a question like the entitlement question 
is to risk distortion. It is language th2.t keeps us from seeing in 
the ȚŠÜÙŨÙĿGŸŲĚ term what we have missed. By proceeding through invented 
and ima6'ined cases Tfisdom' s precedure is concerned with concepts and 
not the use of \·lOrds. Is it likely to mislead by being described as 
'arGUment'? There is an obvious way in which it invites a defence 
of the Kantian Vie',",. for eX.::Jl1ply, my calling Case by Case Argument 
'argument' is always to risk the reply or retort that 'It isn't 
argument really, it isn't conclusive, deductive, delCionstrative 
argument.' And, of course, it's not argument by inductive analogy 
either. This raises the whole question again. It revives the case 
for saying that in the sort of insta!lces iJisdom was considering no 
reasoning is possible. The d8.nger of misinterpretation is a 
measure of the strength of the Kantian vie".,. iJe can go someHay to 
rectifying the Kantian misapprehension of the nature of reasoning 
\..,i thout mentioning the term 'argument'. A summary of \1[isdom's thesis 
would be possible without the use of the term. In the Virginia 
Lectures \'Jisdom refers to it most often as a 'procedure'. In a brief 
summary it is necessary to a WWŤŸJÍÍŊWĚ to give the main elements of the 
argument and to attempt to express its force. Calling it case by 
case argument runs the risks of vulgarisation, and debasement that 
produced the FCil. But the differences bet;..Jeen the h..,o ma...Lce this less 
likely. This is because case by case argument tackles a more radical 
form of scepticism. For if ca,se by case argument isn't argument, then, 
as all argument amounts to a consideration of cases, argument isn't 
argument. Unless we are to succumb to irration2.lism and allow 
nothing to count as argument or reE.soning then ',Je must allow that case 
by case argument is argument. 
1.6.Concepts and Analysis 
An intending student could read among other things that 'a 
prodigious capacity for puzzlement by the very familiar is a 
characteristic quality in a great philospher.' (122) He is unlikely 
to meet and even less likely to understand the related remark that 
'when we do philosophy we are like savages, primitive_people, who hear 
the ŤĻŸŲŤVVÙŬŪVĚof civilised men, put a false interpretation on them, 
and drm! the queerest conclusion from it.' (P.I. s 194) Students might 
begin to underste.nd if their limited 'capacities for puzzlement' 1rJere 
directed towards the 'questions' and 'question-like' inscriptions that 
they Hill be asked to 'answer'. 'lJhat is education?' '·lihat does the 
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termfleducation"mean?' Inscriptions like these a:9pear in essays on 
- (123) (124' 
the concept of education. Dunlop, Peters, ' and Hirst and 
. (125) . Peters provJ.de instances for their use. ĿŬŪȘŤŮŸẀŠŨĚanalysis 
seems traditionally, if not of necessity, to involve the use of 
inscriptions in this particular interrogative form. C)ften supposedly 
(126) 
more general inscriptions appear such as "oJhat is a concept?' 
( 127) 
and ",'lhat is the meaning of a word?' It is the oddness of these 
inscriptions that should ȘŠẀŸŤĚpuzzlement. For the first four 
'questions' are not questions and the last is a specimen of nonsense. 
These inscriptions are not questions. They are marks on paper 
which have some vague and indeterminate sense. rI'hey are not 
VŤŪVŤŨŤVŸĚUttered in ŠŸŮŲŬŮŲÙŠWŤĚcontexts by appropriate persons 
they could be questions. len appropriate person might be a foreigner 
\'1ho \'las puzzled over the meaning of the \'lord 'education' having, for 
instance, never heard it before. Or he might be troubled about the 
nature of the concept. Having tre.nslated the term into his own 
la..."lguage he is still puzzlec3. about the nature of the thing. \vnen a 
philosopher utters these 'questions' or uses these 'inscriptions' he 
. (128) is engaging 1.n a form of ÜŤWŬŨŨŨŸŅŅÍQĦĚ \/e ask these 'questions' 
wi th a very sombre air, or ,vi th a wry smile on our face; or vIe ask 
it with eyeorm.;s raised. It is unsatisfactory to give the answer 
that Harnett and Naish do. They say that the question is usually 
t ŸĚ t . d f' . t . ( 129 ) Th' b t h a reques lor a programma 1.C e 1.n1. lone 1.S may e rue w en 
the question is ŠVÚŸŤTĚappropriately but not lifhen it is asked 
philoso;:.hically. v,'hen a ŮUÙŨŬVŬJŸUŤŲĚutters such a 'question' he is 
entertain=_ng it, not asking it. He is trying to ina.uce us to feel 
puzzled e.bout things that do not puzzle us. He '.;ants to make us 
feel 'lost' so that we may be enabled to find our way about. He 
is hoping for greater illumination, for an increased grasp of the 
concept. 
If the 'c"uestions' are in the forr.:tal mode ',Ie might say that the 
ŮUÙŨŬVŬŮUŤŨŸĚ is trying to get us to consider the cleaning of words the 
meeming of ',"hich we alre·,;,dy 1:-:nO\'1. And this may be disputed by someone 
\'lho will argue that T;le don't know the meaning of the terms life use. 
The existence of this paradoxical situation which is never quite as 
stark emd obvious as presented here is evidence for a misapprehension 
and we can connect this r.lisapprehension with the Kantian -dew of 
examples. For sucl 'questions' predispose us to seek definitions as 
the outcome of our enquiry. .c"nC:ilogously, if they are in the ::aaterial 
mode they predispose us to attempt to remeciy the confused nature of our 
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concepts b;;.' producing or exl,ibi ting conceptual connections l·;hich 
tend to assume the forD of definitions. Becau:3e philosophical interests 
are of a general kind seeking a general ch3.r2.cterisa:ion or 'criterion' 
seems to follow as a matter of cc·urse. If 'ire '''ish to justify our use 
of 9.ny pe.rticula.r ter:J1 it seems that "re must .:ppe2,1 to some general 
principle. And implicit in all this is the denigration of case by 
case argument. Farticular cases or examples cannot justify our use 
of terms. Suppose a philosopher Here to ask a student the 'question' 
'b'by do you call this an eXaLl]::le of education?' The student replies 
by r;iving more ŤẄŠÜŸĒĞŨŤVĦĚ This doesn't seem adequate. He hasn't 
given us a justification of his claim. He ha.sn't produced reasons. 
Hisdom would argue that he has produced ŲŤŠVŬŨÍVŸWUŠWĚwe can always 
give reasons N"hich justify our examnles. But these reasons are appeals 
to other eX2.mples. ::'f course the reO.sons (cases) He give may be 
inadequate, just as the reasons (criteria) we give may be inadequate. 
Bu t in both cases we vlOuld shoH this by considering examples. The 
'oaradoxical situation involving the two ŬJJĴĞŸŊŬVŤTĚ epistemoloiSical claims 
about the meaning of terms might be invoked here. The dogmatic 
position might incline us to reflect more on the language 1;Ie use, 
while the sceptical position might suggest that we need to:consider 
the concepts of things in order to get clearer about the meaning of our 
terms. If it does not mean something like thi,s it collapses into either 
the claim that some at I.l5 don't YJJ.ow Hha t ',ie ar'8 talking about, or the 
claim that none of us knows \"hat ',,,e are talking about. The first claim 
is true but unhelpful v!hile the ,second Bakes clarification inr;)ossible. 
Introducing the terr,' 'concept' is haroless enough if it means no more 
and no less than the injunction to consider imagined as well as actual 
cases. Some distinction like this is implied by Austin's distinction 
beb-leen the 'syntactics' aIld 'seLcantics' of the explanation of meaning. 
The former involves the exhibiting of sentences in which a term is 
used 1,-lhile the latter involves the imagining of e}..rperiencing of 
si tUidions in ŴŸĤHÙȘUĚ the tern: might be employed, and those in which it 
might not. ',lhe1'e the distinction dra;·Jl1 by i"ustin and that drawn in 
the discussion of case '::Jy case argument diverge is that 'imagined' is 
to be thought of a covering cases vlhere He might be said to be offered 
a 'ne\.,' concept. The 'adultery example' is an insta:J.ce vlhich could not 
be catered for by Austin's account. 
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That th.", fourth 'question' is one of a species of nonsense 
'questions' typically asksd by the philosopher ȘŠŸÍĚ be seen if it is 
compared with the question 'ijhat is the mec;.ning of the word ",,!Ord fl ?' 
asked in an appropri9_te setting. It is nonsense because by being 
construed on analocy with que2.tions asked in appropric;.te circumstances 
it forces anyone who seeks to 'an,swer' it to h:rpostatize entities to 
explain what it is they think the 'question' is about. Thus we conjure 
up 'meanings', 'ideas', 'cor:cepts' and. ultimately 'universals'. 
These stand. as the desiguc;.tc;. of the 'questions'. ",/hat is a gerbil?' 
"i"lhat does 'ger'-Jil' r(.ean ?' i;le can do lots of elementary things in 
the way of ans,,"lering these questions if raised by some person in an 
appropriate context, for example, in a prir.1ary school science 
lesson. But ,vi th 'ilhE_t is the "IJea:Qing" of a word?' ";ihat is the 
flr;;ec;.ning H of me2JlL1g?' and the more dizzying "".ihat is the meaning 
(130) 
of a concept?' lIe cannot IJroceed by ostensive definition or 
by demonstrating the 'syntactics' and the 'semantics' of the terms. 
This does not mean that \ve can.."'1ot ask questions about meaning. 'J.:here 
is nothing nonsensical in Qlhat-is-the-r.1eaninr.;-of (the phra2e "1-[hat 
is-the-meaning-of(the word) 'x"'?' (131) To answer such a question we 
proceed in the Hay indicated. '::'he_se comments "Ihich derive from 
Austin do not go far eno,-,_gh. ',/hen a 'question' such as 'liha t is 
education?' or 'what does the terr.1 fleducation fl mean?' is ŠVŸĴJŤTĚ by a 
philosopher it is still La specimen of sense in his twofold 
categorisation of inter:rcgatives. O::,e reason for begin..'1ing with a 
collection of interrogatives ',vas to sugGest thc;.t these 'questions' 
mask a misapprehension. They constitute one form of philosophical 
nonsense which is related to Austin's characteris21.tion of seemingly 
more general questions as nonsense. They are asked with these seemingly 
more general questions in mind. As we shall see there are several 
related ways in \oJ hich 'questions' Cro1 be given spurious senses by 
seeing them as more general forrIs of appropriately uttered questions. 
Austin's cate.S;orisation of these questions is one stage in the 
aetiology of philosophy. If we Hish to know why such 'questions' 
are forrrulo.ted we have to look to such things as the idea that all 
gensral lilords function in a similar \v'3.y to proper names. \;hat concerns 
us for the moment, is that the philosopher's 'questions' are not 
apnropriatcly uttered or inscribed. 
It has been suggested that this sub-species of ŪŬŪVŤŸÍVŤĚ aims at 
increased grasp of a concept. But a paradoxical situation arises. 
Frecisely by seeking to 'ansvler' such 'questions' increased grasp is 
thwarted.. Equivocation behJeen appropriate uttera_nce and philosophical 
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utterance serves to define 'conceptual analysis' ŸŸTĚto explain its 
utili ty. .t,. common characterisation of tDis philosophical acti vi ty 
is that it is the unproblen2.tic but very difficult business of 
'atte:11pting to make explicit the rules behind our usage of words, 
( 132) 
and thus get clearer about ÕĒÒŸŲĚ conceJ:ts.' Thi,s platitudinous 
and seemin!;ly safe eXlJlan2.tion is a ŸŨŬŲŪŤWGĚs next of confu,sions and 
wild assumptions. The claim that VIe need to get clearer about our 
concepts is undocumented. \}ho needs to 'get clearer' '? This cannot 
refer to the ignorant, the ẀŪŦŲÎŊĴGŊØŅŠĦWÙȘÎŸÍHĚ the illiterate, ana. the 
illogicB.l. ',ihat they need is education not reflection on the concent 
of eO.ucation. But the 'underlabo-u.rer' conc21i-cion of yhiloS0Jhy only 
seee)s credible if He a,ssun'ie a JŮŲŬŸĴŲŤVVÙẂŤĚ continuum of cases. 1;Je 
shift from cases of the above sort, to cases of confusion perha:9s 
induced by conflating what one eJas told about education in the 
different di,sciplines, (133) to a much more nebulous and. philosophical 
confusion. This conception of philosophy is often felt to De unsatis-
factory because although it dis8Etangles pseudo-debates it leaves the 
t . t t . . . t h d ( 134) p t -r h' . . t' f . mos In eres lng ŰẀŤVŸŨŬŪVĚun ouc e • ar ŬŸĚ t lS alssa'lS actlon 
stems from the ",-]3,Y in ·ĦĒUŸĦȘUĚ the Horking model of conceptual analysis 
we are z;iven embodies the Kantian vie'!!. 'lhis is a habit of thoushtand 
lIe interp::,'et the model of h011l to do philosophy of educo.tion in a certain 
direction ',li thout reflectini', u;:on the all too familiar methodological 
injunctions. 
Take as an example Thlson's assertion that we should not jettison 
the vleapons of 'clarity' and 'ruB.lysis'. Our immediate need is to 
( 135) 
'look harder and get clearer'. l-lhat ",-re have here, and in the 
example from Hirst and Peters, is a series of \vell .vorn metaphors. 
In this Darticular case '.-/e have a checaic3.1 metaphor and h'lo vi,sual 
mete.phors. It is these metaphors that lJlask the Kantian view. The 
metaphor of 'analysis' fits easily into a mesh of similar metaphors 
farr;iliar to any student of ,?hilosophy. 'Ane.lysis' in philosophy is 
sometimes like that in chemistry ,'There we take things apart. But this 
ŸŸŠŨŬÙĚy can 'oe pushed tOl"lards anotl1er meta]horical paradigm. The 
comparison could b::, wi tIl literacy or artistic a.."'1alysis iLich is the 
art of juxtaposition, of contiguity, of injunctions and so on. This 
analogy meets with resistarlce becau.:3e the background is missing which 
facili tates the take up of the metaphor. The ŠŪŠŨŬŦŸJĚ \"rith scientific 
method is so familiar we do not give it a thought. The visual metaphors 
cause simi18,r pro'oleLls but can also be signposts to a diffel"ent terrain. 
'Clarity' can be the ȘŨŠŲÙWŸØĚof analysis in the first sense. iiJe see 
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the structure more clearly by separating out its constituent 
elenents. The ?nalogy need not refer to something analogous to 
microscopical tech:dque which literally gives us better vision. 
',Ie can still talk of cetting clearer ",Then everytring is before 
us and we viel"r it in conch tions of optimum solar illumination. 
Nothing is hidden GŸĞŤUÙŪTGĚ anything else but the Hay we look at 
it is changed. \Je see something nevi. And the ,,,ray this ne,'! vision 
is facilitated is by an analysis similar to literary analysis. 
"tIe shall return to consider this sort of analysis in Chapter Four. 
1,\ihat gives the habitual interpretations of 'conceptual 
analysis' their strength is that ·,[e seem to have in 'dilson' s and 
Hirst and Feters' presentations of the ',mrking model a prima facie 
candidate for ÜÙȘŲŬVȘŬŸÙȘŠŨĚ technique in 'rules'. For most 
people are' held not be be able to state the 'rules' that govern 
their use of \,rords. Searle has suggested that in attempting to 
state the semantic conventions of language in a rule-like format 
'de 2.re in the position of someone vlho has learnt to play chess 
purely oy watching games a11d \"',,.0 110\01 attempts to state the rules 
of the game. Here ',Ie meet the game metaphor \Jhich by being 
interpreted systematically has been systematically misinterpreted by 
philosophers. References to it abound in discussions of the concept 
. (136) 
of educatlon. The analogy does not UŤŨŸĦÚĚ when interpreted in 
Searle's manner. For it avoids the central qEestions as to vlhether 
there are 'rules' of language in the sense in whicll there are rules 
for games like chess. In Chapter r::\,JO it ',:ill be argued at some 
length tha.t there are no such 'rules'. 
This may seem an extreme claim, Searle seems to see this sort of 
claim as an expression of despair. ,some philosophers have sought rules 
of use \vhereas 'Certain other philosophers, dismayed perhaJ:s by the 
failure of their colleagues to produce any rules, have denied the 
fashiona.ble view that meaning is a IJatter of rules and have asserted 
that there are no ser(:antical rules of the prOI)Osed kind at all'. He 
ar.gues the.t 'this scepticism is prerr:ature' and it sterr..s from a failure 
to distinguish between two sorts of rule. But, as we shall see in 
the next chapter, Searle fails to make the distinction he is hinting 
at. Furtherr1ore, his more general attempt to state the necessary 
condi tions of 'promising' from Hhich he intends to extra.ct sem&ntical 
rules is a self-declared FAILURE. It is not just humility which 
drives him to say that; 'I find the statement of the conditionsvery 
difficult to do, and I am not entirely satisfied '.rith the list I 
am about to ·oresent'. (137) tie then lists the reasons llThy: 
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(1) Ordinary Lo.nguage has no strict rules; (2) There are odd, 
deviant, and borderline cases; (3) There are counter ŤẄŸÜŮŨŤVĴĚ
(4) There are half promises, metaphors etc. (5) The conditions 
are circular. How can such seemingly intractable problems be dealt 
wi th? Simply by ignoring them. The methDd is not Ockham!s Razor 
but Procrustes' bed. 
'Rules' serve philosophers of education well. In analysing the 
concept of education the::' provide us with the analytical residue. 
'They also enable us to connect language with the world because we 
encapsulate bits of the world as we distinguish it in rules. They 
also provide us with justification for 'rules' and 'principles' are 
said to underlie our use of ':lords. 'Rules', 'principles', '(logically) 
necessary conditions', and '(public) criteria' are all sides of the 
same coin. The essential motivation for introducing them is Kantian. 
How else are \ve to explain our i';rasp of a concept? 
All this may seem to avoid the central issues. 'Some account of 
what a concept is, or what it is to have a concept should be offered. 
It is not equated with the use of terms but is not adequately 
distinguished from WUŤŸĦĚ Accounts of a concept could be offered in 
terms of behaviourism, Platonism, constructivism, conceptual realism, 
or in several other ways. I.ve could argue that the term 'concept' is 
an imprecise technical term of philosophy or metaphysics whose utility 
(139) depends upon its imprecision. 'Hetaphysics' refers to talk 
about the talk of others. It is when we reflect unon the talk of 
others; educationalists, mather'1aticians, children, or philosophers 
that lrle are likely to use the term 'concept'. Talking of mathematics 
. (140) \IIi t tgenst ein argues that' "Concept" 1S a vague concept'. Hhen 
this remark is quoted it is often taken along with his rerr;ark that 
. (141) 
'The word 'concept' 1S by far too vague' to indicate that what 
he says about concept forl7lation in mathercatics is il'lprecise obscure 
( 142) 
and confused. But l!li ttgenstein' s point is that even in 
mathematics which is our paradigm of deductive reasoning we clarify 
our concepts and this includes the concept 'concept' by means of 
examples. '4hen he mal-ces the remark about the 'word' being far too 
vague he is discussing one of the ways in "thich we might WŸŸŤĚ the 
concept to be part of the proof. Then we might say that the concepts 
TŤẂŤŨŬŮŤŸĚwere dependent on the structure of the system and then go 
on to give rules determining what concepts could be ȚŬŲŲŸŨŠWŤTĦĚ The 
concept shows in how we go on after the proof. It shows in what we 
say and do and don't say and don't do. It is not a possession in 
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any sense other than that in which we can be said to possess a 
language. Ii/hen vJittgenstein says that the word 'concept' is far 
too vague it is said in the VŮHŸȘÙȚÙȘĚ context of the seeing the 
concept as part of the proof. 'dords may mislead. Eu t the concept 
is still held to be vague. Vii ttgenstein certainly rejects any 
account of 'concept' which refers to 'general principles'. He 
offers no account of a concept other WUŸŸĚto repeat and repeat the 
near simile that 'Concept' is something' like a picture with which 
o (143) 
one compares obJects'. To do more than this would be to 
offer up some account of a concept in terms of universals i.e. 
something with instances or in terms of Frege's notion of a concept 
as a 'possible predicate'. Iii ttgenstein rejects the Platonism 
implied by such accounts, but avoids conventionalism as well. 
Two examples will illustrate this last point and tell us 
something about the concept 'concept'. Part of vIi ttgenstein' s 
rejection of Platonism is a result of the difficulties in seeing 
what its predicates were predicates of. But it also came from the 
recognition that there were many 'concept terms' such as 'slab' and 
'block' and 'tile' of the famous language game involving builders 
(P.I. s. 2) which do not appear in subject predicate propositions. 
\"Ji ttgenstein raises the question as to whether this language game 
contains concepts. It could become a language game with concepts 
if there were a technique of representing, describing, or portraying 
th ,0 t (141) ose oOJec s. 
A series of 'thin' examples are given by lilittgenstein aimed at 
showing Platonism to be wrong by illustrating how calculating, 
counting, measuring and so forth could be done differently. One 
ŤẄŠŸŮŨŤĚ involves a society which had the following way of calculating 
the price of wood. They sold it a price proportionate to the area 
d b 01 °th f t h' ht (145) At f;rst ;t covere _ y ŮŸĚ es ŴŸĚ no re erence 0 elg • ŸĚ ŸĚ
seems that we can understand such a society. But the conseauences are 
absurd. If I hold a plank of wood \"hich measures six foot by one foot 
on its end its value increases when I put it down. If I am carrying 
a pile and drop it scattering the timber far ana wide I increase its 
¥alue. A radical conventionalism requires that such alternative 
concepts be intelligible. ',,!i ttgenstein' s example shows that these 
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altern2,tives when fleshed out are not intelligible to us. GŸŨUŠWĚ the 
example shows is that the formation of concepts different from ours 
is intelligible, not that those concepts are intelli,sible to us. 
This also explains why the example is unusually thin for i/Ji ttgenstein. 
The notion of a concept as a ŸĲÙȘWẀŲŤĚ is illustrated \Vi th 'visual 
demonstrations'. Two simple ones can be used to illustrate the noint 
9.bout concepts. j\ rectangle can be made of two parallelograms and 
two triangles, and the proof of this can be the simple diagrammatic 
t t · f th ȚŸĚ (146) TTl ,. ° d t 1 represen a lon 0 e 19ure. ".e can a so QlVl e a rec ang e 
°th ° 1 1° (147) Tlh fO t h thO th d Wl a \if1gg y 1ne. 'J. e lrs sows us some lng e secon 
does not. Thus we might say it gives us a new concept of a rectangle. 
This is because we can do things with it. It shows certain 
transformations I can perform with triangles and parallelograms. The 
second has no such use. The bolO main points that can be drawn from 
such 'visual demonstrations' is that no appeal is made to any rule 
of deduction or any form of reasoning or general schema behind the 
picture. It is the proof that proves. The transfiguration of shapes 
is shown in the picture. This explains the appeal of the ŸŤŬÜŤWŲÙȘŠŨĚ
view' of proof for \Vi ttgenstein. It is a counter to Russell's view 
that what a proof rested upon was a logical proof in Principia 
Hathematica. The second point if': that such demonstrations may be 
said to give us a 'new' concept only because we have a system of 
concepts (calculations, proofs) in which we place it. There are 
obvious analogies between the giving of such demonstrations and 
examples considered in the discussion of how deduction reduces to 
a case by case procedure. 
The notion that a proof 'rests on' a logical proof in J? .j\. is 
a specific form of the general idea that there might be rules that 
determine why we think in the \Vay we do. Hathematics is a motley 
of techniques of proof. Mathematical proof has been regarded as our 
paradigm of reasoning because it introduces ne\1 concepts by giving 
definitions. But definitions must be given in terms of undefined 
elements so the process of refining a concept can be endless. Even 
a relatively determinate one like 'triangle' can be clarified. 
Every new definition, every new fact, clarifies a little of the 
picture that was blurred. But all pictures are only determinate to 
a certain degree after that, they are vague. Such 'definitions' can 
mislead becau,se they are determinate in a \'lay that the meaning of 
words in everyday language is not. If we consider 'education' to be 
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definable in the way that GVŸẀŠŲŤĚroot' is definable we will be 
misled. If we define 'square root' of a number we can say that for 
any given number x 'the square root of x' is a definite description 
of another number Y. But the meaning of any given proposition about 
. (148) 
education is not a definite description of any sort of ent1ty. 
The formation of concepts in mathematics is different from the 
form3_tion of concepts in chemistry. In philosophy of education the 
concepts that are discussed are concepts which function mostly in 
civil life, that is, in everyday speech. Part of the vagueness of 
the concept 'concept' lies in the fact that what it is to talk of a 
'concept' is not given independently of its employment. If we wish 
to ÜŲẀŸŤĚ the concept 'concept' clearer we must proceed by considering 
examples. 'vIe cannot proceed by deciding that to have a conceJit is so 
and so and tlcen consider soJtle particular concept. That is, unless we 
set out to mislead. 
1 .7. Summary \'Inat it Hakes Sense to Say 
Hisleading talk about 'a delicate balance between principles and 
(14q) 
cases' / h3_s been upset by the introduction of case by case 
argument. The appeal to cases has been sho\Vl1 to be fundamental. To 
put it another way; an argument has been made out to show the logical 
priority of the particular case. Vulgar empiricists misleadingly 
argue that to 2.cquire a concept you must examine particular things 
and see what is common to them all. Against this it is misleadingly 
argued that the empiricist must be wrong because to be seen as 
instances they must be instances of something. So there must be some 
prior or underlying principle of organisation. There must be a 
criterion. (150) r;:'he parallel in philosophy of education to this 
picture of concept acquisition is even more misleading. To 
explicate a concept is to produce criteria. To cr)nsider instances 
is misle2.ding because to see them as instances presupposes underlying 
cri teria by 1rlhich we recognise them to be instances of the concept. 
The introduction of case by case argument has upset the delicate 
balance between the more empirically minded phllosopher of education 
and his opponent. The whole aim of discussing case by case argument 
is to cast doubt upon if not erase the idea that to know that a thing 
is of a certain kind it is necessary to produce a criterion. Thus the 
empiricist is \'Jrong for the ŐÎĦŸŊÍŤĚ reason as those who argue that he 
puts the cart before the horse. 
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A whole range of sophisticated interpretations of 'criteria' are 
available to supplement if not supplant the simple model outlined in 
this introduction. For example the notion that certain consid.erations 
criteriologically imply that X is a case of Y but do not deductively 
entail it. Some such consideration is clearly active in the views we 
have considered and ;.:ill consider. Sucr accounts ,.Till be sho_ll to be 
as misleading as the simple initial model. Again a series of 
sophisticc.ted moves are available and utilised by philosophers of 
education to deal with the related notion of a 'family resemblance' 
which is seen to have a:oplication to their atter.lpts tooexplicate 
conceuts by seeking criteria. These moves usually repeat in some 
form the misapprehension the metaphor was intended to correct. 
There is a tendency to suggest that the philosopher's 'questions' 
we have d.iscussed are nonsense. i'here are no real issues here. The 
anxious doubt they create in us about our understanding of faDiliar 
concept fades as \ve come to see the inap::;Jropriateness of the 
interrogative form. But this will not quite do. \;\Te have documented 
a misapprehension about the concept of education that is at work in 
everyday life where we seem to get on well with the concept. Ijie have 
noted a paradoxical state of affairs in relation to this misappnehension. 
The misapprehension is due to what we have called the Kantian view 
of examples. This has a corollary in philosophy in the broadly 
'criteriological' approach adopted by philosophers of education in an 
attempt to make our concepts clear. Such approaches attempt to set 
out the mathematics of the concept. But in doing so they perpetrate 
the Kantian misunderstanding. 
In v:isdom' 5 phrase they are concerned with the 'strict logic' 
of the concept. Such an approach may be justified when we are in an 
'obfuscation-state' because of paradoxical utterances about education. 
But a concern with the strict logic of the term will not give us 
increased grasp. Increased grasp comes fror:! a clear understanding 
of what it makes sense to say about the concept. To understand what 
it makes sense to say is to consider fully fledged and determinate 
examples. 
variety of 
Increased grasp comes from reflection on a multitude and 
cases. In what follOiITS it will be argued that 
'criteriological' approach cannot give us increased grasp. Increased 
gras··, comes when, and only when, we consider education by exawples. 
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Chapter Two RULES AIm CRITERIA 
live now enter a labyrinth in Hhich there are many turnings and many 
dead ends. The thread to lead us in and out has been partly unHound in 
Chapter 1. If we do not keep the multiplicity and variety of examples 
of education in mind we will get into trouole. 1;Ji ttgenstein once said 
that the first mista};:e in many philosophical controversies was the 
asking of certain questions. From which it follows that the second is 
attempting to answer them. 'rhe questions we will consider do not bear 
their danger on their face unlike 'hlhat is a question?' but they are 
expressions of deep confusion. In this chapter and the next the follow-
ing questions will be considered: 'Are there necessary and/or 
sufficient conditions for (the use of the term) education?' 'Are there 
criteria for (the use of the term) education?' and 'Is education a 
family resemblance concept or term?' How calm these questions seem. 
But this is merely a function of their familiarity and the fact that 
they are written in a certain highly developed 'scientific' style. They 
are, in any case, merely schemata representing the many variations which 
are actually found in the literature. These questions are often mixed, 
up. Questions about necessary and sufficient conditions being married 
with questions about criteria. ŐÙÜÙŨŠŲŨŸÙĚ questions about criteria 
are often linked lllTi th the notion of family resemblances. Thus confusion 
is heaped upon confusion. 
The 'criteriological' view has been characterised as the idea that 
something is a case of X He must be able to produce a criterion or 
criteria. The term 'criteria' is used in various ways by philosophers. 
This chapter looks at different aspects of this usage. Section 2.1. 
introduces the notions of necessary and/or sufficient conditions. These 
are shovm not to be siQple analytical tools but to imply that language 
is largely a matter of rules. Section 2.2. shows why it is misleading 
to suggest that language is a system of rules. It is also shown that 
there are no 'meaning-rules' that justify the use of certain words. 
Section 2.3. connects the previous sections 'flth the discussion of 
'criteria' by considering and rejecting an interpretation of which 
associates there, vii th the notion of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
Section 2.4. consists of a critique of various attempts to veld sets of 
criteria on to the concept of education, primarily through the idea of 
GUẀÜŠŸĚnature'. Section 2.5. VŤŸVĚout a 'theory of criteria' that is 
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ȘŬÜÜŬŪŸŨŠȘŤĚ in philosophy. This is a systematic interpretation of the 
notion as used by i.1i ttgenstein, and as such, is yet another misinterpret-
ation. Section 2.6. considers an attempt to separate the notions of 
'criteria' and 'meaning'. Section 2.7. examines the use of the notion 
in V.ji ttgenstein and suggests that the only plausLlle interpretation 
is one which ties the notion closely to the details of particular cases. 
Finally, section 2.8. returns to the cruder use of the term in philosophy 
of education. 
The discussion of the 'family resemblance' notion is left until 
the next chapter. Although it is often taken to be a warning against 
looking for necessar;' and sufficient conditions in an over simple way 
:.t presents exegetical difficulties which merit independent treatment. 
These concern the use of this analogy in 't'J'i ttgenstein' s later philosophy. 
2.1. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions 
Almost every introductory book on philosophy(1) has a section 
devoted to 'necessary and sufficient conditions'. For the most part 
these notions are WŲẀŸŤŪĚas unproblematic ones. Something is a 
necessary condition ( C) of something else ĜJŸĞĚ if in the absence of 
(C) , (E) never occurs. On the other hand (C) is a sufficient condition 
of (E) if ,vhenever (C) occurs, ĜGŸŘĚL) occurs. The distinction is an 
elementary one and elemente.ry examples are given to illustrate it. 
Typical examples would be the follo\ring: Oxygen is a necessary 
condition of human life. Being a plain figure bounded by three sides 
is (in Zuclidian geometry) a sufficient condition of being a triangle. 
This latter condition may be said to be both necessary and sufficient. 
All this is rather trite, though it is not clear whether \..re are refer-
ring to things, events, concepts, or words. I want to concentrate on 
Cases in "'hich these pieces of jargon have a linguistic turn. For in 
these cases it becomes clear that this ancient and obvious distinction 
trails clouds of mee.ning theory. Flew, to take a typical example, makes 
this comment when introducing the terms: ' ••• the ÜŤŠŪÙŸŦĚof a 
proposition is just the sum of the logically necessary conditions of 
its truth.' (2) Hirst and Peters have made the notion of a 'necessary 
condition' in Flew's sense central by conceiving of 'conceptual 
analysis' as the process by which \ve set out 'logically necesse.ry 
conditions'. This methodology separates their enquiry from that of 
the scientist. The ȘŬŪŸŤȘWJGŬŪĚbetween the methodology ana search for 
such conditions can be seen if I continue a quotation that will be 
faffiiliar from Chanter 1. 
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'In attel1'yting to make explicit the rules behind our 
usage of vlOrds, and thus get clearer about our concepts, 
it is important to distinguish logically necessary 
conditions from other sorts of condition that may be 
present.' (3) 
These other sorts of condition are nerely de facto ones. 'Being an 
oArygen-b;eeathing organism' might be a pre-condition of any things 
being educated. :C:ven a silk \-JOrm '..,ould Deet this condition. But 
such conditions would not have anything to do with vlhat we mecmt by 
'education' • 'Conceptual analysis' is therefore an apriori enquiry 
not an empirical one. 
This is how the terms are usually introduced. There are many 
complicated issues involved in their introduction that I have avoided 
going into at this stc.ge, because I wish to comnent first on the \-/ay 
this distinction is imported into what is supposed to be an account 
of meaning. Flew talks about the meaning of propositions, while Hirst 
and Peters talk about the me;;;;.ning of a Hord. To this '!Ie can add the 
general question of what is involved in saying anything meaningfully. 
How do all these cases relate to the giving of 'necessary conditions'? 
To ansvler this question it is important to get several things clear 
about 'meaning'. (4) 
It is primarily words and not sentences or utterances that we 
know the meaning of. '\,Ie understand sentences or utterances and we 
know the me2.ning of words but not vice versa. The ,question 'Hhat 
does the sentence "Rodney is going to the thsatre" rc.ean?' seems odd. 
1:Ie would only ask it in very rare circumstances perhaps when learning 
a language or an unusual code. i.Ie can find out what vlOrds mean by 
comparing their applicability in certain linguistic environments. 
'Killed' and 'murdered' Cill1 be seen to differ because the former but 
not the latter is applicable in the environment • 'The falling rock 
•••••• the climber'. Sentences are often said to be meaningless but 
not words. live may say the remark by a Labour politician that his party 
was going to 'put 9...."'1 end to all cOf.1peti ti'ie ousiness activity' was 
meaningless because what it suggests is logically impossible. But the 
individual words still have meaning. l,Je may say that a word like 
'love' is meaningless. But this is not a comr:lent on semantics but 
an expression of disillusionment or heartbreak. 'I'he fact that \I{ords 
rather than sentences are said to have ÜŤŸŪÙŪŦĚis not surprising. 
Ziff argues that to determine v;hether a Hord has meaning it is 
necessary to consider the 'distributive' and GȘŬŪWŲŠŸWÙẂŤGĚ sets of 
utter3.J1ces in Hhich it appeB.rs, and does not appear respectively. 
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This is because it is reasonable to VẀŮŸJŊŬVŤĚ that a meaningful word 
will not chan,S'e its mC8ning 8verytirne it occurs, and because Ivhat is 
said depends on It!hat is not said. So it is necessary to consider 
what cou.ld contrast i"i th the vlOrd in the Sa;}le linguistic environment. 
But if such elements are necessary in determining 1rlhether a "rord has 
mea..'1ing it is far from clear that sentences have meaning. For it is 
far from clear that they ha.ve 'distributive sets'. (5) 
Hords are the primary things that are said to have mea..'1ing. 
Philosophers of education a.re concerned with the mG3_ning of the 1rlOrd 
'education' despite the fact that the term is so familiar to us. To 
get clearer about its meaning it may be necessary to consider utter-
ances in which it occurs and does not occur. Nevertheless they are 
not primarily concerned with the meaning of sentences. For this 
reason I do not wish to consider further the notion that the meaning 
of a sentence is the function of its necessary conditions. ':2hough 
\ discussion of 1rl!',ether lan,gtJ.age has rules is in part a critique of this. 
3efore considering the idea that there ar2 necessary conditfuons 
for the use of the word 'education' it is important to distinguish 
this from a similar ,sounding but completely different notion. This is 
the idea that 'there ar::; logically necessary conditions for the use of 
(6) 
any ivord'. The latter are the necess2.ry condi tions ẀŪTŤJŸGĚ which 
anyone can meaningfully S2.y anything. They are logical in a proper 
sense. Thus if we take a word to be X then it can't be not X. If we 
use a ,,,ord to refer to a person or thing then i-Je are ȘÕŨŸÜÙĚtted to 
using the same word to refer to another person or thing with similar 
features or characteristics. And so on. These are logically necessary 
condi tions that must be met if 1rle are to speak ÜŤÙÙŨŨÙŪĜŸȚẀŨŨXĦĚ nut 
such conditions do not serve to give the i"ora or words we are consider-
ing a place in a parti cular conceptual ȚŲŠŲÙÍŤẂŨŬŲŸJĦĚ 11 ery little follo\>ls 
from such necessary conditions. As Reddiford puts it 'these formal 
condi tions' place no substa.nti ve lini ts on the contexts in 1rlhich the 
word can be used nor upon what is to count as correct usage.' (7) 
But arguments about the necessary conditions for the use of a \vord 
are confused ',-Ji th arSuments about the necessary conditions for 
spes_king me2.ningfully. Can't 1,re sirJply allow that th::;re are necessary 
condi tions in Redo_iford' s sense? Doesn't his account seem innocuous? 
If we say education is X then certain 'formal conditions' follow from 
this ŸŤȚÙŪÙWÙŬŪGĦĚ One supposes that these are the rules or laws of 
logic. Thus if A says E is X then it is not not X. At the end of the 
brief section in "hich he makes the distinction between the two sorts 
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of necessary condition, he comments 'Eot only moral judgements are 
uni versalisable ' • If ·"ie use a word in a certain \'I[;.y then '"e are 
commi tted to applying that \.,rorcl in sir:iilar circumstances to similar 
things. Two aualifications must be made to this textbook aGcount of 
logical consistency. Firstly, the argument presented in Chapter 1 
about Vere's judgement in the ŪŬẂŤŸŁÙŨŨXĚ3udd suggests that 
educational like other judgements which are regarded as having a 
moral force are not so easily universalisable. For in some cases at 
least the fact that A can judge that C, is a case of E oecause it is 
X, does not commit him to holding that B must judge that a not 
dissimilar case C2 is a case of E. A can allow that B can judge not 
E and be right. B could also ÚẀTŸĴŤĚ that C1 was not E and A could 
allow that he was right. And this will be the case when both A ac.d B 
proc.u.ce the same 'definition'. ?or the question is not whether being 
E implies X but 1tlhether this case before us is and instance of E. 
Reddiford argues that certain logically necessary conditions obtain 
despite the difficulties of c5efinihon. Such 'definitions' Hill not 
help us in the problem of deteroining what i,3 an instance of what. 
Secondly, why can vie not utter 'Contradictions '? Education is worthwhile 
and not worth'dhile. Play is serious and not serious. Are these 
insta."t1ces of the la1;J of contradiction: P. not P? They do not seem to 
be meaningless contradictions but rather deep paradoxes. vie can take 
the law of identity x = x as the paradigm of consistency. Surely a 
thing must be identical with itself! But is this a logical truth? 
'l'he algebra of logic does not tell us an:"thing about things. If the 
variables are interpreted as :9ropositions then there are substantial 
counter-examples to this so-called logical law. 'Ivar is war'; 
Business is business'; 'Love is love'; 'Richard is Richard'; and so on. 
'l'hese are not empty tautologies. Nor would 'Education is education' 
be such a tautology. 1!!e can imagine a context '.fhich gives it a sense. 
rt can be uttered to get us back on the rails when faced by those 
who would water down the content of education by defending some 
impoverished concept of education. Likewise 'I'/ar is 1t!ar' reminds us 
of the reality of the thing'; 'I3usiness is business' places it above 
morality; 'Love is love' suggests that such behaviour is to be expected; 
'Richard is Richard' rema.rks that :::1ichard III is nm'! himself again. 
IJhat both these qualifications point out is that ·,ore cannot determine 
whether it mal<;:es sen,se to talk of there being logical conditions of 
saying anything is not given prior to a consideration of what we say 
(8) in particular cases. To talk of 'necessary conditions' without 
these qualifications is to facilitate the prestidigitation that 
Reddiford is condemning. A slide is made from talk of logically 
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necessary conditions in this Gense to some other sense. It becomes 
easier to suggest that there are also logically necessary conch tions 
for the mec,ning of a term. Follmving up Reddiford' s idea,s EanraJcer 
has suggested that Peters' errs in going beyond formal matters ŸŪTĚ
starting to analyse the content of education. Thus we may say that 
form2l conditions about saying anything meaningfully ?;lrovide us with 
no \vay of dealing with the content of a Hord like 'education' ŸĚ Hi th 
(9) i-lords like this 'meaning remains a permCiEe:m:.-: problem.' If the 
argument about particularity pre.3ented above and in Chapter 1 is 
valid, then \Ie cannot atten:pt to increase ŬẀŲŸĤŚŦŲŠVŮĚ of tl:ce ooncept 
of education without reference to content. In other words it is 
necessary to consider detailed and determinate examples. 
Perhaps it ŸŪŨŨĚbe argued that there are 'necessary conditions' 
for the use of the term 'education' (or any other) in the minimal 
sense that they !?pecify the rules behind our usage. This it could 
be argued is a different interpretetion of 'necessary condition' 
than the one connected with saying something meaningfully and the 
'other sense' that I have not specified yet. There are a lot of 
confusions in this suggestion, though it is essential to the methodology 
of 'conceptual analysis'. The idea is something like this. Knowing 
the meaning of a word is applying it in accordance with certain rules. 
These rules are laid dOeIn in the teaching of langua_ge. If '_'Ie break 
these rules '"e misuse the word. If He vlish to 'get clearer' about a 
word then l-Ie must specify these rules. ':2his move, ubiqui tous thou$h 
it may ':Je, is of no use. 'Rules' have nothing to do '\'i th understanding 
the meaning of a ,vord. He can misuse lang;uage as He can [1isuse a saw, 
a pen, or a hammer, })ut in doinG so He break no :cules. There are two 
major confusions here. One is a mista.'-<:e of f2.ct the other involves 
a misinterpretation of an illuElinating analogy. 
1.2. Rules 
The factual error is the belief that we 2_re taught language or 
even most of it. By an 0_ Lorge we learnlang"U2_ge but are not taught it. 
He pick up the maj ori ty of our ','.'Oro_.::" phrases, and ŲŤÜŠŲŸVHĚ ,vi thout 
any teacher. I-lore im})ortantly we cannot lec:n-l vhat it [.'lakes sense to 
say, -by any peca:;o3'ic Elethod. Learning to speak is not just learning 
the vocabulary and rules of granmar of a language. The nicture at 
vlOrk her:: is the WŤŸȘȘUÙŪŦĚof such things as forLlal gr;=;mE!atical rules 
a t a la_tel' date. 'This is the paradigm He have in our minds ';!hen 1;[e 
consider Hhat 'rules' lay behind the use of arry expression. lJe are 
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taught these 'grammatical rules' and it is thoughtlessly assumed that 
we must be taught the rules of lang'uage and the rules for the use of 
expressions when we are ŨŤŠŲŪÙŪŸĚlanguags. Let us corlsider this t;1is-
leading picture in some detail. 
'Rules' are thought to eX1Jlain o. child's ability after a finite 
period of time to utter innumerable "fell formed sentences thE,t he 
has never heard. This is sOTlletimes referred to as the ability to 
ŤẄWŲŠŸŬŨŠWŤĚor the phenomenon of linguistic creativity. To be able 
to ,speak a langu3.ge He must be guided by 'rules'. Even though the 
child does not know these 'rules' his ability to extrapolate is 
guided or governed by these unkno\"ffi 'rules'. Before Chomsky's 
sophisticated 'interne.list tl:.eory' the ability was explained by 
reference to ŸŪÙẂŤŲVŠŨVGĚ or 'principles' or even 'concepts'. These 
mysterious ŸĤHŲŤVŤŪȘŤVĚ along with an equally mysterious act of 'guiciing' 
(10) 
or 'being guided by' ,serve to direct the flm,' of words • That such 
views have become commonple.ce is a result 0:': stretching the analogy 
wi th games. Ches,s clearly has rules which are stated and available. 
It is usually learnt by reference to these rules. But there are still 
three possible ways in Hhich the game can be learnt: 
1) .:\. learns to play chess very sxilfully but entirely 
by watchj.ng. He has never seen or heard or atte:"lpted 
to forr:mlate the rules. 
2) B learns the rules by rote but has plccyed so long 
that they hB.ve become habi tUEcl \vi th him. He never 
refers to them. 
3) C has learned some rules but constantly checks up in 
his book when he makes a move. 
LanQl2.ge learning B.b initio is only characterisable by a rule description 
of the Eort given in 1). To mal<;:e this clearer let us see ,"Ihy rule 
descriptions of types 2) and 3) CalL'1.ot be said to explain a child's 
ability to extrapolate. At an advanced stage a child might ircrprove 
his ability to produce well formed sentences by learning rules about 
the split infinitive or about when to use 'infer' rather than 'imply'. 
But this is not 1:lhat has to be 8xplained. Such a person already has 
the e))ili ty to use language. Does the introduction of 'rules' 
explain anything about the child's untutored abilities? T:le answer that 
it is not ŤẄŮŨŠŪŠWŬŸXĚat all assumes that there is sor,:ething worthy of 
explanation:-:here. But it is unhelpful to postu12.te 'rules', and there 
are many difficulties created by their introduction. There are 
problems \'Ji th the notion of 'UnYJlovm' rules, of what it is to 'learn' 
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such 'unknown' rules, and of what exactly it is to be guided by 
such rules? Do we need another system of rules to show how we are 
guided by this set and so on. If we are to avoid this regress are 
we merely to say that having an 'internal' system of rules is not 
something requiring further explanation? ŸĤŊUXĚ get going on this 
regress at all? vie can be 'governed' by rules we don't know but 
can we be 'guided' by 'unknown' rules? 'dhy should the structure 
of the rules of grammar be the same as the internal grammar? If 
there are different grammars do \"e say that people have different 
structures in their heads? Any regularities may point to structural 
similarities but this is different from a similar grammar. Thus the 
introduction of the notion seems to raise more problems than it solves. 
But there is one insuperable problem. 
The postulation of explicit or implicit rules cannot explain 
language acquisition without circularity. The ability to use any 
such rules presupposes a mastery of language which is what is supposed 
to oe being explained. Ide simply hC've no idea what i t ŸĚfor there 
to be structures guiding us when we speak. '.'le may as well say that 
1 (11) we have internal structures guiding us lIThen we walk or make ove. 
In Chomsky's internalist theory the system we are presented with is 
a deductive or mathematical model. The 'deep structure' is like the 
axioms from which are deduced the sentences a person 1,oTishes to utter. 
Language is, of course, rule-like and rule-describeable, we 
could not have grammar books if it were not. 3ut it is another 
question as to whether it is rule-governed or rule-directed. It may 
seem that we are leaving the matter of a child's ability to extrapolate 
entirely without explanation. That is, we have not presented any 
theory to explain the child's ability to extrapolate. There are 
obvious alternatives here. An empiricist theory could be advanced 
leaving: the matter open to further investigation of what it is to 
recognise, compare, remember, and to generalise. Particular attention 
would have to be :oaid to habits and pattern recognition. (12) -tlhat ever 
variant is ŠTŬŸĞWŤTĚand whether explanation is given in terms of 
anological inference, association or abstraction the common factor in 
all empiricist ŠȘȘŬẀŸWVĚis that language learning is seen as a sub-
case of the ability to be inductive. A more rule centred or rational-
istic theory could be presented. Chomsky's generative grammar i"ould 
be a restricted form of such a theory. A more complete theory which 
links both the syntActic and ser.1antic elements of language into a 
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unified whole. Such a unified system would consist of a list containing 
the entire rules of language. Each sentence would have the form of a 
prescription or injunction. It would be a hierarchy of sUb-systems 
of rules. (13) Quite clearly this would be a deductive model. Empiricist 
theories offer a satisfying solution to the yroblem of meaning by 
associating certain elements, whether words or sentences, with the 
world. Traditionally all such theories resort to some absurd form of 
ratiocination such as inductive abstraction to explain this connection. 
The deductive Dodel avoids this problem by reference to some prescriptive 
rule e.g. 'This X is to be associated with Y'. But this comes up 
against all the objections we have mentioned in connection Hith the 
introduction of 'rules' to explain extrapolation. The model of 
language as a rule folloHing activity like a game is a corrective 
to empiricist theories. But the deductive model comes up against 
equally strong objections. The choice is between a mythology of 
abstraction or a mythology or some super-deductive inner guidance 
system. This is no choice at all. However, we do not have to go 
into detail for the point is not to resolve but to quickly review the 
debate so that the peculiar nature of the philosoyher's 'appeal to 
rules' can be made clear. Aware of the non-choice between the Scylla 
of ind u ction and the Charybdis of deduction some philosophers incline 
to view that the rules are TIon-inductive, non-deductive, inference 
(14 ) 
rules' • l!/'hatever their status the use of 'rules' does not 
explain or justify an ability to use la.nguage. 'w'hat I shall argue is 
that there is nothing to explain or justify here. 
It may be thought that 'rules' as used above is metaphorical. It 
is obscure. It does not reflect our ordinary usage of the term. ',Jhat 
is needed is a non-metaphorical account. Or one which minimises the 
reliance on metaphor. \1e could proceed by distinguishing 'rules' from 
closely related notions such as descriptions, laws, commands, principles, 
maxims, canons, orders, customs, regulations and so forth. This would 
follow the classic pattern of conceptual analysis. A characterisation 
of Tules' could then be provided which could tell us whether language 
could be said to be a rule following activity. Such an analysis haS 
been provided and 'rules' have been characterised as appropriately 
adopted prescriptive linguistic entities having no truth value. Hore 
fully linguistic entities called 'rules' i) have no truth value; 
ii) are follm·mble; iii) are prescriptive; iv) havect)een adopted; 
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v) remain in force till unadopted; and vi) are conditional, that is, 
they act as critiques of behaviour if and only if certain antecedent 
conditions are fulfilled. (15) 
Even such an analysis does not help the proponents of the rule-
governed theory. ŸŸÙWŤĚ the ŬŮŸŬVÙWŤHĚ as the characterisation given 
above only allows examples of the sort given in case 3) above to be rule 
foll01,o1ing acti vi ties. 'lie cannot go into all the details of the argument 
h (16) ere. But briefly we could say that in case 1) we have merely an 
example that is in accordance with rules. In case 2) we have an 
example which is both in accordance \-Ji th and fulfil s rules. But only 
3) is in accordance with, fulfil:E and follo,,!s rules. So the second 
criterion is not fulfilled. Given this our initial objections of a 
less rigid sort are confirmed and language is not strictly speaking 
a rule governed activity but is an activity that can accord with rules. 
Which is to say no ŸŬŲŤĚ than that it is rule-describable. 
Thus language cannot be said to be rule-governed and the learning 
of language is not explained by reference to either explicit or 
implicit rules. It may be though a consequence of this that all we 
do in learning language is to le'lTn what [;enera,lly happens. This is 
what Ziff argues when he reduces 'rules' to 'regularities'. He 
argues that it is regularities not rules that 'de are concerned with 
when we are concerned with language. Rules constrain but regularities 
do not. This can b", illustrated by considering the following three 
propositions: 
(a) Ann ret;;ularly cycles to work. 
(b) As a rule, Ann cycles to work. 
(c) The rule is that Ann cycles to work. 
(a) is easily assir:1ilated to (c) vic, (b). C;:'he more general mis-:ake is 
the assimilation of languscge to a metatheoretical system which is 
supoosed to descri-:.Je it in the sense that it is an adequate projection 
of it. 'Rules' are ir.:portant in formal systems and it is assumed that 
because these, or some of them, correspond in relevant systems to 
semantic regularities, that these regularities are the 'rules' of 
language. rrhat is, that there are 'rules of lan;uage'. 11e are here 
concerned vIi th non-syntactic semantic regularities hut the point holds 
good for syntactic regularities as well. ŸUÙVĚargument is not always 
made very clear. I'Jhen it is, it is obvious that to say that 'there must 
be rules in n2,tural langusge is like arguing that roads must be red if 
. (17) they correspond to the red llnes on a map.' 
·",./hat Ziff ignores is that language is more like a rule-governed 
system than a series of observed ŲŤŦẀŨŸŲÙWÙŤVĚbecause it makes sense 
to talk of 'right' and 'wrong' in connection with language. But this, 
in turn, does not mean that language is a rule-governed activity. life 
can be right or ·,'.Tong wi thou t breaking any rules. 'I was right about 
that picture, it does go well in this room' or 'I was wr§1lg about the 
curtains the pattern is too larger. Both these comments can be made 
without reference to any rules. 
To say the.t in learning language we learn rules is to speak 
metaphorically. Rhecs qualifies his talk of 'rules· in connection 
with language by allowing that learning language 'is in some ways 
like leBTning the rules of a game, although in some ltlays it is very 
different. It is different from learning tIle rules 0:: a calculus, 
too. In fact in some ways it is misleading to talk of rules at all 
here. But it does make somethings clearer - that it is possible to use 
(13) 
an expression wrongly, for instance. 1 'iJ"hen you learn to speak you 
learn not merely what other people do but to say something. 1iie agree 
that this sample is red. If 10le did not agree in our reactions it 
would be irriDossible to say anything, as nothing could be taught. Talk 
of vrules I brings out the force of this a,greement. but it is not that 
there is a criterion and therefore a justification for our calling a 
sample 'red j in 'human agreement i • i .• ŸŤĚ have no criterion and we lleed 
no criterion. h'e have no justification and need. no justification. 
The point about metaphor can be made clearer oy reference to 
:.H ttgenstein' s style. For the notions of 1 1'ule'like the notion of 
'criteria' are both most at home in his work. ne uses the notion of 
a I rule i of language to combat a misleaci.ing picture of lang"uage that 
was common to ŤŸŮÙŲÙȘÙVWĚ ti eories. But this stress on rules has to 
be seen in the context of his repeated denials that he is presenting 
an alternative theory, and the "Jay he does this is to show that \·,.-e 
need. not talk of 'rules' but merely knmving how to continue a series 
of examples. Examples are an antidote to theories. 
'Io illustrate how the analogy \·:i th 'rules' can be both illuminatin6' 
and misleading let us look at the analogy with 'games' for it is the 
rules of games like chess that form the basis of the former analogy. 
Garnes are autonomous. \ihat is right or Hrong in any game is 
determined by ths rules. If I castle after moving my king then I am 
no longer playing chess. If I wish to play I must follow the rules. 
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There is no external purpose in playing chess. :Langua;;e is autonomous 
in a similar way. 1Ihat is right or vlrong is not determined. by 
something external to language. Hight a1.'2.d ,""rong is decided by 
reference to the internal 'rules' of language. Bernard Harrison has 
suggested that 'autonomy: is itlhat distinguishes language from a series 
of marks, or sounds. ;Je read off the meanihg from the faces of the 
( 'j9) 
signs if we are dealing 1:Jith a language. 
Games and the rules of games are also arbi trary • '/e can ask 
whether a Game , , 1S gOOQ. '.!e can choose whether we play it or not. 'je 
can alter and invent rules at will as a result of human choice. But 
language is not arbitrary in this sense. If it were vIe could say 
that a 'private language' is impossible because there is a decree by 
human beings that it be impossible. Vie have set up a 'rule' to the 
effect that there shall be no private language. Thus by fiat the 
notion would be meaningless or nonsense. Vlittgenstein warns of the 
dangers of seeing language as arbitrary in the way that games are 
when he says that 'Hhen a sentence is called senseless, it is not 
as it were its sense that is senseless' (P.I. s 500) To take another 
example from Chapter 1 'No surface can be red and green allover'. 
The contradictory of this is imrossible. But not because of a rule. 
vIe cannot explain why we accept this 'grammatical proposition'. He 
could go further and remind ourselves of what it makes sense to talk 
about 'red chairs' and 'green chairs' but not 'red/green chairs'. 
But we still give no reasons for this. 
ŸẂŞŤŪĚwe use metaphors, give analogies, or use simil es we are 
inviting someone to compare and contrast sOl7lething with something else 
vIe are not inviting the:n to equate and identify tvJO things. If we 
interpret metaphors systematically 1!!e systematically misinterpret 
them. He have seen that it is misleading to consider that language 
is a rule-governed activity and that its 'rules' do not provide us 
wi th a justification for 1.-!hat we say in the "lay that the rules of 
chess justify the moves made in that game. ŸUŤĚ idea behind this is 
that the whole of lanf,J"L<age is a 'language-game' and can be said to 
have rules like any other game. 'The expression usually refers to 
some prir:'ii ti ve or incomplete fragment of language. Thus we can talk 
of the language-game of '}Jromising'. Can such acti vi ties be defined 
by giving a complete list of the rules for engaging in that activity? 
Searle gives five rules of promising which he derives from nine 
conditions which do not differ from these 'rules' except that four 
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are of more general application. The two most imDortant rules are 
the 'sincerity rule' 'P is to be uttered only if S intends to do 
A' and the 'essentie.l rule' 'The utterance of P counts as the 
undertakins of an obligation to do A'. (20) Having produced these 
rules Searle adds that the 'rather tiresome analogy vIi th games is 
holding up rer;]arkably well! nut this is bound to be the case 
because promising is being rewritten as a game with rules. But 
nothing is gained by talking of 'rules' for the 'speech act' of 
promising. If someone is insincere vjhen he g'oes through the 
motions of promising we may be outraged. He's broken his promise. 
But this is a breach of ȘŬŸÜÙWÜŤŪWĚnot the breaking of a rule. Austin 
almost always talked of insta.nces where the promising was 'null and 
void' or 'insincere' or involved a breach of 'commitment' as 
(21) 
'unhappy'. ii/e could talk of 'happy' and 'unhappy' rather than 
'rule-fulfilling' and 'rule-brea.1dng' instances. Nothing Hould 
be lost but an illusion of strictness. The illusion that in some 
way rules determine Hhen it makes sense to promise and when not. 
Rules do not and cannot define the nature of an activity. This 
holds even for a game like chess. Statements like Searle's rules for 
promising are attempts to explicate the activity of promising. They 
attempt to remind us what it makes sense to say about promising. In 
Chapter 1 we referred to such reminders as 'grammatical pemarks'. 
Once again the term 'grammar' derives from Uittgenstein. It differs 
from school textbook grammar in reminding us of so much more. 
Grammar reminds us th3.t it makes sense to say 'He goes out' but not 'He 
out goes'. 'Grammar' reminds us that it makes sense to say of chess, 
for example, things like 'Lets play', 'Good move', 'Careless', 'I beat 
him' and soforth. But these remarks are not 'rules' in any sense. The 
rules of chess define chess. This is unobjectionable. An example will 
, (22) illustrate these pOlnts. 
Imagine a tribe who have a sacred rite of chess. Two ?riests 
play one game once a year to determine the "'ill of the gods. If white 
wins the community \oJill flourish. If black wins there '!Jill be trouble. 
A traveller asks ''vlho is winning?' arLd receives the reply that 'Chess 
is not a battle'. Later on he asks his host if he would like to play 
competitive ga!Jes. They have no concept of winning. To them the idea 
of winning at chess would be as absurd as the idea of winning at mass 
in our culture. 
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There are several ways in which this example needs to be ÜŠTŸĚ
more determinate. The origin of the game needs to be explained. 
Perhaps it is a result of a visit by a 'oJesterner long ago. It would 
bear some reseDblance to the infamous 'cargo-cults'. But for our 
purposes 'de can fill out the necess3,ry details by meeting some 
objections to the example. 
It could be ar;lled that although this activity is not a game for 
the observers it could be one for the priests, teey could enter into 
competition. But this changes the example. The example was not one 
of a culture where the vriests played regularly in secret but in 
public only once a year. Nor is the indeterminancy of the outcome 
a function of competition. The priests could stop after every move 
and Ivai t for d±i..vine guidance. They need not use strategy. It could 
also be a.rgued that the excur.ple is not adecuate as the priests must 
obey the rules of chess and not merely r.1ake moves in accordance with 
the rules. But they do. If asked ,'Ihy the bishop moves diagonally 
they will refer to the rules. Finally it could be made a condition 
of their really playing chess that they see theoselves as playing 
chess. But they do not see chess as a sacred rite. If this means 
that thi,s cannot be seen a,s a game of chess then the point is made. 
This is precisely ,vhat is being a:cgued. The rite of chess has a 
different 'grammar' from the gaue of chess. 
This example VUÜŸVȘŨŤÎHŲŨXĚ th2,t rules ca:'1llot explicate ,,!hat it 
lS to play chess. Playing chess does not consist in acting in 
accordance with the rules. The game is not characterisable as a 
system of rules. It is only when you kno,", the 'gram:nar' that you 
knmv what ,sort of activity sor.1ething is. 
1,'le are now in a position to deal Hi th Sea.rle' s sugGestion that 
there are two sorts of rule and that scepticism about foruulating 
semantic 'rules' stems from a failure to distinguish them. 'vie have 
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already suggested that what he calls 'rules' are 'grammatical propositions'. 
This \·rill be the basis of the cri ticisE1 of the distinction he makes 
between 'regulative' al1.d 'constitutive rules'. Regulative rules merely 
regulate antecedently existing behaviour wherea,s consti tuti ve rules 
create or define new forms of behaviour. But such constitutive rules 
cannot define "rho,t is the nature of an acti vi ty. Pc new acti vi ty, a 
new practice can only be brought into being \"hen its gran1r.1ar is clear. 
Sup;;ose the 'rules' of X in,s are listed frOfJi these rules alone we could 
not tell what sort of activity X ing was. It could be a rite, or a 
game or something else. The 'rules' vlOuld be something more pointless 
than a pointless list until their 'grammar' is given. In so far as 
Searle's constitutive rules give us the 'grammar' they may be said 
to explicate the concept of Dromising. But what of the 'important' 
distinction between the hm sorts of rule? Consti tuti ve rules seem 
to have an alchemical pO'.V"er of creatin.s ne'" forr.1S of behaviour while 
regulative rules merely regulate existing behaviour. This is 
seriously ambiguous between creating new behaviour and new descriptions 
of behaviour. The distinction may thus be seen to be being blurred. 
Perhaps there is a distinction to be macle here but why should it be 
made in terms of a distinction between hV"o sorts of rules? l.v'hy not 
say th2_t there are two sorts of behaviour rule-regula ted behaviour 
and rule-constituted behaviour? If we do not say this 
we certainly imply, and shall probably thin..1.{ that 
there exist two classes of rule that are fOrmally and 
inherently different. But rules are rules of, and in 
rela_tion to, behaviour. ŸUŤXĚaTe not things vlhich can 
be examined in abstraction and, upon examination, be 
classified by their very ne_ture consti tuti ve or regula ti ve. 
To speak of two kinds of rule is to speak of tvlO kinds of 
relationship. 1ile cannot know in particular cases what 
kind of relationship (and hence what kind of rule) until 
we know Hhat piece of beh2.viour is in question.' (23) 
Etio.uette is behaviour 'r:hich Searle suggests is characterised by 
regulative rules. But this can pass the constitutive test, and in 
a far from trivial vJay. l1e have certain pieces of behaviour, 
shaking hands, kissing a lady's hand, and such like which were 
possible before the rules of etiquette were introduced. But etiquette 
creates new possibilities of behaviour in the form of 'polite' and 
'impoli te' behaviour. ile could shake hands before the introduction 
of the rules of etiquette but now it has a point that it didn't have 
before. Before it \"as no insult to refuse to shake hands. A new 
form of behaviour is introduced and not G1erely the regulation of 
antecedent forms. Uhat Searle characterises as 'regulative' rules are 
therefore a form of 'constitutive' rules of his definition. If \"e 
consider other exar.1ple,5 \,re will see that the point about etiquette 
applies to other activities constituted by 'regulative' rules. 
Constitutive rules in some fully fledged sense which introduced a ne,,, 
form of behaviour tout court would be distingTcishable from the back-
ward looking sort of rules of the sort that ch?.racterise etiquette. 
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However the introduction of such 'rules' uould not enable us to partici}Jate 
in any acti vi ty because lele would not know the nature of the acti vi ty 
in question. Only by being given the 'grammar' of the activity could 
we engage in it. To the extent that Searle's so-called rules give us 
the 'grammar' of some activity they do enable us to understand and 
participate in that activity. But they do not enable us to do this 
by being 'rules' of B.ny sort. 
The idea that language is a matter of rules misleadingly suggests 
that there is a systematic connection between the conditions of 
utterance and that utterance. Our use of a term can then be justified 
by reference to these conditions via the rules which give us 'criteria'. 
In the next section we ,..,ill see how this oisleading idea gains 
expression in -ohiloso"'Jhy of education. 
2.3. 'Criteria' As ŨŸŤȘŤVVŠŲXĚand Sufficient Conditions 
So far I have said little about 'necessary and sufficient 
conditions' or 'sufficient conditions'. In doing so I merely followed 
a comr:10n practice. These sorts of conditions are usually only 
considered in cO:'"'Jlection with symbolic systems where tight logically 
necessary and sufficient conditions can 1:1e laid dOlem. The attempt to 
produce 'necessary an.d sufficient conditions' for the use of terms in 
ordinary language is now almost universally adlI1i tted to be futile. 
The reason usually given is that ordinary language is too va6ue. 
',fuatever is meant by this it does not preclude the surreptitious 
re-introduction of necessary and sufficient conditions to help refine 
the vague concepts embodied in ordinary language. 
The idea that there are 'necessary and sufficient conditions' for 
the use of terms is often called the 'strong thesis' of 'conceptual 
analysis'. The 'weal;: thesis' is the claim that there are 'necessary 
conditions' for the use of terms. It is in the exposition of this 
'weak thesis' that we meet with the 'o-:hcr sense' of 'necessary 
condition' that I hinted at earlier. To introduce this highly 
dubious and ouestionable 'other 1.:.ense' I want to follow another con,Don 
practice of ŮUÙŸŬŮUŤŲVĚof education. I will introduce the term 
'criterion' into the discussion as if it were totally unproblematic. 
Ly excuse for this is the fe.ct that I will consider it later in great 
detail and offer an account of it. 
The term usually slips in u:moticed in the general muddle 
associated witt 'use', 'application', 'rule', 'condition' and several 
other terLls which are also useo. Hi thout too much explanation of what 
they mec'-il. Hirst and :?eters provide us vrith a typical exaoJJle of such 
a muddle. In The Logic of :Sduca tion they begin v!i th a discussion of 
'sufficient' conditions, and 'necessary' conditions for the possession 
of a concept. They then ŲĤHŠŸĤȘŤĚ a reVi remarks about having a concept and 
the possession of ffi1 ability and try to differentiate this from a more 
f ' t 1 ' . f " l' ( 24) Th h uno.amen a grasplng 0 a prlnClp e • ..ey t en mention 
'publiclj oBservable criteria' without explication. They then talk 
about definition and distinguish between the setting out of 'logically 
necessary conditions' and other sorts of conditions. They then show 
how Hi tt?'enstein brought the possibility of finding necessary conditions 
into question. They then say that they do not adopt a 'crude view' of 
the explanation of a ,",'ords meaning that would involve them in trying 
to produce a ha.rd and fast set of logically ŸÍĦŤȘŤVVŠŲJŲĚ conch tions for 
all uses of a word. 'Education' 8ug?ests to them two 'conditions', 
the 'desirability' ŠŸGŨTĚ 'knovJledge' conditions. These give us 'criteria ' 
for distinguisbing between cases of educa tio!]. B.,.'1ci other things. They 
consider counter-eXamlJles v!hich suggest that these are not 'logiGally 
necessary conditions' of the term in general use. To cater for this 
they distinguish between a 'specific' and 'general' concept '.ii thin 
the 'continuum' of cases of education. Cn the basis of an argument 
fror;- etymology they suggest that our modern c0!1cept of education is 
or incorporates in a 'central' position this more specific concept that 
the=c have picked out. This more specific concept presumably has tight 
'logically necessary conditions'. Indeed Peters has referred to his 
. (25) 
analysis as brinGing about a tightening up of the concept of educatlon. 
In other works by Peters and others these implied 'conditions' are 
called 'criteria'. In The Logic of Education these conditions are 
merely said to 'give' us criteria by \vhich we can make certain 
educational decisions. 
This introductory account is 'subtle' in that it incorporates the 
'classic move' of conceptuaL.analysis. It is not intended to be an 
authoritative account. But if ;c,ll the available papers are studied 
there is little substantial improvement upon it. Considering the 
concept of education for contemporary pHlosophers of education oeans 
dealing ,o!i th the work of Peters 0 Almost all papers begin with his 
account, or contrast their accounts ,lith his.,. or suggest some amendment 
to his account, or merely set out to clarify aspects of his account. 
I shall discuss the many variants on his basic approach as my argument 
proceeds. 
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The 'muddle' is the lack of a clear differentiation between the 
sorts of thing mentioned. 'Principles ĒŮẀŞŨÙȘŨŸĚ observable criteria' 
'conditions' 'necessary conc.itions' 'rules' and 'criteria' are all 
mentioned but only WŲÑJŸĚ first two are differentiated. Hirst and Peters 
attempt to impose a Kantian \'ledge between a concept as an acti vi ty and 
some more fundar:;ental grasping of a 'principle'. It is questionable 
whether it is possible to insert such a "ledge in any absolute sort of 
way. ŸĒĴŬŲŤĚ interestingly this general 'principle' seems to be a 
'condition', possibly a 'necessary condition', a.TJ.Q also a 'rule' and 
a 'criterion'. To untangle this Gordian Knot it is necessary to 
consider just what is involved in the sug-gestion that there are 
'criteria' for a '.vord's v-se, or for the application of a concept. Thus 
the questions 'Are there necessary and/or suf:::icient conditions for 
(the use of the term) education? 'and the question ',,'ere there criteria 
(for the use of the terr,,) education?' cross here. 
Though I have linked WŸHŤĚ 'cri teriological' approach to concepts 
firmly with Kant, Plato's Socrates could be a contender for the role 
of antagonist in my arguments. The' cri teriological' ap:oroach is what 
many people c2.11 the 'Socratic >Tethod' it merely differs from it in 
not necessaril:! see'dng for 'criteria' to fit all cases. It allows 
broad borderlines. The notion in current use derives almost 
exclusively from \1ittgenstein. Some evidence for this claim can be 
given: Firstly, there have been over 200 articles written recently 
in which '"Ti ttgenstein' s use of 'criteria' has in some \vay been 
" (26) dlscussed. Secondly, encyclopaedia entries dealing with this 
concept are almost entirely restricted to discussions of ',Ji ttgenstein' s 
f . t (27) use 0 1. Thirdly, the use of the tero in philosophy of education 
has connections with '"li ttgenstein. This will be clearer \1hen we 
discuss amendments to ŸŤWŤŲVĚaccount, 'out it is evident from Peters' 
own Hork. Peters is quite clearly familiar and concernec. vii th 
"vIi ttgensteinian notions such as 'farJily re.'?embLmce' c.nd Langford has 
suggested that his use of 'criteria' is an abuse of '6i ttsenstein' s 
" (28) 
notl0n. Discussing Ui ttgenstein' s notion gives us a \vay into this 
perplexinG maze. Before offering an account of ir,fi ttgenstein' s notion 
I shall discuss another co;nmon interpretatio::l of it which has strong 
affini ties vIi th the 'Socratic' view of 'criteria'. 
This early and mistaken interpretation issues from a seminal 
pape::-" by ĻŨŞŸŔGÙWWŬJĤŨĦĚ 'The criterion', he says, 'is a logically necessary 
11 ŸȚ·Ě "t dOt" ,(29) mh h" "t t't" "ll as we as SUJ...1Clen con 1 10n. 1 us lS ln erpre a :Lon 1 _us-
trates how 'necessary and sufficient conditions' can get in through the 
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back door. How far this interpretaL_on can be attributed to Peters 
is hard to say. He does not specify the notion he is working with. 
But if it is, then there is quite clearly a serious contradiction in 
his writings as he, tacitly at least, aE;rees with those who reject 
the 'crude' search for such conditions. I susC"lect that Peters' 
unanalysed notion exhibits a stronger connection with one of two more 
'interpretations' of 'criteria' that I shall give. But all this is 
mere opining until such time as Peters specifies exactly what he means 
by 'criteria'. 
How does Albritton defend his contention? A main line of his 
defence rests on his reading of t'.-JO remarks from the Brown Book where 
Wittgenstein is discussing 'reading'. ŸUŤĚ two remarks are a reference 
to the 'real criterion for a person's reading or not reading' and one 
to 'the real criterion distinguishing reading from not reading'. (30) 
He considers only one objection to his equating 'criteria' ,·ri th 
'necessary and sufficient conditionS. This is that he is doing violence 
to 1·li ttgenstein' s thought by trying to force it into a straight jacket 
of jargon. One of the major tenet· of iili ttgenstein' s thought is 
supposed to be that many explanations of "rhat we mean by an expression 
are inherently vague and none the worse for that. In reply to this 
he says that he has not offered to tabulate' strict rules' for 
ŸŊÙĚttgenstein 's use of criteria. He also adds a rider to the effect that 
the 'logically necessary and sufficient conditions' of X being a case 
of Y rest on human conventions. 
A serious objection to this account is that it is based on a very 
cursory textual reading. The two exaQples of ways for looking at 
reading that are given in the BrQi.offi ĨÌŸÛĚ (31) are being criticised by 
iIi ttgenstein. The first is actually prefaced by the phrase 'There is 
a great temptation to regard the conscious mental act as •••• ' In the 
second example l,'ii tts:enstein is questioning the notion that a person's 
feelings are the criterion of ŲŤŸŨŚTÙŪŦĚ or not reB_ding. Clearly 
Vii ttgenstein is not suggestin.5 that we WŠŶŸŤĚ ǾŸŊĚ the notion of there 
being somethilllgg" which is the criterion of reading. Zxactly the 
opposite, he is attacking this notion. He is attacking the idea that 
there is a 'la,,1 in the w.ay a word is used' not putting this forward as 
a possibility. This is what is wronG with AliJri tton' s introduction of 
'necessary a."'ld sufficient conditions'. These terms bring Hi th them the 
idea of la"rs, of strict rules. Albritton may not set out strict rules 
for the ap:"lication \'i ttgen.stein makes of the term 'criterion' but he 
is committed to the idea that it allows us to sho'll how terms are 
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strictly applied on the basis of human convention. As we shall see 
later Albritton is mixing up bolO d.ifferent accounts of meaning. 
This way of interpreting 'criteria' has had Gany criticisms 
levelled against it. i·!ewton Garver, F.it. Seigler, Carl Ginet and 
Paul Ziff have discussed it at length in VXÜŸŬVÙẀÜĦĚ Carver begins 
by criticising Albritton in just the v/ay that he had expected and 
unsatisfactorily tried to ŮŲŤŤŲŸŮWĚ in his paper: 
' ••• to begin in this manner (ie. ',vi th necessary and 
sufficient conditions) is to set off in the wrong 
direction. The terminology is alien and inimical to 
'IJi ttgenstein 's thought, for the concept of a criterion 
was introduced by ŸÚÙĚttbenstein precisely to avoid 
speaking of necessary and sufficient conditions in 
respect of those relations ,,,here such a forr:1al notion 
does not apply. Criteria are human instruments, 
whereas conditions are natural phenomena; criteria are used 
or applied, whereas conditions obtain; criteria are 
arbitrary or conventional, a:cd Hhen "Ie reach them lithe 
chain of re2sons has an end ll , ,"hereas statements about 
necessary and sufficient conch tions are justified by 
something else, generally by scientific laws; conditions 
are conceptually ind.ependent of what they are conditions 
for, \-!hereas criteria (in 'i.'li ttgenstein' s sense) are not, 
and so on. Only confusion and perplexity can result 
frOE:: arJalganating two sUCD diverse concepts ••• ' (32) 
If this is compared with my sketch of hmv such 'conditions' are 
usually ir..troduced in :ohilosophy of education it is quite obvious 
that VÕŇŸŤWUÙŪŦĚdifferent is bein€; considered. F'or Peters' account 
begins :oy separating 'logically necessary conditions' frOD other 
sorts of 'conditions' 2uch as contingently necessary ŮŲŤĤȘŬŸTÙWÙŬŪVĦĚ
Peters' 'criteria}' are more like '.;arver's 'cri tera' in that they 
are said to be conceptually con..l.leci:ed Hi th \·,ha.t they are of. Thus 
it looks as if Garver's account of a 'condition' is wrong or Peters 
is mixing up 'conditions' and 'cri teri2.'. I shall leave the 
resolution of this problem for the rlOment, and taking Garver's 
account at face value, ŐŸÍÌÍWŊĚ other ways in which it can be faulted. 
Garver takes iii ttgenstein to oe using the notion of 'criteria' 
to apply to relations where the notion of 'necessary and sufficient 
condi tions' does not ap:ply. 'l'his ÜŠŸĦĴJŤVĚ 'cri terie.' both like, as well 
as unlike 'conditions'. They are lLce 'conditions' in that they do 
the job (as instruments) that 'conditions' do, only where 'cona.itions' 
for some reason, are not applicable. On this view 'criteria' are 
merely intended to fill in e. gap left over by 'conditions' and thus 
cannot be 'conditions'. Sut VẀŮŸŬVŤĚ that many 'conditions' change. 
ŸÙŨŨĚthe 'criterion' of X still ensure that something is X no matter 
73 
what other factors have changed; Al;)ri tton, if he is to hold to his 
view that 'criteria' are 'necessary anC'. sufficient conditions' must 
3.gree with this view, though it is highly questionable. Sadly, the 
same thing seems to be true of Garver's view. For, as he strongly 
differentiates WUŤŔŸĚhe does not allcw for this sort of case. Garver's 
whole ap:proe.ch seems to r.1e to set off in the direction that hlbri tton 
sets off in. He is clearly looking for some sort of 'theory' of 
'cri teria' • (33) As I have said ŸÙÙĚtt3enste1n is attacking the idea 
that there is a 'la1:l in the Vlay O. "rord is used'. To pick out 13 
'distinctive features' of 'criteria' in the Viay that Garver does is 
a totally un-Hittgensteinian :9rocedure. Such listing is the essence 
of essentialism. Hovl it is supposeo. to illum:.nate his use of ' criteria' 
is beyond conjecture. It is as if som80ne 1-lere to try to understand 
what a 'form of life' is by looking at &11 the occasions on ,vhich 
'vii ttgenstein uses the tern'; and listing the conrl1on features l:o'e found. 
l;.That '"e "!Quld COrle up with would seem very like 'conditions' for the 
application of the term. Or perha:9s Cjarver would say V[e would have 
'criteria' for the use of 'criteria'? \fuatever he would say it is not 
surprising that his fellows in the symposiurl found his comnents 
unclear and often inconsistent. 
Garver makes the point that 'conditions' can be used in th8 ",ay 
that Garver says 'criteria' ,should be used, and he concludes \vi th 
the insightful remark that , •••• the feeling that criteria are 
somehow suspect often arises, I believe, from wondering how preCisely 
they are like yet not the saL1e as necessary and sufficient defining 
(34) 
conditions.' But Ginet also seems to ÜÎŸŤĚ this very ÜÙVWŲẀŸŤĚ
\oThen he suggests that: 
Tl'lv·i ttgenstein 's notion of a criterion is a generalisation 
of the ntion of a defir..ing necessary and sufficient 
condi tion •••••• ",hich does not require that they be 
blessed \l/i th necessity or sufficiency •••••• things are 
determined by the more fluid, or -dorldly things of h'.lman 
custom and agreement in human responses.' (35) 
It would be better to c.doC)t VIi ttgenstein' s ovm method of never 
comparinG the hvo. Indeed I have found no reference to 'necessary 
and sufficient conditions' in Hittgenseein' s ,·!ork. Contrasting them 
with 'criteria' even in the way Ginet does leads to the problems he 
descri bes. 'L'J'hen he says that' cri teria' are a generalisation of the 
notion of 'necessary a.l1d sufficient conditions' this is true. it,,'hat 
Ginet does not understand is vlhat Hittgenstein is producing this 
generalisation for. Siegler sees one of his intentions very clearly: 
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'Often i:iittgens-'::ein uses the notion of criteria to avoid 
the suggestion of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
And the term is most often used in the criticism of 
sceptical or metaphysical theses •••• He asks the sceptic 
to explain in 'efha tever 'iTaY he likes what he means, or how 
he can mean what he must in order to say what he >'fishes 
to say, or how he can do ".,ha t he implies he can do, or the 
like •••• ' (36) 
He introduces the notion to avoid the suggestion of 'necessary and 
sufficient conditions'. In fact, as He shall see, the term is 
introduced to attack a whole way of looking at questions about 
meaning of ,,,hich looking for such conditions is merely one aspect. 
Superficially the Ginet and Siegler accounts seem incompatible, 
but they are not. The generalisa.tion is used as part of an attack 
on a theory of mecming and is applied during the cri ticisEl of 
certain VȘŤŸŸWĚical or meta:Jhysical theses in a rather unusual 'lay. 
'The unusual nature of the "'TaY in which ",Ii ttgenstein aW:Jlies the 
tern: is one ,-,!hich precludes any talk of his having a 'logical 
theory of criteria'. 
All of the participants in the ,symposium were agreed on 
the ŦŤŸĦŤŲŠŨĚ conclusion that 'criteria' l'fere in no way to be seen 
as 'nece.3sary and sufficient conditions'. Yet all the accounts of 
'criteria' given,make the error of making the notion seem a little 
too like the notion of such conditions. The reason for this is that 
they are not able to give an adequate account of 1rfhy the term is 
introduced. But even before such al1 account is offered they hint at 
a distinction behreen 'criteria' and such conditions. Ginet' s 
comments will serve a.s an example. He considers that to distance 
the two it is necessary to establish (a) that there can be different 
criteria for-+the application of a term that are not a set of 
necessary conditions; and (b) that there can be a logically insufficient 
cri terion. lie attempts to anS\ver these points in the followinz; vlay. 
He mentions the 'family resemblance' notion and the in:portance of 
particular circuTGstances, as included in criteria, as possible answers 
to Ca). The idea of a '10gic,c:ll1y insufficient criterion' troubles 
him. He thinks that the 'shooting a duck' example given by Garver 
might be an example of a case v!here a criterion cannot be specifieo.. 
It is a case where there is room for doubt. A man may raise a gun 
and shoot a duck, that is, one may fall frOE' the sky. Now we may say 
he aimed at it, and what we sal"! may be O'Jr criterion of so saying. But 
doubt is not ruled out, so our criterion n'.ay be an example of an 
insufficient one. (37) A differentiation is possi"ole along such lines, 
and I shall taJ:e up several of Ginet' s suggestions as we proceed but 
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I will put them to a slightly different use. 
Leaving the 'strong thesis' aside, let us consider the 'other 
sense' of 'necessary condition'. This is also an assimilation of the 
notion to that of a 'criterion'. But a different and more complex 
account is given of 'criteria'. This account is one that I think is 
implicit in Peters' notion of a criterion as it has been interpreted 
in the literature. 
2.4. 'Criteria' In Philosophy of Education 
This notion of 'criteria' has been developed to attack or to 
defend or to make more explicit the nature of the 'conceptual truths' 
about education propounded by i?eters. I \oJill consider one account and 
show how it derives from a use of the WŤŲŸĚthat has become increasingly 
common in 'pure' philosophy. The account is that of F.N. Dunlop. 
Dunlop's account is exegetical and his positive contributions are 
tentati ve. He doe,:" not deal at length with the notion of 'criteria', 
but ȚŸŬÜĚhis account of what Peters is doing certain things stand out. 
Firstly, there is a necessity behind language which forces us to adopt 
a certain concept. VJe have to accept it because the world is what it 
. (38) lS. This suggestion is supported by using the notion of a 'human 
being' as an intermeciiary. 'l'he world being 1:lhat it is and we being 
what vIe are certain things must be held as conceptually true. Of course 
Dunlop cannot deny that people disagree about what ŤTẀȘŠŸÙŬŪĚis. To 
deal with this pertinent olJ ,icction he ·out forward the rather implausible 
notion that 'being human is-an ŠȘUÙŤẂŤŸŤŪWGĦĚ (39) Then the state of 
being fully human is never re2.ched, according to Dunlop. We still lapse 
from it, we are irrational, and often passive victims of convention. 
Secondly, he exploits a distinction between the 'uses of a vlOrd' and 
the 'concept' in an idiosyncratic and misleading fashion. If \-Je were 
only interested in the way words are used then 'the concept could be 
connected with all sorts of criteria an particular social groups'. (40) 
The word Day have unusual and odd uses but \"e can say that the concept 
is being misused if we go so far as to deny certain things, for instance, 
th t ht t d 1 th " (41) mh f D 1 t . a one oug 0 eve op e mlnQ. 1.' us, or un op cer aln 
'criteria' are guaranteed b:/ the way we are, by ,'Jhat \·r8 do. i.le must 
acl<-..D.o'.-Jledge these criteria if l-re are to be human. 
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The force of the first point comes from Dunlop making the notion 
of 'human being' central to an account of 'education'. But he is 
assuming a totally unbelieveable view of the uniformity of human beings. 
Education can be considered to be 'truth', 'the development of the soul', 
'a process of exploitation' and many many other things ŸĚÏÎŸŬÜŤŬŪŤĚvIho 
was committed to the vie\'IT that educat ion was about the development of 
the soul might radically disagree with DuriPp's suggestion that 
education implies that ,va shoule. develop the mind. It is not impossible 
that these two vie'.;!s could be held to be incompatible. ŨŸŐĚ I understand 
it, Dunlop's only line of defence Vlould be to say that his opponent's 
vievl was evidence that he was less completely human than himself. But 
this defence will not stand up. Being 'human' is not an achievement 
concept in the way that Dunlop thinks. ĦŨŸĚ prima facie piece of counter-
evidence is that there are no common utter2.nces in our language of the 
form 'now he is a human being' or 'He is nOl'I half 1fT?y to being a human'. 
If l!lhat Dunlop says is true you would expect such expressions to be as 
common as they would be important. But thoue;l:. they may have a use, say 
in a lecture on evolution when some stage in the movement from the 
primordial slime to Shakespeare is being discussed, they have no other 
clear use. Dunlop is running together the fact that we may embody 
certain elements of the human condition to a greater or lesser degree, 
and thus may be said to be at any given time a more rational humal1 being, 
or a fully spiritual human being, with our being human. That is he is 
treating the concept of a 'human being' as if it is like one of its 
elements such as a 'spiritual or moral human being'. These elements 
or factors of the human condition clearly have an achievement aspect. 
vie often do say of sor:J.eone that tbey l)ecame, or have become, a more 
moral human , . oelng. Dunlop's position here is very similar to Oakshott's 
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notion of education. He al,60 argues that 'nobody is born a human being' (43) 
and therefore the educational engagement is necessary if the postulant 
to the human condition is to be initiated into the 'inheritance of human 
h · f d t . . . b 1· f' ( 4l.J. ) Du 1 b· 1 th . nk ac levements 0 un erS.anQlng ana e leo • n op 0 V10US Y 1 s 
that ŸĒŲŤĚ are less human if we fall froD the heights of rationality into 
error and silliness. Yet it is quite possible to mutiny against this 
suggestion and suggest that Hhat chars.cterises human beings is exactly 
that they, unlike beasts and infants are 'liable to sillinesses, 
stupidities, and wrong-headednesses other than scholastic ones, ano. in 
(45) being capable of being judicious in other vlays than judicial ways'. 
There may be a problem with babes and infants though I suspect that the 
denial that ÕŲẀŸVUŬWWĚ and, by implication, Dunlop make about their not 
being human beings is a rather unfortunate way of expressing the 
'tautology' that infants are not adult,s. Such remarks are incautious. 
It would be better to say that infants cannot be said to be 'human 
beings' or not GUẀÜŸMĚbeings' they are infants. 
As far as relatively adult human beings are concerned there 
could be a case made out for saying that some fe3_ture such as 'thought' 
marked them off from ŸŸÙÜŠŨVĦĚ ŸXŨŤĚhas attempted to make out such a 
" th t b" "f f t" I" ( 46) B t case 'Ill ou em ,racJ_ng some crUvle orm 0 essen la lsm. u even 
if it is true that such an idea as 'using or misusing our Hits' which 
is constituitive of specifically human actions, it is going much 
further than this to claim that ,-Ie must take a particular Vie\-l of one 
particular concept. This c1aim is open to many counter-exa:nples in a 
way in which Ryle's may not appear to be. It would be more or less 
equivalent to the move that Ryle explicitly rejects of suggesting 
that all thinking is concerned purely with the intellectual fault of 
" (47) breaching the rules of loglc. 'l'his suggestion, like Dunlop's 
notion of education, can be countered by discussing alternative,s. As 
there are alternative notions ŬȚŸŠTẀȘŠWÙŬŪĚthere are alternative 
intellectual " -1. Vlr"ues. But there are counter-ex2,mple,s to 2yle. ' .. lhat 
"[QuId \"e say of someone 'c,rho could use their wits and fail to use them 
yet who never showed any affection? Hary If:idgley h2_s suggested that 
this is one of the ȘŬÜŸŬŪŤVWĚ reasons for calling someone 'inhuman'. 
"de might evince any of the so-called Darks of being human such as 
thought, reason, language, self consciousness, tool using, production, 
a sense of the future, and still be considered inhuman if we lacked 
affection. Her point is not that this is the simple differentia that 
marks man off from animals, for animals shO\-I affection in abundance, 
but that there are no VÙÜŸŨŤĚmarks. There is a cluster of nore or 
less essential marks whose arran?-;ement can be altered froLl time to 
time for many reasons. She concludes: 
'Hhat is special about each creature is not a single, unique 
quality but a rich and complex arrangement of powers and qualities, 
some of which it will certainly share Hith its neighbours. And 
the more cOf:,plex the species the more true this is. To expect 
a single differentia is absurd. And it is not even effectively 
flattering to the species, since it obscures our WŲǾŨŸĚ
characteristic richness and versatility.' (48) 
There is no simple distinguishing mark of man. Dunlop's mistake is to 
conflate the idea of such a distinguishing mark with a particular view 
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of \vhat is involved in a particular concept. This conflation puts 
him in the awkward position of having to suggest that to espouse 
what he calls a derivative or idiosyncratic use of 'educa.tion' 'is 
simply to fail to be human or, (if this is intelliz;ible) to give up 
trying to be. ,(49)--
This unhappy attempt to get us to accept that there are certain 
criteria that all humans will accept as being part of the concept of 
education is bolstered by the distinction between 'words' and 'concepts' 
mentioned above. 'The idea is that only certain uses of the word 
'education' 'touch reality' and so can be said to be nart of the 
concept. How it is decided that certain uses are paradigmatic ones 
is unclear. Presumably they are those uses which exhibit the 
criteria that Dunlop suggests we L1USt accept, as humans, as applying 
to 'education' .1'his 1,-lOuld be a decidedly circular argument. However, 
it is difficult to see how he avoids the circularity. B..is only option 
is to argue that fundamental disagreement is impossible. He must 
impose a unity on the heiErogenei ty of t'fhat 'lie call education. 
Presumably because if disagreement is allowed it may seem as if we 
can never say what education is and whether it is good or bad. Dunlop 
rejects universals yet uses the concept of human nature as a surrogate. 
1i,fhat we call a 'conce:9t' comes into existence only b;/ incorporation 
(50) into language. Dunlop cannot make the concept of eQucation a 
touchstone for disting-uishing betv/een different uses of the term. He 
can only show that his use of the ten;] r:1U/C't be accepted by showing 
that there cannot be rival views. 'This he has not done. 
Dunlop's account is rather extreme, but it does contain several 
elements which reveal a crude application of ' .. Jhat has come to be taken 
as a cardin2.1 part of '"jittgenstein's later philosophy. I refer to 
Wi ttsenstein' s notion th2.t philosophy was in part the art of supplying 
remarks on the 'natural history' of man. ( PI. 3.415) This is an 
important element in his account of logical nece,sf';,i ty. It is 
interesting to compare hoVl the conce)t of 'human nature' is used by 
him ""hen discussing logical necessity with Dunlop's use of the same 
notion. According to Barry Stroud, I,"w'i ttgenstein calls such renlarks 
'facts of our naturc"l history I because he ,,/ant,s to ŤÜŸĮUȘĖÙYŤĚboth their 
'contingen.cy - that is, that they might not have obtained - and the 
f3.ct that they are souehoVl "constitutive" of mankind that is, that 
their obtaining is ',,!hat is resDonsible for human nature's being what 
°t . , (51) It ° , to t' f t t' t tak '10ur ? 1004 1 1S. 1S a con 111(en ac na we - e -, 
to be going on in the same H2Y as we do Hhen vIe put dovm '996, 998, 
1000'. If certain general facts of nature had been different -- if we 
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were not the creatures we are -- ',,,e could have folloeleo. another rule. 
The idea of following another rule is intelligible to us although that 
other rule may not be. This applies to concepts. If certain facts 
of human nature were different \'le might have formed different concepts. 
This idea is intelligi "ble to us although those different concepts may 
not be. The notion of 'human n2_ture' is put to use here to counter 
both Flatonism and Conventionalism, as theories of mathematics as we 
saw in Chapter 1. 
Hittgenstein also arplies the concept of 'natural human responses' 
to particular concepts, 'pain' being a Hell kno"m example. But pain 
gets a fa othold with the \vrigglin,g fly so we are not considering 
differentia here. How far is this sort of reflection on things such 
as 'following a rule' as constitutive of human nature relevant to 
the concept of education? lili ttgenstein' s point is thEl_t the possibility 
of our imagining a society ouch as that described above is excluded. 
i!le would have to be other than we are to imagine it. i.-ie merely 
imagine that it is possible. But with the concept of education Dunlop 
has to admit that there are not only imaginable cases of societies in 
which people did not have the particular concept of education 17hich 
Peters has refined but lots of actual instances. Indeed most of 
mankind has not got this concept. Faced with this objection Dunlop 
assumes a minimum of moral properties present in any given group of the 
biological species Homo Sapiens. But that one must have some minimum 
of 'morality' nothing follOl"S, certainly not agreement about education:. 
Even if \-Ie have the full concept can't we reject it in :avour of 
training? Dunlop cannot reject such views as unintelligible in the way 
that the suggestion that men coulQ count in the strange way illustrated 
above is unintelligible. 
The account of logical necessity provided by l,ii ttgenstein, and 
the account of 'education' that Dunlop dra\ .. m out of Peters' analysis 
are both attempts to solve problems of justificc:ction. l/Ji ttgenstein was 
concerned with ho\'! we can justify certain logically necessary 
propositions in mathematics, Hhereas Dunlop was concerned \'lith how we 
can justify certain 'conceptual truths' or propositions that are held 
to be neces,::,ary, about the concent of education. In both instances the 
'problenls' are rejected in favour of certain things being necessary in 
our 10f,ic, because of the "ray \"e are. The idea that 'criteria' are 
essential elements in (i,Ii ttgensteinian) theories of justification is a 
commonplace of contemporary philosophy. This is how the notion is 
usually interpreted: 
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'To say that X is a criterion of Y (where 'X' and 'Y' 
range over types of event or states of affairs) is to 
say at least that, whenever I knO'cJ X is instantiated 
(that something of type X occurs or obtains), I am to 
that extent warranted in supjJosing that Y is substantiated 
as ŸẂŤŨŨĦGĚ (52) 
There are many grounds on which this synopsis can be criticised. 
For example, certain constructivists reject the idea that 'criteria' 
connect states of affairs or events in the interests of simplicity. 
Furthermore, the notion is a we&.."":er one th&t that which can be dra\-ffi 
out of Dunlop's account. There are similaTities which will be more 
apparent when I develop what 'd.G. Lycan calls the 'basic criteriological 
view'. (BCV) 
2.4. The Basic Criteriological View 
It is best to approach the 3CV through a statement of the 
problematic nature of 'criteria'. The classic remark comes from 
\!i ttgenstein: 
'The fluctuation in gr&rr.mar ;Jetween criteria and 
symptoms Dakes it look as if there ,vere nothing at 
all-but symptoms'. ŸĦŅĦĚ S 354) 
Urammar' here is a metaphor but it is unnecessary to go into all the 
complexities of Uittgenstein's use of it here. In current jargon it 
is taker! to be equivalent to 'the logic of lanzuaGe'. 'lIe have seen 
that it, like1logic UŤŲŸHĚ and 'rule' is a metaphor. The characterisation 
\ve g2_ve earlie::-" is that 'grammar' is a matter of what it makes ssnse 
(53) to say. 'eli ttgenstein' s point is that if our criteria for Y 
fluctuate then Vie may think that there are not 'real' criteria only 
symptoms contingently COIElected with Y. 
To help in distinf,uishin€,; betvreen 'criteria' and 'symptoms' it is 
useful to :Jorrow some terminology from Lycarc: 
',,- IIC proposition" states that a criterion obtains -
a C relation will be said to hold betiveen X and Y - and 
a "C cpnmection" will be said to hold between the 
proposition that X obtains and the proposition that Y 
Obt5ins, if and only if X is a criterion of Y'. (54) 
','Ie have already had occasion to reject the vie\" that libks 'criteria' 
,·ii th necessary and sufficient conditions. Utilising this terminology 
it is easy to refute any attempt to conceive of 'criteria' as logically 
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necessary characteristics. ŸẀÙWŤĚ clearly, and 'e connection' can 
break dO'/ffi because it is ahiays concei v2ble that one 'e proposition' 
should be true while the other is false. The obvious example here would 
be a proposi tioD. a;jou-c 'pain ŸŤŨŨŠŘGĤÙŬẀŲGĚ and some conclusion about being-
in pain. Eowever there is SucJPosed to 1e sorlie sort of !necessi ty! about 
'criteria' in tIle sense that they are not me::::-ely de facto features of 
concepts. 70 establ::'sh this :criteria' must be clearly differentiated 
from 'symp toms! • C,O sho'"" how this is usually accomplished Itie must 
consider the four points Hhich make up the BGV and some o:]jections to 
them. 
B.1 • . ĦËŸĚ lS a criterio!l of 7' m.eans 'It is necessarily' true 
that X is evidence for Y'. This is only true in most 
cases otherwise we would have a defining criterion. 
B.2. 'C relc.tions' get their unique status by playing an 
essential role in the ,·lay concepts are formed, and 
in the It/ay words are learned. 
B.3. If a certain 'e relation' did not obtain, then our 
language 1t!Quld not be the way it in fact is. Our 
'grammar' would have shifted towards another paradigm. 
B.4. The important difference to bear in mind when 
attempting to distinguish criteria and symptoms, is that 
between what ;t!e have discovered to be evidence for 
something and '''hat '.-Ie have learned to call evidence for 
something. (55) 
These are the central themes of the BCV. The first point is, 
however, open to some obvious objections. For example someone could 
deny Y 8..-7J.d alloH X. But the onus would be upon the objector to show 
why the case in point ,.,ras odd. Hore seriously, sor:leone could point 
out that it was not logically incoherent to suppose not Y. This 
objection could be dealt with by pointing out that it is, nevertheless, 
logically incoherent to demand further justification for saying that 
Y does obtain. To avoid this sort of objection B.1. is usually amended 
to read something like B.1. (a) If one understands language he ',Jill 
see the impropriety of asking for further justific3.tion. According 
to the BCV, then, 'criteria' are the same as 'essential justifying 
conditions.' 
There are several similarities between the BC\! and Dunlop's 
discussion of the sort of connection that Peters' 'criteria' have with 
the concept of education. Firstly, there is the notion that our 
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'criteria' for a concept are given an essential role in the way that 
concepts are learned. Dunlop would allo", that the 'C relation' is 
formed when 'lie in the process of becoming 'human' acquire the concept 
of education. That is, that it is a part of the learning process. 
Secondly, Dunlop would agree with the modified version of B.1. to 
the extent that if we questioned the conce;;Jt, or wished to say that 
it \Va.:: other than the standard R.S. Peters' type of analysis, we 
would be failing to be human, or merely using the '-'lord 'education' 
and not touching the concept. Thirdly, Dunlop deals with the restric-
tion on the use of the criterion in the umlOdified B.1. by suggesting 
that only central paradigmatic cases 'touch reality'. Fourthly, B.3. 
is clearly an essential part of Dunlop's analysis, though once again 
it is given a more extreme internretation. For if we change our 
concept of education, then I'le are no longer human. Finally, there is 
general agreement that He are dealing with some sort of necessity which 
is tied to human nature, and is n'8ither de facto nor something known 
a priori. These similarities are rough ones but they indicate the.t 
Dunlop is ·,vorking VIi th a crude version of the BGV. 
As the notion of 'criteria' will be central to several of the 
arguments I will present in this and later chapters it will be useful 
at this stage to discuss a recent and very full treatment of the 
concept. This will involve the statement of an interpretation of 
Hittgenstein's philosophy of language which I do not agree "lith. It 
is, however, the most thoroughgoing of all the attempts to construct 
a 'theory of criteria' out of Hittgenstein's work. This interpretation 
will have much in COITLlTIon ĤŸŊÙĚth the BCV I refer to John r;:' .E. Richardson's 
'constructi vist' account of Tii ttgenstein 's philosophy of langu3.ge in 
his book ŸUŤĚGram'TIar of Justific"Oltion. (56) In philoso:9hy of mathematics 
'constructivism' is concerned primarily ,vith the 'proof conditions' of 
mathematical propositions. In philosophy of langu2.ge the term refers 
to a family of semantic theories Hhich attempt to explain the me8.ning 
of any sentence in terms of the conch tions appropriate to its 
employment. Thus declarative sentellces are to oe explained in terms 
of truth conc5.itions. I shall elaborate this theory, as PichaTdson 
propounds it, only insofar as it is necessary for an understfulding of 
the concept of 'criteria'. 
Constructivist theories are usually opyosed to realist theories. 
This opposition will reveal the ,"-lay in which the notion of necessary and 
sufficient conditions is an essential element in realist notions of 
meaninz. This is something I deferred earlier but must no,,! tal<::e up. 
There are three features common to most realist theories of meaning. 
Firstly, they assimllate all cases of assertion to the stating of 
facts about objects. Seconci.ly, they hold that the mecJling of an 
individual "lOrd is to be explained in terms of necessary ane sufficient 
condi tions. Thirdl:r , non-declarative sentences have to be explained in 
terms of declarative sentences 1.-Thich correspond to them. This is 
because realists explain meaning in terms of truth concii tions and only 
declarative sentences can be true and false. The opposing position 
set out by ŎÙȘUŠŸTVŬŪĚhas been labelled by Dummett GĦŸWÙĤŎŤŠŨÙVÜGĚ but 
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this is far too negative. There are three features foune in Richardson's(57) 
characterisation which will serve as an introduction. Firstly, a 
constructivist theory describes but does not explain the conventions 
which determine the appropriateness of particular utterances. 
Secondly, constructivists describe grounds cOI'-ventionally taken to 
justify assertions. These conventions must also oe recognised by the 
specd-;:ers of 2.ny particular language as o>:taining when they do obtain. 
And thirdly, assertive and non-assertive uses are not assimilated. 
Richardson develops what he takes to be vIi ttgenstein' s version of 
constructivism in a lengthy discussion of the notions of 'family 
resemblance' and 'broad borderlines'. (58) He says in the concluding 
pages of his book that 'Iii ttgenstein' s discussion of criteria makes 
precisely the same points as the theses of fanily resemblance a.'1d 
broad borderlines'. (59) Taking him at his "lOrd I 1rfill make the points 
solely by reference to the notion of 'criteria' as I do not wish to 
pre-empt my discussion of 'family resemblance.' 
Central to ifittgenstein's supposed 'constructivism' is the notion 
of meaning-as-use. Richardson deals Hith ',Jittgenstein's 'woolly' use 
of 'use' in the following way. He argues that, in general, the word 
'use' Elerely dra\l!s attention to the ŠÙŨĴŸĚ or function of a word, its 
role in the life of a community, and the idea that language and 
concepts are instruments. ØUÙVŸŤŪHHHŲŠŨĚ approach is expressed in 
v,Ji ttgenstein' s use of 'Gebrauch'. This wor d immediately sets his 
approach against the realist one. :lor realists see meaning and use 
as separable, the former governing the latter. however, Eichardson 
points out WUÎŸWĚ the ter::"J 'Gebrauch' also involves two other notions, 
'.i;.nwendung' and 'Verwendung'. The 'VervTendung' refers to the employment 
of a word in a game i.e. its role in language. This is the 'set of 
rules governing its use'. The 'VenJendung' is c02:1stituted 'oy the 
'Amvendung'. This term refers to the connection between signs and 
the world. Eichardson takes it to mean 'the linguistic practices of 
a Corr:'YIUn1' tv,) .' (60) D' ,. th b I f '1 l.Jy game 1n e a ave mean 0 course B.nguage 
gar.1e'. This refers to either a siL1plified form of language, a 
primi ti ve form of language, or a:fJ. acti vi ty by \-Ihich a child learns 
language. Riche.rdson defines a 'language game' as 'an activity 
determined by a system of linGuistic rules which specify the 
circumstances which are conventionally recognised as legitimate 
for the employment of a concept or set of concents.' (61) 
This notion of rules constituted by the linguistic :9ractices of 
a cormnuni ty, \"li th the idea of conventionally recognised grounds are 
the two main bases on which }-::ichardson erects his 'theory of criteria'. 
He follows Hacker in simylyfying the 'criterial relationship' so that 
it is said to hold only between linguistic entities rather than the 
variegated sorts of eoings that '\e,'ittgenstein applies it to. Thus he 
thinks a 'criterion' can be defined in the following 'day: 
'F is a criterion for q if p is non-inductive evidence 
for q i.e. if there exists a linguistic convention to 
the effect that p justifies q.' (62) 
A 'symptom' is merely inductive evidence ",hich regularly coincides with 
some cri terion. ŸÙȘŲŨŠŲTVŬŪĚ further char2.cterises 'criteria' by listing 
several descriptions of them ,.lhich are to be found in 'iJi ttgenstein: 
He therefore states that i) Criteria determine the meanings of words; 
ii) If you change the criterion you change the meaning; iii) To 
explain criteria is to give a gra;Jmatic:'l ex-planation; iv) Criteria 
are fixed by convention; v) ØUŤŸJĒĚ determine the language game with a 
word; vi) They are kinds of justification; and vii) They .3.re laid G.Q\om 
in the rules which deterrnine ,·rhat counts as adequate justification for 
(63) the ascription of a concept. None of these descriptions are 
definitive, and if 2.ny of theE; aTe taken to be so we are ale-lays at 
liberty to r'2vise our decision. 
Richardson utilises his reading of ,vi ttgenstein, and his 
understanding of the BCV, to att:)ck several of those writers, already 
mentioned, that see the criterial relationship as a 'somewhat strict 
logical relationship, to be assin;ilated, perhaps to entailment.' (64) 
In other vrords he attacks those \vri ters that assimilate 'criteria' to 
'necessary and sufficient conditions' and thus give Vii ttgenstein' s 
semantic theory a form more appropriate to realist semantic theories. 
l''Iuch of Richardson 1 s discus,sion of these other interpret2.tions centres., 
as do their accounts, on the \"lell knovm passages in the Blue Dook. I 
have already suggested that these may be misinterpreted. Richardson 
attempts to argue against a sugGestion by Eac::;:er that there are two 
different uses of the term in !"Ii tt,:;enstein, one in the Blue Book which 
SeelY,s to be a sort of 'necessary and sufficient condition', and one 
found in the P.I. ,",hich does not seem so. To do this he tries to 
shm", that the Blue Book account is misleading in that it gives a :false 
account of medical diagnosis and disguises rather than exhibits 1tlhat 
Hittgenstein actually thinks about the special status of 'criteria'. 
The medical point need not detain us long. This revolves around 
(65) 
a discussion of J.S. Clegg's paper on 'Symptoms'. Clegg bases his 
discussion upon the fact there are many tests available to enable us 
to identify diseases which are not constitutive of them. 'Criteria' 
cannot, he sUGgests, be said to be 'necessary' nor 'sufficient' 
conditions. They are 'not sufficient, because the patient may be a 
carrier of the disease they are not necessary because the empirical 
correlation between syn:ptoms and criteria may fail.' (66) \fuether 
1ili ttgenstein is right or 1rr.cong when he gives his medical example there 
are hlO things to note. Firstly, -,h ttgenstein is merely exhibiting 
and not stating the case for 'criteria'. (67) And secondly, his method 
for much of the later philoso:r;hy wa,s the ,?;iving of examples. This 
method is, of course, a varied one sometimes consisting of lists, some-
times quotations, sometimes the description of prLni ti ve or fantastic 
situations but most often it consists of reminders of the commonplace. 
ŸGŨUŠWĚ it is important to reDember 8_bout this method is that it is 
detached. The example per se does not matter. It is said that 
Hi ttgenstein was ahlays 1tTilling to withdraw examples if people found 
(68) fault with them. 
The account is further inaccurate according to Richard,son in that 
it see;;]s to encourage the assimilation of criteria to 'necessary' and 
'sufficient' conditions, and to see the 'cr:iterial relationship' as 
something similar to entailment. ',Ie have discussed the first version 
of this so we Hill concentrate here on the second. The' cri teri8.1 
relationship' is taken by the propounders of the BeV (or some of them) 
to involve the giving of 'decisive evidence I. Thus i{enny follows 
rvIalcolm in considering that 'a criterion differs frot''! a symptom in 
b 0 • f d . 0 0, , (6g) ""h tOt thO e1ng a Inece 0 eClSl ve eV1aence. OJ.' e argumE.n s agcnns 1S 
view are legion. There may be no single criterion for something. It 
amounts to equating 'criterion' vrith 'sufficient condition' which 
would lead to a behaviourist interpretation of ŸŸWWŦŤŪVWŤÙŪGVĚphilosophy 
of mind. "vIi ttgenste:'n himself ob jected to the dependence on entailment 
3_nd attacks strict rules for the application of terms. And finally, 
the idea implicit in this vie"v that phenomena sited in the explanation 
of a term are sufficient condi tj ons of a term's use is a very un-
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',vi ttgensteinian one. He 1",ould obviously rej sct it, and any 
variation on it. 
This strand of the Bev is one of the few attempts to answer the 
question 'Are there sufficient conditions for the ap:?lication of a 
term?' in the affirffiative. Though it is inadequate, a version of it 
. . t . . ŸĚ. 1 - . , , ' . t,... t . t . ,( 70 ) lS gl ven a cursory men lon In l'le (ang s :-l.galns I.;ompe l lon • 
Fielding refers to what ,Ie can all the l'::leining/Scri ven arb"Ument 
after the philosophers from which he derives it. The argument is an 
anti-essentialist one, but it allO\",s that words may be partially 
defined in terms of sets of conditions 'iJhich are jointly sufficient 
for the terms use in tIle sense that they are characteristically, or 
typically, implicit in their use. Though this account of meanine is 
interesting ruld deserves a mention it is too laconic to be dealt with 
here in any satisfactory way. It does, however, utilise conventional-
ist notions 'typically' and 'characteristically' which may align it 
with some form of constructivism. I will, therefore, consider it to 
be dealt with in a similar fashion to :2ichardson's account. 
Hhat is wrong \"li th Richardson's ' constructivist' interpretation 
of Vii ttgenstein? If there is nothing wrong with it, then as the 
fullest ruld mo':'t developed of recent accounts of 'criteria' it would 
provide a basis for a 'criterioloe;ical' analysis of the concept of 
education in the manner of Peters. It develops out of the BCV but 
avoids most of its blind alleys. By stressing the importance of 
linguistic convention it also avoids the pitfalls of the quasi-
realism implicit in Dunlop's paper. 
Anyone who has followed the arguments of Section 2.2 of this 
chapter .. -rill already understand the gist of my objection to his account. 
For he also builds his theory of meaning on the idea that there are 
rules constituted by the linguistic practices of the community. These 
rules give us criteria and determine 'iJhat is adequate justification. 
Vie shall not go over these arguments again but approe.c:'c its 
inadequacies by considering nichardson' s account of iJi ttgenstein' s 
philosophical method. 
According to :t-1ichardson, when,Ji ttgenstein notes that in philosophy 
'we' continually CQJ;ipa:::'e our use of words with one which follows exact 
rules, he is not criticising such procedures. :ci.ichc:rc.son believes that 
vIi ttgenstein' s method is to remove philoso::Jhical pro'olems by clarific-
ation of the rules according to which \4e are inclined to use lrulguage • 
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Though this is a one sided \vay of looking at 12nguao;e, Richardson 
argues that 'ilittgenstein at no point suggests 'that having such a 
(71) 
"one-sided point of view" is at all unsatisfactory'. Thus 
I'ii ttgenstein is said to study lang'uage as if it were a game with 
fixed rules. In support of this he quotes the ŲŤÜŠŲŸŸĚ froG Zettel 
\vhere GŸÙÙĚttgenstein says that though irle do not seek the real meaning 
of \'Joros, ','Ie do often give "Tords exact meanings in the course of our 
. t' t' ,( 72) Th' h d' . . ŸĦĚ - , h h' lnVes 19a lon. lS met 0 lS ŊẀVWŨŸŨŤŌĚto ŸĚ e extent t at It 
removes disagreement. 'Alternative' conceptions of meaning such as 
the n?me-bearer or causal theories might also be useful for specific 
purposes. The culminabon of all this is that ŸĒŊÙĚttgsnstein is said 
to have a 'theory of criteria'. 
i<y quarrel \ri th this stral1ge account is not that it is wrong but 
that it ignores entirely the 'form' or 'style' of the P.I. (and 
Hi ttgenstein' s later works) and extracts from them a content 1t/hich is 
exhibi ted not o.sserted. Let us take the first ŲŤĴŸÍŠŲŸĦĦJJĚ about what 'He' 
do when philosophising to mal-ce this point clear. The remark is the 
resul t of Hi ttgenstein' s reflection on a converse.tion 1;/i th Ramsey 
(P.I. s. 81) He is concerned '.vi th ,,ih2.t can lead us to thin.l.;: th2 .. t to 
mean sOClething we must be 'opera tin,g' a calculus according to definite 
rules. ' ]ichardson is quite right in saying that.'li ttgen.stein is 
not criticising such a vie1[. But neither is he asserting such a view 
He is not offering any 'alternative' to the vie1<TS that he h2.6 8UP:90SecUy 
been 'critiCising' he is showing how we can be misled. He then opposes 
this picture by getting us to consider the familiar rough ground of 
langua.ge by considering eanes in whictl there are no definite rules 
(P.I. s 83) Richardf50n believer; that \.Jittgenstein is attacking the 
notion of 'strictness' and not that of 'rules'. But again I do 1l.Ot 
see VJittgenstein 3.S prossnb_ng any 'alternative' to strict rules in 
terI!1S of lax or flexible rules. Richardson is insensitive to the 
whole tenor of the P.I. if he really thinks that this 'one sided' 
"lay of looking at lanr,uage Hould not be objected to by '.Ji ttgenstein. 
It is prima facie implausible, is it not, that tte philosopher who 
warned 'A main caU;3e of lJhiloso:?hical disease - a one sided diet: one 
nourishes one's thinking Hith only one kind of example'. (P.I. s. 593) 
was not against a 'one sided' treatment of ŨȘŸŸÍŦẀŠŦŤĹĚ ',iittgenstein 
described his remarks as 'a number of sketches of landscapes' "lhich 
were made in the course of 'long and involved journeyings' (LI. Preface 
p. ix.) He is like an artist makinr; sl-cetches rather than the scientist 
putting forward theories aDd hypotheses. Thus it is hard to see 
V!ittgenstein as presenting any theories. Just a brief catalogue of 
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some of his remarks should be enough to establish this: 
'If one tried to advance theses in philo$Jphy, it ',JOuld 
never be possible to question them because everyone 
would agree with them'. (P.I. s. 1228) 
''vie must do a1:lay 1:li th all eX-rlanation and description 
alone mu,st take its place.' P.I. s. 109) 
'Compare a concept with a style of painting'. (P.I. p.230) 
'''The sense of a proposition" is very similar to the 
business of tran ap]reciation of art:t'. (73) 
'Do you think I have a theory? Do you think I'm saying 
what deterioration is?' (74) 
Richardson makes little or no atterlpt to deal with these remarks. 
Thus when he argues that the method advocated ŸXĚHittiSenstein is 
that of clarifying the rules of language, and perhaps accidentally 
gi ving words exact mea11ings, he is like the 'someone' mentioned by 
Hi WWŸĴŤŪVWŤÙŪĚwho is looking at a landscape painting -"lith a house in 
it who asks ,T,ihose house is that?'. 'L'he ÙÜŠŦÙŪÙŪNŸĚ :':L'lishc:s vIi th the 
remark: 'The answer, by the It/ay, might be "It belongs to the farmer 
who is sitting on the bench in front of it.1T But then he cannot for 
example enter his house.' (P.I. s. 398) Richardson has confused the 
'theory' sketched by Hittgenstein as his theory, which it is in the 
trivial sense that he is the artist. 
A possible line of escape i-JQuld be to say that the thesis attc.cking 
theses (:?1. s. 128) is at best paradoxical, and taken at fs.ce value 
quite obviously false. This sort of line is taken by Bambrough who is 
much given to rer:1arks lil(e the following: 
'Now the (I enial of a thesis is a thesis. And though one 
may deny a theory without affirming an alternative theory, 
the rejection of a theory, like the rejection of a thesis, 
is the adoption of a thesis. Wittgenstein rejects all 
theories and ma...11.Y theses, so ',d ttgenstein cannot 'oe said 
to hold the ŮUÙŨŬVŬŮŸĤÙȘŠŨĚopinion that he holds no 
opinions in philosophy.' (75) 
'Hot even his mill philosophical idords can be taken at their 
face value, not even vlhen they express his theory about the 
nature and effects of philoso-)hical theories.' (76) 
These remarks come froD a paper entitled 'Hm. to B.ead 1ili tt;:;e!lstein' • 
They ignore the fact that reading i:1i ttgenstein is like reaciing poetry 
or looking at pictures ( or sl:etches) '.-.. hich captuX'8 aspects of a 
thing. Not for noth::'ng is picturing a profound al1( ubiquitous metaphor 
L'1 the ÍĨŚWŤŸŬĚ T./ri tings. The so-called 'theses' about theories are 
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merely pictured by Wittgenstein not seriously offered as 'alternatives'. 
If they were then the sort of points made by Bambrough would connect 
wi th what he says, but they do not. The essenti2.1 thing about poetry 
(or any art) is that it defies translation. A literal paraphrase, 
or clarification of, say ?:eats 'Ode to a Fightingale' ,wuld simply 
be a parody. Philosophy, like art, is particular. It consists in the 
presentation of examples ,,,Thich are reminders for some particular purpose. 
The point about the analog-j with the arts, which will be developed 
later, is that the points made by \.':ittgenstein cannot ŸŊŤĚ sUf'lued up in 
any general formul& or theory. It is tr.e place of the renark, point, 
or example wi thin the context in ','Thich it is made which ,;!ould give each 
of them its unique character. '!:'he point of any remark is that it is 
set next to this and this, but not that. Thus ŸÙȘUŠŲTVŬŪGVĚone sided 
vie,." of language is set against other misleading pictures of how 
languac;e works. It may have a strength '"Thich tempts us to set it up 
as an altern2.ti ve to these other pictures but this would be misled by 
another picture. 1.1hat 2ichardson gives us is another picture of the 
workings of language. I am sugge,sting that it ,.;ould be a very un-
\rli ttgensteinia.l1 mOile, to suggest, as he does, tha.t this picture is 
being given us by ŸŠWWŦŤŪVWŤÙŪĚas the correct one. 
These are very general points which Elay tell against Richardson's 
overall approach to 'I'!'i WWŦŤŪVĤGŸŤÙŪĦĚ It remains now, to sho\1l how they 
relate to hiE characterisation of 'criteria'. Certainly, the whole 
notion that Vii ttgenstein had some sort of impl:iri.t 'theory' must be 
dropped. It is a misreading of his ,;rork. But the characterise.tion 
must 2.1so be rejected. l<emer:'Jber that Richardson is attacking the 
notion that the criteriological relation is an entailment relation. 
One would therefore expect him to be rcoving away fron; this 'logicist' 
paradigm. But this is not so. He ÜŤŲŸJŨXĚvIants to shm"l' that 'the 
criterial relation is an evidential reletion, but it is something 
Iv-eaker than entailment'. (77) He does not move far enough away. He 
restricts the ayplic::tion of 'criteria' to proposition,s. The term 
only applies to ?henomena, \·rord..s, or concepts in a 'deri vati ve' sense. 
All this is despite GĴŸWWŦŤŪVWŤÙŪGVĚvariegated usage'. Such simnlifi-
cations of i.Ji ttgens-:ein are nece,ssary, only if you 1dish to produce a 
'theory'. As we have seen such exclusions are one of the WŸLĒŮÙȘŠŨĚ
fe3.tures of esseLtialist argu!!lents. Rich.':lrdson does seer.1 to be trying 
to avoid essentialist }"losi tions even ',;hen he is arguing like an 
essentialist. Thus Hhen he giv2s the list of characterisLcs of 
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criteria - which wou16 be the first ste, in the essentialist 
J)rocedure of isolatin,s what is co'non to them all - he cor.1ments 
that it is difficult to decide if any of the descriptions 'is to 
b d f · . t . d 1 . d' -c' , (78) He e e lnl l ve, an. i.e nay a Hays revlse our escrlp"lo J.on • 
presents his list of characteristics as analogous to those de,scriptions 
used to 'define' the term 'Moses' in P.I. s. 79. The point being that 
any 'definition' can be withc1rmV11 l,'rithout making the tern; useless. 
They are 'props' lile have in readiness \1hen we are challenged. But 
Richardson is still seeing the use of such characteristics as 
definitions. Admittedly he is a long '.tray from the position of the 
cruder proponents of the Bell, like Albritton, who l.·,fOuld seem to want 
one single criterion given by linguistic convention. Richardson accepts 
that there may be severE-I. '.ihat he is ignoring in using the 'Hoses' 
passage as an exannle is that part of "']ittgenstein's intention there 
is to ShOl.! thc:..t a term can be rightly used 'without a fixed mee.ning'. 
This does not only mean that our definitions of the tern are all 
corrigible a.nd th'3refore not suf::icient. It may al30 mean that vre 
have no such definition in mind at all, hOHever difficult it may be 
to imagine this '::>eing true in the case of this particular proper name. 
As liii ttgenstein puts it elsewhere 'To use a word without justification 
does not mean to use it without right.' (P.I. s. 289) 
Richardson is correct '.tlhen he suggests that the popular view 
of 'criteria' is derived froE! 'a:.'l over-dogmatic view of the central 
(79) discussion in the Blue Book'. Richardson himself makes no 
apologies, however, for also ȘŬŪȘŤŸĴWŲŠWÙŪŦĚon this cen'::ral discussion. 
This concentration on one small area of 1:Ii WWȘĴŤŪVGŸŤÙŪGĚs 1t!ork is a 
result of the fact that T.ii ttcenstein uses the words 'criteria' and 
'criterion' nore often in these pages. I have indicated that 
Richardson's account of 'criteria' is misleading in that it is still 
a 'logicist' account. It puts consicerable stress on 'rules' and 
'teaching' in a man..."'l.er i"Ihich I have already shmm is mistaken. 
(80) 
The most gen,sral criticism that can be made of his account is, hm,rever, 
that it is a misreading of \/i ttgenstein. Of course, to thoIJoughly 
establish that it is a misreading ",ould involve my giving an account 
of 'criteria.' \.hich is consistent with a reading of 1:li ttgenstein 
which is sensi ti ve to his GVWŸȚŨŤGĦĚ This I shall attempt later on in 
this chapter. 
Richardson's account, then, is to be found in the Blue Book. He 
offers a subtle analysis of the notion of 'criteria' by comparison with 
that offered by several other writers. Yet for all its subtleness his 
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account fails to make sufficient alloitrances for the importance of the 
'style' of the later itrritings. This means that the 'form' or 'method' 
of Iii ttgenstein' s work cannot easily be separated from the 'content' 
to give us a 'theory' of ,some .sort. ':':'0 facilitate the se,'Jaration he 
desires it is notable thEl_t RichE_reison takes the usue,l path of 
denigrating the importance of examples, ()Oth in '"Ii -::tgenstein, and in 
, (81) phllosophy generally. 
2.6. Heaninf; and Criteria 
All the interpretations of 'criteria' that vie have considered up 
to this point have been eX2nples of what can. l)roaeily be called 
'criteriological theories of meaning'. Such theories Day seem to be 
guilty of quite an elementary confusion. They conflate questions about 
the -nature of meaning, that is, about \-/hat it is one is supposed to 
knOi,r ''''hen one YJlo\'IS the oeaning of a word, with questions about what 
requirements must any \-lOrd meet if it is to be said to have meaning. 
Thus, to take one of Locke.' s favourite examples, they answer the question 
Ii:Jhat does "gold '1 mean?' By giving a criterion such as 'I-laving a certain 
'f' 't' - d' t" U R -) 1.' (82) h 1'''' specl lC gravl ŸŲĦĚ _ccccor lng 0 'J.ll •• J:: ark,J.nson suc an answer ŸĚ
unacceptable because there is more to ŸŸŬŨTĚ than this. But if the 
insufficiency of the criterion is Parkinson's only objection to it, 
then he has not precludeci a Lockean sort of anS\o[er to this que.stion 
1rThich "rould be sufficient and therefore be also 3.1.1 ansvler to the former 
question. l)e would merely have to complete the 'complex idea' of gold 
by listing all those 'simple &bstract ideas' other than SlJecific gravity 
lIrhich together give the essence of gold viz: yellm·mess, weight, 
" , (33) 
malleaolll ty, etc. Though there are '.-,rell knm·:n clifficul ties vIi th 
L 1 , t' t1- (84) '-h . 1 '1' t f' I· b .,. th OCKe s semE.n lC "ceory L- e POSS10l 1 Y 0 l-C rlQglng e gap 
behreen the two sorts of question s}',ows that they are not so obviously 
separable as Parkinson seems to think. The 'criteriological' theories 
so far considered quite clearly linle the two sorts of questions by 
considerinG tj'2,t 'criteria' ca:pture at least necessary conditions of 
mea..'1ing. ØUŤŸŲĚ too ,'lOuld not usually consider their 'criteria' to be 
sufficient but would al"g-ue that they captured esser..tial elements of the 
t er'11S mecming. 
The classic atterJnt to separate 'cri teri&' frOli": 'meaning' is 
found in R.iJ:. Hare's famous chapter in The Lang-uage of ŅGŸŬŲŠŨVĦĚ (85) 
Hoods and Barrovj h2,·l7"e recently attempted to ÙMŸŊŬŲWĚ his distinction into 
their tree,tment of the concept of ŤĜĴŸẀȘŠWÙŬŨÍĦĚ The two distinctions they 
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make are not exactly the same. Hare distinguishes betvleen 'meaning' 
as use' and 'criteria' whereas they TÙVWÙŪŦẀÙŸUĚbetween 'criteria for 
use' and 'meaning'. Perhaps some presently unfathomable depths are 
indicated by such terminological ŲÙŮŸŨŤVHĚ but they need not concern us. 
If \ole ta'.<.:e ii/oods and Jarrows 'criteria for use' to mean something like 
'criteria for application to a particular instance' then their 
position is similar enough to Hare's to enable us to gloss over this 
small point. I will summarise their argument before attempting to 
deal with Hare's distinction. 
They argue that there 'is an important philosophical distinction 
b t . d· t . f ' ( ĮŸĚ) H . e ,veen meanlng an crl erla or use. owever, they do not apply 
this distinction to the 'unre\varding' concept of education but follow 
the more recent work of Peters in analysing what is involved in being 
an 'educated man'. They drive their wedge between 'meaning' and 
'criteria' by contrasting the labelling of someone as 'educated' with 
calling, say, a symphonic performance 'first class'. 'First class' is 
an evaluative term and their discussion explicitly utilises the hoary 
old distinction bet\veen evaluative and descriptive meaning. It is 
also a terL1 used in commending and by introducing it alongside 'educated' 
they show that they have performecl their analysis of the term 'educated' 
on the lines of Hare's treatment of 'good'. Hare says three things 
about good that are taken up by ','Joods and barrow. Firstly, that the 
function of the \vord 'good' is to comnend. Secondly, that it has 
evaluative meaning, and thirdly, that it has descriptive meaning. (88) 
'Good' has these latter two features in a peculiar combincdion and, as 
we shall see, \voods and BarrOlv experience not a little dif'ficulty over 
the question as to vrhether or not 'educat ed' has descriptive rnea..'1ing. 
Their argument begins where Hare concludes, \,ri th one common sense 
of 'mean' '\o[hich is a request for a criterion. SUP:9ose I call a 
symphonic performa..'1ce 'first class' and you ask r1e "dhat do you mean?' 
I may reply that the performance vias 'technically equal to the demands 
of the symphony'. I give here the criterie. for my application of the 
term in a particular case. (89) This is a valid use of 'mean'. But 
there is another sense of the term 'man' to which this reply would 
not be acceptable. If it \Vere acceptable then the mec:.ning of 'first 
class' would be 'co-extensive 'IIi th my reasons for using the term and 
t . Id ' - d t ' (90) . T • d d tl h t your ques lon ·"rou De reaun an • Vie can In .epen en y c arac er-
ise 'first class' as being not unlike 'applauding loudly' and make no 
reference to the criteria for applying the term. The 'criteria' for 
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something are the reasons I have for applying it. But 'ltle can see 
that 'first class' has an evaluative me<:.ning which can be understood 
without refere!1ce to specific criteria. Different people may apply 
different criteria for a things being 'first class' but it nevertheless 
has an evaluative lIieaning common to all uses. 'educated' differs from 
'first class' in two ways. Firstly, it is a less general term of 
commendation, and secondly, it m:(l be that 'eciucated I possesses an 
element of descriptive ÜŤŸŸÙŪŦĚouch that seemingly different criteria 
for use on the part of dif:erent people do, in fact, have common 
elements. These common elements would then serve to identify the 
elusive descriptive meaning. A search could be made for some such 
COm[;10n element, or to put it differently for the 'necessary and 
sufficient conditions of oeing educated'. (91) Thus, to call someone 
educated is to pin an award or medal on theD. 'I'his is 'It,hat calling 
someone educated means in one sense of mean. This simple claim is 
complicated by the possibility that theTe may be some common element 
to the ve.rious criteria for applying the term. As we have to look 
fer such an element it seems to be something purely contin€;ent and 
presumably gratuitous. It is far from clear 'lt/hether 'I"J'oods and Barrow 
\ .... ould allo"l that this 'descrj.ptive meaning' is part of the 'meaning' 
they separated from 'criteria for use'. If they allowed this it 
Hould make nonsense of their earlier distinction, and they must allow 
this to some extent for they call this descriptive factor 'descriptive 
meaning' • If they vlish to B.llow this descriptive meaning and retain 
their earlier distinction bet\ITeen 'meaning' and 'criteria' I simply 
do not see how this can be done as the descriptive meaning just is a 
common cri terio1\ for the application of educated in Darticular cases. 
The distinction is, to say the lea3t, obscured. ŸŬĚ consider further 
this radical dichotomy it is neceS:3ary to look closely at Hare's more 
extreme position. 
Hare believes that to teach what makes something good is different 
for different cases but 'the "lOrd "good IT has a constant meaning which, 
once learnt, ca.n be understood no matter Hhat class of objects is being 
talked about.' (92) Though he accepts that attem;Jts to characterise 
this common meB.ning for all classes of objects are doomed to failure, 
he thinks we may well 1)e able to give it for certain grou)s of object 
i.e. 'being efficient' applies to r:1any good objects suer, as cars and 
tools. Ha:ce wishes to show that 'good' unlike 'red' has a me:ming 
indeDendent of its criteria for a;Jplication. To do so he produces two 
main arguments. The first is an attemDt to show tDat we can teach 
someone the criteria for somet!-J.ing beint; a good such and such while he 
94 
remains ignorant of the meaning of 'good'. 'I'he second is an attempt 
to show the reverse, that is, that we can teach someone what 'good' 
means ",ithout teaching any criteria for application. This latter 
argument is similaT to 'LJood,,:,, and Barrow's argument about the 'redundant' 
question as to Hhat 'first class' means if 'means' is underc"tood as 
'criteria for application'. 
Hare ŠTŬŸŊWVĚHi ttgenstein' s suggestion that 'the logical character 
of words can be investigated ŞŸŲĚ asking how vIe '-'lOuld explain their 
meaning'. (93) He sees this method as involving questions about how 
we would teach the meaning of a word to a foreigner. iilld this points 
to a first and very ;::'eneral mistake in Hare's overall approach, as far 
as it is typified in this rarticular chapter. I have already mentioned 
tha.t the over emphasis on 'teaching' that is rife in contemporary 
philosophy is a \\Tealmess. But it is made even more of a handicap in 
finding your vray about the conceptu2,1 environment when it is compounded 
wi th an investigative model which is one of the most ir.rroortant of the 
misleading pictures of the vJorkings of lanGUage that T,v'i ttgenstein set 
out to free us from. I refer to the Augustinian view of language which 
Hittgenstein discusses in the opening paragraphs of the P.l. Here is 
Hittg-enstein's clearest characterisation of it: 
'Augustine descrioes the learning of language as if the 
child came into a strange country and did not understand 
the language of the country; that is, as if it already had 
a language, only not this one'. (P.l. s. 32) 
1'lhat lili ttgenstein is suggesting is that "re ȘÕŨGŸVÙTŤŲĚ how we would teach 
someone \'rho has no language \',1ha t a \'lOrd meant, or how we Hould teach 
the meaIling of a word to someone who has acquired, some but not all of 
his native language. The point is not a trivial one. The assumption 
that a person already has a language ŊŸJJHŬẂÙTŤVĚ a medium 'ltlhich seems to 
explain SO:11eones understanciing of a term when it really begs the whole 
question. Suppose \',1e \',1anted to teach some foreign philosopher the 
rules of chess. He Day kn01.! ho\!{ to play the garne, but not the "::nglish 
word 'chess' nor 'rook' or 'mate' etc. Once 1'18 Sh01v him the board, 
pronounce the words 'chess', 'mate' etc. he may soon be pia\.Ying, and 
using the English teros. '\":e may have to go over SOC1e of the rules in 
case he thims this is some other game, 'out this does not matter. The 
point is he picks up the garc.e quickly because he already kno\rr the rules, 
even though he cannot tell us the rules. T.ii th a child the situation is 
different.He has no previm,E, kl10Vlledge to utilise. 1./e must teach him 
the rules by giving him examples, shOi',1ing him move after move. After 
sometirJie he will, unle:3s he is very stupid, pick UIJ the game. To 
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assimilate these two ca.ses would be absurd. However, the situation is 
masked somevlhat if vIe consider the following situation. The foreigner 
comes ȚŲŬŸĚan island Ivhere the people rarely play games. They have no 
contact with the west and as part of his induction into western culture 
we try to teach him, or explain to him, the rules of cricket. This 
case will then be analogous to that of the young child who is learning 
about cric':et for the first time. Or is it? Perhaps we have here an 
example of cad case by case argument, the decisive move in the philos-
ophical conjuring trick being ;nade simply by placing these two cases 
side by side and stressing obvious similarities when dissimilarities 
are more important. The test in Hare's case as to whether or not his 
general methodological mistake has serious consequences is to be seen 
in the two examples he gives to establish his two main arguments. 
Hare's examples exemplify many of the defects of examples 
mentioned in Chapter 1. They are incomplete and hopelessly indeterm-
inate. To establish that He can teach the criteria for a class of 
objects without teaching the \vord 'good' he asks us to imagine a man 
trained to put augers into two :Jiles. The man has no idea that this 
° lIt ° to. f t others. (94) 1nvo ves se eCJ1ng cer all1 augers 1n pre erence 0 
Presumably his 'manager' does know this. 1iJhat can we say of this man? 
Has he no lanzuage? Is he a conplete imbecile? How does he come to 
be in this si tua tion? Doesn't he o.sk questions? Couldn't we replace 
the ma.'1 by a machine or a monkey? ',iould we then be tempted to say 
that \"e had taught the m.onkey criteria for application? The acts of 
this man or this monkey are com:)letely meaningless for them. Not only 
do they not know the meaning 0 f tll.e word 'good' they do not, in a 
qui te ordinary sen.se of the word, Jr...now \1hat they are doing. Hare's 
example demands too much if it is to be successful. But if we fill 
it in then this will introduce the notion of preferential selection 
which it is intended to exclude. The exaE'ple seems to 1rJOrk because 
we know that he is really distinguishing between 'good' and 'bad' augers. 
Aild \o[e are assisted in this because \o[e know the l;)eaning of the word good 
is not primarily a comfl:encJing one. 
The second exarrrole exploits the AU6'ustinia!l vie\o, of language and 
it Houle!. not have any force Hi thout the assumption th9.t the person 
giving a paradoxical eX}Jlanation of the meaning of 'good' already has 
a language. The lJaradoxical situatio2.1 arises i£ \"e ir.1C::'Lgine a tribesman 
who is e:;S':llaining a gari.1e which is played with an instrument cal1eo. a 
shmekum. Before the ŤẄŸĞŨŠŪŠWÙŬŪĚgoes any further the Englishman asks 
what sort of shmakum ':w-Llld the tribesman choose if he were buying one 
from a VUŪŠŨĦȘẀŲĦŸĤÜÎÍĤŘJŤŲĹĚ Receiving the answer 'the one that he could 
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make the most smashes with' the Znglishman is able to conclude that this 
would be the 'best' VUÜŸŸÜĚ and 'best' is the superlative of '800d'. 
Thus he has managed to ex-)lain the meaning of 'good' to someone ",ri th 
reference to objects for which there are no criteria known to the 
person giving the explanation. The ability to make sma.:{es would not 
be a criterion as it does not describe a physical pro}Jerty. Thus 
explaining the meaning of the Hard 'good' is 'quite different from 
explaining any of the various criteria for its applica_tion.' (95) But 
the indeterminate nature of the example means that it is purely chance 
as to vIhether the Englishman is right. Hare's argument relies on the 
Englishr.1an's being able to convict the tribesman of having the thought 
that 'the best shmakum is the one that you can make the most smashes 
with'. As the first exaople exploited the detached observer's 
understandinEc of the f9.ct that the selection was Ilreferential, so this 
example exploits the fact that someone knows the criteria. But suppose 
the tribesman says 'No'? Hare's example does not exclude this 
possibili ty. 'de cannot mClke ita requirement that the game is ȘŲÙȘŸĤKJŤWĚ
as we play it. 'J:'he tribesman ÜŠŸØĚ belong to a tribe that only values 
and commends the underdog. Defeat alone is commendable and victory 
is a sign of the action of evil powers. l'/e select our shmakums on ŸÍÍĚ
equal basis but the 'best' schmakum is the loser's shmakum. This is 
the one we han; on the clubhouse VIall. Such a topsy-turvey world of 
values is not without foundstion in a typically 'British' attitude to 
sportsmen. 
A more general cri tici,gm can be made of Hare's contention that the 
primary use of 'good' is to COnlnenci. Hare's claim is one eXEwrple of 
the claim thc.t it is possible to explain the meaning, or part of the 
meaning of words by reference to the speech acts performed when they 
( 6) 
are uttered. 9 The idea is that [!leaning ca!l be explained by reference 
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to the illocutionary act performed ;'Ti thout reference to further semantic 
information. But such acts are performed by sentences not words. Further-
more, it i,g only non-determinate utterances that come close to being 
independently identifiable. Deterr;linate utterances such as 'George K 
crossed the Hudson on October 20th 1943' do require sup}Jlementary 
semantic infor[Jation. (97) Iii til non-determinate utterances such as 'It's 
over there' we can not only identify the act in its context where it 
can be relJlaced quite easily by a gesture. Eoldcroft has argued that 
only such acts as CEC1. ',)e perforDei Hi thou t the sentence can be 
independentl:r identified. This has the consequence that if the 
illocutionary act could not be perfornec:. \vithou: the sentence then it 
will oe: 
impossi;Jle to sho .. ! the.t it is not necessary to 
ẀŪTŤŲVŲŸŠŪTĚ the sentence first to identify the act, and 
of course if it is necessary to ẀŪTŤŲVWŸŸTĚthe sentence 
first to identify the act under a full description, 
then any attempt to eXylain the meaning of the sentence 
by reference to the act would be circular'. (98) 
For most deterr:Jinate sentences He cannot ex-plair. the meaning by 
referenc:; to what we do with the sentence. s:'his is a general 
conclusion applying to any TŤWŤŲŲŚŸÙŪŠWŤĚ sentence containing the word 
'good' • 
Hare supports his contention that the word 'good' has comoenciatory 
(99) 
meaning by reference to the Oxford English Dictionary. Paul Ziff 
has pointed out that reference to the dictionary is not a trouble free 
procedure in philosophy. The dictionary is often wrong, and it is 
vrrong in the case of 'good'. Ziff discusses over one hundred and 
sixty exan1ples to produce his analysis of 'good'. He has no 
difficulty utilising this painsta..J.:ing case by case procedure in 
coming up with ÜŠŸŪŬŪĤȘŬÜÜŤŪTÙŪŦĚuses. Utterances such as 'Be sure 
to do a good job' are urging not comr:1ending uses, and what vrould vie 
say of 'It is good that she is dead?' Is it an utterance comn:ending 
death? There are many more examples in his book. Consider these few 
and ask Ivhat they are cOElmending:-
'( ÍÌÒŸĞĚ No news is good news •••••• 
(105) \,ie shall have good weather tomorrow 
(106) I "rant a good cu:? of coffee 
(107) I had a good time 
(108) George has a good opinion of himself 
(109) The good seats are all reserved 
(110) A good tennis racket unfortunately costs twenty dollars.' (100) 
Ziff also stresses the point that we have no reason even in ȘÕMŸŤŪTÙŪŦĚ
uses to suggest that 'good' the word does the comnending. s:'his point 
is, of course, inqlici t in Eoldcroft' s paper. Consic12r a simple 
sentence th2.t seems to comme:1d such as 'That is good'. The use of good 
is not necessary He could replace it '!Ii th 'fine' or 'spendid'. It is 
not sufficient for He can ask 'Is that good?' If Ive replace 'that' with 
'what' we can get ""I'hat is good?' So I-Ie may as well say that 'that' 
does the commending rather than 'good'. There does not, therefore, 
ap:pea.r to be much in the idea ti1at good has comc'lendatory meaning. Ziff 
rejects Ulis notion and is firm in his conclusion that 'apart from 
certain minor, derivative, or 6.eviant cases, Jlgood l ' in 3nglish means 
answering to certain interests'. (101) Only one WUÙŪȚŸĚwill upset this 
analysis, he says, 'a better one'. 
Hare's distinction runs into great difficulties "Thich are 
compounded in the case of 'education'. Not only is it a 'less general 
term of comr,1endation' but it folloHs from the above argument that it 
does not necessarily have comcendatory me2.ning, but is used in 
sentences \"hich may commend. ŸŸŠWUŤŲĚ than saying that mEmy peo:?le do 
not accept the desirability criterion of 'educated' 'de can simply say 
that they do not u,se it in sentences which comr:lend, and thus avoid 
the seeming paradox that they do not desire the desirable. ",%ods and 
Barrow 9.ccept that 'educated' may carry an element of descriptive 
mea::1ing. One reason ".,hy Hare \'rished to avoid t'is move with the word 
'good' 'vJas to resist the idea that the featurss of o::,jects determined 
the meaning of the word. By importing the descriptive or ev:,!luative 
dichotomy into the discussion to avoid this conclusion he misses a 
more important and related distinction bet'.veen the '2Jhenomenological' 
and. the 'grammatical' which we she,ll discuss in Chapter Three. 
A concluding remark about the di,stinction between 'evaluative' 
and 'descriptive' L1eaninG can be made, i:ioods and Barrow clearly think 
that it is important to distinguish them ",hen analysing the Hore. 
'educated ". But it is imnortant to make a sim:;Jle qualification 1Irhen 
such familiar philosophical distinctions are brought into play. It 
is not the word but the utterance in a:?propriate circumstances of an 
utterance that may be said to have evaluative meaning and not an;-/ 
particular word in the utterance. Even something that seems to be a 
purely factual a.."'ld descri:r::tive utterance such as : 
'Henry VIII had six \.,ives.' 
could be highly evaluative if 1I,e ir::mgine it being spol-:en by a staunch 
i{oman Catholic in the course of a debate about sin and monogamy. To 
stress such a point is to do no G10Ho, than remind ourselves about the 
impor-':ance of context, and to bring the particular to bear once more 
upon tDe general. 
2.7. ŸŲÙWŤŲÙŠGĚ In Wittgenstein's Philosouhy 
fllention of the particular ÙŸŲÙŪŦVĚus bac% to the main theme of this 
essay. ŸŸGUŠWĚ I must offer now is some account of 'criteria' which differs 
substantially ȚŲŬŲHŸĚ that given b:r those writers who see Hi ttgenstein as 
offering some sort of 'theory'. In givinG this account I will also 
extend and elaborate F.ly previous reL103.rKs about the im'oortance of a 
sensitivity to liitt0;enstein'" style. 
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To help to ȘÒŠŲŠȘWŤŲŸVŤĚ "'Ii ttE;ena-::ein' s use of the concept of 
'cri teria' I want to begin by loo.'-cing at how he cOllld be seen as 
offering a 'criteriological theory of meaning' a.s a solution to 
the so-called 'problem of other minds'. The 'criteriological' 
theory I \'lill di,scuss is quite clearly and deliberately similar to 
Hichardson's extension of the BCV. Scepticism about other minds 
results from any attempt to drive a 'l'ledge r)etween 'body' and 'mind'. 
Such a-'::tempts usually introduce some extraordinary use of the term 
'body' such that ','Ie see 'bodies' a..'1.d not peo}Jle, and are therefore 
held to have to provide special g-rounds for believing that these 
other bodies feel, thin!:;: etc. as ' .. Je do. To a.'1.Shrer the sceptic '.:e are 
prohibi ted fror.1 i!laking appeals to what would ordine.rily count as 
evidence for, sa/, a problem about how a part'cular person felt (He 
told me!). Instead 'de must justify our inferences from basic 
stateme:l.ts descriptions of the movements of these mindless bodies 
by an appeal to somethinc; extraorci.inary (God) or by ŐÕÒŸŤĚ purely 
formal meDns. One 'fray of seeing 'criteria' as an answer to this 
demand. To see ŸËÙĚttzenstei::l 9.8 in'":roducing 'criteria' to solve this 
prol:llem is to see him as a subtle sort of behaviourist. His disclair:Jers 
about being a behaviourist are to be ÙŸŲŤȘÙHĚ or are to ŸĞŤĚ taken as 
ÙŸÒVWŠŪȘŤĚ of self deception. The connection between pain and uain 
behaviour 1:Jould therefore be established by reference to movements 
whose ȘŬŸŸŪŤȘWÙŬŪĚwith pain was established when the \'JOrd or concept 
of pain \vas taught to a y,:,ung child. These movements, grimaces or 
whatever "'Tould WŸŤŲŤȚŬŲŤĚbe contil1t;ent yet necessary in the way we 
mentioneG earlier. It i.s by reie:C'ence to these 'criteria' that He 
could say that someone -,wula. be i.n pain. s:'hus to take just this 
typical exo.mple 1,[e could cl.e:,l with the p:::oo:)lem of other r"inds by 
reminding people of the 'criteria' for VŬÜŤŬŸŤGVĚŸŤÙŪŇĚin pain, and 
therefore esta'blish that they felt the 'same' a.s vie do 1;:hen I,ie are in 
pain. Or if they did not feel the sallie it \vould not 3.lter the fact 
that the word 'pain' still had a meaning. Other Qental concepts could 
be ŤVWȘHŞŨÙVŨGŤHJŸĚ as having &;)]Jlic tion to these mindless moving objects 
by analogous procedures. The cri terial relation vlill not be a strict 
logical relation like neces:;E.ry a."ld ,s.ufficient condition it ,viII be 
somethinG looser. Thc,re may indeed be several cri i:ec:-ia 1t1hich connect 
up the ŠŮŸŨÙȘŠWÙŬŪĚof mental predicates with characteristic patterns 
of mover;']ent. This account is quite a ȘŬÜŪŸŬŪĚone but its ubiquitousness 
does not vindicate it. I Vlant to show that thi.s is not how \Jittgenstein 
meant the term to be appliec. and that he was using it to deal with quite 
a different problem. 
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As we have seen many ÙŪWŤŲŮŲŤÒÍĦGJŸÙŬŪVĚ of 'criteria' rely on the few 
pages in the Blue Sook ",here the term is introduced. Again it is ",ise 
to look clo,s,:"ly at the text. iJi WWŸĴGŤŪVWŤÙŪĚ is dealing with the notion 
that it is not ii11portB.nt to consider the details of particular cases 
because all we need is to find a CO:T110n element beb-Ieen various cases 
and the bewilderment ŴUÙȘËĤŸĚ leads us to ask '\.'hat is ') , .... questions 
will disa1'Jpear. Irrr.-nediately before introducing the terns 'criteria' 
and 'symptom' 1/ii ttgenstein is discussing how :;Jhilosophical paradoxes 
can be clee.red up by the considere.tion of cases: 
'ide sB.id th3.t it VI8.S a way of examining the gramnar 
(the use) of the word lito lm01."Il, to:ask ourselves 
'l-rhat, in the particular case h'e are examining, we 
should call "getting to know". There is a temptation 
to WUÙŪŨŸĚ that this question is only vaguely relevant, 
if relevant at all, to the question: "',ihat is the 
meaning of the word 'to kn01.'I'?r!. i.ie seem to be on a 
side track when we ŠVŶŸĚ the question "'!,/hat is it like 
in this case 'to get to know'?" But this question 
really is a question concerning the grammar of the 
word lito lmow!T ••• ' (102) 
1,ii ttgenstein introduces the two terms in a few paragraphs later in order 
to 'avoid certain elementary confusions'. He gives the nedical analogy 
ȘŲÙWÙȘÙVŤȘŸĚearlier, and distin:;1.lishes behleen the bIo terms in the way 
that RichardsOI:' does. But he then goes 0::": to remind us thE,t in nractice 
we won't be able to say that is the defining criterion and ",hat the 
synJptom but will have to fJi32--;:e an 'arbitrary decision ad hoc'. ŸUÙVHĚ he 
says, is not a 'deplorable lad: of clarity': 
'For remerlber that in general He don't use language 
according to strict rules - it hasn't been taught us 
by means of strict rules, either. 'lie, in our 
discussions on the other hE.nel, constantly compare 
lanzuase '"i th a calculus j)roceeeling according to 
strict rules. 'This is a very one sided Hay of looking 
at language.' (103) 
i!1hat TJi ttgens-:::ein is doing here is. characterising essentialism, the notion 
that there must be a COD!l10n feature in all cases of Ÿ·ÜÜĒÙŪŦHĚ thinking, 
expecting, rec.ding etc. It is part and Darcel of this view th2.t the 
difference bebleen different cases 'syr:1ptoms' are of no interest to 
those who 1"lal,-t to anS':ler 'i,,'hat is 'q,uestions. '"That is rarely seen 
about the notion of 'criteria' is that this deni.gration of the partic-
ular is self contradictory. r;:'his point has been made, as far C6 I know 
by one solitary philosopher, John Cook. According to Cook: 
••• the claiE; that in the various yart::'cular cases of 
e:qJecting ue can discover only symptoms is self-contradictory, 
for hOvJ could 'ere set out to search through these cases for 
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that corW.1on element which He complain of not 
finding if He did not knOH that they ,,,ere cases 
of expecting. If there must be a defining 
cri terion, and ' .... e admit to not having discovered 
it (but ŬŪŨXŅŐQŊJŨŸŊĒWŬÜVØŨĞHĚ then 1"e should also 
allow that "Ie do not even knm" whether '""e have 
been considering cases of expecting. But this is 
absurd. • •• 3ut if the idea of a Ildefining 
criterion" is a bogus notion, then in considering 
the details of particular cases 1I.'e are not 
consiciering merely 'lsymptoms ". '1'hese details which 
VB.ry from one case of eX:gecting or knowing to 
another, can show us sorJething about the grammar 
of the words.' (104 
As we shall see this argument is often reversed. (105) The argument is 
not comple:'e in the Blue Book. It needs to be read against certain 
passages in the P.I. such as section 153 w>ich concludes '..:.'_nd if I say 
it is hidden - then how do I knO'lI Hhat I have to look for? I am in a 
muddle'. The rejection of es:o:entialism necessarily involves a rejection 
of the search for a defining criterion. Of course, several writers 
atten'pt to retain 'criteria' but drop the notion of a 'defining criterion' 
suggesting that the target of iii ttge2:stein' 5 ŠWWŠȘŸJĚ 1Ims the notion of 
defini tiol1 and not that of a 'criterion', as such. It is my contention 
that the two notions C2.nnot be separated in this 'cfay. i}hat the attempted 
separation relies on is a use of 'criterion' which is acceptable and 
is to ':Je found in "'J'i ttgenstein. Thi,s use of 'criterion' refers precisely 
to those details of particular cases tl-i2.t we would mention in justifying 
our use of a certe.in term in a particular circumstance in everyday life. 
Such details can be as sDall and seemingly insignificant as the 
tvli tching of someone' s nostrils which may be in some particular case 
our criterion for someone' s ex'eecting someone else. \ie can ima;;ine 
this being of great importance in a novel, a great turning point in the 
psychological account of a character. But such details cannot be 
accommodated in a version of the BCV like Richardson's. Such views 
atteli1pt to retain the notion but defend it against the standard 
cri ticisms of 'definition'. Despi te GŸĒËÙĚttgenstein' s assertion that 
'we may not advance any kind of theory' (P.I. s. 109) such attempts 
to defend the 'criteriological view' do not move substantially away 
from the essentialist idea he is attacking. They merely provide a r:lore 
refined theory. Em-there does L'i ttgen,stein sug::est that by isola_ting 
'criteria' that a philoso}Jher can. bring out all or even mOE;t of what 
is of in':erest to us in a conce'at. i'lpologists for the Bev ,,,ill take 
two main lines 0: derence against the arguments I am trying to put 
forward. Firstly they \ViII remind us of the passages in the investig-
ations Hhere l,Ii ttgenstein refers to our 'criterion' or 'criteria' for 
this and that. Secondly they Hill seek some account 0: \"Ji ttgenstein' s 
102 
work which ŤẄŮŨŠÙŪJĤŸĚ hOlt! l.ii ttgens;:eil1 could use 'criteria' to character-
ise a view he ,'Jisi:ed to attac,l:, ",hile also making further references 
to 'criteria', jclhict avoids the implausible h:'pothesis that 
'di ttgenstein l;.sed the S2X'e piece of jarGon to refer to hJO seemingly 
contradictory notions. To anSHer the first criticism let us return 
to our discussion of the putative 'problem of bther minds', a.'1d what 
is supposed to be GŸÍÙWWŦŤŪVWŤÙŪGVĚ 'criteriological'solution to it. 
If ;Ji ttsens-'::ein \"as advocating a 'cri teriological' solution to the 
'pro'::llem of other minds' you 1/lould ex\)ect him to refer to characteristic 
cri teria or sets of criteria which justify our 2,scription of mental 
predicates. But he does not do WŸŨÙVĦĚ The 'problem' arises because of 
a Cartesian notion of 'body' \-lhich is metaphysical. This notion is 
attacked from several directions. .Ln sections 203 to 223 of P.I., for 
example, he recreates the pUZZlement that leads to scepticisn: q','hat 
gives us so much as the idea that living beings, things, can feel? ••• 
Couldn't I irnagj.ne h2.vine frightful pains and turning to stone \-Jhile 
they lasted? 'dell, hOI.]' do I know, if I shut my eyes, 'o"hether I h?ve 
not turned into 2. stone?' (LL s. 283) He continues through the 
maze of rel.s.ted problems such as the idea that a body C2...D have pains 
(P.L s. 286); the idea of a private imrard identiHcation of pains 
(P.L s. 293-5); the mLsleadinz assimilation of pictures, expressions, 
and grammatical statements (P.L s. 297, s. 317, a.'1d s. 350 respectively); 
the idea that thinking is em 'incorpore'Oll. process' (P.L s. 339); and 
the diffi.cul ties involved in seein(; children 2nd other hUD2.n beings as 
automata (P.L s. 420). ",here are a 1:!hole family of Lcsues th2.t mal-ce 
up the GŸĞŲŬŞŨŤËÍÍGĚ and ',Ji WWGJHJŤŪVWŤŸŪĚ ȘÕŨÍŸĤŬÙTŤŲVĚ many more exc..''llples of the 
family than those I have ÜŤŪWÙŬŪŤŸĦĚ This is characteristic of his 
method. He apl)roaches the 'pro:Jlel'c1' frol" many different directions 
like an·artist sketching a la.'1dscape. 'c'!nat he o.oes not do is to 
simply point out salient "!features 'ilhich are 'criteria' but uses 
analo§;ies, examDles and counter-exarLples. i.Je get eX&DjJle after 
exari'ple of the sort of thinking that leads to s cel=,ticisin, along with 
examples designed to counter these nislcadinz trains of thought. Some 
of these ŤẄŠŸHÍŮŨŤVĚ illuminate by ȘŬŪŪŸŸȘWÙŪŦĚlike ŠŪȘŸĚunlike, for eX8.mple, 
the anal 0 .:Y between seeing a hUlTI2-n being as 2.n automaton and seeing 
a cross 'Jiece of a windm,j as a swastika (P.l. s. 420). Others reveal 
ŸĚ ----
mislcadi:-:g assir.1i2.ations by maldng disguisec. nonsense explicit. For 
eX8.mule 'iii ttGenstein comp2.reE WŲŸHÙŪŦĚ to get at the meaning of the word 
'think' by ",atching your,self ",hile you think with trying to find out 
vrhat 'mate' m,:ans 'by close obser-'la.tion of the last move of some game 
of chess' F.l. s. 316). One of his comn:onest uses of exar:iples is to 
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ShOH that wh:::"t '.'le think is a perfectly clear aIlcc intelligi';le statement, 
suggestion, or possibility is based ẀŸŬŪĚa misleading analogy. This 
analogy need not, of course, be clearly formulateo, or even cac:)able of 
clarificetion. For exau)le, ',i/hen ',li tt[;enstein is discussing 'understand-
ing' he asks 'Boh' should '.FS counter someone who told us that wi th him 
und<2rs-':B.nding I'ras 2.n inner process?' (P.1. Part 2 P. 131). And ÙJŪŸŨŤT­
ia-cely asks the 'parallel' question 'How should. ,·;e counter him if he said 
that ,,,i th UÙŲĦŸĚ XŸŬŘÙÙŪŦĚhOH to play chess 'das an inner process?' This 
particular analogy '.lith the gaue of chess comes up time after time. 
Hhat he does \'!i th it in each case is to make the absurdity of the state-
ment, suggestion, or possi'::lility clear by makinz; an analogous statement 
etc., th",t hints at the sort of mistake that is being n::ade. That is, 
it ShOHS that in these cases 'l12 are assi'Tl.lating: ȘŬŪȘŤŸŊWVĚ of different 
sorts. This is ;Jrought out in the example we are considering by 
simply presUf:2ing that the person ,,,e are taU:ing to persists in his 
assimile,tion even in this second case. I-Ie argues tho,t for him playing 
chess is an inner process. BOH do we deal VIi th this? ',;ji ttgenstein 
makes the sugsestion that we should 'drE.I·l his attention to the criteria 
that ,,,ould demonstrate his capacity, and on the other hane: to the 
criteria for "inner states".' (P.1. Part 2:2.181). Sirr.ila:coly, when 
discussing what is involved in expecting C'4"ld whether this is an 'inner' 
feeling ',ii-tgenstein 1:laTnS against assirnilatinE; differeEt sorts of 
concerts b=T remaTl:ing that: GHŸHÙŨĚ rlin:''ler urocess" stand;s in ne'8d of out-
.... ,ard criteria'. (P.I. s. 58C). Here He VŤŤŸŊĚ to have i,iittgenstein 
adoptinc; a 'cri teriological' approach. Ack1i ttedly he does not actually 
present the relevant criteria but he indicates that there are such. 
\'le seem, therfore, to be in a ]aradoxical position. l,iittgenstein 
introduced the term to charEl,cterise 'essentialism' and yet Clses the term 
in a ,.lay that appears to allow the idea of a 'connon element' to creep 
back. :Sut this is a ŪŨÙVŲŤŠTÙŸŦĦĚ ÙŸĦVĚ tde have seen if the notion of 
'cri teria' has any use it ref:,:,ys to the c',etails of particular cases 
that ",e might ref'2r to in oro.inary life. Thus in thE) exa:n-ple we discus-
sed above this -,;QuId involve giving detailed exarilples of in'hat it is in 
case after case to hcwe the capacity to play chess, and detaileo. exanples 
of 'inner states' such as feelings, sensations, and pains. ŸUŤĚdetails 
of these particular cases ,.ould b ŸĚ our 'criteria' for the ascription 
of one sort of concept ro,ther elan the othel". lio Qou'-Jt SODe of these 
cases may have simi12rities out thi.s point is not relevant here, for, 
as '"e have seen, ŸIËŤĚ cannot iGnore any details. hOHever tenpted He may 
be to produce ŐÕŸÍÍŤĚ comnon element there ,,:ill be n12:.'lY Cases in '.vhich it 
104 
does not fit. Though such a move may be satisfying it is mainly so 
because it abrogates the need for furthe2." thought. The problem seems 
to be solved. by producing a forrmla. But this i,s not Hittgenstein's 
way of working. He does not give"us 'solutions' but considers cases 
of the one sort and then of the other. ŸŶHĚ fOOo. example of this method 
is section vi of the second lJart of the P.J. the very section to Hhich 
\"e have besn referring. To counter the idea that understanding the use 
or the meaning of a term W3..S a psychological feeling 'di ttgenstein does 
not produce 'criteria'. He gives eX2.mple3 of Hha t this could 'mean', 
produces counter-examples, JŸŲŤVŤŪWVĚanalogies, and constantly asks 
questions. He gets us to appreciate the numerou,s ways in i"hich the 
analoGY works upon us. For the a,ssimi.lation of concepts of different 
sorts 'tlOrks 2,nalotjically .I.ie 3.ssimilate this C3..2e to tha.t often only 
dimly a'iJare of l1ihEl.t 'J,re are doLlZ. By ma1:ing the analogy explicit 
through concrete exe.lll1)les 't!i tt,enstein 1.'Teakens its pull. The assimi"'c-
ation of ccnce"Ots of quite dif:;:'erent sorts is a form of bad case by case 
argument. 
!'-:e can nmc' give ans\\'ers to the two objections. Firstly ',lIe have 
seen that ŸÙWWŦŤŪVWŤÙŪĚdoes talk of our 'criteria' for this and that. 
But we ha.ve elso seen that he does not give criteria but mentions that 
there are cri teri2. i:'1 the 5 ense of details of uarticular cases. Uhere 
he does seem to give a criterion as in s. 146 'The ŠŮŮŨÙȘȘŸÙŬŪĚis still 
a criterion of understanding'. It is C1uit", clear from the context that 
this is a way of getting us to consider the particular circunstances 
\.;hich justify the understanding (P.I. s. 19+ md 155). Note also that 
the very general reference to ap:c")lic2.tion is only said to be a criterion. 
;vi ttgenstein is dealing here with the assimilc.tion of concepts of 
different sorts. It is mostly in such cases that he will refer to 
'criteria'. But there is nothing in his use of the term that implies 
that he is reintroducing the idea of a common eleLlent. Indeed, he is 
still cOJrh&..tting one of the residual ideas of essentialism. For if \ve 
concentrate on a common element such as knOiiing the foremla for 
producing a series "re can CODe to think that all the accorapsniments to 
understanding this-being [.!.ble to 't1ri te out the serieE using pen and 
paper, having been taught some elementary maths in the past etc. -
are inessential. Thus it is possible to come to believe that having, 
say, the mental image of the formula is all tha.t is necessary to have 
the capacity to produce a series. 'J:Io counter thi2, vie", IIi ttgenstein 
gets us to consider \vhat in pa.rbcular circumstances would be our 
cri teria for saying the.. t someone had this capacity. 'ilhat he refers to 
is not the comn:on element but to the details of these cases. Thus, he 
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cannot be held to 'be ei-::her re-introducing U1e idea of a comrJon 
element or of using two contradict::ry notions of criteria. 
However, as is so often the case, an insensitive reading of 
Hi ttgenstein by vlhich I mean a prosaic and superficial understanding 
of the technique.s he em:910ys can lead to the follovling interpretation 
of what I have jUGt argued. It could be thought that there is an 
obvious contradiction in all this. Either criteria are common 
eleI:1ents or they are details of parti.cular cases but not both. 
'vIi tt:::enstein seems to refer to criteria in ooth ,·rays. Thus he refers 
to our 'criteria' for something i.e. inner states, in a general way 
and seems to refer to a common element, 'dhereas it is argued that he 
means 'the details of particular cases'. This seems a rather thin 
argument. 
"'ii ttgenstein' s style has been cO'l1ljared with an artist, a . .... :9a1.n"er 
sketching landsca-pes. It naB been compared with poetry because of its 
non-assertoric style. It can also be compared, ,vi th music. ',Ii ttgenstein 
often cO;Dpares music 2nd language: 'Undersi:a..'1ding a sentence is much 
more akin to understanding a theme in music that you may think.' (P.I. 
s .527) • 'Speech \,ri th and Hi thout thou,:;ht is to be ȘŬÜŮŠŲŤȘŸĚwith the 
playing of a piece of music \vith and without tholl.ght.' (P.I. s. 341) 
It . fIt t t TO T' • 1 t (106) If t 1 1.S u,se u 0 .ry 0 see ŸĚ1.n mUSlca ŤŲŪŸVĦĚ He a;:ce 
Hittgenstein'B use of 'criteria' as a theme and the Investigations 
as a VŸĦGÜŮUŬŪXĚ it is possi:")le to apprecie.te 'l·ihat he does -Ivith the concept. 
A thene ÙŪWŲŸĤTẀȘŤTĚat a certain point in a symphony can be light hearted. 
The context makes it so. Heintrod1.:,ced in a later movement it can appear 
sor;1bre and heavy. In another context it C211 a,lmost be hidden. Thus it 
can be used to evoke nOvl one effect, now another. Simi12.rly 1,ii WWŸĴŤŪVWŤÙŪĚ
introduces the notion to characterise essentialisr:1 - \'lhich is a pm-rerful 
picture of how terms have ÜŤŠŪÙŪŸVĚ- and tries to win us away from this 
picture. But he is not atta,ckin,::,- one theory to proyound another. Thus 
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\Ve find him saying later that 'Essence is expressed by grarJmar' (P.I. s 371) 
This can be vie',red 2.S 2. metaphorical use of the ter:l1 'essence'. nut 
this 'dould only be the case if the ass1.m,ption ',.rere to be made that all 
uses of 'essence' had to be Teferrin;c; to a common elenlent. iii -;;tgenstein 
had dealt with the misleading il;-:plictions of this view ear=.ier. Here 
he is using the term in a different context, one in which there is no 
suggestion of a ȘŬŲHŸÜŬŪĚ elerJent. In a sense he is giving us, in this 
aphoris(.}, a notion 0: es'ence 11Jithout universals. (107) 'l'Jittgenstein 
is suggesting that if i.Je 'clant to uncierstand something 'de must look to 
the form of life, the actual way the thing is manifested. If vie have 
not follm'led his reflections ' .. 'e ,,,ill read a comr,10n element bacl-<: into 
this passage alld ŞŸĚpuzzled by it. The idea of an essence is innocuous 
if He do not 1hinlc of it as a comDon element. His use of the term 
'cri teri2' functions analogously. Iii ttcenstein is not suggesting that 
there are no cri teri2.. This ',wuld be 2.bsurd. But he is rejecting the 
notion of a criterion as a 'COQffiOn element' which alone justifies the 
application of a terr;1. Once the charm of this picture is 1ilea.kened the 
term car;. be used and should not trouble us. If 'de are still be\vi tched 
then 't'li ttGenstein '.dll seen to be using one expression j.n contradictory 
ways. The im:;?ortant thing is tnat'i tt,genstein is not denyj.ng essential-
isr:l .oond proposing an alternative theory. He is WŨŸŸŲÙŪŦĚ to free us from 
a :picture. 
vIe could describe \Ii WWĦĜŸŤŪVWŤÙŪGĚs use of concepts like 'criteria' 
and 'es,:,.ence' in musical terms as contralJuntal. In music counterpoint 
is the blenc.inc; or 2.ddin,g WÕŇŤWŸŤŲĚof meloc:.ies. l,Ji ttgenstein in the 
ex;-;.mple given blend,s WŲĤŸŤĚ notion o:f essence 111i th tlv;.t of 'grammar'. l)e 
have said that he meC.ns by 'gramr!lar' much more than the stuff of school 
textbooks. It is meant to bring us ŞŠȘŶŸĚ to the rough ground of 
ordinary langua.ge, to actual hUQ:3.l1 practice, to the customs and 
conventions of human culture. This is a far cry from the rigid view 
of la.nguage in:'plied b-- the search for a 'comrJon element' or a 'defining 
cri tE"rion' • Again vThen 1,ii tt ,enstein uses the notion of 'criteria' when 
vTe are te"lpted to assim,i12te ȘÕŸÍĦȘŤŮWVĚ of different sorts he uses it to 
get us back to the rough ground of what we wot.ld say in actual ce.ses. 
This is a contrapuntal use of term again. 1,[e are not askeci to draVi out 
a CO[IDOn element but to look at cases. Both these uses of the concepts 
are contrapuntal in another sense. In music bvo [1elodies that are at 
odds vIi th one another can be said to ŸŊŤĚ contrapuntal. Similarly 
\"li ttgenstein sketches a skewed aDd distorted uicture of 'criteria' or 
'essence' '-'lhich nevertheless has a great charm for us 3..!.""1d then g'oes on 
to show how misleading this picture is. He renders it innocuous, and 
then useE: these terrr.8 along side different IJictures. ,:'1 though these 
different sketches can be said to be at odds this must not be taken to 
mean tha.t "'.:ittsenstein is presentil1g rival actions or theories. The 
distorted pictures of the 'dorkings of lallguage, the natur.e of reality 
or \',hatever, that he c,!ishes to erase are very powerful. The metaphors, 
analogies, stores, and dialogues that he lJresents may have an equal force 
and mag-ic. They must have if we are to escape the seductive and faniliar 
gras}J of our h9.bi tual ŲŸĦŬTŤVĚ of thin:cing. He does not present us \Vi th 
two notions of 'criteria'. He removes one bewitching picture ŸẀWĚ does 
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not put another in its place. He merely leads us back to the rough 
ground of particular cases. 
This account does follo\or t!',e so-callee. 'therapeutic' interpretation 
of idittgenstein's philosophy. It stresses the analoc;y bet\-leen philosophy 
and therapy set out by ',jittgenstein in s. 255 'r::'he philosoIlher's treat-
ment of a question is like the treatment of an illness.' Under this 
interpretation ',li ttgenstein' s comments are not propositions or argurnents 
but theraneutic comments which aim to cure a philosophical malady. 
I.,'/'hat this is depends on the context. Its treatment must be slow: 'In 
philosophising we may not terminate a disease of thought. It must run 
its natural course, and slow cure is all important.' (108) No counter-
arguments or statements are produced no theories advanced. Talking of 
a misleading picture in mathematics lili ttgenstein said: '''Your concept 
is vlrong. - However, I cannot illuminate the matter by fighting against 
your words, 'out only by trying to turn your attention a 1!Tay from certain 
expressions, illustrations, ir.1ages, and tQ1.llards the employment of the 
" ,(109) A d' t th;s ' l!'t.l- t' d t' ff woras. ccor J..ng 0 .L vJ..ew IJ.. Lgens eJ..n oes no pro er 
his remarks for simple agreement but to help the reader question and 
think. TvlO points about this W2.y of reading Vii ttgenstein are very 
important for the arguments I am presenting here. I shall briefly 
discus.,:: them before illustrating the approach by discussing the 'family 
resem'Jlance' metaphor. The first point is thEd philosophy is not 
vie\ved as architectonic. ';ie do not build philosophic systems, or 
advance theses. .Such systems are merely ȘŠJŸWŨŤVĚ in the air. In seeming 
to destroy them we are merely de,stroying 'houses of cards and we are 
clearing up the ground of language on which they stand.' (P.I. s. 118) 
The second point is that this interpretation suggests that one of the 
main causes of philosophical disease is '- a one sided- diet: one nour-
ishes one's thinking with only one kind of example'. (P.l. s. 593). 
vlhat thi2 interpretation embocEes in these last two points is not a 
recipe for philosophical anarchy but an important step towaYds viewing 
philosophy as an art rather than a science. Hi ttgenstein, \ve are told, 
'repudiated the analogy wi tll mental illness and the assimi.lation of his 
. (110) 
method to psychoanalysJ..s'. Allowing that he probably meant only 
that others had made too much of the similarities this disavowal still 
points to a further and more \videspread WE..y of misreadin.g l':i ttgenstein. 
The whole notion of philosophy as WUŤŸĒŠŮXĚ is self-reflexive. Part of 
the therapy would be to we'3.n us frol1' the notion tha.t philosophy is a 
forD of therapy. The idea th:::ct ',iittgenstein is writing like an artist 
and sketchil'ls' ra.ther tha..n asserting philosophical theses must be applied 
to the allusions to mental illness and WJŸŤŲŤHŮXĦĚ To attenrot to draw out 
the precise points of this analogy is to Delee a fundamental error. ide 
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are presented with only an aspect of Tdi ttgenstein' s view of philosophy. 
To try to SlJecify :in detail what he means by such remarks is to try to 
convert them into assertions. This ,vould involve ignoring his style 
and merely referring to the supDosed content of the ŲŤŸŠŲÛVĦĚ It is 
not a piece of mystification to but an important insight to realise 
that these comparisons and an9.10gies cannot be stated otherwise than 
they are. They may seeEl to be vc::gue , indefinite, and opaque. They 
are intenc5.ed to free us ȚŲŬŲŸĚ the very idea that He must be presented 
vii th something d efini ti 'Ie in all its resDects if we are to really 
understand what is being said. Consider hOH David Pears, for example, 
deals with the two elements of the 'therapeutic' approach mentioned 
above i.e. the non-architectonic approach, and the importance of 
giving detailed and varied examples. The two points are not unrelated. 
If you resist the thrust of science and system building you of 
necessity move towards the idea that a philosopher should present 
examples in the way that an artist does. This is certainly the way 
tha.t i;littgenstein moves. Pears calls such a shift 'very elusive'. It 
is 'difficult', he says, 'to be sure of the precise points of the 
( 111) 
analogy.' Of the suggestion that examples must involve imulicit 
generalis2,tions Pears suggests that \Ji tt[';enstein might have thought 
the idea both false and useless 'but it is not entirely clear ",hether 
that was h.;s v';ew'. (112) H 'd th t' t' t "'tt t' .L. .L. • e ȘŬŪVŸĚ ers e sugges ŸŬŪĚ '11a ŘHHJŸĚ gens ŤŸŪĚ
thought that the meanings of the things people said were somehow 
'irreducibly particular'. But he continue:::. 'This is a vague suggestion. 
How much r!lOre precise can it be made?,(113) Pears holds that '}ittgenstein's 
'wholism' could he.ve led hiD to the view that the in,pression made by 
any example cannot be caught in a formula because its posi WÙŬŸĒGĦĚ in the 
whole system, its context, gives it a unique character. 1-iowever 
despi te all his attempts to Get all precisely what 1,'Ii ttgenstein meant 
by rejecting the arc:-;itectonic in favour of the detailed presentation 
of examples he concludes that it is 'not clear exactly hovl far he went' 
in this direction or 'preCisely 'Ilhat view he took of the application of 
. (114) 
the partlcular case'. By seekiI'-g precision ŅŸŤŠŲVĚ deals \vi th 
several misunderstandings and misinterpretations. But as an attempt 
at 'Getting at "That i,Jittgenstein meant' it is necessarily wrong-headed. 
1;/ittgenstein meant wh3.t he said. If he had \-Janted to present a fOT[lal 
and precise view of the role of examples he would have done so. In 
approaching '.'Ii WWHŸŤŪVWŤÙŪĚ"Ie must take note of his style understood in 
its widest sense as not ŬŮŸŬŬVŤTĚ to content. i.'-ie cannot detach the 
meaning from what he says in order to restate it more clearly. This 
is the essential mistake of 'constructivist' interpretations of 
'l/i ttgenstein like i.io.i,sm".nn' s B.wl ŨJĜÙȘUŠŲŘĦĦŸVŬŪGĚs. I Hould be loath to 
say that Pears falls into this mould unecjui vocally, but to the extent 
109 
that he is actual2.y seekin[; precision rather than ado::'Jting an exegetical 
device he cannot pl"ovide a satisfactorY account of the later l,}ri tings. 
Such an approach goes against the grain of those works. 
2.8. General Criteria and Education 
I,Ii th this background it is possible to rJake some progress with the 
second of the questions Vii tb ĤẂŨŸŸĦÙȘUĚ this chapter opened 'Are there 
criteria for (the use of the term) education?' As I have indicated I 
do not intend to do anything like attempt to answer this CJ,uestion but 
to understand it. Something of "'het I would suggest as to what sense 
can be given to the notion of 'criteria' can be gleaned frou the yrevious 
sections of this chapter. I "lant now to consider the notion as it is 
used in contemporary philosophy of education. Its use is not simple or 
monolithic, its development is not unilinear, and it is often taken as 
a term that is totally unproblematic. HOl"ever, to simplify the task 
of this section I vlill concentrO.te on trle use th3.t Teters and Hirst 
make of the terD and of the c.evelopments of it made by only a few other 
writers. As a starting point I will begin with a supposed paradox 
pointed out by R.J. Haack in a recent paper. 
Haack's paper is a piece of mud-slinging - an inefficacious 
diatribe against philoso:;':Ihy of education as it is currently )ractised. 
Peters has called it a 'slovenly' piece of work. (115) Haack -",ants 
to suggest that philoS01Jhy of education is sOiTiehow 'intern&lly 
(116) defective' • Despi te the glaring oversirnplification of Haack's 
paper it is possible to derive from its turgid pages four different 
views of education supposedly held by Peters at various times and 
harvested fro.n! papers )ublished over a ten year s:9an. This does not 
mean that taack clearly distinguishes behreen the vievls but they are 
mentioned in his paper. 
(1) The Essentialist view - that there are a set of necessary 
and sufficient condi tion.s for the use of the term 
'education'. Or the view that there is a sole criterion 
for the use of the term. (117) 
(2) The Family Beser.lblance view - though Hirst and Peters 
discuss this view at length Haack's only support for 
Peters' acceptance of it is a remark of his that it is 
absurd to think that there coulc ever be one agreed 
aim for education. (118) 
ĜŸHĞĚ '::'he 'Historically Independent Concepts' view of education 
- the Spartans he,d a com})le'ely diffel"ent view frora us etc. (119) 
110 
111 
(LI-) The Super Concept of <3ducation - froe Peters' re);l&rk 
that 'The conce]Jt of "education" is a very fluid one', 
Haack de:ci ves a notion of a 'super' concept embra.cing 
possibly inco@patible views of education. (120) 
Haac:.;: argues tha -7:: it is difficult to knoH ('Ihich of these vie\·.fs Peters 
accepts, and that Peters is far from cle3.r about wh8.t he c·'ishes to 
assert. Delineating such vie,vs, however tells us little. Are they 
incompatible or ȘŬŪWŲŠȘŸĦÙȘWŬŲXHĚ justifiable or arbitrary? Haack feels 
that (1:' and (2) are incompatible, and this is the suggestion that I 
wish to consider. Two of the three oain criticisms that Raack ventures 
against ŸGŤWŤŲVGĚ no"'::ion of conceptual ane.lysis concern the fact that 
Peters seems to want to accept some sort of essentialist view and a 
family resemjlance vie'l or that he -seems to accept a GȚŠŲĦÍÙŨŸŲĚ resemblance' 
view and a multi-ale conce,")t view. Haack Qoes not devel03J any of these 
points in detail or in any sort of llepth. rie merely r:1ention2 them to 
intimate that Peters' account of the concept is thoroughly confused. 
Thus he leaves him with an easy line of retreat. In his reply Peters 
remarks that Haack's criticisms gain a spurious credibility from 
contrasting or as.siDllating elements that he had recently distinguished. 
'He (Haack) must knmv, surely, that I do not now think 
that by "education" we mean '1ini tiation into worthwhile 
activities" for that conflated the fact that peOlJle 
become educated by WŠŸTŪŦĚlJart in various activities of 
learning with the cha.racterisation of them when educated 
i.e. by reference to their state of mind, not necessarily 
by reference to the activities in which they then might 
take part. I later distin8Uished a general concept of 
education, ,!,hich is more or less equivalent to bringing up 
or rec:.ring, from 2. specific concept ':Ihicn picks out processes 
of learning by \vhich educated peo)le develop. Being 
"educat·"d Tl is characterised b:i the possession of k."1owledge 
and understanding which'lS not-inert and not just specialised.' (121) 
In a sense this new distinction, is Sir.lply a clarifieation of a distinc-
tion implicit in many of Peters' earlier remarks. In Ethics and Education 
. . h ' 1 HŸĚ h ( 1 22) - f he distingulshes uses WhlC are centra Irom ot ers. u course, 
there are dissimilarities. In the earlier '.·,ri tings the peripheral cases 
are ŨÙŸĤKJJŤŨXĚ to be metalJhorica.l or ŤẄŸŲŤÚĞÍŤĚ u.ses of the terr.1 'education'. 
Latterly certain specific UE'es are distL .. guished from a loose sort of 
use of the term according to Hhich almost any ŸŊŲŬȘŤVĦVĚ could be called 
'education', or 'educational'. 1.lhether this means that there are three 
concepts to be distinguished is something that \fIe will discuss later 
( 123) 
on. For the present I Vlill ŠŐĿŸǾŲJŨŤĚ that ,vhatever the difference 
is between these tvlO views they can both be considered to be examples 
of 'core' concepts. As I shall use this term it refers to any attempt 
to understand a conce:'Jt by making the 'classic move' of conceptual 
analysis - that ef distinguishing between 'central' and 'peripheral', 
'specific' and 'general', or GŤVŸĦGŤŪWÙŠŨGĚ and 'inessential' uses of a 
term or parts of a ȘŬŪȘŤŮWŸĚ Let us no\'! return to what Peters actually 
says about the concept in order to appreciate that there is some 
substance to Haack's hasty criticisms. 
Peters' treatment of the concept of education is protean. He 
readily adrd ts to changes of ::,:,osi tion, emphasis, and even to inadequacies 
. ,. -. ( 124) Ct· 1 d j' • 1 h In nlS anal.ysls. er aln c,-,8.nges 0 no ŸĚ Qlre ct y concern us ere. 
By considering how his views have altered it is possible to see that he 
ossillates between contradictory analysis. It is also possible to 
understand t}-e important assumptions which flaw his \vork. Ini tic.lly 
at least, Peters was an avo·wed essentialist: 
' ••• have I already put oy foot on the primrose path 
that leads to essen.tialiSln? ••• ?rankly I do not much 
mind if I have ••• ' (125) 
Thus he cava lierly dismisses any qualms about essentialism. His first 
analysis consisted of making three points about education which were 
'necessary for the ŤÞŮŨÙȘŠWŸŬŪĚof ÙŸNGĚ essence'. (126) These 'points' 
soon becoQe 'criteria'. 'Cri teria' are in one COl71.nlon wccy of using 
the terrJ 'stand"xds' or 'tests'. Peters weaves around and into this 
usage a numbeJ:' of philosophical notions of meaning. Some of these ,viII 
be familiar from the earlier sections of this chapter. However, his 
use of the term is, by and large, unexplained. \,-Je have discussed some 
sophisticated attempts to explicate v!hat he means but not his own 
sUGgestions. ':':'hese are found in four seminal works. (127) Consider 
first his remarks a'Jout 'criteria' in Ethics and Education and The Logic 
of Education (vlj.th ? Hirst). Both these accounts a':tem':)t to say vlhat 
a uhiloso;)her of education is doing when he2ngages in 'conceptual 
analysis' and, although there is a four year gap bebleen ther,1, they 
bot}, begin by 'squaring up' to \[i ttgenstein. In both cases serious 
problems for 'conceptual analysis' are seen as arising out of 
Hittgenstein's 'family resemblance' notion. These prolJlems are dealt 
wi th as if nothing fundamental is affected by them. :for instance, 
'o"!i ttgenstein' s discu,ssion of the 'naming' model of meaning is discussed 
in a I)aragraph and ŸŤWŤŲVĚ concludes: 'fev1 vlould deny that his general 
(128) 
thesis was a salutary if unoriginal one'. ŸGŅUŠWĚ is at issue here 
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is not Peters attitude but the filct that his whole account of the 
concept of education and of his notion of 'criteria' are developed 
from the s tart by comparison "lith 'lJi WWHÌJŤŪVŸĚein' s 'f2.mily resemblance' 
notion. '::'his itself is but a minor p2.rt of a general conflict 
about the \vay in which thes3 philosophers view philosophy. 
Peters seems to accept whatever he understands the 'family 
resemblance' notion to be about insofar as it involves an attack on 
the notion of 'precise definition'. He accepts that the notion 
involves the idea that the uses of a word are conl1ected not by a 
forr:ula but "!)y a complic2.tec.'i. network of similari ti'3s overlapping 
and criss-crossing; sometimea overall simi18rities, VŬŸŤWÙÜŤŇĚ
simil ri ties of detail.' This renark taken out of any meaningful 
context, is all we get of '""i ttgenstein. Peters is fairly consistent 
in his vie", of definitions. In contrast to a suggestion made by 
John iJoods that 'conceptual connections' should be a.s tight as those 
between 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' ?eters argues thct such a 
premise would: 'stop most works in ethics, philoso]hy of mind, 
epistenoloz;y, political philosophy aesthetics, and the philosophy of 
(129) 
religion - as .",ell as in the philosophy of educ2.tion.' Despi te 
this concession to ŸŠWWŦŤŪVWŤÙŪHĚ and his acceptance of the fact that 
'education' is 'a concc:[)t of this sort' he qualifies his comments with 
the statement that nevertheless 'it is not as difficult to get a grip 
OY1 it as it is on more abstract concepts such as "cauo.-.e" or l'truth ll .,C130) 
He accepts that it is important to recognise differences between Uses 
of the term 'education' but it seems that this does not override the 
recognition of similarities: 'The formulation of criteria which 
started \.,i th Socra es, is an attenpt to make explicit what binds the 
uses together. It is like a guide to the customs of a people rather 
than a definitive statement of their la·".' (131) Superficially this 
could be a version of the ÑŸGĦȚĚ like that found in Hichardson. But 
the si tuati.on is further complicated by Peters' assertion in the same 
paragraph th2.t exception to the 'obvious' cri "teria do not mean that 
'there are fio criteria which are cD-extei1sive with most of its central 
(132) . 
uses. ' Is thJ.s a 'core-concept' vie'", or just the 'classic move' 
or both? If we look elsewhere we find Peters saying that to call certain 
activities education 'is to say that they conform to certain very 
. ., (133) F· . f h· 1 t· th general crJ.terJ.a • or J.t seems as J. e J.S mere y res orJ.ng e 
essentialist vields thB.t he sees the 'family resemblance' notion as 
attacking. The very general cri::eria reduce ultimately to tvlO, the 
knowledce ana. desirability criteria. (134) Roughly, these criteria 
are th?t for someone to be said to be educated he must have k....'1owledge 
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and understanding which is not merely technical knm·r how, and that 
'd t' ,. J' th t ' . bJ l . t' . (135) e uca lon lmp .. les a o.eSlr::, .e qUeLl les are passed. on. 
But there are c01,;,nter-exam}Jles to these conditions 'irhich 'make it 
. (136) 
very difficult to maintain that an adequate analysis has been glven.' 
Earwaker has suggested that utilising these criteria and the notion of 
a ŸŮŤȘÙȚÙȘGĚ and a 'general' concept of education it is possible to arGue 
(137) that there are at least four concepts of education. The point 
that comes out of all this is that even if there is a very general 
criterion covering all central cases - Hhatever this means - it has not 
been SlJecified. lill that has come out of this attespt to produce 
criteria is a cancerous :':lultiplication oi' 'concepts'. i,Jhat Peters 
never questions - as we shall see - is his ap}Jroach to the concept.' 
If "rhat analysis thrmJs up is never satisfactory it is not enough to 
continually patch things up with ever more sophisticated thread. He 
must consider that analysis. As Peters notes the search for criteria 
has a long heri tage and the ha'Ji ts of two thousa..'1d years cannot be 
easily throvm. The method of analysis is tied up vii th the notion of 
, cri teria ' • 
Peters usually adopts the 'formal' rather than the 'material' mode 
of speech when discussing education. 'Chat is, he discusses the use of 
the term 'education' rather than the 'concept'. He seems to accept 
that if \ve wish to elucidate the conceuts of education we must look 
at hO',.1 we use the word education. He has said that 'Philosophy, as 
I understand it, is concerned mainly \Vi th the que:"tions, lIiifhat do you 
( 138) 
mean?" and !lHmr do you knOlt,? 1! , The notion of 'criteria I, as 
he uses it is so ela:::tic th2l,t it is capable of answering both these 
questions. In Ethics and 3ducation he says that 'education' ••• picks 
ou t no particular acti vi ty or JJrocess. Rather it lays dovm criteria 
to which activities or processes must conform.' (139) Later he says 
that criteria are 'implied by' or 'built into' (140)the term or concept. 
The que,stion he is concerned with is ",'/hat is 'educ9,tion?' put in the 
'foroal' mode of ',,!hat Qoes the term "education" mean?' This is so 
from the beginning but it is obscured by the fact that he assumes 
straig-ht away that there is no general rroblem here. He believes 
that to answer questions about meaninc; you take note of the use of 
terms. Any problems about meaning are already solved or of no 
importance. The nearest vre [;et to any solution is a vag"Ue remark that 
cri teria are 'cc-extensi ve' \vi th central uses, and that they J:1ake 
explicit what binds the uses together. Thus criteria are connected 
in somelt,ay with UnS1Jecified elements of meaning'. The question 'EoN do 
you knm'r v!ha t education is?', therefore, seems to :;Jrovide an a.'1S1;rer to 
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the question " .. 'hat do you mean by the term "education"?' It answers 
it by offering some unexplicated version of the criteriological theory 
of meaning. 
'That it is a crude version of that theory com be seen from the 
presentation of his ideas in The Logic of Sduc3_tion. In this work 
tall-c about 'criteria' is di vic.ed behveen 'criteria' which help us 
decide whether or not some thine; is educational and I concii tions ' , 
presumably identical to these criteria, 'dhich are principles which 
determine the correct application of terns. This fits in well with 
the method of conceptual analysis. This method is characterised in the 
follOioJing ways: 
'The point is to see through the wOk'"ds, to get a better 
grasp of the simila:l:'i ties and differences that it is 
possible to pick out'. (141) 
' ••• in the process of trying to mru-ce explicit the 
:orinciples thclt underlie our use of words, we shall 
have become clearer both about how things are and 
about the sort of decisions that have to be faced in 
dealing with them'. (142) 
By reflecting on the use of terms He come to see those principles that 
lie behind them. These principles are also our criteria_ for determining 
whether some cases are instances of the particular concept we are 
interested in. Vie have seen tha.t the notion of 'rules' governing 
our use of language "lill not support the extraction of 'criteria'. '.Je 
have also seen that although Peters has moved from the notion of a 
defining set of criteria to a weaker notion of definition, exactly 
"lhat theory or view of 'criteria' Peters invokes is entirely obscure 
and confused. It appears to be an unhappy marriage of the Be'! and a 
cruder interpretation of criteria like Albritton's. The uncertainty 
is complicat·<;d by his acco,mod3.tion to the 'family resemblance' metaphor. 
This metaphor is meant to direct our attention a-,·,ray from the search for 
a common element to all examples of what ,je call 'language'. Applying 
this metaphor to a particular use of language i.e. to the term 
'education', Peters accommodatss to it by employing conceptual ana.lysis 
.< to refine a specific concept of education out of the variegated usage 
of the term. ldhat is misleading about this seemingly innocuous shift 
can only be brought out by considerinz the 'family resemblance' 
metaphor and why that metaphor is used. 
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Chapter Three TP.REE i'-iEI'APHORS 
'Play ••• is a non-serious and self contained activity 
which we engage in just for the satisfaction involved 
in it ••• ' (1) 
'Both play in general, and games in particular can be 
very serious ••• Games ••• do not seem to be so 
arbitrary, marginal, unserious and non-mattering as a 
tidy person might have hoped ••• play insists on being 
taken seriously.' (2) 
Play is non-serious and discontinuous with the 'business of life'. 
Play is serious and continuous with the 'business of life'. There is 
no simple equivocation in these remarks between 'internal' and 
'external' forms of seriousness. Both of the authors of these 
conflicting remarks accept that a player can play seriously and that 
the rules of a game might den
'
and that '"e take it seriously. Bridge is 
more serious than tidcUy winks, and football more serious than British 
Bulldog. The 'seriousness' of games in this internal sense is not at 
issue. "vlhat these conflictin[; remarks sho,,! is that there is a defect in 
our grasp, not of what play is, but of what it is to explicate the 
concept of play. Our interest in the concept of play is directly 
co:".nected with the understanding of the fEmily resemblance metaphor. 
That metaphor interests u,s because it is intimately connected with 
the consideration of cases and not just cases but cases and cases and 
(3) 
cases. This is also true of the alJ.alogy \-ii th ganes and the 
metaphor of 'grammar'. 'rhess are the 'three metaphors' that vlill be 
considered in this chapter. 
The 'family resemblance' metaphor presents a forceful and 
attractive model 0::' the explanation of meaning to counter the 
'property in common' model of mes.ning. As \ve saw in Chapter Two the 
prima facie opDosition between these two Dodels of meaning demands 
that philosophers still charmed by the first wodel of meaning must 
dispose of this neta:Jhorical alternative. Hirst and Peters make a 
fairly typical series of accommod::J.tions to, and criticisms of this 
al ternati ve. They arGue that the se9.rch for defining cono.i tions which 
are both necessary and VẀȚJŸÙȘÙŤŪWĚ is only appropriate to a:::,tificial 
symbolic syster.1s. In philosophy we settle for a vleaker notion of 
making explicit 'defilli::l(; charactsris-':ics' for sorctething or 'logically 
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necessary conditions' for the application of a term. This notion of 
'loose' defi:'1i tion is \,!hat they are concerned \'Ii tho But unfortunately, 
'it has becone fashionable in recent times to deny that it is ever 
. 1 1.1. d " f· . t . ,( 4 ) mh' , 1 f POSSl J e i.-O pro uce suc" ae lnl J_ons. .!. e games examp e rom 
the P.I. is mentioned and the quotation given earlier is repeated. 
i.Jittgenstein is held to be reminding us of the existence of counter-
examples, cases in which the condition ws thotlght we had 'pinned do1tm' 
does not apply. 'This, at least, should warn us that we may not 
always be successful in our search for logically necessary conditions 
(5' for the use of a word.' ) Yet he goes on to ŠŲŸẀŤĚ that 'sometimes we 
may be'. The 'gaLles' example is also attacked: 
••• it can be doubted whether 1,ii ttgenstein was even right 
about this particular concept. For ho';: would we know "'Thich 
sanples to layout in order to look for the VÙÑŸÙŨŠŲÙĚties? 
\'!hy did not ','ji ttgenstsin take gardening or getting married 
as eX9.r.1ples of games? :=loes this show that there is a more 
general principle ';Thich underlies calling things "games" 
which he might have overlooked? ••• it depends on how a 
human being conceives an activity. A necessary condition 
of calling something a game is, surely, that it must be 
an acti vi ty winch is indulged in non-seriously.' (6) 
vii ttgenstein is held. to be bringing out the fact that calling something 
game is not to refer to any simple observable property. Thus his use 
of the 'family resemblance' notion is held to be part of his general 
ŠWWŠȘŸĤȘVĚ on the naming theory of meaning. ŸUŤĚ outcome of all this is 
that we come to see that ',,,e 'must not look for defining characteristics 
in any sim:91s stereotyped way, \vi th the paradigm of just one type of 
(7) 
word before us.' Lang-ford has said of this section of Peters' book 
that it is 'odd to interpret "iii ttf;enstein as saying, in effect, 
that since conceptual analysis is difficult you may have to be 
satisfied with, at best, logically necesse.ry rather than sufficient 
conditions.' (8) He suggests that a better interpretation is through 
Bradley's idea that 'analysis is mutilation'. Certainly, this is an 
odd account of '\'Ii ttgenstein. .c,lthough he did allo,,[ that SO:11e misunder-
standings might be ŲŤŸŬẂŤTĚby substituting one form of expression for 
another and that this might be called an 'analysis' because the 
'process is sorr;etimeE: like one of taking a thing apart'.(P.r. s. 90) 
He saw nothing but dangers in this appr02.ch. For it' may come to 
a 
look as if e::here were somet;.int: like a fin2.1 analysis of our forms of 
language, and so a single resolved form of every expression'.(P.I. o. 91) 
'Analysis' seeks to ren:ove misunders+:andings by making our use of words 
more exact. It does this by bringing socething hidden to light. Thus 
Peters seeks an underlying general principle which tii ttgenstein might 
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have overlooked. But such principles are e. ŲŤŰẀÙŲŤÜŤŸÍWĚnot a result 
of 'analysis'. Feters uses the terminology of 'analysis' but does not 
produce any underlying 'general principle' but makes a grammatical' 
remark. 'The distinction here is of absolutely fundamental importance. 
To grasp it we need to see what led 'iii ttgenstein to the 'family 
resemblance' metaphor. This metaphorical use of language is a use of 
language like any other and to understand it we must see it in its 
context. 
3.1. Family Resemblances 
Ivi ttgenstein introduces the 'family resemblance' neta:;?hor in 
ansi·rer to a specific challenge that he has 'nowhere said \vho.t 
the essence of a langu2.ge game, and hence of lan.:6Uag'e, is: what is 
common to all these activities, and what makes then into language or 
parts of language. I (p.I.s.65) He introduces the idea of a 'language 
game' early in the P.I. through examples. He specifies in more 
general ter-ms what he meEms b" the ŮUŲŠHGŸŤĚ in s.7. Here they are 
related to 'those games by i'ihich children learn their native language'. 
It is not just the speaking of words but 'tte l whole, consisting of 
lan2,uage 2-nd the actions into which it is woven'. The term is connected 
with his notion of a GŮŲÙŸÙWÙẂŤĚ language', a language more primitive 
than ours, which he refers to as a 'language game'. Thus the notion 
of a 'language gar:Je' introduces the I game' analogy long before it 
comes in s. 66 to illustrate the 'family resemblance' metaphor. There 
is an important connection between the two an(1 they cannot be under-
stood separately. For the first 64 paragraphs of the P.I. tJi ttgenstein 
is discussing the 'philosophice.l concept of meaning' (Pol. s. 2) through 
examples of various language games. Jut 'behind all these considerations' 
lies a 'gre2.t question' (P.r. sO 65). 'J:'his vIas the: question that gave 
him the most headache the attempt to specify the 'general form of 
propositions and of language. This is a reference to the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus. In the 'Pref0.ce' to the Pol. 1,-Jittgenstein says 
that his old thought and his n8\v ones should be published together 
because 'the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast 
wi th and against the backGround of myoId way of thinking' 0' In J? 01-
ŸŊÙĚttgenstein is discussing the 'telrptations I that 'de feel when 
reflecting on language an.d logic. 'That book no less than the former 
is a wor:-c on the philosophy of logic. In the Tractatus, he succumbed 
to the 'temptation' to 'oroduce something C0[11T:on toeall that we call 
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langi_lage. The paSS8.E;eS He need to consider, to understand the 
'family resem'Jlance' meta1'Jhor are part of 'iii-i:tgenstein's fight against 
this parti.cular form of 'essentialism'. They are part of his attempt 
to expla.in his new thoughts about 'language'. He anSHers his inter-
locutor's suggestion that he is dodging the 'great question' quite 
categorically: 'I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in . 
comr.1on which makes us use the SaIf:e "lOrd for all, - but that the:;r are 
related to one another in c3.iLcerent '<Jays. And it is because of this 
relation,ship, or these relationships, that \"e call them all 'language'. ' 
(P.1. s. 65) 1'0 understand the specific use that iii ttgenstein is 
putting the metaphor to we must, despite the risk of gross oversimpli-
fic2.tion sketch his earlier ȘŬŪȘŤŸŬWĚ of 'language'. 
In his 'Preface' \Jittgenstein says that philoso:?hy results from 
misunderstanding 'the logic of our language'. His book aims, he tells 
us, to 'draw a limit' to the 'expression of thoughts' and it is only 
'in language that the lir,1i t can be draHn'. ( 9 ) He is concerned with 
what it is for a language to have sense, with ''''hat it is for there to 
be a:'1y language at all. Logical forn, and syC1bolism, the nature of a 
translation of one formula into another by means of logical opsrations, 
are central to his ccccount of what it is for language to have sense. 
1Ji ttgenstein says 'thm'<'ijht can never be of anything illogical, since, 
if it ";ere, \-Je should have to think illogically' (T. 3.03) and 'It is 
impossible to represent in language anything that "contradicts log·ic"'. 
(T. 3.032) ŸUÙŪĦŨĦĴJÙŪŦĚ is a sort of calculating. The general form of 
logical operation is the general form of WUÙŪŸĤĴJÙŪŦĦĚ J!. form2.1 operation 
in a sTnbolic system is a sort of 'translation'. t";i ttgenstein sees 
thin.l.:ing as ŬŮŤŲHLĦWÙŪŸHĴĚHi th a calculus. Th-e 'picture theory' is no 
exce:;)tion to this. 'A picture pr2sents a situation in logical spo.ce ••• ' 
(T. 2.11) To picture a fact 'de ri1.ust see it in a syster:l. There is no 
other Hay. T,Jittgenstein is concerned '."ith intern,)l relations. If \.,..e 
gi ve the essence of all propositions, i. e. wha.t is common to them all 
(T. 5.47) and hence of language \\!e give the 'general propositional 
form' • i.·ji th this we also give the 'General form of ol=)eration', that 
is, the general forQ according to which one proposition can be generated 
out of another b:- means of a:c. operation' (T. 6.002) This brief reminder 
of hm" important the notion of a logical operation is in the r::'ractatus, 
helps to f:J2.ke sense of '.iittgenstein's comments in :2.I. s.81 that in 
philoSOIJhy ;,,'e often 'coraper2 the we of vlOrds i,ri th galT:es and calculi 
which have fixed rules' and that if Ne reflect upon langl.lage in this 
way we may come 'to think that if a.1:.yone utters a sentence and means 
or understands it he is oi.Jeratin8 a calculus according to definite rules.' 
119 
To avoid makin,g this error - T.h ttgenstein [laue it in the Tractatus 
we need to attain greater clarity about the concepts of 'meaning', 
'understanding' and 'thinking'. This 'clarity' is not the sort that 
;,:i ttgenstein sought in the Tractatus. i:Jhat 'tJi WWŦŤŪVWŤÙJJŸĚdid in both 
these works could be referred to as 'conceptual analysis'. But this 
would he misleading. In the Tractatus \-Jittgenstein states that 'A 
proposition has one and only one complete analysis' ĜŸĦĚ 3.25). There 
is only one final analysis according to the correct scheme exemplified 
by the general form of operation. Hittgenstein's goal was to give the 
essence of langu.age. To do this he had to require (cf. P.I. s. 107) 
that every :proposition had a precise sense. By 'analysis' understood 
as 'substitution' or 'translation' the fundamental nature of a 
proposijion could be revealed. A complete analysis of all (factual) 
propositions would consist entirely of elementary propositions i.e. a 
class of logically independent factual propositions. ĜŐŤŤŸĦĚ4.211 and 
5.134). These elementary pro:positions would then 'serve as a point of 
origin, from which the philosopher, using a logical formula can calculate 
the limits of any possible language.' (10) This notion of analysis is 
that of uncovering ",hat is hidden by language (1:.. 4.002). He presents 
one single scheme centred on the picture theory for solving the 'great 
question'. In the ?I. there is no one scheme but many reminders to 
help remove particula.r confusions. 
One final point rJay help to ,show exactly ",hy the concern with 
formal systems is so important to the Tractatus and how this produced 
an essentialist treatment of language. According to Rhees the thing 
that troubled Tiji ttgenstein about the plurality of logical constants in 
P .Il. Tdas that 'this made the development of the logical system seem 
--. (11) 
arbltrary'. This would mean that there could be form;:; of inference 
only vaguely related to one another, and this could lead someone to 
doubt the reality of logic. The general form of propositions, if given, 
1tTOuld meet these doubts: 'One could say that the sole logical constant 
\vas what all propositions, by their very nature, had in conmon ,vi th om.e 
another. But this is the general propositional form'. (!. 5.47) The 
problem of setting a limit to language is at least in part the problem 
of showing that logic is not arbitrary in this sense. 
These short paragraphs an, not meant to do anythinz but give an 
idea of the sort of problem that I,Ji ttgenstein vIas using the notions 
of 'language games' and 'family resemblances' to dissolve. I have 
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missec. out many essential points such as the relationship of the 
ordinary use of propositions to their 'picturing' role. .but \ole are 
not engaged in an exegesis of the Tractatus. I a:n merely trying to 
put certain passages of the P.I. into their proper context to facilitate 
a critique of Peters. 
i4i ttgenstein came to see the.t he had oeen misled. He ceaseQ to 
talk about language in the way he had in the Tractatus. He turned 
his way of thin'dng completely about. Thus we find him saying that: 
'No ŮUÙŨŬVHJŸGŮUÙȘŠŨĚproblem ccm -oe solved by a calculus'. (12) 
In the P.I. iJi ttgenstein uses the 'family resemblance' notion to 
bring out the difficulties we face in attempting to explain 'language' 
and its related concepts and to dispel them. To appreciate the 
problems more than a cursory look at the text is needed. vIi ttgenstein 
introduces the metaphor with a methodological injunction: 
'Consider for exanple the proceedings that we call IIgames ll • 
I mean board-games, card-grunes, ball-games, Olympic games, 
and so on. iiihat is common to them all? Don't say: "There 
must be something cOl'lDlOn, or WUŤŸĦŲĚ would not be called GŦŠȚŨŸŤVGĚ " 
but -look and see whether there is anything common to ·all. For 
if you look at them you will not see something that is common 
to them all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole 
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series of them at that. 'l'o repeat: don't thinl;: but look! ' (p.1.s.66) 
This injunction is often taken to be nothing more than the adoption 
of a more 'empirical' as against the 'high a priori' approach of the 
Tractatus. This is not incorrect as long as it does not lend us to 
thin'.-\: that 'l'li ttgenstein is embracing em:oiricism. In the Tractatus we 
find a general rule for the analysis of propositions, a general rule 
of thinking, a general rule of \vhat is sense and nonsense. In other 
\vords, a general account of language. All 'L'}i ttgenstein 's examples in 
P.I. are concerned 1."ith fightingcgainst this picture of language as 
strictly defined. This is a fight against the contemptuous attitude 
towards particular cases. 'I'his fight takes the form of presenting 
examples and analogies. The 'game' metaphor is important because if 
we consider garEes we will find cOLimon fe2.tures such as 'winning', 
'losing', various skills, an element of a:nusement. But these will 
not be corrnon to every gaf:'Je. JŸVĚ 1.'Ie move from game to game some 
features drop out and others an"Jear: 
'And the result of OUT examination is; we see a complicated 
network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: 
sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of 
detail.' (P.I. s. 66) 
',rJi ttgenstein says that he can think of no better expression to 
characterise these similarities than 'family resemblances' because the 
resemblances between members of a fru1ily criss-cross in a similar way. 
Therefore he says that ',sali.1es' form a fa.mily (p .1. s. 67) This metaphor 
is dependent on the 'game' analogy, and it is difficult to discuss them 
separa tely. Here we are concerned with how the metaphor arose we sh3.11 
have cause to consider its usefulness when we consider the suggestion 
that gar.:::es do not form a family. The ÜŤWŠŸJĞUŬŲĚ is ÙŸËŨËØŅŤTÙŠWŤŨXĚ applied 
to the concept of 'number' and provides an account of conceptual 
extensions: 
'lrJe extend our concept ••• as iE spinning a thread \-/e twist 
fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not 
reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its i-Thole 
lene;th, but in the overlapuing of many fibres.' (P.I. s.67) 
The power of this G:etaphorica..l style of ,:,hiloso.9hisint; can be seen if 
it is comp&.red with what Peters offers us when he says that 'terms in 
a natural language develop a life of their O\ffi and send out shoots 
which WŠĦŸŤĚ them far away from the central truw.: of the concept.' (13) 
This. 'organic' or 'tree' metaphor is a piece of mystifica.tion. ;,-ihat, 
for example, does 'develop a life of their ovm' mean? 
Having given this account 'iii ttgenstein proceeds to refute any 
attempts to sJSl:ematise what he is saying, to make it more than an 
analogy. ŸŬŲĚv!hen a metaphor or analogy is used there is always 
because of our 'craving for generali t;y' an attempt to ma:.-{e it run on 
all four legs. To do this is not to tr;/ to make ,,'i ttgenstein' s ideas 
more clear (does this mean more exact?) it is to misunci.en::tand the 
form in which he gives them. ;.ihich means to misunderstand them. Thus 
it could be argued that there is something CO;-:ilJlOn to all these 
constructions' - namely the disjunction of all their common properties' 
C.P.I. s. 67). This would be 'playing ,:,ith I<!ords' as if one were to 
argue that the 'continuous overlapping' was \;That was common to ill cases. 
He then takes up in various ,·.rays that it 1S possible to misunder-
stand the metaphor. All these reactions have their root in the idea 
of the 'crystalline purity of logic' (P.I. s. 107). Accepting 
L'ii ttgenstein' s metaphor seens to do avray vii th logic: 'But what becomes 
of logic now? Its rigour seems to be giving way here' (P.I. s. 108). 
I ltlill briefly lliention wha.t the,s8 criticisms are and how \lli ttgenstein 
ans\,rers them. 
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The first is a suggestion that for T,Ji WWŸŸŤŪVWŤÙŪĚa concept can be 
defined as 'the logical sum of a corresponding set of sub concepts' 
(P.I. s. 68). ""ittgenstein replies that I-Ie can give a ȘŬŪȘŤŸŬWĚ rigid 
limi ts in this way. 'Ie ca:1 use it as a riGidly limited concept but we 
need not do so. \Je norm2"11y do not, and this does not trouble us: 
VIe can dra,,, a boundary - for a special purpose. Does it take that 
to make the concent usable? Not at all.' (Except for that special 
ŮẀŲŸŮŬVVĦĞGĚ (P.I. s. (9). This ano. other passages TŤŠŨÙŪŔŸĚwith dravling 
boundaries and giving definitions (Ue;.. P .1. s. 75 s. 76 s. 77) make 
nonsense of the interpretation of the rJetaphor by Peters.' . .'e can give 
defini tions which allm-l of no exceptions for special purposes. The 
D.E.S. mizht do so in a report and equate ea.uc:ation entirely ",ith what 
goes on in certain listed institutions. But this sort of approach can-
not be adopted if we are enGaged in 'conceptual clarification'. It is 
not that \vlcat ,Ie would like to do is shown GŤÜŸŬÙŲÙȘŠŨŨXGĚ to be impossible. 
It is quite possi:Jle, but it is hard to see \-ihat the point of it would 
be. 
If a concept like 'game' is ul1circumscribed, not being everywhere 
bounded ŞŸØĚ rules, it may seen to be vague, inexact, blurred. It tn2.y 
seet:! th2"t we don't knm,! 1:That it mean.s, that it is not a concept at all. 
l:iittgenstein replies that it is often the rough (P.I. s. 70), or 
indistinct (P.I. s. 71) picture that is exactly j"rhat 1!Te need. 
Hany of these passages irrtr'lediately following the introduction of 
the metaphor are concerned with the notion of a 'rule'. ŸŊŤĚ have already 
spent some time in discussing the idea that in order to explicate a 
concept He must give 'rules' in a special philosophical sense of the 
term. TJittgenstein's use of the terE! 'rule' is held to be 'notoriously 
e:ccentric' • Part of the difficulty \\ri th ',,:i ttgenstein' s use of the term 
ster:Js from his attel'lpt -Co combat the idea that '"hen someone utters a 
sentence WUŤŸHGĚ must be operating a calculus according to fixed rules. 
A fixed. meaning is not necessary for a terril to be useful. Discussing 
sor:leone's use of 'N' he asks GŸIUŠWĚ do I call I'the rule by I'Thich he 
lJroceeds' I?;r: 
'The hypothesis that satisfactorily describes his use of 
words, \\rhic" l.tJe ol)serve; or the rule he looks up when he 
uses UJe signs; or t'::e one -lThic' he gives us in reply if 
ue a;-=;i: !iim what his rule is? - But what if o:Jservation 
does not enable us to see any clear rule, and the question 
brings none to light? For he did indeed give me 
a definition \lThen I asked him what he understood by liN" 
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but he was prepe":red to withdraw it and. alter it. So how 
am I to determine the ru1e according to ŴŸGHÙȘUĚ he is ŸŊŨŠXÙŪŦĹGĚ (p .1. s 82) 
Again it is useful to look at the analogy between langu3"ge and ganies. 
Wi ttgenstein ÙŔŸŠŦÙŪŤVĚpeople l)laying ball games on c. field, some 
tradi tione"l games, out others involving chasing and bombarding. 
Sometimes they make up rules as they go along cmd cha.nge them at ,,,ill. 
l;lhat would we say if someone said they were follmrin[ definite rules? 
Peters wantsto get clearer about the rules underlying 'education'. 
3ut isn't education a..'1alogous to the use of 'N' above? i,jould talk 
of a 'i!leak' definition help? It does not mean it can be withdrawn. 
GŸGĴÙĚttgens-sein ,says that ,,,e often compare the use of l'lords with gaIJles 
and calculi with fixed rules. This reuinds us of ŸÙȘUŠŲTVŬŪGVĚone-
sided viel·f of philosophical method discussed in Chapter Two, and we 
could ak'Jly that method here. If l'le allow that when someone uses 
language he needn't be playing such a game because: 
••• the actual usage of a word resembles, not one game 
played according to strict rules, but rather an activity 
approaching sometilJes this gane, sometimes that, moving 
irregula.rly (fJoe.ting about) between thel;] , then nothin!,"; 
\;/e would call ŸĚsystem of rules will describe this 
usage. 1.Ie have then to describe various games, giving 
various sets of rules, serving as centres of variation.' (14) 
Such rule descriptions of language are perfectly possible. But this 
is a far cry from uncovering hid6.en principles governing our use of 
terms. 3ut these rule descriptions lie always on the brin..k of a 
misunderstanding. This procedure is not mistaken but it is 
dangerous and wrong-headed. i,!e have characterised di ttgenstein' s 
style as 'contrauuntal'. The 'rules' he refers to are the rules of 
grammar' in the lives of beings with a language. 'A rule stands there 
like a sign post' (P.I. s.(5). As i·le saH in oeLr discussion of the 
'rite of chess' the 'rules' have no meaning unless the 'grammar' of 
the ach vi ty is given. 'Ji ttgenstein qualifies his talk of rules by 
stressing that they are 'practices', that they belong to a form of 
life, that to obey a rule is a 'custom' or 'institution' (P.I. s. 198). 
Peters vlishes to use analysis to clarify concepts by getting clearer 
about the rules behind our use of i"Jords. But analysis will not helpo 
VJhat we need is to understand the GȚŸŲŠÜËÙÍŠŲGĚ of a concept. 
The GŦŸŤVĚ'passage is to be read as a..'1 injunction to consider 
examples. The source 'of metaphysics is a craving for generality, a 
contemptuolS attitude to the particular case. 1,;'e disavow the particular 
case because any exarrple, or set of exam91es, seeras incomplete even if 
we add the phrase 'and so on'. iJi ttgenstein understands the dangers 
that lie in gi vin!?; exar,l1Jles becaus 2 of our cravings for generality: 
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••• this is ••• how one might explain to someone \-Jhat a 
game is. One gives examples and intends them to be taken 
in a particular we.y. - I do not, however, mean by this that 
he is supposed to see in those eX2.Dples that CO(J:TIon thing 
ŴUŸȘUĚI - for sor:1e reason - was unable to express; but thEtt 
he is now to employ those examl)les in a :?articu12x way. 
Here giving eXaIr.ples is not an indirect me;;ms of explaining 
- in default of a better.' (P.I. s. 71) 
Certainly, somet ŸŚÜŤVĚ 'ire only give exarnl:.lles because "He cannot produce 
a defini t-i on but this is exactly the sort of one sided example that 
can mislead us. i,Ie are u;:> against the idea of the 'hidden'. Our 
craving for generality makes u,s ignore examples we want to get at the 
essence but we do not seem to ŸGJŪÜĤŊĚ where to find it. lie nay argue 
that any particular exam:91e is a s)ecial ca,58 - rc.ther li:.-re Peters' 
treatment of cases of education that don't match his criteria 
consider it peripheral. 'In order to fine the real artichoke we 
divest it of its leaves' (P.I. s. 164) I/J'ittgenstein means that what 
we ȘŬŪVÙTŤŸĚ to be 'peripheral' or a Dere 'sym)tom' is just one of 
the family of cac;es. This consider2tion can be carried fUl"trler. It 
can be used to dispel the idea that there is anything ŨÙŸĜŤĚ a central 
group of 'uses' of a term or a 'core' to a concept. ImaGine a 
picture of colour patches with clear boundarie,s ane. another set vIi th 
vague contours. It is Yjossible to see the first as a mOl:.el of the 
second. In the ",econd you have a vaf,"Ue b' ue circle and in the first 
you h2ve a clearly defined disc. ,So far so good. 'But if the colours 
0.0 merge without a hint of any outline 1"on't it become a hopeless 
task to draw a sharp picture corresponding to the blurred one?' (LI. s.77) 
You can draw anything you like a aruare or a circle or a triangle. It 
is like this \-Ji th the core conceut notion. It is HŸJŲŠŘÜĚ on the concept 
rather meaninglessly. As if you took one leaf of the artichoke and 
said that it was the essence and the rest peripheral. ŸŊÙĚttgenstein 
says quite clearly that ' ••• this is the position you are in if you 
look for definitions corres=oonding to our concepts in aesthetics or 
ethics' (P.I. s.77)0 This sounds like the sort of thing that Peters 
was saying in his re:91y to '·Jood. But ',Ii ttgenstein means that if you 
try to nroduce an essence in the form of a definition then 'Anything 
- and nothing - is right'. _.{nd this goes for' both 'weak' and 'strong' 
definitions. 
Analogies will not r2move the feeling thit if we can't say what 
He kno'.!l then c'/e don't kno"l it. :"Je have no real concelJt of a thinE:;. 
It is hard to dissuade anyone frolil the quest for the bidden essence 
by giving ezamples, they c-rant a general ŸGÒÌŲĦŲŪẀŨŠWÙŬŪĚ of their Jr,.noHledge: 
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"/ha t does it mean to ;:n01.'1 vlha t a game is? 1:[ha t does it 
mean to know it and not be able to say it? Is this 
knovlledge sO['1eho'.",1 equivalent to an unfo:C'mulated 
defini tion? So that if it Vlere formulated I should be 
able to recognise it as the expres.sion of my knowledge? 
Isn't my knowledge, my concept of a game, completely 
ex:ressed in the explanations that I could give? That 
is, in my describing examples of various kinds of ga.me; 
shm.,ring hoy[ all sorts of other games can be constructed on 
the analogy of these; saying that I should scarcely include 
this or this allbng games; and so on' (Pol. s. 75). 
Perhaps this paragraph more than any other :r,lresents us with the problem 
of the method of the I='.=:. Hittgenstein once told his students: "i:nat 
I Wa.l1.t to teach you isn't opinions but a method. In fact the method 
to treat as irrelevant every question of o:nnlons ••• If I'm wrong 
then you are right which is just as good'. (15) He said that he Has 
trying to get ŮŤŬŸŊŨŤĚ to do something they \·ron' t do. That is why he 
talks about 'cravings' and \.,re have tal'::eci c::.bout 'habits'. Examples 
are not WŠŸŤŪĚ to have any import. Hirst and Peters illustrate the 
sort of intellectual reluctance that is met with. They consider that 
there are many counter e::am:!Jles to their analysis so 'it is very 
difficult to maintain that an adequate anlysis has been given' but 
they contil1.ue: 
'It is possible, however, that there is some explanation of 
these counter-exs.mples. It could be the case, in other 
"iOrds, that the cases that fail to fit the analysis could 
themselves be linked in some Hay. If He could get clearer 
about the principle underlying the counter-examples further light 
would be shed on the concel'Jt of l1 e ducation ll generally' (16). 
Conceptual illur:1im}.tio':1 is seen only in terrtls of findin,s a hidden under-
lying principle that conl1ects up counter-examples. This means. that given 
a set of counter-examples - the instances of technical education, 
Spartan education, La\..rrencia.n or Tolstoyian 'anti-educational' views 
described in some detail, that no illumination of the concept of education 
is available until '.-Ie have said 'i:lhat is common to all these cases is 
This view is adhered to desl:i te the fact e1at y{hat usually fills the 
blaw\: is s ooething trivial or :)lati tudinous. 
These desires for exactne,ss, completeness, and ciefiEitiveness, 
.... 
all fino. expression in the view th&.t the es.':'ence of WŸŨÙŪŦHVĚ is hidden from 
us. This is somet;ling tha t ŠŪŠŨŸØVÙVĚmust dig out. Thus Peters llishes 
to look through la.nc,uage to see the principles that underlie the use of 
tenls. ŸUẀVĚ thee}i -::tgenstein ol tte Tractatus sought the structure of 
language. ':::'hus philosophers have ahmys sought to ask q}hat is ••• ,,' 
ouestions: 
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'The essence is hidfen froD us' : this is the form our 
problem now as,3umes. ('fe as:-:: : !11"./hat is language?", 
lii/h2.t is a pro:Josi b.on? 'I and the answer to these 
questions is to be given once ŸØÍTĚ for 211; and 
ÙŪTŤŮŤŪȘĦŤŪWŨŸŅĚof any future experience'. (Pol. so 92) 
Until now 'de hiwe only looked at Hh;}t 'ii ttgens'::ein actu2,11y said to 
indicate that some of the points about definitions, central uses, 
u:C1c'erlying principles, the idea 0::: 'lveak' definition, or olf giving 
logically necessary conditions, ';.nd so forth made by Peters in a 
co:c:sistent ",-Jay through sevcrG.l works, ar", not com:patible with the 
'family ressl11tlance' OT 'game' Eleta:ohors. Nor are they successful 
accornmodE',tions to ito That picture is directed at a method of 
ŮUÙŨŬVŬŊŸUÙVÙMŦĚand thus the issue::::, lYlay seem to ::Je a terminological 
one or 'a matter of words'. These metaphors are introduced to ȘŬÜŞŸWĚ
a powerful ŸŊÙĚctu.re of the "loTking of le.nguage. Eut it is not possible 
t8 sir.1ply contradict that ''Jictureo \Jbat ",ould this involve? 'There 
are no necessary conditions for the use of the ter:-!] lIeducationll?' 
This is as misleading as the assertion of its contradictory. Ivbat we 
need to do is to run away from looking at conce:pts in the vl?:.y that 
Peters and others have made the norm in philo,sophy of educa.tion. Eut 
this cannot be done by sEwing the contradictory of what he S2.yS or by 
ignoring ",hat he says. 1:'li ttgenstein says in reply to the sUGGestion 
that to use a term witi-,out a fixed me'Jning D2.y be said to be VŸŊŤŠÛÙŪŦĚ
r.1eaninglescly, or speaking nonsense: 'Say 1,,11a t you choose, so long as 
it does not prevent you from seeing the fa.cts. (And when you S'2e theL1 
there is a good deal you will not say.) (P.I. s. 79) 
It might be objected at this point that thia is pretty old hat. 
If we disregard Hirst and ?eters qualifications about not looking for 
a 'siDple observable pro:yerty' aJ.1d that they doubt if 'iii WWŸĴŤŪVWŤÙŸÍĚ
was 'right about this particular concept' then they ca:::l be seen to be 
taking this point. The necessary conditions they look for are not 
found among the physical properties of games but in 'hOH a human being 
conceives an activity'. Although this may sound subjective and 
relativistic, in a 1:!ay the.t talk of rho\'! human beings conceive an 
acti vi ty' would not, they areC:9proac11ing the concept as part of a 
'form of life'. This comes out more convincingly in Dearden's early 
article on play. After reviewing hOH the, family resen-blance metaphor 
may strongly tempt us to accept that play 'is not to be demarcated by 
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looking for some fea+.ure pre.sent always in pb_y acti vi ties ••• but by 
making a rr:ove ::lui te diffe'ent from these. usu.:3_1 ones'. (17) This 
involves a considering play 'in re13tion to social life generally'. (18) 
Again it is dependent on hOI" adults conc2ive certain activities. 'l'here 
a:re similari ties between this unusual move and the discussion of 'grammar' 
in Chapter Two. but the: differences are ŸŲŤŠWŤŲĦĚ Dearden ȘŸŬŤVĚ not 
mention 'rules' but he is seeking 'criteria'. Several psychological 
cri teria of play are rejected Cl_S ':'eiClg insufficient or not necessary 
or both. But \<1e still have 'criteria' which locate play on the social 
map. This may seem to be h""lf ""e.y there eve,,:. if it retains the 
'cri teriological' mO':.8 of speech. But \vhat this unusual approach 
amounts to is a repetition 0: one of the mistakes the family resemblance 
approach sets out to rectify. Only it does this at a 'grammatical' 
rather than a 'phenomenological level'. 7hat is, in the sphere of 
social life rather than in the features common to play activities. 
l"]y juxtaposition of ::)earden' s remarks with the conflicting remarks 
of r,jary Hidgley at the beginninG of this chapter was intended to bring 
this fact to light. It icc nm" appropriate to go into some more detail. 
It he.s lEen claimed that the 'fanily resemblance' ÜŤWŠŸŊUŬŲĚ is 
connected -,lith the need to look at case af-'c.er case. '\;e have seen that 
explicatin2; a concept is not just loo:-(ing at 1.hat Vie rilight think are 
central ca.ses. 'je have seen tl,at the metaplcor is an attempt to reninc1 
us that iVe need not dra.w a bound2TY to make a concept usable. That we 
can give a concept rigid li;lits but we need not do so. l!!e can define 
or refine a conce'Dt for special purposes. Some comments of ',·Jilliar:1 
James seen to be consoT_ant with ',Ji -ttgenstein'.3 P9sition: 
'To understand a thint:: rightly \"e need to see it both 
out of its environment and in it ••• (and) ••• it 
always leads to a better und.erstanding of a thing's 
significance to consider its exaggerc,tions and 
perversions, its near equivalents and substitutes and 
nearest relotives elsewhere'.(19) 
Dearden does not consider th.,-,t deviant cases are ';Jorth enumeration: 
••• this account of play could be complicated. in all 
sorts of .laYs, for example by considering what to say 
of those peol')ls \,-,ho have a professional interest in 
games, or those who play for the purpose of maintaining 
health or getting business contracts, but to chase such 
cases vlOuld be merely tec_ious. Vlhen one is trying to get 
somei"here, one does not pause to consider eVer;)T lane and 
side track.' (20) 
Yet if "'hat you are trying to get to is the position where you command 
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a clear view of a p2.rticular concept consider9.tion of such cases is 
essential. It is not the obvious cases thDt go to the heart of the 
concept. And this explains the difference behleen Dearden's and 
Hidgley's accounts of play. For she delights in just such cases, 
even, hea.ding her article with this r2r:,ar1: fro[:1 Dill Shankly: 'Some 
people talk about football as if it ,Jere 
. t - h - th that'. (21) l lS muc more serlOUS an 
life or de&th itself, but 
They look at different 
examples of play and produce conflicting analyses. But let us shift 
the 'games' analogy back into the centre of the metaphor. 
3.2. 'Games' 
r'iary l'Iidgley bases her discussion of 'games' on the repetition 
of the assumption that, unless He have clear knmrlledge of an underlying 
unity, metaphor, or a..'1Y extended use of a term is iDpossible. She 
exnresses this conviction at least twelve times. (22) The idea she has 
is simple. liletaphor is an epidiascope, and an epidias cope needs 
something to project. It projects an enlarged imB.ge of a words meaning. 
Thus she uses a metaphor to explain metaphor. This metaphor forms the 
backbone of her paper. In the paper she considers numerous exa:nnles 
of the use of the term 'game' including metaphorical uses. The point 
of this is to 'dra", out the ,,'.earrings that eEl'er:::;e from it l-lhen you use 
_ (24) 
it metaphorlcally.' 
Befol"e discussing her critique of the 'fanily resemblance' metaphor 
it is es,senti 31 to note that something is aske\-l already. For she 
appears to hc:ve ŸĚunderstanding of metaphor. Hetaphors can be seen 
as mere decoration. If they are not seen in this \-lay they are 
iml)Ortant and what can be important can be dangerous. Her metaphor 
is dangerous because it expresses a rigid view of concepts. Drawing 
a line is crucial for her because it will help solve what we called 
'Conflict ĿŸẀŤHVWÙŬŪVGĦĚ Is this a case of X or Y? But it is quite 
clear WUŸŊWĚ dra\-ling lines does not help with moral conflicts and 
dileJ!l.mas. If I lmo\-l that X is right and Y wrong, or I kno", how 
near \-lhat I an delib'er2.ting about is to cases of what iE, wrong and 
cases of l·rhat is rig-ht this won't help me. It is because we know this 
tha t '1,'8 have moral dilemmas. 'dha tever we do it goes against our r:Joral 
sense a..rld practice. loIidgley does not attempt to see ",hy the 'farnily 
resemblance' metaphor was im',Jortant to ŨŸÙÙĚttgenstein. She does not att2mpt 
to see l-lhy he uses it. life have seen that it i,s used to dispel a certain 
a:9proach to tl:.e conce·ot of language, exemplified in the 'J:ractatus. 
There is 21so a double use of metaphors here. 'Games' are used to 
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illustrate the 'fanily resemblance' metaphor and in their own right 
ŠŸĚa metaphor for our use of language. These uses of metaphor are 
relctted in thaL they are both aids to dispelling the notion that, 
there is Cl.n essence to languae;e. It i,'3 thi,s ue of metaphor j:jiclgley 
does not mention. She considers the metaphor as merely makinG a 
'point about definition'. She VẀŸŦŤVŸŁĚ that, on the basis of her own 
met,').phor iJbout metaphor, GŸŨÙWWŦŤŪVGŸŤÙŪĚ is denying that there is a 
common element and aleo asserting that there is an underlying unity. 
t1idgley talks as if I,ofi ttgenstein ie imp a led upon a contradiction in 
somevJB,Y. But to talk of something common and to talk of a lini ty are 
not the same thing at all. She constantly assimilates the two terms 
and"Equivoc;3,tion vitiates her approach. There is nothing common and 
there is no underlying unity. She supporte her epidiaGcope metaphor 
with a reference to tije metaphor of Christ as 'the light of the world'. 
This only \'Jorks ŞĜŸȘĿŊẀHVŤĚ people knol'! what lights have in common. Ue 
have a 'clear positive idea' of the root notion here. Indeed 
Hi WWŦŤŪVJŸŤÙŪĚ talks of la,mps and light as examples of objects I'Thich 
allow a sharp distinction between eSRentiRl and inessential.(P.I. s. 62) 
The metaphor was not ÜȘŸŪWĚ to apply to all concepts. If it ŴŠVŸĚit 
\'Iould iml)ly a theory of Iileanin;:,. 'rhis th'"ory \'lould be a vo,riant of 
realist theories of resemblance. Perhaps it could be applied to 
concepts such ae 'lamp', 'chair', 'orange', and 'parrot' but ŪŬWUÙŪŸĚ
of philosophical importance would reeult from this application of the 
metaphor. ŸŸUŤĚ metaphor \'las an attempt to stop us looking for the 
essence of language. Applied to particular concepts as if it were 
a general account of concepts it.'ould be contradicting these accounts. 
But it is ÜŤŸŤŨXĚexhibited not asserted as the correct account of 
concepts in general. Midt;ley's initial attempts to weaken the meta.phor 
is nothing but a' desperate attellipt to get the 'family resemblance' 
metaphor to run on all four legs. Thus she points out that \r/ittgenstein 
says in s. 67 that 'games form a family' I'!hich is very different from 
having a 'family resemblance'. The metaphor is then made to run on two 
legs I",hen she says 'A family is a functional i,.roup I,!i th a concentric 
, (26) 
structure... and upon all four when after giving the 'thread' 
metaphor she says: 'But the threads must end somewhere; ho\'l do VIe know 
where to cut them off?' (27) 'rhe metaphor is connec ted Hith an 
injunction to consider ca,ses. This in turn is connected with 'grammar' 
with what it make8 sense to say. The sort of unity hidgleYJ is commenting 
upon here is no underlying unity or common fe2ture but a unity provided 
by 'grammar'. 'ro make this clear let us consider the following 
examples of metaphorical US2S of Lmeuage: 
She is a Borgia 
She is a Smith 
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Christ is the light of the world 
NOH is the 1,linter of our discontent 
This is my body (said 0: bread by Christ) 
'Its the Taj Mahal (said of a hat) 
Beauty is truth 
Simone is a dajati 
Metaphor works in inverse prOl)Orti.on to the degree 0: similari '::' or 
familiarity of the items juxtaposed. hetaphor is one of the language 
games He play. Language is shot through 1.-li th metaphor. Thus a metaphor 
such as 'As white as snow' d02s not strike us at all. l'iidgley argues 
that unless \\'e have a 'clear grasp of the underlying unity' metaphor 
won't Hork. Tde must have a 'pretty clear, positive idea of the root 
notion'. (28) \Jhat does this meC.n? He could oe up against two of the 
ideas cri ticised ŞŸHĚ ',ii:: tgenstein. E'irstly, that there must be a 
strict definition of a tern or clear boundary to a concept before it 
is usable. Secondly, there is the notion of the 'hidden' something 
underlying or b,'lo1t! which gives unity to a concept. Thu2 we have 
Midgley talking of 'family resemblances' as consisting of 'surface 
, 'I . t' , (29) C 'd h t"" . b t If I Slnn arl les • onSl er ow ulS Vlew may come a ou • 
say of a flo·,·rer th,,, tits colour is 'As white as snow' there appears to 
be a reference here to a surface 'phenomenon' i.e. there is a similarity 
of colour conceiveci as a sort of epi-epidermis. The same 'phenomenal' 
relation could be said to exist in the faces of a cert2.in i"amily i.e. 
the cold blue eyes. Snow is usually white if He except that found 
on one of Jupiter's moons. All the eyes of a certain family may be 
blue. This is the supposed cor:Jmon element. We can then talk of 
flowers being like snow and someone being like an 'X' where this 
varia.ble stands for the cold ŞŨẀŤĤŤŸŲŤȘÙĚ family's name. Could we say 
that Hidgley has a 'phenomenal' vie\'l of metaphor? ,She seems to view 
it as needing something like the 'Galtonian Composite Photograph' 
before vIe can :91ace it on the epidiascope. Thus she sees shiftint; 
surface resemblances irrelevant. SUppOS2 tha.t someone says 'She's a 
Borgia' • Here we have 9. different sort of metaphor. Nidgley explicitly 
rejects the VẀŸŦŤVWÙŬŪĚthat this ȘŸŨŨȘÙĚrefer to any GŸUŤŪŬÜŤŪŠŨGĚ
charactE:ristic. They mus':, she says 'h,:::.ve something in comr:lOn a:part 
froD being linksd by their family re-:eoblances'. (30) The point has 
alre:1dy been made that such rel11:J.rks take the me ŔŸȘJĦÍŊUŬŲĚ too Ii -terally. 
But given this qualification, ;,,rhat is Disleading in her sug:2'estion that 
there is something: comeon to a.ll Borgias? One of the mistal-;:es we make 
'l"Jhen thinl-:ing 2,bout similarities and TÙŸȚŤŲŤŪȘNJVĚ is to think that 
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differences of the 'phenomenal' sort differ from other sorts of 
difference in deg-ree only. For instance, the difference behreen 
'rockland 'plant' is different froD the question ''iihat is a plant in 
essence?' only in the fact that the latter is a more general question. 
Thus when searching for "Ihat is comnon to all Borgias we look for an 
element \-.rhich is not 'phenomen8.l' but is nevertheless essentially 
similar to a :9henomenal difference. liJhereas what vie should look 
for are 'grammatical' remarks about the concept 'plant' and these 
alone viII satisfy our curiosity. ';ie shE1.l=_ go into the com:clexi ties 
of \-Jh?,t 'gramc1atical' remarks are later, but we can bring in the 
related notion of the use of this term in language to shed light here • 
We call someone a 'Borgia' rather than a 'Smith. ŸȚẀŠWĚ difference is 
there? tole knovl how to use both the terL1s. But there is a difference, 
we may know lots 0: SCli ths and nothing may strike us a.bout any of them. 
But if He knoH some history "Ie may knOl'l SOl!1e facts about the more famous 
130rgias as 1:1e may knOVI thinGS 8.bout other famous families such as the 
lIills or tr_e Churchills. If I call someone by anyone of these naE1es 
,;[hat sort o£ clear posi ti ve idea of the root notio:cl must I have? I t:1ay 
defe:cld my apIJlic2.tion of the ŸŤŲŲMĚHi th anyone or Emy set of facts I 
knOhT about the Borgias or j":ills or Churchills. ŨĒŸŤJWŠŮUŬŲVĚ are usually 
challenged on the que::.tion of their applicability. You call her a 
Borgia but she is good, kind ••• etc. i.".ihere the actual metaphor is 
challenged 'lie usu2.lly express our ignorance. 'Simone is a ciaja ti' -
vlill bring the ÙŲŨŸĦÜŤTÙĮĦWŤĚ response: 'Vlhat is a "dajati!l?' ,"e can answer 
this question in a variety of ÍËËŠÎŸVĦĚ ';'!e can give examples, show 
pictures, present definitions or "IThatever. Ue do not ŮÙȘŨŸĚ out a common 
element. ',ie try to teach SO[leOne the use o£ the term by shmving him 
the ,sort of language games I-[e can play \-.rith it. l:!e gi-ve exaJnples of 
its everyda.y employment. NOH i'J;idgley l-jill argue th:cl.t it is only 
possii)le to use a term o:c concept 'because it does have some principle 
of unity, because it is not infinitely elastic'. The Christ metaphor 
may 'dork because the essence is sharply defined because 'people knew 
very well Hhat light,,; had in common (namely a certain rela.tion to the 
things and people lit).' (31) Hidgley admits that i:: "';e looked at the 
differences behveen lights 1o1e miGht see that they differed as much as 
games. But these differences would "be uninteresting. Her critique of 
the 'fanily resemblance' netaphor seems to amount to a distinction 
betwee!1 a cle;:;.!' posi ti ve 'unity' a!1d. a set of ,surface similarities 
which are related in a'family resemblance' fashion. This seems to 
approach something- like the distinction between the 'phenomenal' and 
'grammatical' as ans',rers to '\Jhat is ? , .... Yet she goes on to say that 
she wants tl:o talk about the sense in which we do Y.nm-J what is in cornmon 
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b t th . '-' h th' 'I . . t ' (32) e i'leen ,games, e sense ŸŪĚŘGŅÒŸĿĦĦĚ ,.ere ŸVĚan unQer XŸŪŦĚẀŪŸĚy. 
If this 'common' factor thet gives underlying unity is simply 
XŸŬŴŨŤTŦŤĚof how to use the term, if it is related to the fact that 
\"le live in a society that plays games etc. then it is something that 
must be acknO\'lledged.. If He say 'I'Jovl is "::he -,linter of our discontent' 
'This is my body' (Christ said of the br8ad eaten in the upper room) 
we Elust helve experience of Hinter, ','IE: r:mst live in a society 1-There 
religion has a foot hold. IJlidgley seems to thinI-<.: that the notion of 
'follm'Jing 3. rule' is crucial. It is, but she gives no SlJaCe to the 
discussion of the variety of things th21.t cOl,;.ld ŞHŸHĚ meant by that phrase, 
so it is difficult to understand what she means. Perhaps it is something 
like a definition to her? But this Hould be of no interest to us. All 
questions about l1'etaphor ',JOuld be related to questions of 'strict lOGic'. 
But will this do? It is quite clear that there:, is some relation but 
that relation is not clear. Suppose I say of a hat thE..t my \Olife has 
chosen'Its the Taj IIahal' or 1'I11en KeatB says that 'Beauty is truth', 
how do questions of 'strict logic' help us? Vie could say that we apply 
the term 'Taj mahal' only to 'Ted Hahal' - like objects, or objects 
'!hich are elaborate, domed, and splendid. But this "JOn't help the hat 
isn't sha}ed like that. 'Beauty' isn't like truth. Cert2.inly, every-
thing is like everything eJ.se in some ·days. Chc,lk is like cheese. To 
understand these l'.1etaphors, h01,lever, l'iS need more them a general 
connection of this sort. "J'hs.t is credible in the ca,,-,e of a things being 
as vlhi te as sno\! does not move us at all in these latter aases. Any 
connection we found behleen 'beauty' and 'truth' \-JQuld be: fatuous. 
Something else is needed and the thing needful is an understanding of 
the culture in ,,,hich the metaphor is possible. In the exal7lple from 
Keats ",'e need to be coel1.si ti ve to romantic poetry and to be a'.vare of his 
view of the ŪŠWẀŲŸĚof art and its relation to life. ŅŸĚthe Lectures 
a.'1.d Conversations ',Ii ttgenstein says that' ie, nat belon,5s to a la.ngl.l.age-
(33) game' is a "."/hole culture.' This, rather than the production and 
application of trivial definitions, is what lies at the heart of 
ẀŪTŤŲVŸŠŪTÙŪŦĚa metaphor. 
Midgley is VǾŇŸŤVWÙŪŦĚWUŸWĚcertain of our uoral conceDts are in 
some so,...t of trouble. She arg-ues th'Oct ',3ince WUŤŸHĚ do a lot of work we 
must try to define ther,lJnd look for ẀŪTÎJŸŨXÙŪȘĚunities ĜUŤŨŸŤĚ they are 
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1 . 1 , f . 1 . J ' . '1 t . ŸĚ .1. 1 ' , (34 ) un L(e . anL ŸHŸĚ reGemb_.al1ce , an ŸŌĚ ';0 CO!lC 2), ŸŨĚ ,".'lere ŤẂŤŨŸĚ was one).. • 
She does ackno\oJledgs thS.t ','12 sh,,-11 not be 2.ble to give a simple 'litmus 
paper' test "lhich \vill facilitate the us':; of Doral conce".Jts. Yet if 
vre make too much of this E..nd cee.coe to look for underlying unity \ole vlill 
find that o'J.r concer;ts ·"iIl fe.ll to pieces just as, she thinks, the 
concept of art has done. ŸŊGŤĚ are cOl1centra,ting on her efider points 
about definition because they are in direct conflict with the remarks 
of 'Iii ttgenstein' s He consider:cl. e2,rlier about it being a hopeless task 
to draH sharp ŞŬẀŸËĦTŠŲÙŤVĚ :J..round a 'iJlu'.Ted r:icture. If '"e do so then 
anything and nothing is right, and his conclusion \-las that ' ••• this 
is the position you are in if you look for definitions corresponding 
to our concepts in aesthetics or ethics'. (P.I. s. 77) This points 
to a paradox in her arguoent. For although she looks for a definition 
she does not nrOQuce one! This fact escapes notice because she examines 
and ex},licates the concer:t of a game by considering exam'oles. She 
examines case after case of oetaJJhor ical and non-metaphorical uses of 
, garle ' • She is convincing w11en she argues th2.t football (Rangers v. 
Celtic) is not cut off from the lives of players or supporters. She 
is convincing \-Then she shows that oetaphorical uses of 'game' in 
literature stress not the arbitrariness of life out point beyond it to 
'God' who controls our play. She is convincing in her talk of the 
Stoic morality of 'playing the gaEle'. She deals ',-lith Plato's vie", that 
play is the only serious business in life. She dHells on NŤJȘŸĚs 
examples ŬŸĚ 'games' people play. E,he discusses Huizinga's vie,., that 
play is a ri tua.lisation of the most importa'1t things in life. She 
accepts that Plato and Huizinga may appear 'somewhat paradoxical'. But 
she concludes play demamds to be tal-cen seriously and is not as arbitrary 
and non-mattering as had been thought. (35) This is a corrective to 
the account offered by Dearden and taken ul? by Peters. But v1here is 
the definition? The nearest ,'Ie get to it is talk about the profound 
and complex need for play. But because this need is complex 'the things 
that will satisfy it will not share any simple obvious characteristic, 
like being painted gTeen, but because it is strong and universal, they 
will share structural ch2_racteristics which are easily and wiciely recog-
nised'. (36) She provides an immediate _ parallel Hi th 'chairs' which 
provid2d you unc,erstand that they are used to sit on can take an 
infini te variety of forms. This need is simple \-"h2reas 'the need for 
play iE) subtle and complex. '"je do not Hell understand it. I'lhich is 
what ÜŸȘŤVĚWittgenstein's point attractive,.(37) 
The 'fa.mily ŲŤVÎŲĦŸŞŨŠŪȘŤGĚ metaphor is connected with an injunction 
to co:>:'_:=ider a variety of ca.ses. This iiidzley does in the hope of find-
ing an underlying unity. But it is her examples that illur.1inate the 
concept by reminG.ins UE· of \Jh- t it ma..l(essense to say about games. Thus 
she gives us an insight into the 'gramE1.ar' of the terD 'game'. But she 
does not give us anything like an underlying unity. \Jhat vie get is a 
misleading analogy ':i th the 'graJnmar' of the ter;'TL 'chair'. GaInes have 
a unity ,,:hich is shown in their 'grammar' "Thich marks them off from 
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other sorts of things. But it is not a matter of a difference between 
'simple' and 'complex' and 'simple characteristics' and 'structural 
characteristics'. The analogy, and ;":idgley's comments, make the 
differences here too slight. 
JvIidgley's 'chair' analogy comes fror.1 an article by Haig 
Khatchadourian. If we follow up her reference to it we find that it 
Ivill hardly support her nascent 'definition'. Khatchdourian has 
isolated 'pleasure' as an 'effect' common to all games. He writes: 
'But now a doubt ariSeS: is the pleasure produced by 
different games, or different kinds of game, of the same 
kind in every case? Are not the pleasures produced 
related merely by certain "family resemblances," at 
least in the case of the pleasure produced by games of 
different Ilkinds""? If the anS\ver is in the affirmative 
- and 1oJittgens-:.:ein would say th2.t it is in the affirmative 
- then obviously ',v'i ttgenstein' s analysiS of games would be 
completely true, though here it would be the effects of 
games that are related by IIfamily reEemblances ll , rather 
than, or as well as, WŸGŤÙŲĚ characteristics themselves'. (38) 
Khatchadourian considers the -;,ossibili ty and although he allows that 
there are distinctions between 'physical' and 'psychological' pleasure 
but that in the end all games produce a relatively qeterminate kind of 
psychological pleasure. The distinction between 'intellectual' and 
'emotional' pleasures, for example, 'more concerns the way in which the 
1 . "d d' t 1 . t . t ' (9) Th" . t ' P easure lS prOQuce ,m1 1 s r,enera In enSl y • lS capacl y 
common to all games is only obvious \,hen they are see:a from ' a very 
. (40) general standpolnt'. And this is Hhy we may be misled into 
thinking they only ha"lTe 'family resemblance' characteristics. 
Khatch2dourian does not argue his case. 'Lie are left with the assertion 
that there seems to be merely a distinction of quality here. Two 
considerations can be offered to cast doubt on tbis assumption. Firstly 
it is prima facie implausible that chess and snap provide comcensurable 
psychological effects. Secondly, even if they do, and no evidence has 
been produced for this, then we may \vish to use an argument to the 
effect that some differences in quality of commensurable effects are 
differences in kind. If this is so then it follows, on Khatchadourian's 
m·rn admission, that l,iittge!Cstein's 'analysis' is true. And he adds a 
footnote ÑŸÙȘUĚoakes this point, and a very important qualification to 
his argument about 'common names': 
'It is note'worthy that n'Lany of the phenomena Wi ttgenstein 
analyses are complex "psychological II :processes, such as 
thinking, doubting, lear::ling; a.nd it may well be that 
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there 0nly "family resemblances!! cen be discovered. 
Eut supposing this to be true, and even if in the 
case of games ther:1sel ves, only "family resemblances II 
are discoverable in their effects, our position seems 
to remain secure as far as the names of manufactured 
objects are concerned - and also of activities 
which do not ŠŸŮŲŤȘÙŠŞŨXĚinclude psychological 
elements in their effects'. (41) 
But what is the point of all this? ŸÙUŠWĚ is at stB-'k:e if it is 
established that manufacture,d articles have an essence in the sense 
of a 'capacity'? .l-<.s we sm".', lji ttgenstein eXIJlici t4:.y mentions lamps 
as an example of something which bas an easily distinguishable essence. 
Khatchadourian like Hidgley is exploring the possibilities of the 
'family resemblance' notion as if it offered an account of concepts. 
Philoso;:,hical probler.1s are cau.sed by misleading analogies between 
forms of expression in different regions of language. i'iuch of the 
early part of the investigations is conceY'ned vIi th the explanation of 
the meaning of language on tlle model of the way in which \"e name 
objects. Khatchadourian can easily establish his restricteci case as 
it 'das never in question. '111103. t he and. Midgley do is simply to 
reverse the analogy. I'lidgley' s 'structural characteristics' \"hich we 
recognise sO easily may, once we have some account of them, be 
related by a 'family' of characteristics. Certainly 'needs' in 
general would appeo.T to be linked by 'family resembli:nces'. \vllat 
we have to note, then, is thE'.t ·,·.,e do not get any 'definition'. 
'rherefore we do not get an account of an underlying unity. 
Vie lIJere led to cO!1sider ihdcley' s account of 'games' because of 
Peters' vague suggestion that there raay be underlying unities or 
common elements. hidgley suggests that ,,·re do know of some underlying 
uni ty or COEllTJOn element. In both cases the implication is that if 
there is no such element then it will follo\-r that all our concepts are 
in trouble. Both make the point that if i're didn't kno',;] of such 
elements that 'de vJOuld not knovJ \"here to find examples of \-That we are 
talking about, as ŨŸÙTŦŨŤXĚputs it: IIli)on't think, but look!" says 
',Ii ttgenstein. But we need to think ::irst or \"e shall not know -r,;[hat 
to look for. , (42) This slick retort Hhich is truism . ŸĚ it refers 
-
a 1.1. 
to the search for a lost sock 
-
raises the crucial point. How do we 
know what is an e::ari:ple of something and ,,,hat is not? I "lOuld want 
to say that Vie ŸJÜŬŴĚ WUŲĜĞẀVŨŸĚ exolmples. I think lii ttgenstein would 
say that this is the case as "Jell. ',-Ie have seen that he allows that 
\"e can eXDle.in. our cone eDt of sonethin,;' through exar(',:les and that 
this is not an indirect or faulty Hay of proceeding. Hidgley seems 
to think it is. If so, then her avo;"/ed fa.ilure to produce a ciefinition 
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after considerinG numerou,s enlarged oxamples of 'games' is disastr ous' • 
She argue,s that oeta]Jhorical uses of a concept li::;:e 'game' are 
possible bec3.us.s the concept stanCi.s on a 'snaIl island of Des.ning - a 
ŸÙŲŅJGĚ isl;:;nd with a TȘȚÙŪÙWŸĚshape'. (43) This turns out to be Atlantis. 
However, Midgley does give some ides. of the unity of the concept 
by describing its 'gram1ar'. But this unity is not underlying, it is 
on the surface for all to see. .Khatchadourian suggests that VIe VIill 
not see any GȘŠŸŊŠȘÙWXGĚ unleG·:- \.,e con,:;ider it frori' a general standpoint. 
The word 'general' is dangerous but what he means is: 'Considering a 
thing in the light of h01;l vIe talk about it in actual contexts'. ',Ie do 
this by considering examples of usage and irnagins.tive exanples. This 
is what the metaphor is meant to get us to consider. But ,,,e must read 
it right. If we look for a common element in actual examples then we 
will see a complicated network of similarities ••• and so on. The 
conclusion is that there is no comEon feature which constitutes 
essence and not that the essence is constituted by a GȚŸȚŨÙŨXĚ resemblance'. 
If we seek a comDon feature to explicate a concept whose 'gramrnar' \.,e 
are faoiliar with, and so not just assume that \-Ie are asking a ''.Jhat 
is ••• ?' question in an appropriate context, the result is paradoxical: 
'I confess to you, Lord, th3.t I still do not knoVl what 
time is. Yet I confes.s too that I do know that I am saying 
this in tirle, th2,t I have been tal'ccing about time for a 
long tif'!e, and that this long tin:e 1:!ould not be a long time 
if it were not for the fact that time has been passing all 
the while. How can I know this, ,,,hen I do not know \-Ihat 
WÙŲĦŸŤĚ is? Is it that I do know ",hat time is but Hat I do 
not Y.now how to put what I knOH into words? I am in a 
serry state, for-I do not even knm"l what I do not know!' (44) 
There are a fancily of languar;e gaL1eS which make up the gramruar of 'time'. 
To present the :problem of 'time' Cane. there are r:Jany dif.ferent problems 
de:pending on context) as one that can be solved by d.efinition is not 
to oversimplify the 'problem' it is to make a fundamental but very deep 
error. The GȚŴŸÙŨXĚresemblance' metaphor is one of many suggestions 
made by 'iii ttgenstein to wean us ŠGH·ËŠŸØĚ fror'l certain notions of meaning. 
He is primarily concerned Hi. th lang-:uage, ,'Ji th speaking, with communic-
ating. But 'time' presents analogous problems. His injunction to 
look, to consider use and language gaDe is :p"J.rt of an atte:Clpt to teach 
us differences to get us to look at WŸŤĚmotley of things. In doing this 
we may cor.·,e to notice important facts. ?chees touches upon thi,s 1tihen 
he says 'It may never h3.ve ĨWŲẀȘŸJĚ 1')'",e before that SOlTI2 form of language 
t d Id 'It th '1 • 11 ŸĚ "t" -" , ĜŸĪĞĚ- S2·Y 6eome ry - oes or cou ŸĚ De onz 0 e· meanlng or ŨÜŸĦĚ
This is ,,!hy it is important to stress the point that when we are discuss-
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ins lal'lgu2ge games \'Ie are discussing whole cultures. The notion that 
meaning can be found by draHi:1g out of an instar ... ce or L1stances SODe 
defini tiol!. is a nonsense. This is ::lot to S3.y th2.t it might not be 
useful to do some such th:i.ng 2.t sone time, perho.ps, when teaching. 
The es,sential point is one th3.t is often stated as the iGljJortance 
of context. 1,"/ords such as 'time', 'rule', 'gaoe' ar_d 'thinking' get 
their meaning;s from the particular circumstances in ""hich they are used. 
'rlithout re8ulated ordersd societies, v/ithQut clocks and deadlines, 
wi thout geooetry there i"Quld be no meaning to 'It [mst be almost time 
to go'. To understa,,'1.d the 'grarJrLar' of 'time' it is necessary to stop 
looking for comllon essence:::; and to consider ",heet \;i ttgenstein calls the 
'natural history' of human beings. 
Hidgley began her paper ivi th some reflection on the contemporary 
philosopher's concern with 'game'. She sets out to illuminate a 
corner of Wittgenstein's thought by concentrating on the single concept 
of a game. She hopes that this night be 'a helpful example when vie 
vlOnder about other exa:Jples of seeing something in common, and that the 
t . t If b . I t th' t ŸĚ , ( Lf6 ) B"ut concep 1 se may. e a more lnrpor':an one an 1 seems ••• 
how important is the concept uer se? It may be ÙÜMŬŲŸŠŪWĚ in the 
philosophy of prim2,ry education to take note of the W2.y tha.t play 
demands to be taken seriously. But the phiJDs-ophical importa..l1ce of the 
'game ,. analogy resides in applica-':::'on by 1}i ttgenstein' as one of the 
many examples he uses to deal vIi th a habit of thought. As an example 
it I-las unit:'!jJortant although its unLTlportance may be important. If it 
did not succeed there are other examples that may and it can be replaced. 
VJi ttgenstein is suggestin[; that there is an anology between the way a 
pbilooorher' might explain ,,!hat 'game' means 2.nd the l!o'ay in Hhich he 
mi5ht explain \Jhat 'language' means. ŸUŤŲŤĚis unity in the two that 
is the unity that a ȚŠĜŸÙŨXĚ r;light have. But '.-Ii ttgenstein is not 
sUf:;gestL':.[ that the two are the sor,e. ŸUŤŲŤĚare disanalogies here. 
I can explaj_n ivhat a gar"le is if you don't k10i-l by describing examples 
ŠHHŸȘĦĚ by saying 'this and the like' a.'Ce gaEles. But if you can't speak, 
and hence can't use language, I caJillot proceed in this wa.y. Ey 
descriptioY'ls of 'sp,eaking' simply Vlo'clld not do. His general point is 
that 'tJe can see throut;"h this anD-logy that it is pOe,sible to explain 
what a langu9.ge is \vithout reference to any ŦŤŪĮŨŸŠŨĚ forr". There are 
many pro'llem2 Hi th the analot;"y. But these ŶŊŲŬŞŨŤŸĜŊVĚ re12.te to what 
Wi ttgenstein inte:'1Qed :Jy the analcgy. 
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3.3 'Grammar' 
'It is not the property of an object that is ever 
'essential', but rather the mark of a concept.' 
\o!ittgenstein (47). 
ŸIUŤŪĚHirst and Peters point out that 'whether something is a game 
(48) 
or not does not depend on any sir:1ple observable property'. They 
draw no furth2r conclusions, other than that we must not look for 
defining characteristics in any simplistic vlay. As this stands we can 
look for more subtle or complex characteristics. But something more 
important is me',nt, and it is worth labouring the point. Let us consider 
Bambrough's interpretation of the 'family resemblance' metaphor, as this 
is becoming the standard account of what Hittgenstein meant. 
Bambrough argues that 1;Ji ttgenstein has solved the problem of 
universals. Using \·,hat he calls a 'legalistic' technique he interprets 
the 'family resemblance' passages as being a denial of the common 
assumption of both the realist and the nominalist: 
'The nominalist says that games have nothing in ȘŬŪŸŪŬŪĚ
except that they are called gai"1es. 
The realist says that games must have something in 
common, and he means by this that they must have 
something in common other than that they are games. 
14i ttgenscein says that games have nothing in common 
except that they are games.' (49) 
He presents a simple diagram to illustrate the analogy Hith reference 
to five objects with a closed set of features: 
ll,1je may classify a set of objects by reference to the 
presence or absence of features ABCJ)E. It may well hap-
pen that five objects edcba are such that each of them has 
four of these properties and lacks the fifth, and that the 
missing feature is different in each of the five cases ••• 
e 
ABCD 
d 
ABCE 
c 
ABD:2:: 
b 
ACDE 
a 
BeDE 
Here we can see how natural and how proper it might be to 
apply the same word to a number of objects betvleen which 
there is no COElmon feature ••• Zven if the actual instant:es 
v/ere indefinitely numerous, and they all happened to have 
one or more of the features in COODon, it would not be in 
virtue of the presence of the common feature or features 
that WUŤŸÙĚwould all be rightly called by the same name, 
since the na':'le also ap:olies to possible instances that lac),;: 
the feature or features.' (80) 
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The dispute between the nominalists and ŲŤŸŨÙVWĚ is resolved, accordir€ 
to Bambrough, because \"ii ttgenstein alloHs that the nominalist is right 
in saying that 'games' have nothing in COO1']on other than their being 
games anci by also al:!..Oi·Jing :pace the realists that '/e are, nevertheless, 
objectively justified in calling them ŦŠŸŨŤVĚ becaus8 games are related 
in the VIa::' sU2_gestcd by the schema. It is enough for any individual 
game to have a subset of such features. 'l'his deals ŸĞŬWUĚwith "i,'/hat 
is ••• ?' questions and ",ihat justifies us in calling this a ••• ?' 
questions. 
To understand 'Ilhy 3ambrough' s interpretation is essentially no 
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different fro" realism is importc.nt. For then he is open to ŸTÙĚttgenstein' s 
cri ticisms of realism. }urtheroore, such a revelatiOll vlOulci protect 
us frol,1 the plausibility of Bambrough' s position. To begin let us 
revive the distincticn beti-leen the 'phenomenal' and the 'grammatical' 
mentioned when discussing ŸÙTŦŨŤXGVĚ treatment of metaphor. 
The difference beh;feen an apl)le and al1 orange, a tree and a plant, 
and brick aIld a flint, is a difference of perceived features. The 
difference betHeen 'five' and 'red' and between 'cold' and 'pain' is 
not a percei,red or phenomenal difference. It is a di:':ference of 
'gramrnar', of the use these \;fords have in 13.nguage. The distinction 
behlS'en 'grammar' anG. 'u,se' is mer:cly a shift to a formal mode of 
expression. Hubert Sch',,ryzer has ŠŲŦẀŤȘŸĚ that a pervasive and fundamental 
theme in the P.I. is that the difference ŸJJŊŤWŴŤŤŪĚ the question 'i,jhat is 
the TÙĶJŸGŤŲŤŪȘŤĚ behleen an orange and a grapefruit?' and the question 
'T1hat is the difference between a nuober and a colour?' is made to seem 
too slight. Thus ''''hen a philosopher asks '\,;nat is a number?' he is 
held to be asking an analogous question to ''. .. hat is a grapefruit (as 
opposed to an orange)?' In this latter case a list of features is 
appropriate, but not in the former. Suppose W8 ask '\Jhat is a grapefruit?' 
in the philoso:9hical "laY, then we may say that it is really extended, 
solid, coloured etc. It is easy to think of these characteristics being 
simply more general than the 'phenomenal' features "llle could list i.e. 
being yellow, bitter, large etc. This would be misleading. These 
latter features deternine 1:!hat a grapefruit is. 'Thus it is because they 
are coloured th'd \V'e can sI)eak of seeing thecl, '::Jecause they are solid 
that we can speak of picking them u:;? If aVJles were different in these 
fe,:.tures then VJe could not talk of ŸĞÙȘÛÙŪŦJĚ th2i11 up etc. Of course, they 
could be of no interest to us so that wc did not notice them "thich shows 
th:=.,t these 'phenomenal' fec;,tures are not absolute. But to list cha.racter-
istics like 'solid' is alnost not to describe apples, that is, it is not 
to attribute features to them. ŸUŤVŤĚcharacteristics do not determine 
how "Ie VŮŤŤĦŸĤĴJĚ about grapefruit. They are r.1erely 'backhand' ways of 
saying that it makes sense to talk a.bout yicking up gra:pefrui t etc. 
It is because it makes i3el1se to sa:T certC'.in things about grapefruit 
that determines uhat gra2)efrui t are. Saying' Gra:?efrui t are extended' 
is a e;ra011Jatical re'·'lark abou·t the use of language, about 'dh:,t it makes 
sense to say in a lanf,Uc"ge gac'e. The confusion of the 'lJhE:'nor.1enal' 
lI!i th the 'gramrr:atical' is at the h'2art of Bambrough' s interpretation 
of Fittgenstein. 
·'ilhen 1,-18 ask ")hat is ••• ?' in philosophy we are concerned with 
the explication of a concept \!ith Hhat a word means. Bambrou;h, and 
this is clear froD the passage quoted above, believes that ultimately 
the meaning of a term is ",hat it applies to, that is, a subset of 
fomily fe::tures. Thus it is just ,mother variant of \-{hat ',Ji ttgenstein 
is attacking - the notion that the meaning of a term is an object. He 
has hypostatised the family resenbla.."1ce notion. Schwyzer shows this 
clearly by setting up sdlelllata similE.r to Bar.:lbrough' s to show that the 
use of a word ca!L.'1ot be determined in such a way: 
'A: of orgc"nic matter 
B: not com:.JOnly eaten 
C: soft, yields to the touch 
D: green 
E: an individual thing 
(not stuff) 
a: 
b: 
c: 
d: 
e: 
a plastic lawn 
a ripe avocado 
a copy of P.I. C3rd U.S. 
a kitten 
moss 
Each of the objects edcba has four of the properties ABCDE 
and lac'cs the fifth, and the missing fifth is different in 
the five cases. Thus 
e 
ABeD 
d 
ABCE 
c 
ABDE 
b 
ACDE 
a 
TIeDE 
Let us call the term that is ŤẄŸŨÙȘŠWŤTĚby the schema under 
this interpretation "omega!!.' (51) 
:Sdition) 
Here we have a formula 'o:r which we can determine 1,-:hether an object is 
an 'omega' or not. It is not an arbitary or closed term as ,",ould be 
a naIile for the things in my pocket. Suppose that ',re are totally 
proficient in applying the formula. Then we discover an actual language 
in \-{hich the ',1lord has a use and is i3ub j ect to tbe above formula. ',,Jill 
we be able to say that He lmderstand the peorle 1dho use the term? Hill 
we kno1,-! ",hat lan8v.af;e gar:1e Hley a.re playing? J?eThaps vIe wOL,ld say 
'They are playing the language game "describing or,1egas Tl ?' But how do 
we knOlv? It might be that to say 'I have found an omega', 'He collects 
omeGas', 'Omegas exist' etc. is t21e pure2t nonsense. 'Omega' might 
have a particular function, to warn off young tribesmen 1:/ho step' too 
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near an object falling under the fo!:'rEUla, it might be a ȘẀĒĤŸVŤHĚ or 
something Hhich we cannot translate ea.sily and can only :jive the 
formula as a poor gesture. ',v nat \"ould make an 'oL1eGa' one of these 
things or something else iiould not and cannot be a matter of the 
family fecc_tures as these ':lre ex hypothesi the same ',\rhatever 'omega' 
mea.ns. Only a description of tlw langu3_::;e ;:;-a;,le can tell us '!lhat a 
word Cleans. Ba.mbrc,ugl-' fails in llis account:Jecause he ignores 
everything iIi -':tgenstein says about use. 
Schiryzer also ShO\·TS that B8L1brough's aocount ,vill not ,'Jork even 
for the restricted case of general descriptive WŤŲŸVĦĚ He gives 
another example: 
'The i'iord "beta" ŠŸĞŮŨÙŤVĚ to things just in so far as they 
have WUŸĚproperty of being red. - So we have the schema: 
a 
R 
b 
R 
c 
R 
d 
R 
•••••••• n 
........ R , (5a) 
Suppose we meet another tribe which uses the tern 'beta'. He GUess 
that it means red on the basis of the forr:lUla. But we find tribesmen 
"Tho say things like 'I had three betas for breaJdast' but sooeone who 
says 'h'hat a beta sUI:set! ' is held to talk nonsense. Th8 formula 
cannot choose bet".veen the t,,10 possibilities of ''Jeta' meaning 'red' or 
'rea one'. This is a di ff erence in r:;ranmar, in the use of words. 
It must ::,e said thet ŁŠÜĴŬŲJŸẀŦUĚ is not unique in adopting such an 
approach. 'l'here are several philoso:Jhers "Tho have recently Droduced 
papers making a sir;]ilar misinterpretation of the li1eta)hor. Fogelin 
. .. t (53) lS a case lD pOln • He argues that \Ii ttgenstein is disti!"lguishing 
between sorts of concept, those 1;Jhich are family resemblance ones, and 
those which aren't. Vittgenstein, of course, uses num1Jer as his 
example of a family concept. ŸŬŔĦŤŨÙŪĚ argues that the term does not 
have general application and that it has 'its most natural application 
to descriptive terms'. (54) He rejects TJi ttgenstein' s application of 
it to ethics and aesthetics because terms like 'good' have clear 
definitions! In utilising tte notion in this ŸÎXHĚ Fogelin, like 
Banbrough, is treating the notion as if it presents some alternatiVe 
th20ry of meaning. The arguments of Schwyzer will hold against both. 
Vittgenstein is trying to dispel a badly understood picture or, if 
you like, to correct a misleading lday of thinking. This can be seen 
as -the assimilation of 'pLenomenCll' and 'gra1J1matical' ,statements. He is 
correcting a misleading idea of what constitutes the essence of concepts. 
Yet another phil.osopher to treat the concent in this way is Harold 
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Osborne. He argues that philosophers have become capricious in their 
treatment of aesthetics eecause of the fashionable influence of 
Hi ttgenstein 's notion of a 'faclily resemblance group'. He argues: 
••• it \"ould be; virtually im:?ossible to think of anything 
at all which had not some relation of reser.lblance to any 
other thing in the universe, and it would be possible to 
construct an infinity of the nost outre and extravagant 
assemblages of things each connected by the fact that each 
item had some relation to some other ÙWŤŸĚin the assemblage. 
Nothing "[ould be excluded. Such groupings are quite 
arbitrary.' (55) 
This is a ws,rning not to ex:;?ect a significant fe2.ture common to every-
thing in the ŦŲŬẀŸĚor for necessary and sufficient conditions for 
everything in the STOUp_ But the very notion of a 'family' group should 
lead us to expect that the thing's ,vi thin it are 'linked by significant 
and coherent, not just arbitrary and haphazard, relations of resemblance,.(56) 
The philosopher's job is to investigate the common features ••• determining 
the necessary and sufficient conditions' of something being included in a 
group. These features are often ir:lplici t and the philosopher must render 
them 'articulate and ŸĞŲŤȘÙVŤGĦĚ Osborne is discussing a 'work of art' 
and. shows through historical 8xarmles that there may be something for 
the ŮUÙŨŬVŬŸUŤŲĚ to say about the develo:pment of a 'popular consciousness' 
of ,-ihat consi titl1tes a work of art. 3ut his general approach to the 
metaphor is the sa'11e as that of Peters, 11ic.gley, ancl ?ogelin. He takes 
the metaphor to be introducing a ŦŤŸŤŲŠŨĚaccount of a concept. He 
misreads the passage. '!:'he point must be made again. If you look for 
common elements you will not find them. v]hat tells us 'Ilhat belongs in 
a group is 'grammar'. Or, as 0'/8 have put it, our knoHledge is constit-
uted by examples. Instead of being read as a corrective to the mislead-
ing 'materiel object' or nar,1ing vieH of lang;118.ge the meta)hor is seen 
as providing an inadequate account of the relation of members of a 
given class and the misleading picture is reinstated. This, and like 
eX8npl'2s, can be multiplied indefinitely as evidence of our craving for 
generali ty 2.nd the strength of thc:.t f!lisleadi.Clg picture of how language 
functions. 
Perhaps part of the difficulty is to grasp just Hhs..t is r.1ee.nt by 
a bad or misleading picture. The tendency is to see it as a sort of 
mento.l imase. This ,muld be wron.g. The clearest exau:::Jle of a mislead-
ing picture i,s the an!,! the l1alcolrJ tells us ;.:ittgenstein hir;1self used: 
'SUlJpoSe that a cord was strstched. tightly around the earth 
at the ec;ua'::or. 1"0\'1 ŐǾMŸŬŬHVŤĚ that a piece one yard long \Vas 
added to the cord. If the cord lIas ',:ept tauGht and circular 
in form, flOlcl much 2.bove t!'le surfpcce of the e&.rth "loulo. it be? 
,;'ithout stoppinG to work it out, everyone present (&.t one of 
',Jittgenstein's at homes) HaG inclined to se..y that the distance 
of the cord. fron', the surface of the earth '"culd be so minute 
that it would be imperceptible. I3ut His is 1:lrong. The actual 
distance "!QuId be nearly six inches.' (57) 
VIe are rdslec. because \ve compare the addi tiona1 length to the total 
length vJhich, quite correctly, seems insignificant. It is the same 
vlhen we are misled by mental pictures in philosophy. Gur "lhole \'1ay 
of looking at the problem misleads us. Wittgenstein in using the 
'family re-c 2mblance' analogy a::ld asking us to 'look and see' is 
atten"pting to direct our attention to particular language gart;es so 
that we are not misled by a particular l,Jicture of what constitutes the 
essence of concepts. Here it is necessary to distinguish between 
'essentialism', the H&Y of thinking that embodies the mistaken assim-
il2.tion vIe are considerinc; and, for exanple, the idea of essence being 
expressed by gramrJaI'. ŘŸGÙĚtt,'ens-'::ein is not suggesting th2.t if 'de look 
and see we will find that beside those concepts with a common thread 
we vJil1 find 'family resemblance COl'lCepts' '.vhich can be understood 
through some sophisticated neo-realist theory. The purpose of the 
metaphor was to charm us away frofj the idea that there was a common 
structure to all that we call ŨŠŪŦẀŸŦŤĚwhich directly ȘŬŲŲŤŨŸWŤTĚwith 
reality. 
h'hat sense, then, C2.n be given to the suggestion that the concept 
of educ:Jtion is B. 'fc:.lc.il;y- reser:lblance' concept. ŸĦVĚ 'de have seen this 
is almost t ŠÛŤŸĤŚĚ to be a tr'-lism. It should be cIsar fror' the discussion 
above th2.t to mdce this sUE;e;estion, or to atterqJt to ŠŮŮŨŸØĚ the metB.phor 
Vlould be mi,sgtlided. \iisdom sugge,sted in Other i·;inds thc:.t the therapeutic 
dialoc;ue of the philosopber \'Jas an 'aseptic' technique. It did not 
involve statements of proofs, but questions and questions. The idea 
\vas that every philosopbical cyestion \vould CUlBl-ler i t,,,elf if asked 
aseptically and fully. BO'i/ever, it 1'10.::'. not c:.lways nece"'sary to adopt 
this technio,ue in its entirety inste?d 'One may gently, surreptitiously 
"t ' t" , t b f'.6 t t t" , (58J cIhe 'fam';l" 1n rOQuce a VŸŮĚ1C ou ene 1C =-.n no a lon --'- oJ 
resemblance' metaphor is such a notation but it has a charm which may 
et\mesh those not held car)tive by the :picture it airr:s to correct. It 
may help us towards grasping Hhat is at issue or towards seeing this 
in a TÙȚȚŤJŸŤŪWĚ arrangeoe!lt. The dai1ger of using a septic technique 
is that the notation offered. ÜŠŸØĚbe utilised outside the context in 
which it had a job to do. Can the metaphor be utilised to throw 
light on other concepts than the IJeculiar philosophical ones associated 
with language? \Iould such an application necessarily be crude and 
uninteresting? 
If the 'phenomenal' 'grammatical' confusion was evident in the 
ways in which ŮUÙŨŬVŬŸŊUŤŲVĚ of education dealt \-li th the concept, and if 
the 'family reser.lblance' metaphor helps to dissipate the confusion then 
perhaps it has a use. This is fa.r from saying that 'education' is a 
'family resef.1blance' concept. I,Ti th certain concepts such as 'lemon' 
or 'car' or 'monkey' the metaphor ,.,rould do no oovious Hork, although 
it is possible to apply something like a 'family resel71blance' notion 
. (5q) 
to the relationship of various individuals in so-called 'ring specles'. -
In these cases no philosophical effect would be achieved. And it might 
be objected th2,t no one ŸĤÜẀŨTĚmake the 'phenomenal/gram'mcifical' confusion 
in the case of 'education', even though this concept is important to us. 
Certainly a concept like 'furniture' might involve us in such a..rJ. error 
because here there are physical objects \·rhich might misdirect our 
enquiry. But in the case of 'education' there are no such objects. 
Yet the word 'object' has several different uses other than to designate 
the 'grar:rmatical' cateGory of material object. 'vJe can talk of the 
colour 'red' as an object and we can even go as far as Husserl's 
'intentional object'. Therefore it is not necessary to thin1<: of a 
thing as 'phe:::1omenal' to interpret it on analogy '.-lith a n;aterial object. 
La..rJ.guage masks this. The sir:lilari ty in grammar between the questions 
"Jhat is educa.tion?' and. 11:!hat is an apple?' i-Jhere the latter meClns 
'Vihat is an ap-;Jle as ĮWŸŠÙŪVWĚ a pear?' encourages us in the thought that 
these cuestions are to be ans\'lered in similar 1tlays. In reality it is 
far fron clear '.;lhat sort of question if any is being ŠVŸĤĴJŤTĚ in the first 
C8se. i:ihat is obvious is tha.t the latter calls for a list of features 
while the former calls for a granmatical anS\·ler if it is a que,stion 
about explication of a concept. 'Grammatical' remarks are not lists 
of features but statements about vrhat it makes sense to say about a 
thing.i.Jhen people produce general criteria of 'education' as they do 
of 'game' it i.s often, as h'e have seen, far from clear what is going on. 
Nevertheles2, time after time, suggestions of the hidden, of the need 
to look behind words, search for a common factor, suggest that vrhat is 
being sought is a phenonenal feature. llention of 'rules' sometimes 
cOilfuses the issue but there are other indications th'lt the assim1.lation 
is being made. 'i'he confusion is, in ;Jart, another example cf puttinb 
the cart before the horse. Certail1' graGlmatical' remccrks are held to 
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be feo.tures ,"Thich determine how '.'Je WŠŨŸJĚ about 'ec.uc2.tion'. Thu,s the 
staterJent that 'Education is desir::.ble' does not give us a characteristic 
of 'education' that makes something a case of 'education'. Rather it is 
because it makes sense to talk about ẂŊŠŸŨWÙŪŦĚ education, because people 
seek to have an education, etc. that allol" us to sIleak of education 
being desirable. The tendency to hypostatize 'gra.nmar' leads us to see 
de,siro.hili ty as a chara.cteristic of educatio;-l that cause us to seek it 
out. This tendency becomes more WŲŠŸVŨŊŠŲŤŪWĚ if Vie consider hoVi the 
'grammatica.l' statenent is then elevated into a cl'leck ŞŸØĚ \Vhich we can 
test any p2.rticular insta!:.ce. Hather as if ,"e Here VŬJJĦŸWÙŪŦĚ out apples 
from p8ars. This exercise is as vacuous as the application of the 'omega' 
formula. 'c)hat indicates more than all else that this sort of assimilation 
is being made is the neglect oi the ŸŊŠŲWÙȘẀŨŠĦŲĚ case. If we read 
iJi ttgenstein' s use of the 'fauily resen-,blance' ffietaphor as essentially 
connected with the injunction to consider the particular case then it 
is necessary to consider the language gar:1es we play with Vlords. This 
is implicit in the notion of 'zraClmar' for 'cIi ttgenstein does not use 
that meta1Jhor sirljply to [,18an 'rules' as 'i'iaismann sug;gests, (60) but to 
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_ (61) 
refer to Hh(d 'lie say to human acti vi ty, to a form of 11.fe, to a culture. 
Thus, to HVŤŤGŸĚ some sort of application of the 'fauily resemblance' 
[:leta'ohor to educatiocl ,·muld afJount to no more the.r-.!. to consider case 
after case of education. 
Richardson has sU2:gested that the notions of 'criteria' and 
'family resemblC'.nces' are often used to make precisely the saine points. (62) 
And from our discussion of these notions there are sorr.e similarities. 
It has been su@;gested that talk of 'criteria', if it means anything at 
all, refers to the sorts of things it makes sense to say in ordinary 
life. Likev:ise the notion of 'family resemblances ' is cOlmected with 
an injunction to consider the language Games we play in ordinary life. 
Both are elements in Hi ttgenstein' s a.tten;pt to deal vii th our craving 
for generality. But if this means, and I suspect it does, that there 
is some sort of equation of 'fa[lily resemblance' features and 'criteria', 
then so much the worse for JĦŰÙȘUȘŸŲTVŬŪGĚs 'theory of criteria'. 
',Je beg.3n by osking '.'.(·e there necessary an%r sufficient conditions 
for (the use of the tern) education?' 'Are there criteria for (the use of 
the term) education?' and 'Is education a family resemblance (termlconcept-?' 
All these questions embody in their different \!ays elements of the 
malaise that places all value in the general. ŸŊŤĚ have discussed several 
misleading assir:lilations th t run through these questions. No anS\'ier 
" th ŸŨ·ŬGŸŤẂŮŲHĚ this was not the object of has been offered to ĮĦŪŸȘĚ OJ: ,eGJ. . ,. -
considering them. The object was to try to understand what led to 
the asking of these questions. It is hoped that having come to some 
understanding of this then the urge to ask these questions would be 
reduced. Whether this reduction has been achieved will only be 
apparent to the extent that one begins to consider examples. 
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Chapter Four ESSENCE AND EDUCATION 
What we have been calling case by case procedure, or the consider-
ation of instance after instance, has at least one peculiar feature. 
This concerns the status of examples. The examples themselves are not 
important per see They do not concern us as, for instance, the descrip-
tion of a particular battle might concern a military historian, or the 
description of a particular school in a certain historical period 
might concern an educational historian. In one sense we illustrate a 
method of proceeding by considering a large and heterogeneous number 
of cases. Yet in another sense we hope to gain insight into whatever 
conceptual area we are discussing through the examples we give. They 
may become important and familiar landmarks. This is true of the 
'games' example that Wittgenstein used to introduce the 'family 
resemblance' notion. He could have written: 
'Consider the phenomena we call 'truths' and 'true 
proposition'. I mean scientific truths, mathematical 
truths, historical truths, aesthetic truths, and so 
on. What is common to them all? - Don't say there 
must be something common or they would not be called 
'truths' - but look and see whether there is anything 
common to all. - For if you look at them you will not 
see something that is common to all, but similarities, 
relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To 
repeat: Don't think but look! f 
If we apply the metaphor to the concept of truth the injunction to 
consider examples may be illuminating. Given the particular intention 
in this section to explain why no definition of language has been 
produced it is doubtful whether a central concept like truth would 
have the same magic as the 'games' example. However it could function 
in the same way. Just consider the following examples of true 
propositions: 
(1 ) London is the capital of England 
(2) CKp Cpqq 
(3) Hitler was an evil man 
(4) Red is the colour with the greatest wavelength 
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(5) Sha.!.;;:eS1Jeare is a greater plaYVlright WUŠŸĚRattigan 
(6) Henry VIII had six Hives 
(7) Beethoven's Sonata 110. 14 in C sl-',arp rr,inor Opus 27 
:No. 2 sounds like moonlicht. 
Ir:1agine the battering and squeezing that would have to go on to fix 
these in the requisite philo.so)hical boxes of truth as corresponder_ce, 
or coherence, or in some sense pragatic. If we consider these and 
other examples we vlill s:e some correspondence here, coherence there, 
and ma.""lY vari2-nts. In (1) v,e might see nothing but corres:pondence, 
in (2) coherence. But 1;lhat of the other ezar1iples? Perhaps 0) would 
not be allowed to be an ezar,.ple of a truth lTllt of an evaluative 
juGEement. Sufficient criticism exist,s of the 'fact/value' dichotomy 
to sUbGest th2t there is no such easy 'Jla::T out and that 0) does state 
a fact. The general ir;]port of such criticisms Ca.!l be indicated. by 
consic.erinp; (6). which ,'Ie mentioned in ĿUŠŮWŤŲJŸHẂŬĦĚ This clearly seems 
to be a case of correspondence ',Ii th the facts. But im2.gine it being 
uttered oy a devout Ronan Catholic 'Henry VIII had six 1Jlives.' Is it 
no'\v a statement of value? \'.ihether (::;) is a statement of fact or value 
is deter:nined by the context 0: ÒŸWWŤŲĨĦŪȘŤĦĚ Perhaps (4) could illustrate 
a pragm2.tic truth. But ",hat of (5) and (7)? Are these exaE1ples of truth 
by consensus? Or can we stretch 'correspondence' so that (5) is covered 
by that notion? It is hard to see i·jhat 'corres-oonc.s' to the claim that 
Shakespeare is 'greateln than' Hattic;an. ':20 use the terr:1 here 1JlOuld be 
to divest it of mea.ning. In the case of (7) there is no possibility 
of any sort of 'coTres=)ondence'. Hml can music be said to correspond 
VITi th 'moonlight'. Yet many lJeople say that it does. Beethoven did 
not give his ,sonata that name, It is the name that has been given to 
it by audiences. 1,lhen \-Ie call something a 'truth' or a 'true proposition' 
'\'!hat makes it true is the context of utterance, or to }Jut it better the 
language Game ln which it occurs. This is better because it does not 
su gest the i'.nmediate context bu.t sUGgests human society and culture 
is involvecc. If 'i/2 consiJ.er a wide range of exallples VIe will see a 
,,,hc,le series of VÙŸŨÍÙŨŠŲÙĚties an.d rels.tionships between the sorts of 
things He call 'truths'. 
Perhaps for \!i ttgenstein' s puq:;oses 'truth' lrlould not have been 
qui te such a h3.p::pJT example. And this should ren:il"ld us how much 
ŮUÙŨŬVŬŮUŸHĚ is like art. In the context of thE; P.I. a certain e;cample 
,,,orks. ;3u there ;.'/e are ȘŬŪVÙȘHŸĒGŲÙŪŦĚ a vlider application of a rcethod 
exemplified by ;}ittr:;enstein. '.-,ie have begun to adumbrate a possible 
application of the injunction to consider cases that proceeds the 
introduction of the 'fan:ily re,':'8l'lbLmce' ;netaphor. ',ii th ''I'ruth' the 
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application of the metaphor Inay have some point. Philosophers 
notoriously concentrate on a restricted and hackneyed set of examples 
such as 'The cat is on the mat', 'hy watch is on my wrist' etc. Is 
this true of their treatment of the concept of education? 
, 
4.1. A 'Family Resemblance' Approach? 
Peters' distinction between the ne':! and 'specific' concept of 
erlucation can be put metaphorically. The concept of education can be 
compared to a city that has undergone slum clearance. In the centre 
their'e are formal well planned streets. As you move outward there is 
more variety when you reach the garden suburhs, and eventually you 
corne to the rambling country lanes and pathways. These pathways 
represent the peripheral instances of the concept. The outlying areas 
are for our diffused and general concept. The inner city area (where 
stands the university) is the core concept we have developed. 'fhis is 
a potent suggestion. But it changes entirely if we shift the formal 
streets to the edge of our concept city and think of it as a 'new town' 
complex. l'fittgenstein describes language in a similar way as 'an 
ancient ci ty' : 'a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new 
houses, of houses with additions from various periods; and this surroun-
ded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and 
uniform houses' (P.I. s. 18). 'fhe doncept of education is more akin 
to something like 'the architecture of a city'. We can appreciate 
them in similar ways. We can study specific styles, and periods, 
methods of ŸŬŪVWŲẀȘWÙŬŪĚor decoration, or concentrate on recent devel-
opments. Or perhaps vIe can wander through the city looking at the 
buildings in various ways. The question is not which i5 the correct 
method. All that interests us is increased grasp. Rut let us not 
labour this metaphor. 
If we approach the notion of 'education' in the VŸŨŤĚway as we did 
that of 'truth' we can re-write P.I. ŸĞŤȘWÙŬŪĚ66 in the follo\'lin?; way: 
'Consider for exalople the 1lroceedinc;s that we call 'education' 
I mean moral educFltion, social educ3tion, religious education, 
technical education, physical education, aesthetic education, 
scient'ific education,· special education, liberal education, 
outdoor education, and so on. I'/hat is cOJilmon to them all? 
Don't say: "'.rhere mus t be VŬÜŤWUÙŪŸĚcommon, or they would not 
be called 'education'" - but look and see whether there is 
any thine; that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, 
and a whole series of thell1 at that. To repeat: don't think, but 
look! )1 
There are several different ways of looking that cou.ld be adopted. To 
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begin with consider the follolrling examples of what might be called 
'educi3_tional situations': 
(8) Teaching a child the names of toys and simple objects 
by giving him the object and saying the name of the object. 
(9) Learning 'Ode to Autumn' for homework. 
(10) Jlemorising a mathematical formula and applying it. 
(11) Visiting an ancient Cathedral. 
(12) Camping in the ';Jelsh mountains. 
(13) Playing- football. 
(14) Discussing the arguments for and against abortion. 
(15) '.Jri ting a poem. 
(16) Doing a scientific experiment. 
(17) Visiting a modern art museum. 
(18) Directing and acting in a play. 
(19) Doing a jig sa\-!. 
(20) Sitting '0' levels. 
(21) Seeing a film on Jewish family life. 
(22) Learning tables and spellings. 
(23) Drawing and painting. 
(24) \lorking in a factory. 
(25) Doing lan[:,uage ,'Jork based on social situations. 
(26) Doing research into shop prices. 
(27) Criticising Platonism in a seminar. 
(28) Reading Proust. 
(29) Listening to a story. 
(30) Listening to a ŸŤŤWUŬẂŤŪĚsymphony. 
(31) Hemorising important dates in British history. 
(32) Visiting and assisting old people. 
(33) Visiting a large industrial complex. 
(34) Doing comprehension exercises. 
(35) Learning to speak ŸŲŤŪȘUĦĚ
(36) Discussing your character in a group situation. 
(37) Dissecting dead animals. 
(38) Hri ting a novel. 
(39) Producing a short critical paper for 'Analysis'. 
This list is not meant to be complete. It is sufficient to illustrate 
the sorts of thing that might be called 'educ&.tional situations'. By 
coining this piece of jargon I am not attempting to straddle the VŬŸĚ
called 'task' and 'achievement' senses of the \-rerd education. It is 
usually held that 'achievement' ,..rears the pants. Here the examples 
are viewed from the 'task' 3_spect. It miGht be arglled that none of 
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the cases here is sufficient to allm,j us to talk of a person's being 
educe.ted simply because he has achieved whatever task is fJentioned in 
the particular situation. Perhaps a specific set o:? these exa . 'nples 
would be allo1:led to constitute 'education' in some achievement sense. 
Or an indefinite set? Such a move would cleo.rly be a mistake. Let 
us see why. 
Several of the exaiTc,les in the list fall into oroad groups. (11), 
(12), (17), (32), and (33) form a ŇŲŬẀŸGWĚ as do (15), (18), (23) and 
(38), again, (16), (26) and (37). The first group might be considered 
Vlith the required use of 'and so on' to constitute Social Education, 
the second Aesthetic Education, and the last Group 'Scientific 3ducation'. 
A coamon factor could ŮŤŲUŠŮŸĚbe -oroduced for each group, and in 
instance belonging to another group that factor may be present 'out the 
focus "lOuld be on sone other common element. Thus v:e VJould have a 
nehlOrk of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing. This would 
involve similarities of detail i.e. going to a particular Cathedral, 
and overall similarities such as 'increasing one's knmeiledge'. This 
latter overall similarity would drop out in particular cases such as 
the broadly creative instances (23), (37), etc. 
Vould this consti tu te a 'family ŲŤVŤŲŸŞŨĿĨŪȘŤGĚ approach to the 
concept of education? It seems to fit in '.-Ii th :Dambrough' s interpret-
ation. He argue;,; that it is not just a poor joke but an important 
philosophical insight vrhen it is realised, to apply his argument to 
our case, that cases of education have nothing in common other than 
the fact that they are cases of educc-,_tion. Likevlise our 'educational 
situations' have nothing in cormnon other than being ca':'es of 'education 
situations'. Is there no more to this than, as Peters never tires of 
pointing out, the term 'education' is not associated "'i th any particular 
sort of acti vi ty or process? As 10Je have seen, to propose that 
'education' pick.s out some subset of acti vi ties or ŸŸŲŬȘŤVVŤVĚwould be 
to make exactly the sort of mistake that Iii ttgenstein was criticising 
when he introduced his metaphor. 1'le would be treating 'education' as 
if it had meaning because it referred in some sense to an 'object'. 
But from our discussion in Chapter Three it will be obvious th2l_t tbis 
is an inappropriate and r.lisleadi::1g r{:ove, out w':, are pressing the metaphor 
into service precisely to see hO'.lI far the search for a coemon element 
can go. These 'educational situations' merely provide us ;.-ji th raaterial 
to test the v·Jrious types of ' criteria' thot have been put forward. 
For example h'e could test the suggestion that He can produce general 
criteria in the way advocated in Peters' earlier writings. In the 
sense that there are 'intuitive' criteria such as 'education is 
something th",t we consciously contrive'. This ,,,ould allow S0r.18 of 
the instances .given above to be called 'educational', for example 
(8) and (26) and (27) which involve such contrivance but not others. 
And there are also the criteria produced by analysis such as 'kno,·Jledge' 
and 'value'. As we have seen some of these criteria are met by some 
examples (10) and (14) ŲŤVŸŔŊŤȘWÙẂŤŨXHĚ but not by others i.e. (24). How 
could '\Jorking in a factory' be educational accordin:; to these criteria? 
Applying them means th,d such exauples r.1ore properly come under the 
rubric of 'training'. 
ŘŸGUŠWĚ is im)ortant, then, is that despite the application of criteria 
there appears to be no criterion that meets all or even most of these 
'educ&tional situations'. Perhaps it may be argued that this is because 
Peters' distinction between the srecific and general concept is being 
ignored. The general concert is a catch all that includes anything 
that doesn't meet the requisite criteria. But this distinction is purely 
arbi trary. John Eanlaker has ŠWWŤŸŊÍJŮWŤTĚ to derive four 'concepts' of 
education from it. He distinguishes 1rlhether a term is 'value-loeded', 
suggesting a.:9I)roval or disap}Jroval, from Peters' notion of 'desirability' 
which suggests straightforward posi ti ve approval or lJrescription. He 
sums up the possibilities in c. c.iagram (See Jiagram 1). 
Diagram 1 
value-loaded 
B 
value-loaded 
Generalised 
Concent 
Generalised 
A 
, 
o 
. 
.0 
• 
• 
• 
value-neutral 
Generalised 
Concept 
• 
• 
• 
• 
ŸĚ
• 
• ŸĚ
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
value-neutral 
D 
value-loaded 
.' §pecific Concept 
Specific 
C 
value-neutral 
,specific Concept 
Peters, according to Ear1:laker, noes not distinguish clearly between the 
form an.)_ the content of educc'.tion. Unlic:e Peters he wishes only to 
shmv the kinds of mee_ning the cOl'J.ce-ot can have. He is not concerned 
wi th the ÙŪWVŲŤVWÙŪŸĴĚbusiness of gi vine:; it any particular content like 
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Peters' GXŸŬŴŨŤTŦŤĚ in depth and bre8_dth'. The diagram reads thus. 
'A' refers to any :process of rearing in a neutral fashion as ,'fhen we 
talk vaguely an.d loosely about 'Education in China'. 'B' refers to 
a use of educe.tion which equates it crudely with learning. It ignores 
the need to define '/[hat it considers valuable in any satisfactory 'day. 
'c' covers a 1')recise but neutral use of the term as when 'fIe tal7;{ of 
'Primary ŸTẀȘŠWÙŬŪGĦĚ 'D' is 'much more difficult to illustrate by 
eXaJ11_ple' • ( 2) It is a use Hhich suggests that ths terr.1 'education' is 
expressive and emotive one Hhich is defined idiosyncratically. In 
other -,1[ords, we all have different ideas about "[hat education is. 
Peters' concept belongs to this fourth category as would the views of 
those ",ho want to reject education altogether. Illich occasionally 
takes_up a position like the latter. 
The character of this analysis is interesting. It is held to be 
purely formal.. ŸUŲŬẀŇUŬẀWĚ the article E?..J't'laker does not reflect on 
the 'content' of education in any systems_tic or detailed way. ŸUÙVĚ
is not the business of 'conceptual analysis'. Peters' twofold 
distinction (re9resented by the broken diagonal line) is arbitrary in 
the sense that it is only one of many ways in which the concept of 
education com become more clearly specified. By not distingui,shing 
sufficiently between form and content and involving himself in lengthy 
discussions of content Peters' 'narro,vs down' rather than 'tightens up' 
the concept. The concept can be made more specific while still being 
broad in scope. EarwaJcer' s four-fold distinction does seem to clear 
up in sympathetic way some problems with Peters' analysis, such as the 
suggestion that he is prescribing a concept. But is it any less 
arbitrary? Although it would be natural to see it as a classification 
of four types of 'usage' NŠŲGËŨŠŸĤĤȘŤŲĚ states quite clearly that 'A', '13', 
'C', and 'D' are not vie\vs of education but different concepts. 
Admittedly 'Concept' is a vague concept. But there are serious problems 
in Eartl!akers use of it. He often WŠŨŸĤĤȘVĚ of 'the concept of education', 
he distinguishes on a purely formal basis between four concepts, and 
yet he suggests that there can be many alternative concepts in sense 
'D'. This seeminGly paradoxical picture can be cleared up if we 
consider the first reference to be a meta-level reference to actual 
uses of the concept, and the third reference to bring in the more 
ÙŪWŤŲŤVWÙŪŸĚouestion of 'content'. ŸUÙVĚwould leave us with two tests 
of the four-fold classification. The first ",ould involve showing that 
these are the concepts "ie ,\fork with. The second test woulQ be to show 
th3.t it did assist in the job of ȘŬŪȘŤŸĞWẀŠŨĚanalysis, that is, that it 
could clee,l' up what appeared to be substantial confusions by showing 
that they were merely er"-"ors due to the assimilation of the different 
forms of concept. 
The problem v,e are considering is ho,,! far the 'family resemblance' 
treatment of the concept could be said merely to ignore the distinctions 
presented in the diagram and gets its force by oscillating between the 
various sorts of concept. Let us ta.ke literally the suggestion that a 
concept, and hence the concept of a concept, is a picture with \-lhich 
He compare things. i:/e C2.n visualise the 'family resemblance' notion 
as a fine web and the diaGram overleaf imposed upon it with no difficulty. 
The question lc!e [lust ask is whether Eari,jaker' s suggested set of distinctions 
isn't just a case of the sort of move that led to 1.Ii ttgenstein' s remark 
that when vIe try to dra1:1 such clear boundaries on such concepts then 
anything and nothing is right. This problem is set by the first test. 
The analysis is produced on the basis of intuition about Hhat a consensus 
(Ear\vaker's replacement for necessary conditions) vie"'l of our concept(s) 
of education are. Let us replace this procedu:::-e "lith a consideration 
of e!X:8lTIples. If vie start "lith those given as illustrations of these 
four conce:pts \ve shall see that things are not as sim'Jle as Zarwa!:l:er 
suggests. 
Ear\vaker's examples 'Education in the U.S .A.. ' ; 'Education ••• is 
roughly equated Hith learning'; 'Primary Education'; and ':Dducation 
implies Im01dJ.2c:.c;e and understaLding in depth CL1'1d bre2.dth' are somewhat 
strrulge. For these to approach ŸŸXWUÙŪŦĚlike the status of concepts 
they would have to have clear usage. But ŴŸŖŠWĚ sort of utterance are 
his examples of 'A' and , .rq V • The two ŤẄŠŪŨŸĞŨŤVĚ given are only semi-
complete. The cases ,,'here we might want to talk in a neutral ';Jay of 
'Zducation in the U.S .,',.' ars highly sophisticated and complicated. On 
:2:arHaker's Giill ru1alogy with 'culture' the cases he is thinking of 
Hould occur in textbooks of a scientistic social anthropology. In such 
cases objective reference Hould be made to all the rearing processes 
of a ȘẀŨŸŌŲŤĦĚ Other uses could possibly be found in Tourist Guides to 
various countries or in Heports l)y U .N.E.S.C.O. a:::1d siTIlilar ':lodies. 
Similarly cases of type 'C' are found most commonly in acader::ic and 
governmental re)orts. So this sense of being neutral as to value but 
content-specific is not really a sense at all. For here we are talking 
about labels put upon institutions. 'vJhat does it r;lean to say that such 
a phrase has no built-in evaluation? Evaluation is not built into a 
term but into the surroundings L'l \-Jhich it is usc:d. Consider these 
actual exan11Jles of 'A' in full statements: 
(40) There must be SO[le education in the U.S.A. ! 
(41) Chapter Three discusses 'Education L'1 China'; 
Chapter Four discusses 'Education in the u.S.) •• ' 
and so on. 
(42) '='here is nothing that ca.']. be called education 
in the U.S.I,. 
(L1-3) Schooling is not the most iDportant form of 
education in the ǾĦŐĦŸŘĦĚ
(44) No one values education in the U.S • .'>.. 
Except for (40) and (41) all these utterances in ,;,hich the phrase 
'education in the U.S.A.' occur.s are ezar:rDles of uses of ty;?e 'D'. 
Reference is being made to a specific concept. (40) appears to be 
the nearest 1:1e can get to an 'unsophisticated' use of the term. A 
'sophisticated' use is given in (41). It is ŸŬVVÙŞŨŤĚ to imagine 
someone uttering (40) in a debate with the sort of person vlho would 
utter (42) and (411'). Therefore it too a:opears to be a very so;?histicated 
res]Jonse. Zarwaker suspects that we rarely talk as vaguely as this. I 
would suggest that 'de hardly ever do and that here we have a very 
esoteric use of the tero 'education'. 
Cases of type leI are eve:J. more puzzling. In a footnote (3 ) Aspin 
expresses ȘŬŪȘŤŨŸŪĚ that Earwaker is not just using 'education' as a 
synonym for schooling. '::'here is a lot in this suggestion in that it 
dra\'I,s our attention to the fact that reference is made in all these 
examples to some institution or institutionalised form of bringing up 
young pe0ple. Hence such uses seer.1S to ho.ve a specific social reference. 
Ear'\vaker argues that it Sir:l;?ly doesn't rDo.tter that the people who talk 
of 'Comprehensive Education' criticise or praise it. For the term has 
no built-in evaluativ.e content. Thus he saysinanearlier paragraph that 
'Nazi Education' has no built-in evaluative content. But this is not 
because we are dealing '\'Ii th a different concept. Consider the follow-
ing instances of tel: 
(45) As leader of the Nazi party I say that what :3ritain 
needs to be great again is a systero of real Nazi 
Education. 
(46) Education in Germany under Hitler failed because it 
was Nazi Education. 
(47) On educational grounds there can be no such thing as 
Comprehensive :2:duca'cion. 
(48) For convenience ',ie can divide institutionalised forCls 
of education into 'Prireary i:ducation', ',secondary 
Education', '.Special Education', and 'Tertiary Education'. 
(49) The good li:e can ŬŪŸXĚbe built on the basis of a 
spiritually and morally cleansed form of primary education. 
All these uses 0: the phrases mentioned by Eanlaker except (48) iL1ply 
that what is being mentioneo. is of value or other1tIise. On the basis 
of a person's belief He give a phrase positive or negative value. If 
a iJazi talks of Nazi Education He take hin: not to be spec:kinc; descript-
ively out discussing something he values deeply. I may disagree with 
hirr, and say thing.,s like 'Nazi Education is no education at all'. But 
even here the phrase is not neutra.l a:1d descriptive but negatively 
valued. CO:1sensus about Nazis does not change the :act that what we 
have here is a clash of valuec;. The same is true of the other instances. 
i.Ihat Ear,-Iaker is referring to ic; simply the use of ca}ital letters and 
parentheses If a necme is changed, say, Elementary Schooling, becomes 
Prinary Education, or TeG.cher Training becomes 'L
'
eacher Education, a 
re-evaluation not a re-description has taken place. Thereafter, because 
of the existence of those institutio:1s we use labels which reflect this 
change but they function rather like book titles. Once we call a novel 
'The Brothers Kararilazov' vIe do not create a new concept of say 'Brothers'. 
Arguments could De produced to sho'd that ,ve had done so. If we tal-;:e 
the equivalence 'brothers' = 'm3.le siblings' we find this is no longer 
true: 
(50) The Brothers Karanazov is :Jostoyevsky's ::;reatest Hork 
(51) The Hale Siblings KararGazov is Dostoyevsl-;:y' s greatest work 
One of these assertions is true and the ot;1er false. The point is that 
the use of the term 'education' in parenthesis is not the creation of a 
new concept but a frozen concept. The use of parentheses indicates 
this fact. 
To conclude. Both these 'neutral' examples are very sophisticated 
uses of the terl'2 'education'. In the case of 'A' ,-Ie have esoteric and 
sublimated use of the term. In the case of 'C' l:Ie have nothing that 
is different in any real way from 'B' or ':st. So vIe are left \vith 'B' 
and 'D'. These differ onl;y in that concepts of type 'D' are supposedly 
more specific o This, of course, raises the fundamental questj_on that 
is being posed. in various Hays WUŲŬẀŸUŬẀWĚ this thesis. Earwaker 
distinguishes the two by suggesting that concepts of type 'B' are not 
sufficiently defined. l,jhat is beinz suggested in this thesis is that 
al though definition may clC:crify a concept, it is not the only way of 
proceeding 'I!i th conce:cJtual clarification. If our concept of education 
vIere vague \-Ihat would be achieveC'. by a 1)rocess of definition? Something 
rather like parody? Perhaps it Vlould be possible to proceed by 
examples. But concepts of tY:ge 'D' are definitions ,·:hich embody our 
theories about education. 'J:'he relation of such 'definitions' to 
exam;:Jles will be discussed later in this Chapter. ijihat is inmortant 
now is to notice that the only distinction we are left with is that 
between a concept which is vague and one ,"[hich has been given a 
definition. The distinction sirrliJly being that in cases of concepts 
of type ':0' a definition has been given, whereas, none are given in 
cases of type ,n, D • AcceptiEg this as true, it i·Till be my contention 
in the balance of this thesis that ,ve can have a much clearer idea of 
what 'education' is, or what someone's concept of education is, where 
they proceed by exar.'.lJles &no. not by definition, ir:1por-cant as definition 
sometimes is. 
Despite all these objections it might be i3..rE;ued that Eal"v{aker' s 
four-fold distinction may have uses in clearing up siople misunderstand-
ings. Thus if 1:Je except the fact that there are difficulties in Earwaker' s 
it can still be applied usefully. It is a useful 'day of viewing the 
family resemblance web. ITo doubt this could be true but Ul1.fortunately 
it is not. Earwaker proves this himself. At the end of his paper he 
gives all. examnle of ho';{ analysing 'education' in this Hay can dissolve 
confusion. He suggests that student who ar[;u.'2s thi3.t 'Education is 
socialisation' is guilty of conceptual confusion if he thinks that 
this ŸŸVŴŤŲVĚ the question about the needs of the individual vis a vis 
society. This is only a partial description (Sense A?) and not a 
prescription (Sense B?). Once he sees this he vrill no longer feel there 
is a conflict behleen his psychology, sociology and philosophy tutors. 
There is no real disa(,;reement. Conceptual analysis dispells the illusion. 
But does it? ŐẀŸŮŬVŤĚ the student had been reading ĿŲẀŸŤVUŬWWĚ and far 
from agreeing with him that the gradus.l re:rJlacing of 'education' by 
'socialisation' is a bad thing wishes to precipitate the process of 
change. He 1:lould therefore be prescribing;. Perhaps Sarivaker i-TOuld 
"'ish to use conceptual analysis to shmv that Oakeshott is guilty of 
conceptual confusion? But Cakesbott or the student need not merely 
be mixing disciplines. Something very import,mt could be being argued 
by the student Eari-Jal-:er TÙVŸGĞŠŲŠŦŤVĦĚ The example is so thin and 
ambiguous that a variety of pa-rallel situations can be described. The 
problem of the 'ambiguity' of the term 'eclucation' is not a function 
of the terms vagueness, :':or that does not stop it being usable. (4) 
Rather it is a function of the indet2rminacy of the examples given. 
Too often He get 'exam.ples' Hhich are ambiguous in the sense that they 
su:,?port various interpret'J.t::_ons until ",Ie kno1:! more of the context in 
1rThich they are utteTed. Their disambiguation 1rlill be achieved not by 
the imposition of arbitrary distinctions but by findinG determinate 
examples. 
Ear1;raker's distinction seemed less arbitrary tha:::. Peters' merely 
because it seemed to cover more possibilities. \ihen looked into it 
reduced th2 ariJi tra.ry dichotomy he started. from. The distinctions 
had little obvious a;l:?lication. ŸẀWĚ before lei.?ving the topic let us 
de:cive 811 objection to our 'family re,se:ilblance' proceduY'e ŤẄŤÜJŸŊŨÙȚÙŤTĚ
in (8) - (39) out of concept 'B'. ':::hi,s i,s that vlll.f;ue but positively 
v21lJ.ed ,senS'2 in l1hich any proces': of learning can be referred. to as 
'education' • It might be sUb6ested th2.t although the list of 'educational 
si tuations' is presented in such 2, way 3.S to sus;est that there is no 
comnon element.that these situations must atleast involve 'learning'. 
Here is a :Jrima facie coomon element. Thus it could be sug§;ested that 
like some educationalists 1:iha.t is being arcued fOl' in this thesis is 
just a more subtle version of this loose coomon usage. 
4.2. Learning and F.s-pect Change 
ÙŸŲŤĚ can agree to SOLle extent ,Ji th Peters that 'education' does 
indeed 'imply some kind of learning'. (5) t,lhat is not so clear is that 
in this instCl.nce he is distin;llishing 'education' frOEl ',schooling' or 
merely equivocating between his hro concepts. ŸŬĚdiscuss the suggestion 
that r,1Y exanples all involve learning 1Je need a better characterisation 
of the connection betvTeen the two concepts. The only philosopher to 
provide a reasonable characterisation of this vie\\f is Langford. It is 
,\forth considering his notion of education in depth as a.'1 example of 
how all such putative 'common' features CCln be dea.lt 1-lith. 
Langford says that a major point 0:::" difference from the analysis 
of education given by Hirst and Peters and his own is that he 'dra\'ls 
attention to the connection behreen education and learning '. (6) They 
seem to 'Tely on the notions of "initiation" (into Horthwhile activities) 
and (personal) "dell€lopmenttl. irLea.rning" enters into their account only 
1t!hen they begin to talk about teaching.' (7) Langford Hishes to defend 
a definition of 'to be educated' 2.S 'to learn to be a person'.(S) He 
does allo1t!, however, that this definition is merely the occasion for 
discussing the conceyts of a 'person' and 'learning' 1:Thich 'are surely 
of central import3.nce for the ]::Jhilosophy of education.' (9) He does 
admit to doubts about the process of definition, 'dhich he suggests may 
be radically defective. (10) 1.ihat tve "rill be concerned vTith is the 
veracity of Langforo.'s 'definition' as far as it develops the 
suggestion that there is an essential cO:'lnection between 'education' 
and 'learning'. 
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Langford malces five points a.bou t the concept of learnL1.g as it 
re13.tes to that of educC:'.tion. Firstly, he says 'Learning is a 
. (11 ) 
psycholog1.cal COncelJt.' Secondly, that 'L8c.Tning is a temporal 
( 12) process involving a change in the learner'. Thirdly, that this 
change must 'be a change connectec ':Jith the person as a functioning 
living organism, or person.,(1 3) Fourthly, 'Learning involves 
. (14) 
restrictions on the vlay the chan,s'e 1.S brought about.' It 'must 
. (15) be a consequence of the learner's past exper1.ence', and not, for 
insta:.'lce, of drugs. Fil:.ally, Langford tells us that 'the concept of 
learnL'lg is an epistemological one.' (16) The;::;e points GĒŸØÙŨŨĚ be 
developed later, but 2. ;:o-eneral renark 2.bout IJangford's procedure needs 
to be made at the outset. 
He is engaginE;, ŨÙŸȘŤĚ Peters and 3ar\1aker, in 'conceptual analysis'. 
As He have seen this process involves giving ",hat are knm-ffi as 'weak' 
defini tion,s. The point is vlell made by Langford's characterisation of 
education, or by his treatment of the concept of learning. Such 
defini tions are usually so Vel"y ·,·Jeak that it is easy to agree 11li th Fred 
Inglis when he says that 'In :oractising this style of thouGht, the 
philosophers do their considerc1.ble bit to make ŸHÍÌŲŤĚ trivial the study 
of education'. (17) i.Ie R11all call thi.s the char:::;e of 'tri vialisation' • 
The VẀŸĞVWŠŸÍȘŤĚ of the ch3.r6 e is that philosophers who engage in conceptual 
analysis ' ••• do not c.escribe the 'dorld sufficiently. '2hey deprive the 
1 ' f' +- h' t ., 1 ,. 1 .. ,( 18) T t th' wor a 0 ÍĦŸVĚ ::'.s ory, 1.0.00 ogy, ano SOCL' or1.g1.ns. 0 pu 1.S 
in Hi ttgensteinian jargon they if;nore the lanry2..ge game, the ",hole 
culture in ',-Thich a concept has a use. This trivialisation does not 
merely result in them :presenting ȘŸŤȚÙŪÙĚtions uhich tell us what we knoH 
in even mOl'e comoonplace end p12.ti tudinous form 3.fter each refinement. 
It also results in the givinr; of uninteresting and unillmlinating, 
even if clever, examples. Langford's is a case 1.n point. The section 
of his paper l;j'lich is devoted to the discussion of 'learning' revolves 
round the ,sin2:le exanr:)le of le3.:cning about the toads that live in Lake 
ŸGÙĚticaca. It is hard to see, Ul11ess Langford is adopting the crudest 
form of ,tulgar essentialisc, how suc!', a case C8.n be brcught to bear on 
learninz to be a persorc. The ĴGGÙÕWŨŤŸËĚ of Hhat He c;;:.ll 'learning' is 
probably unsurp2.ssed. Le:?rning facts Cl.bout ȚŲŬŇJĿŸĚ and toads is one sort 
of learninG'. But there eTC other sorts; learning to cook, learninE; to 
:;Jlay gal!:es, learning to C':=IJl'ecia':" art, music, painting, learnin,; to 
love one's felloH man, lC9.j-:l.inc; to love God, an endless series of 
possibilities. It is very hard to see Hhat, if 3nythin:.;-, such cases 
of 'learning' could be said to h:,:v8 i!1. caDman. This is a central issue. 
If a cor%1.on element is extracted as a vJay of rejecting a 'fBIGily 
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res err:bla."'1c e 'interpretation. It com then be asl:ed what do all these 
cases have in CODmon. Lool: and see. ŸŸẀÙĚt e generally the question 
can be c_sked of any ŐẀŮŸŊŬVŤTŨXĚco,m:J:_n element.,]hat is common to 
have in common. ŸUÙVĚ ene_bles us to re-i terate a quite general point 
about the 'faoily resemblance' ÜŤWŠŮUŬJĦŸĦĚ If any common element 'x' 
is extracted as a \-lay of rejecting a 'faElily resen-blance' approach 
to a concept 1:Ie can raise the doubt e_gs_in. ŸĒUŠWĚ do all cases of 'x' 
have in cot'lmon'i' AnCl if He look and see and find a ĿÕŸŨÙÒËÕŪĚ element 'y' 
we can as]: again: 'iJhat do all cases of 'y' have in cODmon?'. This 
regress could be calleo ?:hatchadourian' s regress as it follm-lS fron: 
his remarks about the applicatj_on of the msta:Jhor to exactly such 
ȘŬÜŸŨÙȘŠWŤTĚ 'psychological effects'. iJhat the regress shows is that 
such common factors cannot provide the unity that is sought. 
ŸUŤĚ charge of trivialisation is not to be seen as trivial but 
harll:less. The ch2.rge is that by ignoring the uhole culture in 1:Jhich 
a concept is applied and attenmtint; to give a neutral and logical 
analysis of the conce-ots that interest them these philosophers 
chronically mis-desenbe these concepts. .Specifically it is the argument 
of this thesis that the concept of education has been chronically mis-
described. 
The list of 'educational situations' is inadequate in that they 
are in no sense fully described. Nothinr; ŠŸĒĞŮŤĚars there thc_t might 
not appear on the syll&bus of an 11-16 cODprehensive school. Yet 
some of them, (12) (23), (30), (36) and (38) for instance, need not 
necessarily have an element which can be called 'learning'. This 
point is going to be misunoerstood unless 'de look at examples vrhich 
have, as it Here, a history, an ideology and a socia_I basis. Two 
examples from Ii ter2_tu:::-'c Hill suffice for the present. 
ŸUŤĚ follm"ing exanples are meant to be counter-examples to the dogma 
that 'learning' is a necessary conciition of 'education'. 
In 'l'olstoy's i.lar and Peace there is a scene in Hhich Prince 
Andrey visits the .?ostovs at Otradnoe. ',!hilst there he hears the younG" 
girls, Sonya a::ld ŸŊŠWŠVUŠHĚ playing and singing. At night he over-hears 
their chatter a-bout the moonlit sky. He stays only for that night but 
because of the girls falls asleep 
. t h- -'- t ŸĚ . d' (19) In 0 lS OHn VŸŠĚe 01 nnn • 
'fee1ins incapa'Jle of seeing clearly 
On the surface there ŠŸĞŮŤŠŲVĚ to be 
nothing sducationa1 about this everyc.2_y domestic experience. HOVl 
consider the context in which it occurs. SinCe the cieath of his \rife 
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Andrey has lived in the country. He feels that his meaningful life is 
over. This is brought out in a vivid incident in a birch forest in 
the Ryazan district which he visits prior to Otradnoe. Driving through 
the spring forest Andrey sees an old oak which has in his eyes refused 
to send out any shoots in protest against the meaningless cheat of 
GŐŸŲÙŪŦĚand love and UŠŸŮÙŪŤVVGĦĚ Andrey found himself spiritually 
akin to this oak: 
'Yes, he's right, a thousand times right, the old oak 0.' 
others, young creatures, iliay be ȘŠẀŦŸWĚŸŤŴĚby thaC20 ) deception, but \;Te know life: - our llfe lS over'. 
The passage is he9vily ironic and reveals the almost ÜŤŨŬTŲŠHŚŸŠWÙȘĚ and 
bathetic state of self deception that Andrey has placed himself in. 
Previously Andrey had besn light hearted and thoughtless but the oak 
produces quite a change in hiD. It is clear to the reader that he 
has not been leadin,g an empty life at least in public. He has ordered 
his estates and freed his serfs. He is engaged in writing several 
books. It is this clear headed Andrey who is tralcsformed into someone 
who doesn't know his own thouGhts after one evening at the :?ostovs. 
However, the effects of thet evening first become ap)arent when he 
passes the oak that was his spiritual double. The oak has undergone 
a metamor-'Jhosis: 
'The old oak utterly transformed draped in a tent of 
sappy dark green basked faintly, undulating in the 
rays of the evening sun.' (21) 
This again stirs his thoughts: 
'No life is not over at thirty-one ••• It's not enough 
for me to know all there is in me, everyone must know 
it too; Pierre and the girl who wanted to £'ly alr,ay into 
the sky; everyone must knmoJ me so that Dy life may not 
be spent only on r:1yself; they must not live so apart 
from my life, it must be reflected in all of them and 
they Dust all share my life 'di th me. I (22) 
This incident is not merely the first stirring of Andrey's love for 
Natasha. At this point he can hardly remember hsr name. It is the 
expression of a fundamental change in outlook. lindrey' s view of the 
world his Veltanschauung has changed. Or rather, to him the ĤŸŊŬŲŨTĚ
has cllanced. The isolated introverted Andrey becomes decisive and 
moves again into public life. 
1')y second exar.1ple also COLles froD Tolstoy. This time it concerns 
Levin in Anna Karenin. Tm·!ards the very end of the book Levin is going 
through a crisis. He reads the works of many philosophers including 
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Plato, =-caJ.1.t, Schelling, Hegel, Spinoza and Schopenhauer. But when he 
turned from their 'fixed definitions' to life all their systems 'fell 
to -pieces at once like a house of cards.' The works of theologians 
fall apart likel·rise when he discovers that the writings of different 
fai ths are inconsistent. Levin's educational experiel1.ce arises out 
of this intellectual turEloil. -Uhen \.,rorking 1,rri th the peasarlt F;'lodor, 
Levin discusses the other peasants 1,rlith hiffi. Fyodor comments: 
'Oh, well, of course, ŸŬŨÛVĚare different. One man lives 
for his own wants and nothing else, like IJi tuh; he only 
thirL1<::s of filling his belly, but Fokanitch is a righteous 
man. He lives for his soul. He does not forget (;od.' (23) 
Levin debates the rationality of this VŤŤŸÙŪŦŨXĚincompatible pair of 
propositions about ho\'! to live. The first he finds rational a 
conclusion dictated by reason. Thefficond he finds irrational but 
true. This hits hir.l '!/i th the force of a discovery: 
':.Jhat is it that makes me glad? i,'ihat have I discovered? ••• 
I have discovered nothing. I have only found out 1.rThat I 
knew. I understand the ::orce that in the past gave me life, 
and nm" too gives me life.' (24) 
Levin's struggle is a religious one. His doubts are resolved by the 
plati tudinous murmurings of a peasant. By the stater.lent of things he 
already knows. 
These exanroles give us sufficient ¢aterial \"ith which to discuss 
Langford's notion of 1 earning. HOvJever, not all the elements which 
he lists as characterising learning are important or distinct from 
one another. The first point th2_t GŨŤŠŸŸŪÙŪŦGĚ is a 'psychologi cal 
concept' need not trouble us. There are many things that are 
instances of learning \1hich are not in any sense psychological such 
as learning to ride a bike. This condition seems to be simply inapprop-
riate. It is also dangerous in that it sounds like 'Learning is a 
concept of psychology' Hhich could evoke misuncierstandings. 'l.'he other 
conditions are Elore apposite. The second condition suggests that 
learning happens over a time B.nd i:tvol ves a change in the learner as 
'a f1.<nctioning living organism or person'. ŸUÙHGĨĚ condition is meant to 
reject certain changes such as grm.,ring a,11.other ear. I have run three 
and two together for \'Jithout the qualification of the third point, 
growing an extra ear could be considered a change over a period of time. 
Similarly, the fourth point can be seen mersly as a further restriction 
on the seconci. Yet it is possible to iElagine someone's ŦŠÙŪÙŸŦĚ
knowledge through J.ruGs, or an ability of ' ŸŬŲWVĚwhi ch '!Ie might allow 
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as a case of le9.rning. Fe could imagine a continuum of cases starting 
'vi th lecture,,:, and practice with an adf.1ixture of drugs, to cases 
involving greater and greater amounts of drugs until the lectures 
are unnecess2.ry. \!e micsht be hard nut to knmv ,,,hat was learning and 
what not. However, vIe can accept this point for the purposes of this 
essay. Langford's final condition must be left to stand. Therefore, 
there are really only two meaningful conditions of learning. First 
that a change takes place in a person over a period of tiDe and that 
change is subject to some restrictions. Secondly, that change involves 
an increase in knowledge. i.Jhat I ,'rant to show is that my cases are 
clear counter-exaJTIples to this notion of learning and yet are clear 
instances of 'education'. For the moment I am not going to argue this 
latter noint but lClerely to assume the truth of it. I will discuss it 
belo",. 
Langford suggests that the episte:nological condition is very 
important. Normally one counter example is enough to sholti that a 
condi tion is not met and is therefore invalid. Here we have tvJO 
examnles in which the epistemological condition is denied. For in both 
cases nothing new is learnt. :[\:0 nevI fa.cts are pre:':,ented to the 
protagonists. iTo ne" experience is unc.ergone. .Al though this is 
explici tly brought out in the Levin example vlhers he actually denies 
that he has gained any ne,v knmlledce, it is also true of Prince 
Andrey. He has heard the chatter of girls before, seen oak trees COf.1e 
into leaf suddenly, been restless, seen beautifu.l moonlit nights etc. 
'dhat hap2:')ens is not new and he gains no ne", ÛŪŬŴŨŤTŸĴŤĚbut everything 
is differento It seerns tlierefore tbat these two examples of education 
have no connection with the Langfordian concept of 'learning'. There 
is, hOlI/ever, another possibility here. ',}e could have hvo examples of 
non-Langfordian learning. In an article on 'Human Learning' (25) Hrunlyn 
mentions an objection to his associating 'learninG' and 'knm/ledge' 
it!hich is sir:iilar to that presented in these examples. ŸUẀVĚ cert2.in 
sorts of learning may not in fact end in knowledge such as learning to 
accept,. learning to appreciate things, learning to see things in ne\v 
ways. Hamlyn suggests that these counter-instances may not involve 
kno'tIledge simpliciter but in some indirect way they must. Besides 
'knowledge can take a great many forms'. (26) This is rather a desper-
ate attempt to stretch the meaning of 'lmowledge' so it covers any case. 
This would be like stretching 'correspondence' until it covered all the 
'truths' mentioned earlier. This is clearly unsatisfactory for our 
purposes. ŨØŬŪĤÒŠŪŸȚŬŲTÙŠŪĚkno"lledge presents a challenge. He can deal 
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wi th it in bvo 1"lays, 1.ie can show th2.t VIe have herr:: an instance of 
anothe:!:' family reseclbls.nc2 concept, or ile can dispute the claim that 
these are cases of learning in this neVI and unspecified sense. The 
former move has no further implication, the latter has several. The 
cases mentioned above have to be shovll1 firstly to be quite different 
from my examples, and secondly an account has to be given of my 
examples. There is a clear difference. In the cases mentioned above 
the very use of the tere 'learning' sUGgests Lal'lgford's other criterion 
that of change over a perioc. of time. ŸĒŅÙĚth the examples from Tolstoy 
what hap:;:>ens ha:Jpens very quickly. Learning to see things differently 
suggests a lengUJY faltering process. This is not ill'iplied in my 
examples. Before elaborating this point in giving an account of \"That 
happens in my examples let us look at the other criterion. 
In the case of Frince Andrey there is change, certainly, but it 
is change which is divorced from the knol'lledge condition. Change like 
'learning' is a family of different things. Hot all chant;es involve 
learning something. ŸUŬẀŦUĚaccording to Langford, the reverse is 
necessary. Pi clear examnle of a case of learning \'lhich involves a 
change is that of Austin's Emma. Emma throuGh various hard knocks and 
the guidal'lce of the 'all-\"ise' Iir Knightly cane to be a better person. 
Thi,s chB.nge is very diffj.cul t to c1ark. Peonle are led to believe that 
Emma '/Jill go on making- the SaY;le sort of mistaken jUdgements even after 
the end of the novel. l)hat constitutes change is different in every 
case. In Andrey's case the change occurs later. First there is a change 
in mood, follmvec1 by changes in behaviour. So there are many different 
cases. But the Levin example is completely TÒŸȚŤŲŤŪWĦĚ Here there is 
no change in Levin and he feels this paradox deeply. He resolves because 
of his reflections on r;,vodor' s rema:!:'ks that he .!ill not be the same 
again. In particul2.r he resolves not to argue with his brother. But 
he is no sooner with his brother than he behaves as usual.(27 ) Thus 
Levin is unchanged, and must be, for that is part of what he sees. 
He have seen that there are Grounds for challenging the two 
conditions laid dO"ll1 by Langford. To avoid the suggestion that we can, 
nevertheless, describe these cases ŬŸĚ learning I wish to offer a more 
illuminating description of what occurs in each case. To do so I wish 
. . . (28) 
to nursue ths questJ.on of 1vhether they are lnstances of educatlon. 
The notion of an 'aspect change' is c3.eveloped "lith the help of an 
analogy 1:li th certain illustrations found in textbooks of Gestalt 
psychology. 'I'he Dost fal'1iliar of then is the 'duck-rabbit'. (Fig. 1) 
: I 
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'Aspect-Change' Illustrations 
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
Someone may see this only 2,S a duel: (or a rabbit). The irrrrXlrcant thing 
is th2_t this I continuous seeing I can end and the duck is suddenly seen 
as a rabbit as well. T"ii tt[;enstein calls this the I dm"Tning of an aspect I, 
a_nd tells us that the I flashing of a.."l ŠVŸŤȘWĚon us seeE1S half visual 
experience, half thought.' (:C'.I. II. S. xi p.117) Uittgenstein is 
careful to distinguish two uses 0= 'see' that are Felevant to aspect 
change. The first use is illustrated 'Ii th a brief dialogue: I "'Vlhat 
do you see there?" "I see thisl' ĜŠŪȘŸĚ then a description a drm-ling a 
copy).' (P.I. II s. xi p.193).The secoC1d sort of seeing i,s that 
involved in 'seeing a likeness behleen bJO faces'. In the latter case 
the two faces are clearly visible to all. It \'iill not create too much 
confusion to co_II the first sort 'perceptual I seeing anci the second 
I cOl1ceptual' seeing. _le are interestsJ in the latter, ŠŸŨȘĨĦĚ the v!ay in 
\'Thich He C2.l1 illuminate cOY'.cepts by considering the Gestalt diagrams. 
',1e are not interested in 1:Jr,at causes us to see one picture one 'ila:! 
rather than another, "lhich li:ight be pressure on the eyeball. The 
gellere.l pro'olem ;Josecl by such pictures is In the case of the 
man who sees ?ig. 1 as a duck and the ŸŠŪĚwho sees it as a rabbit, the 
pictorial elemect is the same. Asked to draw what they see, both men, 
being competent draftsE":8n, Tdould produce the ĨŠJĦŸŤĚ diagram. Similarly 
if 2, ma:::l eire'v! the diagram befoFe and after the TŠĤHÜÙŪŸĚ 0-; trLe second 
ŠVĴJĞŤȘGŸĚ he Houlc1 drm! the san'e series of lines. Though the change' night 
be described as perceptual the visual element has not chan_ged. HOld can 
this siri;ple ŠËĦŨŠŨŬŦŸØĚ illumin2,te buma!I conce"Jtualisation? 
Hanson presents the ȚŬŨŨÕŘGŊÙŸŦĚ exar:iple. Tycho :Drahe and Kepler 
are, let us ioagine, watching the sun rise. Kepler has a heliocentric, 
Tycho a geocentric concept of planet3.r7 notion, or rather, celestial 
motion. The question is I Do they see the sar:1e thing? I If asked to dra'tl 
",hat they sa,v they Hould produce a :::>icture of 'a brilliant yellow disc 
cel:tred betvleen creen and iJlue colour patches.' (29) A common suggestion 
is that the difference must lie in their ŲŤVŸĞŤȘWÙĚ'Ie interpret2.tions of 
this ohservational data. 'lhis is siLlply untrue. Consider the second 
G,estalt figure (Fig. 3). ',Ie do not just see these lines and then int-
erpret thee) as a young or ail old '.-lOman. 1Je just see it one 11ay or the 
other. 1'ie are aI"rare of no act of interpTetation. Interpretation has 
a clear meaning and it is precisely in contrast_to this sort of 
'Eurej;:a
' 
,situation th2.t interpretation 6'ets its meaning. Yet, it is 
true that .. sorJeone Hho sees this as an ŬŨȘŸĚ "JO[1an sees sO::1ething different 
from sO(J:eone ,-Tho sees it as a young Girl. If 1:!e can account ȚÕŨŸĚ this 
then \'!2 Hill go some way to solving the probleu of hm"' Tycho aLd Kepler 
can see something which is the sane and different. 1,!e will also begin 
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to unterstand what it is that is different in the cases of Levin and 
Andrey although nothin6 i,a chanzed. The:, both see the sa':le, yet see 
it differe:!2tly. This leads to subsequent changes in Andrey's behaviour 
but not in Levin's. 
Now consider Fig. 3 and 7ig. u,-. Fig 3 is a 'duck-antelope' a var-
iant of Fig. 1. No one \'lho had not seen a.n 8...'1.telope could see Fig.3 
as an antelope. And it ma;y be tha.t sOrJeone may not see an 8...'1.telope in 
Fig. 4 even if he has seen one. ĴŸĚ lot of t2-11-c and ŸŸĴŤVWẀŲÙŪŦĚmay be 
necess'oTY to get son8one to· see the figures as antelopes. TDis suggests 
far away from anything like a 'sense d2tum' notion of seeing. Yor the 
context is LJecoming part of the illustration. i,,'hat ha'O'Jens in such 
cases is that a pattern is imyosed UlJO:!2 the lines 8...l1d that this makes 
us ŠŮÍŸŲŤȘÙŠWŤĚ the elements of the picture differently. ŸIŊUŠWĚ changes 
is the ŬŲŦȘÜÙVŠWŸŬŪĚof Hhat is seen. ÒÙŸŘJŤĚ the monkey in the tree once 
we have seen it we can ŸÍĦŤẂŤŲĚ VWŬŸJJJHĚ seeing it. If '[ole see Fig. 5 as a bear 
clirtlb:ing a tree, nothing in the picture changes. Orf;anisation is not 
another element in the picture. But the description 'see this as a 
bear climbing a tree' \'{ould be part of the illustration. 
The central point that is being made is that the context is part 
of tDe illustration. Cften the context is so familiar that it is 
built into the illustration. Fig. 6 brinss this out. To a child it 
will appear to be no more than an electric light bulb. r.I'o a physicist 
it is a TJicture of an X-ray tube vie\ved froD the cathode. The child 
\vould he.ve to le3.rn a lot to COLle to see this picture as arl X-ray tube. 
This knoHledge \'!Quld change his tihole 1!lCl.y of seeing. Hanson puts this 
connection oe-t:\l!een the ':lay ere see things ŸÍĦTĚ our kum1ledge in a 
forceful manner. If ;t!e ask anyone to give an e::arrple of seeing they 
will probabl:;c suggest something like 'secing ËŸUŤĚ blue s'E..y'. fianson 
profoundly disagrees: 
'If one must find a :9e.radigm C2.3e of seeing it would 
be better to regard as such not the visual apprehension 
of colour patches but things like seeing what time it 
is, seeing \'!h2.t key a piecc of music is in, and seeing 
Hhether a wound is se;Jtic.' (30) 
'.!e can a,::.d ezamples such as 'Seeing that Shakespeare is a greater 
playwright than f:attii;an', 'seeinG thB.t Earnlet is not reall: .. insane', 
and 'seeing education as a fOl"m of commodity ::,rodl).ction'. 'ihe point 
is that ŬŞVŤŲẂŠŸÙŬŪĚis shalled by :::Jrior Imm,rled,_e. In this sense it 
could be said that seeing is 'theory-laden'. The fact that most 
people will see the six figures gi'Ten above in the saG1e I·ray merely 
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indicates the degree to vltich He .share simi19.:c JȘJŪŬẂÙŨŤTHŸĴŤĚ 2nd the Hay 
in \'rhicb this knowledge ŬŲŞŸHŪÙVĚ=8 the uay in 1:Jhich we see things. 
3veryone in 'Neste:cn industrial societies "'rill e::pect the same things 
of tbe object in Fig. 6, for instance, th3.t it ,.,ill breD}: c·rhen dropped. 
The W3 .. y He see the figure is the 'vlay ǾŸĚ thin\ about • J.. ll.". It is not the 
way He think that 2.11m·IE- us to interpret what 'de see. ŸUÙVĚ is the point 
of using ŮŤŲVŮŤȘWÙẂŸĤŲŤẂŤŲVŠŨNĤ as part of a philoso:;Jhical arE,urrent. 
They show that He see the thing differently ','rhile there is no new element 
that we see. Let us conclude this introd);.ction VIi th Hanson's final 
reuark: I The paradigm ob2erver is not the man. \.fho sees and reJorts ,.,hat 
all rlormal o:'lservcr.s see a...nd report, but the man l:fho sees in fa;-niliar 
.. t ' -'- l' , ŸĚ ,(1) o'JJec·s ŘGŊŨÍŠŸĚ no one e 5e [laS seen oe1ore. 
__ \larning about the use cf SUC':l 1Jicture,s h3.S been Given by Tony 
Skillel'l. The cases '!Ie ,ire d::'scussing are connected vJi th 'world views'. 
Skillen argues that they can easily be 1..1.sec'. tc d::cfend tteses like 
'objectivist-pluralism'. This is the notion that there can be altern-
ative but equally valid 'objective' noralities in the s2.nie Hay as there 
lS a duck and a rab 1:; i t in :::'ig. 1, assur'linG that the picture is an analogy 
of our meral fr3.r:,s'.'Jork. Slcillen' s objection is 'that whereas a christian 
eJOrld-view is incomp2.tible, say, cvi th a Harxist \oJOrld-vievl (neo-ecurQenicism 
aside), that I!D.R." is a 'oich:re of a duc;·: is not incompatible with its 
being a picture of a rabbit. Hencs ŮÙȘWẀŲŤĤŮŨẀŲŠŨÙVŸĚdoes not support 
(-' 2) 
world-view pluralism.,;J C;:'here is a VÕŸŊUÙÌWÙȘŠWŤTĚ level on which we 
C2,D. see Fig. 1 as a 'duck-ra:Jbi t' rather than as either a duck or a 
ŲŸŞŞÙĚt. Communism an.d christianity cannot be ma:crieJ. in this vJay. He 
are dealiIlg ',Ii th the ',:arld vievJS of fictitious in(ii vi duals • :Sxcepting 
the r2.ck of irony on which many interpretations run ŠÎŸŲŬẀŪTĚ \,le can say 
that as far as these individuals are concerned they C2Jlnot but thin..1<;: 
that their new i"my of seeing things is right. 301.,'e are not propounding 
in any ';/0.=1 a form of 'objective-pluralism I. 
Hanson's use of the 'aspect change' notion and r.1y own must be made 
distinct. Hanson is concerned ',fi th discovery. He is concerned with 
changes i:n. perception that might oe brought about by learning. Lots 
of ne',v informco.tion mU.c.t be ;s.thered. before 1.;e can an X-ray 
tuos. However his scientist [{,erely pulls the duck-rabbit out of the 
hat in the sense that he shmvs us \'Jhat He 112.'1e not seen before although 
it was visiiJle all the time. Ee cOl>l.ects one element with a.YJ.other and 
we are ŤŸŸŞŨŤTĚto see thin;s differently. There are shades of difference 
in the ŠŸĞŮŨÙȘŠWÙŬŪĚI wi,sh to 03.;,:e of tl1e nction that can be seen best 
by usin.s an a.nalogy Hith Ii teraL:re ŲȘĨĦWŸÍŤŲĚ thc,n science. Tnis tine I 
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do not mean "That happenec. to the chaT2.cter.s in novels but to ourselves 
"lhen reDdi:1g them. It is 3. notorious fact th2.t novels f:ive us no new 
kn01Jlledge, no new inforT:Jatiol1. This is given paradov.ical ex]ression 
by Bambrough Hhen he says 'In literature, as in other media in which 
philosophy of life may be conducted, vie often learn Hi thout learning 
anythi115 new.' (3) Bam'-orough subsequently goes on to ẂŨŤŠŸJŤŪĚ this 
lJoint by talking about literature as a sort of second ha..'1d experience. 
i.le ma.y not ŸŸŪŬŴĚ 'Ilhat it \'las ree.lly 1il:e a.t the front but He can read 
Goodbye to all that. Graves' book is the very exa.m·=,le he Gives when 
discus,sing the paradox..,'e beg-::m thLco discussion with an attempt to 
resolve the suggestion that there vlere non-Langfordian senses of 
'learning' • If this is so then 3al:Jorough' s remark is me:cely a pun. 
',,,-ihat UŠŮŸŖŤŪVĚ \-{hen 'de reac. a book is analogous to the lJerceptual change 
that occurs \"hen 1;Ie see one of the C;estal t dravJin::; diffe:cently. This, 
W8 need hardly pause to say, is not true of all bool-::s but merely great 
ones. i /ha t do \-re learn when we read King Lear? Do we lear!l that it 
is wrong to put out the eyes of ald men, or that this act is horrific? 
Do \;fe learn that old men can be foolish and virgins \-lise? He come to 
see these things afresh because 'de have seen this foolish old man and 
watched his tragic dm-mfall. He learn nothing that He did not lmow but 
here in this arrangement, this particular org2,nisatior., He see things 
we sm·! and yet did not see. Thi,3 is the case with ).ndrey and Levin. 
Through their eXIJeriences things that WUŤŸØĚ have ŠŨŨŸVȘGĦTXĚ learned have 
come into focus. The inteTnal relations of '"hat they know have shifted. 
:Out still there is no nevi knouledce, no loa:::-ning. It is to try to 
give exyressiol1 to 1:ihat is UŠŮŮŤŪŸĦŪŦĚHhen our 'ejQrld-view' changes that 
leads us to speak :oaradoxically about such exp'2riences. 
Of courC3e learning oust occur as a nrecondition of beil1.G educated. 
But this is not the sort of case He are discuE;sing. The Cases 'de have 
looked at are the sort Hhsre one ::Fishes to talk of a.n increase in 
Hisdo;'n, uh8re things are il}.uminated in a '\fJay in ,·[hich they never '.'Jere 
before. This illwninatiol1 is not the sort cf thin:=; you can get from 
finding our .sor:1sthing you did not 1:n01.1. ŸUŤVŤĚC3.ses 2Te not unique. 
There is a clear use of the term 'educc.tion' which is different fTorr. 
that nebulous concept that ŸGŇWŤŲVĚ deric.es or any of the more syecific 
ȘŬŪȘŤŸŊWVĚ of Earwaker' s type 'j)'. There is a certain vocabulary that 
goes "lith it. Let me introduce it through a l1lu6.dle that ŸJHẀVUĚ I-<.hees tells 
US he got into Over the q,uest&on I;.re men better off with education 
thon they Hould have been ui thout it?' ne admits thc.t he VIas confusing 
questions C.'-;out ŸJUŤĚ value of 2 C;l).cation Hi th the question of ·"lhether 
educ:ction is possible. In one :"e:18e this latter question is silly 
170 
because it has been goin:; on for ŸĴŤŠŲVĦĚ Ehees ,-las trying to formulate 
the sort of questions a sce:9tic ŠŞŬŸÚWĚ ŤTẀȘGĦĤGŸÙȘŪĚ [;;ight ask. One further 
forl:1Ulation of a sce'Jtical c;.uec:tiol1 is this: 
'Cne might l)ut the question in terms of 
might put it in terns of enlightenr:Jent, 
of th2se are difficult conceptions, a.Tld 
education might have to discuss theEl.' 
':.'isdom, or one 
I sup)ose. Both 
a pbilosophy of 
(34) 
'I ,Ii th the cases vIe have ŸĞŤŤŪĚ discu2sint; to call the!!1 insb:mces of 
education is to bring in co::.cepts ŨÙĴŸŤĚ 'wi,so.om' and 'illumination' 
and 'enlightenment' and GÙŸÍVÙŦUWGĚ and 'vision'. No doubt these are 
difficult concepts. Perha:-9s that is vlhy they are ignored by philoso-
phers of education. It may be that \-Then we hear sor:lething paradoxical 
said like, 'Your education is no education at all' "hat is beinG expressed 
is not some philistine anti-intellectualism but a real doubt as to the 
efficaayof the man's past education to give him wisdom. During February 
1980 many schools in the south east of England vlere ÙŪȚŬŸŲHĒŤTĚ to a 
series of lectures on 'EnlighteI1J:1ent - The Highest Ideal of ÓẀȘŠWÙŬŪHŸĨĪĞĚ
Snlightenment is described in the coprse leaflet as a 'nevi angle' on 
education. As an airJ of education in Peters' sense it might be 
important to con.sider it. Perhans a beginning could be made \'rith the 
de1::l.::.te beb-reen F .E. Leavis and T.S. Eliot as to just what constituted 
an GŤTĦẀȘŸWŤTĚman' 0 Eliot had said that La\'Jrence, unlike Ba1::lbi tt, vias 
and would ahlaY,s remain 'uneducated' having no 'instinct' for, or 
'apprehension' of where everything belonged on the [Jap of ŸŅUŠWĚ had been 
written in the past. Of having no ẀŪȘŸŤŲVWŠŪTÙŪŦĚof his own ignora.."1ce. 
Leavis re1)lies that Babbitt was 'cm:-llJlacently deaf and blind to 
li terature and art' and had no under",.tarcding of his 'incapacity'. He 
argues that Eliots' idea of the 'educ&ted nan' is the born academic 
'O'Jtuse in his dogged argumentative erudition,.(36) Again, some insight 
miGht be gained by discussing La·,'Irence' s letters atJout his acquaintance 
vIi th Hussell in the 1930' s. Hany ŞÙŬŦŲŠŸHUŤŲVĚsee La"Jrence &s feeling 
inferior and 'ill-educated' whereas he is in fact, very critical of 
Russell's inexperience 'It isn't that life has been too much for him, 
but too little.' (37) 'Enlightenraent' may come into such discussions 
which are concerned vii th a cOi1sciousness which may not be covered by 
the knowledge and understandinc; in delJth and breadth' formula, which 
would hardly exclude ;::;Ussell. It is exactly of a hig:1ly educated man 
in Peters' sense th2.t '/le mig-ht ma'::e l)aradoxic&l remarks. '"je could 
not say such things of an ill-educated or half-educated man. Conversely 
we call S3.y of a ma.n that lacks formal edo.cation that he has a greater 
educa_tion. And we need not'be-though sorr.e :geople ŸŲŤHĚ'\ arguing for 
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un.garnished and pure 'experience' in favour of the things of the 
intellect. l;Je think of the sir.Tple person one meets often in Tolstoy 
or :;)ostoyevsky. It is as hard to formulate some sort of general 
characterisE.tion of the sort of 'education' that I an thin.1-;:ing of as 
it \"Jas for Rhees to formulate the sceptic's question. That does not 
mean that there is nothing to articulate just that articulation in 
general terms is inappropriate. Look at Levin, look at Prince Andrey, 
consider what they say and do then. Reflection upon these cases "rill 
begin to initiate some understanding of the nature of their 'education'. 
Such e:car:1ples bring out the fact that 2c COl1!E:on element may be outweighed 
by something that appears a mere 'symptom'. Appeals to 'experience' 
may gel1erally be philistine and anti-intellectual but not in certain 
cases. Pu'1d these are the illuminating ones. 
l;Je have moved from considering 'educational situations' to fully-
fledged instances of 'educc,tion' or of what it is to be all. 'educated 
man' • The intention beill.g to exploit the extrapolation 0= common 
features or general criteria fron such situations. Thus 'learning' 
which it is easy, but inaccurate, to suggest characterises all 
'educational situations' clearly does not characterise all cases of 
'education' • 
4.3. 'Grammatical' J:i.emarks 
Is it enough to stress the particular instances in this \-Jay? Is 
it not the case that He can produce ÙŨŨẀÜÙŪŠWÙŸÍŦĚgeneral propositions 
about the nature of education, \vhether GËÍŸJĚ call therr. 'definitions' or 
not·: There is no doubt that they have some efficacy in certain 
si tuations. To discuss them and their function in deta.il it is neces-
sary to con.sider some example,s. ŸUŤŲŤĚ2.re so many different \'Jays of 
ans'_lering the question ".lhat is (do you mean by) eciucation?' and so 
many different things that might be meant by this that it is easy to 
rattle off a multitude of exam)les: 
(52) Educp.tion is ini -i::i::ttion into ,vorthwhile activities 
(53 Education is the acquisition of knowledge and under-
standing in TŤŸJJWUĚ and breadth 
(54) Education is .socialisation 
(55) 
(56) 
(57) 
(58 
3ducation is the passing on of a cultural heritage 
:=ducation is a preparation [01' life 
::::ducatio::l is a process of growth 
:2ducation is the brinGing up of the young 
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(59) Education is the acquisition of the forns of knm'rledge 
(60) Education is the process of systenatic instruction 
(61) Education if' the TŸẂŤŨŬŮÜŤŪWĚ oi' the mental ])owers 
(62) l!:ducation is learning to see the \Vorld as it really is 
(63) Education is learning to be a person 
(64) Education is the development of the soul 
(65) Education is a prepa.ration for ŲŤTŤŨÍŨŸŊWÙŬŪĚ in the infinite 
(66) Education is a Ely.stery beyond humar:. conception 
(67) Education is the process by ",rhich ŸŊŬẀŲŦŤŬÙVĚ socie-;;y 
transforms children into articles of commerce and 
instruments of la.bour 
(68) :2:ducation is learninG to rule and be ruled 
(69) Education is trainin,g 
(70) Education is enlishtenment 
These examples of general propositions, restricted as they are to 
positive characterisations of education, could be exter.ded. There are 
many and more sophisticated versions of all of them. Uhat can be said 
about them? The::, are not obviously false Or inadequate. They do tell 
us something unlike trivially true a,ssertions such as (71) 'Education 
is education' or (72) 'Education is the process by which a person 
becomes educated'. But as we saH in Chapter T\Vo even seemingly 'empty 
tautologies' such as the former do have a sense. l"';e can imagine a 
context where the 'tautology' is used to ŲŤŲĴŸÙŪTĚus of the fact that 
there is more to education than schooling. But these eighteen exam:;:Jles 
seem to offer more than the last two. But although they tell us 
something, this is, I submit, vel7 little. 
It is possible to imagine, aIld we have discussed some, sustained 
defences of these and similar views. ldhy do people sa:.' such things? 
Scheffler vrould a:c-gue that their aiJ:1 is to clal'ify our concept or to 
(38) 
capture ŸŊŠŲWĚ of the prior use of a term. iJe could. approach these 
remarks in his manner presenting general categories and strategies 
that miGht facilitate their appraisal. 1.ie might point out that (57) 
is a metaphor, (56) a TŤŸȘŲÙŮWÙẂŤĚdefinition, (59) a prograrnr;latic 
defini tion and so on. In fi!a:.1.y cases it may be very difficult to decicie 
in ŸÍȚUÙȘUĚ category to put a particular general statement. But although 
it nay be difficult to decide in a particulac case whether any of the 
ge:'leral ŸĞŲŬŮŬVÙĚtions listed above vIere -::;rogram:i1atic only two (67) and 
(68) might be clained not to be descriptive in Scheffler's sense. 
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Scheffler's discussion of descriptive definitions begins with two 
mislee.ding analogies. ?irstly he refers to the introduction o£ the 
term 'virus' to a high school class, and then talks of the fact that 
ordinary terrJ;S are o,"ten ambiguous "li th reference to GWŲẀŪŸĤȘGĚ which can 
(39) 
refer to both boxes and to the anatomy of elephants. 'rhe first 
case is an instance of what loIe he.ve called an 'appropriate' situation 
for asking a 'l'Jbat is ••• ?' question. ':::'he VŤȘŬŸĦȘTĚ example leads us to 
expect that, say, 'education' though a single phonological Hord with 
a consistent ŬŲWUŬVŲŠŸŊUXĚmight be the realisation of several grar:lmatical 
words in the ma.nner of 'dovm', 'banK', and sil11ilar 'words'. Eu t there 
is no evidence for this. Clarification of our conceuts is not therefore 
likely to be analogous to either 0= these cases. Scheffler also points 
out that descriptive definition call1ot be the basis on ';lhich an 
educc.tional procr2mue is justified. ''/e cannot decide 1:That to do 'by 
. t' th t f d .1. • ,( 40) "- '11 + t t" b lnspe c Elg e concep 0 e uce. ŸŨŬŪĦĚ ,ne l us vra es illS y 
discussing a programme which was based on the belief that 'the fundamen-
tal meaning of concept of ecluc'ltion is to 11el-o boys and girls to active 
, (41)-
participation in the worlo. ar01md ther;') • He arc,ues, without giving 
any examples, that this programme of play and pupil evaluated activities 
constitutes a borderline case. It is both sufficiently like and 
sufficiently unlike clear past instances. The basis for such programmes 
is to be found in our moral frarle\·lOrk. l.1e can agree with Scheffler 
that descriptive defini t".ons do not in any sir:1ple "ray assist in justi-
fying an educationa.l programme. GŸŶŤĚ have seen tl1at hi,s account of their 
abili ty to cl2.rify our concepts is misleading. Can such 'definitions' 
be ,said to give us increased grasp at all? To anSHer this ';Ie need a 
less superficial account of ths sort of connections br01..i.sht out by the 
general proposi tion.s li.sted above. 
'I'he.se ŲŤŨŨÍȘJŲŸJVĚ or at lea.,,:t sOl""e of t:,en, would be characterised as 
'conceptual truths'. 'lie have discussed Dunlo:o' s attem:9t to characterise 
these as 'necessary' or 'a ĤJŸŲÙŬŲÙGĚ truths. The account vJas found to be 
unsatisfactory in several 1fiaYs. A more sophisticated account of 
'conceptual truths' has been put forward by Recldiford. :,Je have already 
discussed certain ŠVŸĞŤȘWVĚ of his acco'J.nt in Chapter Ti'Jo. rro discuss 
his characterisction of such 'truths' we have to distinsuish between 
conce:9tua1 'systems', 'connections', 3.nd 'framel,:orks'. JŸHĚconceptu21.1 
system' is sOElething thc:t is not designed. It is the VŸGVWŤÜĚof concepts 
throu::)'1 '-lhich a person gives form ar..d content to his ẀŪTŤÚŸVWŠŪTÙŨGŨĴĚ of 
. , f h t . '.1.' ( ÏÎĞŸĦĚŸȚĚ tIl the 1,-nele range o' uman ac l Vl ŸŨŤVĦĚ JJlI eren peop e 1ave, or nay 
have, diff ",rer.ct systems and these may overlap to a greater or lesser 
am.ount with the systeus of other individuals. Conceptual systems are 
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TÙVWÙŸŨŦẀÙVUŤTĚon the basis of 'internal relations' behreen concepts 
within a system rather than by reference to the 'external relationship' 
of a systeffi to the world. The meaning of a concept is given by its 
relationships in one person's systeo to WUŠŸĚof someone else the concept 
\vill be said to have different [1eCLnings in e3.ch case. s:'o give the 
meaning of 'education' "lould be to set out the 'conceptual connections' 
beh/een the various co:ccepts in our system. Thus Langford, in a recent 
paper, o.i.::cusses the 'col1ceJ::,tual truth' that 'education is the whole 
man I and declares that this VÙŲŲJŸĞŨXĚ 'dravls attention to the close conn-
ct " '. t' COl"lr.e'.';Jt ŸĚ '.j.." • -'-,- t f I (43) 0 e lons oe'SHeen De _ or eQUCa"lOll ano. '-112. 0 .. a man • n 
Reddiford's accOlmt all concentu21 connections wi thin a conceptu3.1 
system are ŤŸĴJŠJĴGŨŮÍĮVĚ of conceptual connections and that th8se are the 
(44) 
'conceptuEJ.l truths ' that interest the :philosopher. The set of 
ŤẄÙHJJĴŸÙŪŦĚ conceptual rslationships in any system of any individual can 
be termed a 'conceptual fr3,mel,TOrc:' .I.,'e a:Ae fr8e to choose and adopt 
conceptual ȚŲGĤJHŪŸŤHŨÕŲÛVĚ (or areas of discourse - or language game?) to 
TŤVȘŲÙŨŸŤĚ and justify educatio::1al processes. If our vie';J of the ",rorld 
changes, 2nd this process cleed not 'Je such a purely utilitarian or 
functional one as 'choose' suggests, then our 'conceptual frar:1eworks' 
can ŸĞŤĚ said to ha.'1e chant;;ed. This does not make the whole matter 
arbitrary. In employing conceptu3.l fraDewor}:s we are still subject 
to the Im'lS of logic and the demanccs of consistency i. e. if \ve accept 
A and S as ccnceptual truths about concept x: ,n:.d A and B ioply C then 
we cannot deny C. HOH far we can go in pursuing sm:,e peculi2.r vie';l of 
a concept - an eccentric set of con.ceptual conIlections - depends upon 
its consistency and cOE1pati'jili ty vIi th other elements of our vIOrld 
view. All thi':3 is relativistic and ŸŤTTÙȚŬŲTĚdoes seem to be advancing 
J..' (45) 
a 'family resemblance' vie1![ of the conce'Jt of edUCal,..lon. His view 
\-Iould, seemingly, cope with the variety of general statement about 
education exemplified in the examples a'Jove. 
Reddiford differs from the ŮUÙŨŬVŬJŸHUŤŲVĚ discussea. in Chapter TvlO. 
'i'he most obvious difference is th2.t he rejects essentialism. Reddiford 
rejects the idea. that 1.-te erG searching for 10:::'-ically necessary propositions 
,"hich \'Jill g:i'1e us the basis for talk about the 'correct' use of a concept 
or term. He allows that ttere are many such corr'?ct uses provided they 
are consistent "lith other applic tions of constituent terms 3.nd with our 
beliefs. Thus if we h2,ve an eocentric vie", of educ2:tion that conc:ected 
it with what is nm,! called 'human movement' this view could only be put 
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b · ŸĚ , h ' d' -'-, ( LJ·6 ) forward on the basis of agre'8ment a out tIle use or uman an movemelh. 
To employ every vlOrd like HUHpty MẀÚGÍŸŊWXĚ ẂŨÕẀŨȘŸĚ be to render communication 
well nigh imp03sible. His anal:/sis is formal in Eanfay:er' s sense 
b2cau.=;e he is not putting fOrylarCt his (or a) pa::oticular view of what 
ed.ucation is. He is merely discussing Vlhat is involved in putting 
forward such 'JieYls. There are striking similarities with the arguments 
of Eichardson about the nature of 'criteria'. :::1ichardso:'l, it will be 
ŲŤẀŤŸŪŞŤŲŤTHĚ arg·ued for a y;J1.lrali ty of criteria for the a)p2.ication of 
a term. Although his relativistic approach and his general emphasis 
on choice are reminiscent of 'constructivist' 'i'Jritings. Certainly, 
Peddifo:cd's account seems Dore ÎĦŸŊŨŤĚ to encompass eccentric viet-Is of 
education than vlOuld a multiple-criterion rule-based. a..1"lalysis such as 
Richardson's. lile que,stioCled Richardson's account of 'criteria' which 
Vias criticised for being too 'logicist' and for }resenting a one-sided 
inter""Jretation of i:Ji ttGenstein' s notion. Sh1ilarly Reddiford rejects 
the notion that there3Te substimtive determining criteria implicit in 
the use of "ords tho.t could VǾĞŸĒŊŬŲWĚ a monolithic account of education 
in the maImer of Peters'. Nevertheless his aCCGunt could be develolJed 
and given nore of 2. ;,Jittgensteinian ::;loss by brinc;ing into it further 
discu,ssion of GŨŠŸÍĮẀŠŦŤĚ e:;ames', 'culture' and 'criteria'. Reddiford 
(4'7) 
is both here and elsewhere ' much concerned with 'cultures'. This 
is where he differs most strikingly from the other philosophers we 
hav2 considered. 3y this :I: do not ŔĞÍŤŲŤŨŸØĚ mean that he take,s account 
of other cultures i:.1. the sense of othsr nations and races al1d their 
attitude,s, beliefs, ways of life etc. I refer rather to the sel1se of 
'culture' that i,s ilJ;Jlied by ',]ittgenstein's use of the WŤŲŸŪĚ in connection 
wi th a 'languaGe [:;al:1e'. The sense, \Jl""_ich "re have di.3cussecl, in which 
whole systems of thought r.1ay be IJart of the 'meaninf:' of a Hord like 
'time'. 
ŸŬĚ brinE; out all the similari tie,s and dissiE:ilari ties which can be 
drawn between Reddiford, Richardson and the antiKantian account being 
presented here, let us look at the notions of 'gr2.mr·,ar' and 'criteria' 
as they were TŤẂŤŨŬŸĒŊŤŬĦĚ in Chapter Three. This "Jill allO\[ us to go 
into nore detail cu1.c3. to ShOH hOH i:-:lportant a familiarity ,vi t:1 the 
aspects of fJs.=,ning theory discussed i1'. Ch8.ptsr Tyro is to any successful 
fresh a})l=)r02.ct, to the conceDt of education. 
i,:,ihat VIe called 'gramLoatical rems.l"ks' are seneral ŮŲŬŸĞŬVÙĚtions in 
Schef::ler's sense. llot all propositions of a general nature are 
GŦŲÎÚŸÍÜŠWÙȘŠŨGHĚ for exa)T?le: 
(73) There are 500,OC'0 jJeople recei vinE, eciuc2.tion in Sri tain 
or 
(74) '=ducation' belonGS to the class of nine letter 1!lords 
176 
Both of these are [;8nero.l ŮŲŬŸŸŨŬVÙWÙŬŪVĚ contai:'ling the word 'education'. 
But they r,w.rk 'e;dernal' rather than 'interne.l' conce1.Jtus.l connections. 
ØUŤŸØĚ refer to educe.tional institutions and to ŬŲWUŬŇŲŠŸUXĚrather than 
the COnC81Jt 0: eaucation. A' gre.mmatical remark' HOli.lc1 be, in Eeddiford' s 
terminology, a general pro)osition expressing a conceptual connection. 
It is not necessary to deal uith the distinction between slogans, 
meta;Jhors and stipulati ve andl)rOcr8.mmatic elements made by ,scheffler, 
for it is reason3.blc to claim that if these have any force at 8.11 they 
. (L1-8) 
express conceptual connectlons. The matter is not merely a termin-
oloGical one. The ,s.doption of one \fa:1 of eX:Jressir'-G" sOr1ething is not, 
despi te what even thic:; seems to imply, sinIJly a different Hay of saying 
the sace thing. The ado:9tion of another way of speaking is the linguistic 
expression of the rejection of a l'lislee.ding picture of hOvl language 
worl;:s Emd of a method of doing philoso:?hy congruent \"Ii th that picture. 
\r!e sa\'r in our discl.<ssion of the various interpretations of 'criteria' 
in Chapter Tl:!O that attempts are often made to marry a !":lisleading picture 
with a IJrophylactic one. '!'ie s;:rrq2.thise6. with the so-called 'therapeutic' 
interpretation of 'di ttgenstein to the extent that we saw his introduction 
of certain pieces of terminology, neVI concepts, and striking metaphors 
as essential to his avo1:fed WŠVŸĴJĚ of the painstaking dis-solution of 
philosophical problems. \'!e characterised 'gramraatical' propositions 
as reminders of what it makes sense to say in a language game. This 
shift from neddiford' s terminology is a move away from the lant,'Uage of 
philoso}hy as practised by the 'lo[,;icist' philosophers. I use this 
expression to mean those who pres,s the analogy Hi th c.eductive models 
of thought like i!isdol11' s 'father' who ere met in Chapter One. Reddiford 
is clearly al'rare of the short cominGS of such an a;Jproach as v-re also 
saH from his discussion of the idea that there are neces,sary conditions 
for the a.pplico.tion of a term. He does present a lird ted analysis v!hich 
could be developed in a 1.li WWNŸŤŪVWŤÙŪÙŠŨÍĚHay rather than in the language 
of conceptual analysis that he uses. The reasons for talking of 
GŦŸŸŠÜÜŠWÙȘŤĦŨĚ remarks' rather than 'conceptnal connections' can best be 
brought out by concentrating on the Question of 'rules'. 
ide can perhaps, talk of tvJO sorts of 'logicist'. Firstly there 
is the philosopher who \"lould seek strict rules for the ap,::lication of 
a term. Perhaps this is a strai!J :?hilos0:9her given the qualifications 
we discussed in Chapter T\"lo. But we have the 2&yly ld ttgenstein as an 
exanrole if we rerner.,'.)er P.ichardson's Tellim"k that the later i:/ittgenstein 
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ŠWWŠȘŸKĴJŤȘŨĚ the notion of 'strictness' rather than 'rules'. This view of 
'rules', if rarely expressed is influential. :c\. recent introductory 
boot: (49) on the philo,sophy of education makes the point that if Peters' 
defini tion of education is right then that i.s the end of our ÙŪŸẀÙŲXËĚ
.such impressions are a result of the methodological procedure of 
philosophy as 'conceptual imalysis'. Those philosophers such as Peters 
who ŠWWŤÜŮŸĚ to make some accomrr;odation to Hittgenstein's work are 
'logicists' in a weak:er sense. They seek clarific&.tion of 'rules' in 
a restricted sense. EVen Eeddiford suggests that an alternative 
formulation of his reElarks about conceptual connections is possible in 
(50) 
terms of 'meailinf rules'. r::::'hus the aiL1 is still to ma1.<:e explicit 
the 'meaning of rules' of lan8ua[;·e. This is the termination of the 
'conceptual' part of IJhilosophy of education, ŠȚWŤJĦĦŸĚ Hhich, more 
'important' matters are discussed. 1je sa"j fron our discussion of the 
'rite of chess' that such feneral Ilropositions as are produced are not 
rules of any sort. They are rer'1i.nders of iVhat it makes sense to say 
in evervdav 
" u 
language. That some of them imuress themselves ll'Jon us as 
impossible to dispense with may lead us to talk of 'rules'. But it is 
preferable to see them as 'grammatical remsrks' as attempts to explicate 
a concept. ØUŤŸGĚ indicate sOl"l'Jething of the 'gramc,ar' of a concept. It 
is this 'grrunmar' that expresses the essence of a concept. But it does 
so, as we ha.ve seen, without reference to universals. , Grrunmar ' 
indicates the rough ground ŬŸĚ ŬJĦĦŸTÙŪŠŲXĚ usage. It reminds us of the 
lallguage games He IJlay with a ÙŒŬŲȘŸĦĦĚ Part of the objection to talk of 
'conceptual connections' is tho.t it can direct us a"JCJ.Y from the employ-
ment of Hords. 
But this does not me,m that 'de sho1..1.1o. simply consider examples of 
ordinary usage. .iind hsre 'de EiU:3t correct al1 impression, perhaps given 
by our references to SchVlyzer' s Hork , that vIe are ap::Jealing to everyday 
usage • .sch1:'Yzer uses phrases like 'what it ma':;:es sense to say', 'the 
kind of use a Hord has in lilil[,uage', 'the language gall,e lJlayed h'i th the 
word' as indications of ",hat ŸGŊÙWWŦŤŪVWŤÙŪĚmeant by 'grruMJar'. Dut there 
is an iEl]Jortant difference of emphasis here. ','e are not cO:1.cerned 1dith 
'what \"le say' but '\.,hat it L1clkes sense to say'. \'Ie can grasp something 
of the difference by discussing Ziff's characterisation of ordinary 
usage in his 'jewel' analogy: 
'An element mi can hs.ve associated with it a set of sets of 
conch tions CrJi. GŊGUÙŪŸĦĦĴJĚ of mi as a jewel, of each member of 
Cmi as one facet. Then \"lhich facet catches the light ciepends 
on contexb.l6.1 and liilGllistic environn:ental fe3.tures, thus on 
its setting.' (51) 
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The 'element' Ziff refers to is a morphological element, for our 
pur-Jose vIe can take him as rtisanin; '1:wrd'. The 'contextual and 
linguistic environment2,1 features' are quite clearly meant to be 
',sentence frames'. Ziff illustrates his analogy with the Vlord 
'brother' i.e. 'He is my brother', 'He's a brother to me', 'He's a 
brother of the order ' etc. He ar€,LJ.e,s Ula t 'in each case, if it is 
a standar6. case, a diffe:::'cnt facet of the Hord is turned to catch 
the light'. (52) Any cra'i1'-latic8.1 remark about 'brother' could be 
said to capture one of these facets. This seems to be a fairly 
adequate view of the matter. But it is not. Ziff ŲŤȘŬŸJŪÙVŤVĚ that 
he is dealing \'lith only certain cases. ,so far as we restrict our 
enquiries to these cases then the r.1atter seems quite str3.ishtforward. 
\·,'e arc only considering the Tdord IS' strict logic'. Once 'ife consider 
what Ziff calls 'deviant uttel'a:1.Ces I then, 'matters become vastly more 
complex'. (53) 
Ziff is still doing 'anal/sis'. r:'he multiplicity of cases he 
sets out are presented "lith a view to definition which "Jill includ.e 
all but c.evi3.nt and minor cases. This view is, in fact, more compatible 
vIi th the Tractatus where the propositions of ordinary language were 
in 'perfect logical order' (T. J5. 5563) • For the later i,!ittgenstein this 
11la3 where the problems started. 'Grammar' is not constituted by lists 
of ordinary usage, it is not an elaborate version of the :;:;CA. Ziff's 
al:)proach, for all its stress on 'regularities' rather than 'rules', is 
'cri teriological ' • Thi,s cem be seen both frm1 his general methodology 
and frOGl the 'j ewel' 8.J.'1.alogy. His ap]Jroach would :Je a sophisticated. 
one rather like Richardson's for, a,s '.'Ie sa\oJ in Chapter T\oJo, he rejects 
the BCA. but the hidden 'conditions' that COlile to lie.;ht in a certain 
settL1g can be takel1 to be 'criteria'. 
Three thin:;s COIT:e out of this brief consio.erc,tion of ŸUŤĚ 'jeHel' 
analozy. Firstly there is a tenc'ency to reduce or equate 'grammar' 
vii th consideration of ordinary usage. 'Grammar' is not meant to 
direct us towards linguistic :;Jh'enomena, or WÕŒŊŠŲȘŸVĚ non-linguistic 
phenomena, but tm,;ards 'forms of life' • ',je ha'le introduced the idea 
of considering a ".lhole culture' in connectio!l with 'gramrr.ar'. 'Grammar ' 
is conrlected 1:vi th the idea of a 'conce]t' in ',ji tfgen,stein' s sense of a 
'picture' 1:li th which 'de compa_re things. If' 2:rammar' discusses the 
application of anything it is t!"cese 'pictures' rather than the applic-
ation of words. But the central stress is upon 'cultures'. The 'depth' 
of GĦŸĴŲŠÜËĒJÍŠŲGĚ is the depth of the background, the style of life ui thin 
which these 'pictures' opera.te. Thus v,e CS.IElOt sum u·o the 'gra'ilmar' 
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in terms of a general fO:::'Llula. Thi,s is vhy 'use' lS ĴŸŨHVŬĚ com::.ected 
with 'cultu:::'es' and 'institutions'. '.ie cannot represent such things 
in terms of General pro!Josi tions for easy underst2_ndin(j. ;:Te have to 
make a backGround, ':lhat i.ii ttgenstein calls our '112ttu:cal history' 
clearer before GŸŊŤĚ cael as[;imilate a 'culture'. The point is not just 
to understa21C_ language but to have a feeling for the context a.nd 
attendant ȘÙŲȘẀÜVWŠJŲŸȘŤVĦĚ 'This is ẂŨUŸGĚ tl:.e er;:pI1a,sis 0::1 'ser..se' is 
imlJortant. Secondl;:,r, the connections oet1fieen 'criteria' 2md 'gr2_tnu1at-
iC2.l' remal"l<.:s an0. JŸËŲŬŸĞŬVÙWÙŬŪVĚ becomes clearer. The WŤŪTŤŸGŨȘXĚ of 
'analysis' or of 'logicis,TI' is to hypostatize 'grammar' to see it as 
a vapid lo.;ic or skeletal structure, rather tha.."r1 as involving descriptions 
of our 'natural history'. ':Ji ttgenstein described his own Hork as 
consistinS of 'relllarks' and this is connected ,vi th his rejection of 
theories a.."r1G. explanations. Perha1:)s this helps to shmr v,rhy, say, Ziff's 
procedure is not wrong but 'Hrong-headed'. If \Ve see his sets of 
conditions as 'criteria' He have beQln to hypostatize 'grammar'. In 
discussing the various interp:c'etations of 'criteria' 1:1e follO\"Jed Cook 
in suggesting that if the term tne,mt an.ything it referred to the details 
of particulsx cases that one might refer to in ordinary life. lIe cannot 
ignore 'background' details or ignore Hhat VIe have called the 'culture' 
whicl1 is associated "lith 'gramr:,ar'. lJe sa\"i also that \ii ttgenstein 's 
style VIaS 'contrapuntal' and that we coula. refer to 'criteria' in a \Vay 
which seems superficially similar to 'cri teriolo.sical' approaches but 
whose \1Ihole import is the oppo,si te. 'Grs..[{x1atical remarks' are reminders 
of what it makes .sense to say in a 'culture' or a 'lanGuage gaR.e'. The 
emphasi.s, as \"i th 'criteria' is on the particular. A' ŦŲŠÜŪŸŠWÙȘŠŨĚ
ŲŤÜŸØÛGĚ is an i}J.junction to look at the 'language gaoe' we play Hi th the 
,vord. It can be made Vlhen we have been misled by 8.J.J.alogies in language 
e.ES. 'beli:::ving is not-thinking' (P.L s.574). A 'grammatical proposition' 
has a different status as a frozen record of ",hat it rl1ues sense to say 
e.g. 'Zvery rod. has a length'. Such prorlositions have a quality 1:Ihich 
we might describe as their beinG 'unasGailable'. In certain. contexts 
our list of 'definitions' r!light serve as 'grammatical remarks', just 
a:=: the juxtaposi tioD of therD ŲGŨÙWŸUWĚ be called making a 'gramr!;atical 
rer:larlc'. SOIDe have beel1 defe,lded as if they were 'gramn:atical 
proposi tions ' • These general pro:::,osi tions are, tr_ere fore, like signposts. 
In this form and context they direct us to the 'common feature' in 
another they may direct us to the particular. 
Thirdly, Ziff's account is restricted to a words 'strict lo;ic'. 
He o:genly ma..C;:es the 'classic' c'.ove of cOIlce:9tual analysis even to the 
extent of listing counter-e:-eamples a.;aL'lst his m-1l1 c_efinition of 'good'. 
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If 1I1e acceIJt that his ŠŨŸŮŲŬŠȘUĚ is 'cri teriological' the 'jevIel' analogy 
a.nd the consideration of 'devie.nt' instailces 1.JOuld give us something 
li'rce a 'fa.mily rese:nblance' a.ccount of a tel"m'S meaIling. Thus in 
different cases different sets of 'criteria' would be associated with 
the term. This \-JOuld le2.ve us ,-lith an i3.cco'0.nt very rmch like Richardson's. 
Riche.rdson believes that the 'theory of criteria' that 'clitt[:;enstein 
pre;-3ents ŠŪȘŸĚ the 'family reseE1bl;:;.nce' notion make exactly the same 
points. A' farrrily re':'eGlblance ' term is seen as one governed. by a. loose 
set of criteria. These would parallel Ziff's sets of sets of conditions. 
1.Ie have argued in Chapter Three that it is a ÜÙŸJWŠŨȘŤĚ to see the Eleta.phor 
as it is a oistake to see ŠŪŸØĚ of "'li ttgenstein' s metaI::hors, as tlore than a 
ÜŤWŠĦŸUŬŲĦĚ It does not give us a general or restricted account of mea.ning. 
It is meant to di:cect us ai'Je.y frorJ looking for any sinb"le a.ccount. It 
does not ŸŸŲŤVŤŪWĚus Hi th an anti-ree.list account of meaning but colla.pses 
into rea.lism. Gur attempt to apply the metaphor in a literal ,vay a.t the 
beginning of this chapter vras an attempt to shol"J both the limitations 
as \vell a.s the prophylactic possibilities. Our account was restricted 
to a. SUll1)osedly 'second order' sense of the term 'education' 'dhich 
connects the term v!i th '"hat ,:;-oes on in schools. (54) But insta..l1ces to 
Hhich our list of 'definitions' ap1'ly could be said to be related to 
one another in a. 'far,lily reserLlblaiJ.ce' \-JaY and lience related by a. loose 
set of criteria.. This '.lould tie up with :2ed.diford's ana.lysis a.s he 
urges us to ȘÕŸÍVÙTŤŲĚmore than one or two 'lancuaze games' ŸĞŨŠĦXŤTĚ vIi th 
the ,vord 'education'. Though his position on the idea of a 'loose set 
of criteria' is uncertain, his rejection of 'substa:>:ltii3.l criteria' and 
'logically necessary cO:>:laitions' in Peters' sense are clearly rejections 
of the Be'V. 
'lJe therefore have an account of r:1eani.ng ':Jhich rejects the excesses 
of both sorts of 'logicist' procedures a.nd a.voids the pitfalls ŬŸĚ the 
BCV. To resist such a vievl ',le would have to repeat the ars'Ument of 
previous cha.:Jters. For the introduction of a 'family resemblance' 
account of rlleaning ioJOuld be 'Hrong-hes.deci'. nor 1:iOula it be at all 
effica.cious in breakins the h2.bi t of thought tha.t 'He are combatting. 
For such a.n account wou2.d ("till embody what I have called the 
'cri teriolocica.l' tendency. 'The tenc.e.ency aptly put by '.JiscJ.oL1 as the 
idea that 'Unless one h3.s a criterion that thinC3 are of a. certain 
kind., then on8 C&'l"l never have ratio:1al ground for the claim that a 
thing is of that kind or for a claim that it is not of that kind.' 
( 'T"- VII 1 \ 
..::..::; A p •• ) Despi te their going SO;:1e',ray to recognise variety and 
criteriological variance these views still encourage the view that the 
relationship between these loose sets of 'criteria' and any application 
of a term will remain one of 'quasi-entailment'. This will become 
clearer in our discussion of Casey's 'criteriological' approach to 
literary criticism in Chapter Five. But one obvious objection to such 
an account can be mentioned here. 'Loose sets of criteria' are still 
'criteria'. Our craving for generality is such that philosophers 
will see such a view as defeatist. There will always be a tendency to 
look for the dominant criterion. 
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The 'family resemblance' metaphor, it has been argued, is essentially 
connected with the case by case procedure. In applying the notion to 
the concept of education in a restricted way we do see something of what 
an injunction to consider cases meant. However, this was inadequate 
for reasons already mentioned. The concept of education neither is nor 
is not a 'family resemblance' concept. 
The aim of our inquiry is to give increased grasp of the concept 
of education. We are concerned with understanding a concept despite 
the fact that we seem to understand and 'employ' that concept very well. 
\fuen we said earlier that any of our list of general remarks in 
'definitional' form do not tell us much we might have said that they 
do not illuminate the concept of education. They do not give us 
increased grasp. Part of the problem stems from the inappropriateness 
of the philosopher's questions which are answered in what we might call 
'appropriate' form. Such remarks serve us well. They connect up cases. 
But in ÜŸŸÙŪŦĚsuch connections they do not go beyond what would be 
achieved by a presentation of case after case. Nor can they get us off 
the ground. Only a case by case procedure can do that. Only a case 
by case procedure can give us increased grasp. 
Chapter Five EDUCATION BY EXAMPLES 
'Examples' suggests imaginative descriptions. Unlike 'instances' 
they do not so readily suggest the instantiation of universals. 'Cases', 
our preferred term up to now, is more neutral. In Chapter One we 
documented the perfunctory treatment of examples in philosophy of 
education. We found that examples, when presented, were hackneyed, 
restricted and hopelessly indeterminate. Examples from literature 
have the advantage of being determinate. Although their presentation 
may be indeterminate. A novel gives us a detailed and concrete 
presentation of a 'form of life' or 'culture' in Wittgenstein's sense. 
Indeed an almost Wittgensteinian example is provided by William 
Golding's The Inheritors which describes the 'form of life' and 
'culture' of Neanderthal man. Neanderthalers have 'many pictures' 
but 'few words' and exhibit a remarkable capacity for 'imaging,.(1) 
We should, therefore, consider whole novels. But we must be content 
with a rough and indeterminate sketch of them. That such examples 
are determinate does not mean that disagreement is impossible. It 
means that disagreement cannot take the form of new facts. There are 
no rabbits to be pulled out of hats. (2) Nevertheless critical 
judgements and evaluations vary, and we may think that if they are 
not to remain entirely subjective their justification must take a 
'criteriological' form. 
5.1. The Particularity of Criticism 
Judgements about whether any example from literature is an 
example of 'education' will be a class of critical jUdgements. A 
difficulty for a case by case approach, here as elsewhere is 
created by the existence of a 'criteriological' theory. In literary 
criticism such an aocount would take the following form. Critical 
judgement is objective because critical argument is rational. Critical 
argument is rational because there exist non-inductive, and non-
deductive 'criteriological' considerations which connect certain 
considerations with certain (value) judgements. Considerations which 
show a novel like Howard's End to be sentimental, albeit in an 
innocent way, 'criteriologicallylimply that it is immature. Making 
a critical error would, therefore amount to failing or refusing to 
see the non-deductive, non-inductive, quasi-entailment relationship 
exists between certain characteristics and a response. This, by now 
ÍĮŸĚ
familiar scenario, represents the view of literary criticism put 
forward by John Casey. Casey considers that there are 'close 
analogies between the way one justifies the interpretation of a rule' 
and 'the way one argues for a particular interpretation of' a novel 
and 'the way one can rationally persuade someone to take up a particu-
lar attitude'. (3) He makes much of a quotation from Wittgenstein's 
discussion of understanding to the effect that 'it is the circumstances 
under which he had such an experience that justify him in saying that 
in such a case he understands' (P.I. s. 155). There is an internal 
relationship between the work of art and the response. But we cannot 
deduce the response, and it is not something invariably but 
contingently connected with the work. The 'criteria' we have are 
neither necessary and sufficient or sufficient conditions but they do 
entail certain jUdgements. This, we are told, is an application of 
Wittgenstein's 'general account of reasoning'. (4) 
But the analogy with following a rule will simply not support 
Casey's account. As we saw in Chapter Two there is no justification 
for our colour judgements. We say 'This is red' but we cannot 
justify this by reference to our following a 'meaning rule' associated 
with 'red'. But our colour judgements are objective. Our colour 
preferences may not be, and we often give reasons for them. 'I like 
this blue it goes well with the Morris wallpaper'. Thus we can have 
objective judgements, and hence objective critical judgements, without 
their necessarily taking the form Casey suggests. And reference to 
rules will not supply a general account of reasoning. Reasons are not 
in order here 'we follow a rule blindly' ĜŸVĦĚ219). The notions 
of 'objectivity' and of 'giving reasons' are quite distinct and we do 
not need 'criteriological' implications to make critical judgement 
objective. 
Casey wishes to make the objectivity of critical judgements a 
result of the acknowledgement of, or of coming to see, certain 
'criteriological connections'. His paradigm is 'sentimentality is 
unintelligent'. This is his idea of cogent reasoning in literary 
criticism. Thus coming to see that examples are examples of education 
would be coming to see that because criteria 'X', lye, 'Z' are present 
here this is a case of 'education'. This procedure can be challenged 
by a sceptic, and there are two problems to be faced. Firstly there 
is the '(philosophical) problem of getting someone to see how a given 
set of criteria count towards a conclusion' and secondly there is the 
ÍĮŸĚ
'(critical or aesthetic) problem of getting him to see that these 
criteria are the relevant ones for the conclusion in question,.(5) 
'Someone may know a,b,c, ••• , and yet not see how 
a,b,c, ••• bear on C; and someone may know that 
if a.b.c. then C, and yet not know whether a,b,c, ••• , 
or even see that such and such was an example of 
a,b, or c, etc. The latter ignorance creates a 
difficult problem, for it may require not only the 
enforcing of particular jUdgements (on the basis of 
further criteria), but also an introduction to aspects 
of the whole context in which evaluation takes place. 
When the two forms of ignorance are combined they 
must be remedied together; and that is what I call the 
problem of getting someone to see the criteria as 
criteria.' (6) 
To influence the sceptic we can proceed 'extensively' and contrast 
these criteria with other examples of criteria or by contrasting them 
with features that aren't criteria. Or we can proceed 'intensively' 
and pick out a central criterion the bearing of which cannot be 
denied in some other case, and hence cannot be denied in this. Much 
of what Casey has to say is supported by references to Wisdom's 
appeal to cases. He talks of br:ing:irg cases to bear on cases, and 
of the procedure of 'reflective thought'as advocated by Wisdom. (7) 
And yet what we have here is a parody of Wisdom's case by case 
procedure. When faced with someone who is sceptical about the 
objectivity of critical judgements we present them with 'criteria'. 
And we are being told, by implication, that this is Wisdom's view! 
Casey's account of the objectivity of critical judgements simply 
will not do. If we talk about such judgements as being 'subjective' 
this is an expression of exasperation. It is difficult to discover 
considerations which will stop our vacillations. For example, is 
Marlowe in The Heart of Darkness as hollow as all the rest, or is he 
a reliable narrator? Hard and arduous critical labour must be 
engaged in before we can decide. If critical judgement is objective 
this is not a matter of logic, or quasi-entailments of the 
'criteriological' kind. Rather it is a matter of fact or of convergence 
towards consensus. And this can be expedited ŞXŸĦĚTalk may provide 
us with a rationale, but not in the form of 'criteria'. Talk may also 
help us with the sceptic. Talk may also lead us to change our minds. 
Indeed it often does so, and it is this fact that leads us to believe 
that criticism is objective. One of Casey's central examples will 
illustrate this point. Leavis characterises the opening lines of 
Shelley's poem The Cenci as being 'voluminously emotional'. We come to 
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accept this as an apt characteristion of Shelley's work. We do not 
come to this conclusion by being forced to agree that being 
'voluminously emotional' 'criteriologically' entails being immature. 
Producing considerations which 'criteriologically' entail certain 
responses has a general failing which we commented upon in Chapter One. 
Any considerations that showed us that one work was 'funny', 'sad', 
'tragic' might equally well apply to another work where such a 
judgement was not appropriate. Isn't this a reason for avoiding a 
'criteriological' approach? Surely there is more to literary 
criticism than pointing out 'criteriological' considerations. Leavis 
thinks so. In reply to criticisms of Revaluation he says: 
'Has any reader of my book been less aware of the 
essential criteria that emerge than he would if 
I had laid down such general propositions as: 
"poetry must be serious in relation to actuality, 
it must have a firm grasp of the actual, of the 
object, it must be in relation to life, it must 
not be cut off from direct vulgar living, it should 
be normally human ••• "? If, as I did, I avoided such 
generalities, it was not out of timidity; it was because 
they seemed too clumsy to be of any use. I thought I 
had provided something better. My whole effort was to 
work in terms of concrete judgements and particular 
analyses: "This - doesn't it? - bears such a relation 
to that; this kind of thing - don't you find it so? - wears 
better than that", etc.' (9) 
Clearly, Leavis would find a 'criteriological' approach intolerably 
clumsy and inadequate. His remarks about being aware of Wellek's 
'essential criteria' are not to be taken as suggesting that we will 
gain anything by extracting such abstract principles. By abstracting 
such principles and criteria his work would be made less precise, and 
much would be lost. 
Casey is concerned with establishing that there is a 'logic of 
the emotions'. But his account of critical judgements about ŸÜŬWÙŬŪVGĚ
is one that applies to all critical judgements, indeed to all forms 
of judgement. It is a general account of reasoning. We shall see in 
section 5.3. what consequences this has for Leavis' critical procedure. 
For that procedure as represented schematically above has obvious 
parallels with a case by case procedure. The main reason for consid-
ering Casey's account here is to forestall and pre-empt obvious 
criticisms of a case by case procedure that makes extensive reference 
to examples from literature. For that, too, attempts to offer some-
thing better than 'abstract ŮŲÙŪȘÙŮŨŸGĚ or 'essential criteria'. 
ÍŸĚ
5.2. A Case by Case Procedure 
When would a case by case procedure or an account of 'education' 
by examples, be appropriate? Perhaps in reply to the philosopher's 
inappropriate questionings; Or perhaps in reply to an appropriate 
question? But here we would have to take great care and perhaps 
simplify things. Perhaps it can be imagined as a course in 
philosophy of education? Or perhaps as a lengthy debate? A debate 
that need not, as our documentation established, be conducted by 
academics or philosophers. vfuatever setting we chose the procedure 
would go something 1i ke this: 
In Free Fall by William Golding the early life and schooling 
of Sammy Mountjoy is described. Much of it concerns his interaction 
with two teachers, I-iiss Pringle, and Nick Shales. Rhees argues that 
a good teacher is like a person of character in that he can illuminate 
his sUbject.(9) The man and the subject cannot be separated. Our 
education can come from knowing someone. Sammy experiences the 
separation of man and subject: 
'Yet I did not choose a materialistic belief, I chose 
Nick. For this reason truth seems unattainable. I know 
myself to be irrational because a rationalist belief 
dawned in me and I had no base for it in logic or calm 
thought. People are the walls of our room, not 
philosophies'. (10) 
Nick taught science whereas Miss Pringle taught religious studies. 
Sammy knows that Hoses is more important to him than 'the composition 
of water' but: 
'The beauty of Miss Pringle's cosmos was vitiated because 
she was a bitch. Nick's stunted universe was irradi ated 
by his love of people'. (11) 
Miss Pringle is 'frustrated eaten up with secret desires and passions' 
with only a 'flimsy virtue' accredited to her by her virginity. Nick 
the rationalist, on the other hand is 'followed by children as if he 
. (12) 
were a VŠŸŪWGĦĚ Sammy's education is constituted by these deep 
contradictions. Perhaps this is too complicated and paradoxical an 
example to begin with. Let us take another example: 
In Fyodor Dostoyevsky's The Idiot (13) the simpleton, Prince 
Myshkin, recounts the 'story' of his relationship with the Consumptive 
peasant girl, Marie, and of his friendship with the village children. 
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This friendship makes an enemy for him in the person of Thibault, the 
village schoolmaster and gains him only criticism from Schneider, his 
doctor, who castigates his 'harmful system with children'. ÓXVŸŸÙŪĚhas 
no system. He merely befriends the children, never concealing anything 
from them, even to his own detriment. After several rebuttals he 
eventually has a great success in getting the children to treat the 
dying and rejected Marie with reverence and respect. For this he is 
persecuted by the villagers. But this only strengthens his relation-
ship with the children. As Schneider says, he is 'a complete child 
himself.' And though this is not quite true he is as innocent as a 
child and this reaches the children. The story is not an irrelevant 
aside in the novel. It is an important mirror to how the Prince will 
affect people thoughout the n07el. It makes sense to call this 
'incident' one of education for the children. But such examples need 
not be closely tied to schooling: 
(14) In Ken Kesey's One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest Randle McMurphy 
brings into the Institute of Psychology 'the man smell of dust and dirt 
from the open fields, and sweat, and work.' The effect,. of this man on 
the inmates Billy Babbit, Harding, George, Scanlon, and Chief Bromden 
in particular is traumatic. He clears away the fog in which they 
live. Their experience of McMurphy the ŸHĚis an education. Let us 
look ŠĦŸĚ some different examples. 
In Boris Pasternak's Doctor Zhivago(15) Yury Zhivago does well at 
Moscow University medical school coming second in the whole city. He 
is also artistically inclined and has a book of poems published. A 
paradigm of what most people would call education. 
. (16) ĿŬŪVŸTŤŲĚalso Thomas Hardy's Jude The Obscure Jude Fawley's 
story is one of 'constant failure both in ambition and love.' His 
ambitions are academic ones, but because of his class and background 
he is thwarted in them. He is by no means an unlearned or ignorant 
person. In Chapters 1-6 we read of his intensive, if incomplete, 
private study. He masters alone and single-handed the elements of Latin, 
Greek, Mathematics, History, and Religion. It could hardly be denied 
that this provides a clear instance of education. 
(17) In Charles Dickens' Hard Times we have a notorious example 
of something that is not a case of education in action - the Gradgrind 
School with its emphasis on facts 'and nothing but the facts'. But 
here also we have the history of Sissy Jupe and of her adoption by 
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Mr. Gradgrind. Gradgrind clearly expresses his aims to Sissy as being 
'to take charge of you, to educate you, and provide for you'. The 
irony in this is that Sissy accomplishes an education of the Gradgrind 
family one that is the opposite of the utilitarian ideal. At the end 
of the book we have Gradgrind asking his star pupil, aptly named Bitzer, 
'Have you a heart?' and receiving a purely factual anatomical answer. 
To anyone who has read the book this would be clear case of }tr. Gradgrind's 
education simply through living in close proximity to Sissy. Let us 
look at yet another set of examples: 
In Mark Twain's Huckleberry Finn (18)we are presented with the 
experience of two boys sailing on a raft down the Mississippi River. 
The two boys, Huck and the negro Jim, learn a lot from their trip. 
They advance and grow not onlywcrldly wise but morally as well. This 
is clearly shown when Tom appears towards the end. He is still the 
child they knew in Tom Sawyer. Jim has been imprisoned as a runaway, 
though he is free and Tom knows this. Tom does not act directly but 
turns the whole saga into a romantic daydream, one which ends 
happily for him because he gets a quixotic bullet in his leg. There 
is an air of cruelty about Tom's seemingly childish actions. He is 
introduced into the novel as a foil to reveal ÑẀȘŸĚmoral development. 
His development is instanced several times towards the end of the 
novel. One notable example concerns the scene in which Huck plays a 
trick on Jim when they are lost in thick fog on the river. Jim is so 
hurt by the incident that Huck is moved by this simple 'nigger': 
'It was fifteen minutes before I could work myself up to 
go and humble myself to a nigger - but I done it and I 
warn't ever sorry for it afterwards neither. I didn't do 
him no more tricks, and I wouldn't done that if I'd a 
knowed it would make him feel that way.' (19) 
It is not for its readability, not for its being a rattling good yarn, 
that this book has impinged itself upon the American consciousness. It 
is not a series of chance incidents but a fine example of a boy's 
education. 
In Daniel Defoe's Robinson Crusoe (20) Crusoe does not seek to 
suffer shipwreck. At the moment of shipwreck he resolves 'to sit all 
night, and consider the next day what death I shall die, for as yet 
I see no prospect of life.' (21) From these thoughts of suicide he 
begins to reflect upon his lot somewhat deeper. He contrasts the 
polar elements of his situation the 'evils' and the 'good'. He adapts 
to his situation. He learns how to build a house, to cook, hunt, to 
kill, to cultivate the ground and grow crops, to do wicker work, to 
harvest, to make clothes. All this takes six years. After twenty five 
years on the island he rescues a savage and learns to live with him. 
He learns humility through this friendship. It is clear that we can 
agree with Rousseau in considering this as an example of an education. 
(22) In H.D. Thoreau's Walden Thoreau's persona suggests that 
building your own university would be the best form of education for 
students. (23) His own attempt to simplify his life and to live by 
Walden pond is often taken to be an instance of education through an 
experience of solitude and self sufficiency. But it is not a model 
for education. 
its rejection. 
heaven, here is 
What is educational about that experience must end in 
His life at the pond leads Thoreau to exclaim 'Thank 
(24) 
not all the world.' This experience also has an 
essential element the rejection of the isolated hermit like existence 
that Thoreau lived. A subtler instance of education. 
In Henry Fielding's Tom Jones (25) Master Blifil and Jones' 
education is entrusted to two gentlemen, a Mr Thwackum, who is a 
devout man, a believer in the divine power of grace, and a Mr Squire, 
a philosopher who puts his trust in the natural beauty of virtue. 
Both boys are brought up between these two paradigms of learning. 
Jones becomes master of none, and pays regard to neither of these 
learned men. Master Blifil, on the other hand, soon masters both 
systems, and uses them to advantage. Jones' education is gained at 
the hand of Black George the game keeper, and his daughter Molly. 
This is the pattern of the book. Jones' education is gleaned from 
bed to bed and not book to book. Fielding clearly contrasts the 
worthlessness of the 'education' of Blifil with the education that 
Jones receives. 
In James Joyce's A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (26) 
we have a picture of the developing sensibility of a rather pompous 
young artist. What are we meant to make of Stephen Dedalus? If we 
consider his poetry, in particular the villanelle 'Are you not weary 
of ardent ways?' We find that it is competent. But is it good? We 
are not sure how we are supposed to take the poem. This ambiguity is 
built into all Stephen's educational experiences at Conglowes, at 
Trinity, and in the streets of Dublin. Are we meant to laugh at 
Stephen's antics, at his 'aesthetic theory' or not? This very 
difficulty gives us a problematic or borderline case of 'education'. 
But the following are not ŸŬŲTŤŲŨÙŪŤGJĚ
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In D.H. Lawrence's The Rainbow (27)the last part is taken up with 
the story of Ursula Brangwen's excursion into the outside world as a 
teacher. While teaching at Ilkeston she moves from idealism to the 
reality of classroom discipline. When she is forced to cane a boy she 
feels 'as if violated to death.' (28) She goes to college. She has 
an unhappy affair. Lawrence tells us that her experiences have given 
her 'unalterable knowledge' of her real self, the kernel within her 
which 'was free and strong to take new root, to create new knowledge. ,(29) 
With this new knowledge the arch of the rainbow is completed. Ursula's 
achievement is clearly intended by Lawrence to be thought of as an 
education. 
In Jane Austin's ŸHĜĨÌĞĚEmma Woodhouse is described as 
'handsome, clever and rich, with a comfortable home and happy dispos-
ition.' (31) Throughout the novel we witness Emma's responses to a 
series of hard blows from fate. These culminate in her cruelty to 
Miss Bates, a harmless chatterbox. Because she has had too much of 
her own way and thinks too well of herself she has escaped both 
criticism from others - except Knightly - and has protected herself 
from herself through romantic fantasies. After the Box Hill episode 
in which she hurt Miss Bates, and earns Knightly's reproach, and 
because this comes on top of much else, she cannot escape the shame. 
Nor does it diminish for 'she felt it in her heart'. (32) She 
humbles herself and matures from being a merely clever into a compass-
ionate woman. Though this brief outline does not do any justice to 
the subtle nature of Emma's redemption - something that is evinced by 
the commentators who argue that she will never change but will soon 
find another Harriet - there is enough of the story to make sense of 
the claim that it is another instance of education. 
In Edward Albee's Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf? (33) the ŸẀŪĚand 
games' between George and Martha, and between George and Martha and 
Honey and Nick develop less and less funny overtones as their social 
evening progresses. At the end of the play Martha breaks an implicit 
promise and reveal the 'existence' of their fictitious 'son'. Because 
of this revelation George finds it necessary to 'kill' him. We leave 
the play with the protagonists, George and Martha, desperately lonely 
and clinging together on stage. That series of games could be 
described as their 'education'. 
In Robertson Davies The Manticore (34) we are given a lengthy 
account of David Staunton's treatment by a Jungian psychoanalyst Dr. 
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J. von Haller. Staunton is an advocate and has a first class degree 
from Oxford. He is an educated man. But his education is shown to 
be no education. His education results from his treatment and his 
experience in the cave of bears during his stay at Sorgenfrei. It 
follows from his recognition of man and hence himself as not a 'good' 
but a 'noble' animal. As a descendent of a bear worshipper who 
shudders and stinks: 'Was it only yesterday I had been called the 
boy who could not shudder?' A trick of the wind in the cave causes 
fear 'I knew in that instant the sharpness of death' and 'my bowels 
turned to water and gushed out into my pants, and the terrible stench 
(35) that filled the tunnel was my own! But Staunton's experiences 
only take him 'Out of the darkness into the gloom'. (36) The process 
of education is never completed. Now let us look at some examples 
similar to those given in Chapter 4 section 4.2: 
In Tolstoy's The Cossacks (37) Olenin tries to live in the 
village of Movomlinsk like a cossack peasant. Though he apes Gaffer 
Yeroshka, the old hunter, and makes love to the beautiful peasant girl 
Marianka, his attempt is doomed to failure from the outset. Tolstoy 
makes it abundantly clear that he is trying to live out a romantic 
fantasy. He can never be like the peasants. As he spends the night 
drinking and discussing his plans to join the army, Tolstoy remarks: 
'The workers are beginning to get up after the long winter night, and 
set off for work. But, for the gentry, it is still the evening before. ,(38) 
Though Olenin lives, and hunts, with the peasants they regard him with 
disdain. This is not WUŤŸXĚthey treat other army officers. In the 
end he leaves disillusioned. The novel closes on this note: 
'IiGoodbye, lad! Goodbye! I won't forget you!" 
shouted Yeroshka. When Olenin looked round the 
old man was chatting to Marianka, evidently about his 
own affairs, and neither he nor the girl had a glance 
for him'. (39) 
Olenin's stay in the village constituted an education for him. 
(40) In The Death of Ivan Illych Tolstoy says: 'The story of 
Ivan Illych's life was one of the simplest, most ordinary, and therefore 
most terrible.' (41) Illych has lived a purely formal and public life. 
Only when he is dying does he come to know compassion through his 
dependence on his servant Gerassim. His first attempt to come to terms 
with impending death is to reflect upon the syllogism 'Caius is a man , 
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men are mortal, therefore Caius is mortal. ,(42) This reveals his 
previous character and Tolstoy's views about the importance of a man 
as a rational animal. Illych's son and daughter are cast in his 
mould. They see his dying days as a wretched inconvenience, and they 
are upset because he can't bring himself to comment on their dress. 
Ilych comes to realise that his life has been 'loathsome and senseless' 
and a sense of 'horror' fills him. After the sacrament is given to 
him he begins to scream for days with a moan that was 'so awful that 
one could not hear it through closed doors two rooms away without 
horror.' (43) At the end of his life Ilych is moved to feel real pity 
for the sufferings of his family and his fear of death vanishes. 'In 
. (44) the place of death there was ŨŸŦUWĦGĚ Another example of an 
education. 
In Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness (45) Marlow, a man as hollow 
as all men, tells us of his experience of the heart of darkness through 
his 'chosen nightmare' Kurtz. Mr. Kurtz who, ironically, is a 
representative of the 'International Society for the Suppression of 
Savage Customs' becomes a member of a savage tribe in a 'region of 
subtle horrors, where pure uncomplicated savagery was a positive 
relief.' (46) Kurtz, and through him Marlowe, faces the horror at 
the heart of man's life. Unlike Kurtz, Marlowe finds the prospect of 
facing this reality too frightening: 'It would have been too dark.' 
He has not the courage to go into the heart of the immense darkness. 
Marlowe's struggle with Kurtz, man and legend, is an instance of 
education. 
(47) 
In George Eliot's Silas Marner (48) Silas loses his gold and 
gains a golden child 'a round, fair thing, with soft golden rings all 
over its head.' (49) Previously 'money had stood to him as the symbol 
of the earthly good.' (50) Though Eppie is not his natural child, he 
brings her up. When her real parents come to claim the child several 
years later, her mother says 'I've a claim on you Eppie - the strongest 
of all claims'. (51) Eppie rejects this biological fetter and at the 
end of the novel affirms Silas her true father. This is evidence of 
how he has changed. He haS learnt to value the things of the heart 
and is rewarded by Eppie's loyalty. It is this sort of case that we 
commonly talk of someone's undergoing an education. 
To take another example from Tolstoy we can return, once again to 
(52) War and Peace. After the battle of Moscow, Pierre, though a non-
combattant, is arrested as a spy. He is questioned by Davout, almost 
ÍŸĚ
shot, and put into prison. It is this experience in prison that is the 
period of his life that has the most effect on him. Imprisoned, he finds 
he is an equal with the peasants and with Platon Karataev in particular. 
Tolstoy expresses the change in Pierre in terms of the change in his 
physical appearance. But there is also a spiritual change. When Platon 
falls behind on a march, and is shot by the French, Pierre undergoes one 
of those mQmentous shifts (aspect change?) that are frequent and central 
in Tolstoy: 
"'How simple it is and how clear" thought Pierre. "How was 
it that I did not know before? God is in the midst and 
each drop strives to expand to reflect Him on the largest 
scale possible. And it grows, and is absorbed and crowded 
out, and on the surface it disappears, goes back into the 
depths, and falls not to the surface again. That is how 
it is with him, with Karataev; he is absorbed and has 
disappeared.' (53) 
Pierre's imprisonment has illuminated and made meaningful this piece 
of theological dogma. His world has changed though he knows no more 
than he knew before. A case of education. 
We could go on. We need not terminate the procedure here. 
Examples come to mind from A Passage to India, The Brothers Karamazov, 
ÖÙȘÛŴÙȘŸĚPapers, The Outsider and many other novels. Many of these 
works have critical commentaries written upon them which expressly" 
refer to a central character's 'education'. (54) It would be 
useful to develop and extend these examples. But there are numerous 
objections to this approach and we must meet them. 
5.3. Some Objections 
We might have ended this concatenation of cases with the remark 
that 'These and the like' are examples of education. This is quite 
different from the suggestion that we might end with the remark that 
this, ŠŪTŸHĚand that 'And so on' are cases of education. For the 
use of the phrase 'Ands so on' implies that there is some sort of rule 
to follow here. We could say of examples like the one illustrated by 
Yuri Zhivago, and by any case of a successful university career that 
they all have certain features in common. Perhaps we could end a list 
of such cases with the phrase 'And so on'. There seems to be some 'rule' 
that we could isolate thB.t would apply in all these cases. Perhaps 
Peters' 'knowledge and understanding in depth and breadth' would be 
applicable here? Similarly, we could isolate common features in 
1911. 
several of the other cases and analogous instances. Of cases like 
Emma we can say it illustrates a general notion of education as a 
process of moral growth and development. Of cases like that of 
Pierre in War and Peace, and of Nekhlyuov in Resurrection we can talk 
of them as instances of the idea that education is the development of 
the soul. We could, in fact match these examples with many of the 
general propositions listed in Chapter Four. We can go further and 
talk of education of the emotions. We would thus have a set of 
principles that would, perhaps, enable us to make use of the phrase 
'And so on'. Thi& as must be obvious, would be to reinstate the 
Kantian view of examples and merely to see them as illustrative of 
general propositions. This is certainly a role for examples. But it 
is not one to which our energies have been devoted. We tried to offer 
something better. 
An account offered in terms of 'common features' or 'criteria' 
would soon run into difficulties. We may find actual or imaginable 
cases which meet any criterion but which we would deny were examples 
of education. This may be because one criterion of education conflicts 
with another. We might take Ivan Illych to be a man of great knowledge 
and understanding, and therefore an 'educated man'. But there would 
always be a Tolstoy who would dispute this and not allow that someone 
was educated until he underwent a spiritual development which meant 
giving up, literally in Illych's case, the ordinary knowledge of the 
material world. If two 'dominant' criteria clash in this way then the 
classic move of conceptual analysis is often employed. This allows the 
complex and difficult examples to be ignored if they prove too intract-
able. Either the examples are bruised and battered until they fit some 
general criterion or they are dismissed as peripheral or eccentric. A 
'family resemblance' approach which allows the existence of a 'loose 
set of criteria' might seem kinder to such examples. Difficult examples 
can be said to be typical of a concept with 'broad borderlines' where, 
though we have determinate criteria, we are not certain which criteria 
apply in such cases. Alternatively, if we allowed that the set of 
criteria was indeterminate there would seem to be a redundancy here. 
Why talk of 'criteria' at all? Four courses seem open to us: Firstly, 
we make the example fit the criterion; secondly, we ignore the example; 
thirdly, we look for a determinate criterion; and fourthly, we simply 
allow the criterion to be indeterminate. Such an unhappy state of 
affairs suggests a fifth alternative, simply don't talk of 'criteria' 
at all, or at least not in this way. Not when our intention is to 
bring about increased grasp of the concept of education. 
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But if we don't talk of 'criteria' in connection with these 
examples then it may seem that anything goes. It may seem impossible 
to bring counter-examples. Any example from literature could be said 
to be an example of education. And if everything is an example of 
something then nothing is. To put this another way, selecting certain 
examples as examples of education implies that other examples are not 
examples of education. Consider the Huckleberry Finn example. Wouldn't 
any account of childhood in literature constitute an example of educa-
tion? Quite obviously not. Salinger's The Catcher in the Rye provides 
us with an instance which has often been compared to Huckleberry Finn. 
Holden Caulfield's experience bears only a superficial resemblance to 
those of Huck. Holden runs away from school to busy New York. 'All 
life' seems to be there,just as on the Mississippi. The obvious 
difference is seen in the conclusion. Holden sits in the rain getting 
soaked, while his little sister has a ride on a carousel: 
'I felt so damB happy all of a sudden, the way old Phoebe 
kept going round and round. I was damn near bawling. I 
felt so damn happy, if you want to know the truth. I don't 
know why. It was just that she looked so damn nice, the 
way she kept going round, in her blue coat and all. God,I 
wish you could've been there.' (55) 
'Voluminous emotionalism' is put to good effect here to describe a 
breakdown. Holden's is a desperate attempt to remain a child. To 
fix himself, like Phoebe, eternally on a carousel. An example of an 
attempt not to grow up but to ŦŲŬŴŸĦĚ The acceptance or rejection 
of such examples is expedited, by ŸHĚby discussion of the details 
of the works in question. This can proceed in a case by case fashion. 
Compare this here with how this ŴŬŲÛVŸĦĚ The details of such 
a procedure and the possibility of extracting 'criteria' from it will 
be discussed below. We have seen that we are not in a position in 
which 'anything goes'. Some remarks about why we may feel that we 
are in such a position are apposite here. 
In philosophy, we are not primarily concerned with the correct or 
incorrect use of a word. We are not concerned at all with the question 
of how many people use the word to mean such-and-such. Thus it might 
be that a very frequent use of a word was of little interest to us. 
Purely ŰẀŸWŸÙẂŤĚconcerns are not ours. It may be a fact that the 
majority of people when they use the word 'education', use it in the 
closest connection with educational institutions such as schools, 
colleges, and universities. If this was some philosopher's basis for 
undertaking conceptual analysis then we should have to say that whatever 
19' 
his enterprise was, and however valuable it turned out to be, it was 
lacking in the very spirit of philosophy. In the examples given above 
a certain bias can be detected. Crudely, we can express this by saying 
that most of the examples of education given are questionable. They can, 
and will, be challenged. An elaborate series of examples could have been 
given of the more 'traditional' kind which would correspond with common 
usage in the sense discussed above. These would include examples of 
successful university education (Yuri Zhivago, Ivan Karamazov, etc.) 
and of self education (Jude Fawley, etc.). In these cases something 
is achieved that is connected with formal instruction, even if given 
by oneself. These examples are so rife that it could be contended that 
the practice of conceptual analysis restricts itself to them, and more 
importantly, gains whatever credibility it has from the prevalence of 
such cases. No doubt some criterion can be extracted from such cases. 
But these examples may not be central in any other than a non-philoso-
phical sense. They may reflect a common but unilluminating usage. 
Peters has argued that many people who use 'education' in this way 
clearly do not value it. The implication being that they do not see 
the value of it, and not that they are sceptical about what they are 
being offered. Even if the majority of people did value education as 
characterised by the knowledge criterion, little would follow from 
this. Reddiford has suggested that the attempt to weld the concept of 
education firmly to knowledge and value is most appropriate in a 
primitive society where the adult 'discernment of the possibilities of 
human relationships offer few paradigms to the next generation'. (56) 
The poverty of such a concept of education renders it a commonplace if 
applied to sophisticated modern societies. Philosophers of education 
achieve such analyses by restricting themselves to the 'strict logic' 
of a term. That is, they are interested only in cases which are clear 
instances of an established usage of a term. In Chapter One we 
discussed Wisdom's classification of philosophical questions. The 
suggestion being entertained here is that conceptual analysis is 
restricted because it restricts itself to questions about a term's 
'strict logic'. 
Wisdom's classification was fourfold. Questions were divided into 
(a) Empirical questions; (b) questions of Strict Logic; (c) Conflict 
questions and, (d) Paradoxical questions. It has been suggested that, 
although we are not engaged in empirical enquiry, conceptual analysis 
trades on certain empirical facts about common usages of the term 
'education'. 'Borderline' questions within this framework are easily 
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resolved. When we proceed by conceptual analysis rather than through 
examples we are restricted to strict logic. Here also there is a 
simple 'litmus paper' test for cases of education. It is towards the 
other two sorts of question 'conflict' and 'paradoxical' that we have 
slanted our examples. This is not to exaggerate and misapply Wisdom's 
classification. It can easily be rewritten as a classification of the 
sort of examples we consider in philosophy. And it must not be forgotten 
that the classification is simply an analytical framework used by Wisdom 
to illustrate, in case after case, how such a framework breaks down. 
Many of my examples are 'conflict' cases in that they call for some 
sort of decision. By including them the decision has been made and 
ipso facto the conflict is disguised. Paradoxical cases have as their 
paradigm the 'Adultery' example. It is unlikely that any of our examples 
approach this powerful and illuminating instance. Several of them do 
have a paradoxical air. The examples from Tolstoy illustrate the 
paradoxical nature of cases of education best of all. For, if we 
consider the Levin example, we have a case of 'education' which seems 
to meet no criteria at all. This is expressed in paradoxical ways. For 
instance, by saying that for Levin everything was changed and yet nothing 
was changed. 
Interpreting our examples in this way presents certain difficulties. 
In the case of conflict cases we can be asked 'Who decides?'. This 
question has similarities with the question "Can you define 'education'?" 
It is an expression of the habit of thought we have called the 
'criteriological' tendency. The assumption is that there is always some 
clear criterion by which a decision can be facilitated. This assumption 
also carries with it the implication that people who do not propound 
some criterion or other simply have no basis on which to take a decision. 
This takes us back to the search that Kant mentions in the Critigue fDr 
a criterion to distinguish with certainty between cases which are 
instances of a certain kind and cases which are not. This is not to 
suggest that we do not have to make decisions. What is being suggested 
is that they do not always have to be made on the basis of 'criteria'. 
The notion of 'aspect change' is helpful once again. If we recall the 
'old' and 'young' woman (Fig. 2) we see that we cannot just decide to 
see it one way and now the other. One view just forces itself upon us. 
It is not a matter of choice. Similarly with the various examples. We 
do not just decide to see them as examples of education. If someone 
just couldn't see one of these examples as an example of education we 
might begin to convince him exactly as we would in the case of someone 
who couldn't see the young woman in Fig. 2. That is, we would adopt 
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a case by case procedure. In the latter case we would begin by 
displaying paintings of old and young women by Toulouse-Lautrec. 
Pictures of young women in profile, young women wearing chokers, 
and so forth. In the former case we might take a case we can 
mutually agree upon as an instance of education and proceed, by 
considering cases, to the case in question. In either case we 
may fail. The person we are talking to simply may not be able to 
see the figure in the way we do. We might talk of 'aspect blindness' 
in both cases. But we may succeed. In neither case is a decision 
appropriate. We can make decisions and back them up with a case by 
case procedure. The procedure involves seeing how far our decision 
case was like, and unlike, cases which are, and are not, cases of 
education. This may involve a fairly lengthy comparison of cases. 
And this procedure may be a bad case by case procedure if it 
inclines us to accept something as a case of education which (it could 
be shown by a good case by case procedure) is not a case of education. 
The prejudice against examples is deep rooted. What is being 
advanced here as 'case by case procedure' has its origins in the 
writings of Wittgenstein. What we have called the 'criteriological' 
tendency is manifest in Wittgenstein's earlier writings. Discussing 
various definitions of 'good' he argues that their enumeration is 
intended to: 
' ••• produce the same effect which Galton produced when 
he took a number of photos of different faces on the same 
photographic plate in order to get the picture of the 
typical features they all had in common. And as by show-
ing to you such a collective photo I could ÜŸŸŤĚyou see 
what is the typical - say - Chinese face; so if you look 
through the row of synonyms which I will put before you, 
you will, I hope, be able to see the characteristic 
features of ethics'. (57) 
We have discussed at length the search for such 'common features'. But 
here the emphasis is different. What we are considering here is a 
methodological point about the presentation of examples. In his 
earlier work Wittgenstein saw them as essential if we were to isolate 
a common feature. In the later writings a variety of examples is 
important, but not to enable us to 'look through' them to a common 
element, but to keep you from looking for it. Our response to 
examples need not be so explicit, and yet it may still exhibit the 
'criteriological' tendency. Let us return to our discussion of Casey's 
'criteriological' account of literary criticism to see how such a 
tendency may express itself in a less explicit way. 
As we have seen Leavis explicitly holds that he offers something 
that is better than ŠŪŠŪŸĚwhich sets our 'criteria' for good 
literature. Leavis' work does not characteristically proceed from 
the particular to the general. But it is possible to 'point to some 
extremely general terms in Leavis' vocabulary - 'life', 'maturity' 
and so on - which seem to be like paradigms or central criteria, the 
ultimate premises of a critical system'. (58) It would be a mistake, 
argues Casey, to see Leavis' thickly interrelated terminology as the 
'premises' of such a system 'as if they existed in isolation and a 
priori, to be accepted or rejected entirely on their own right.' Yet 
on the other hand, 'there is a sense in which they can be described as 
(59) --premises'. Casey isolates Leavis' 'paradigmatic' terms and lists 
them in an appendix. They include 'intelligence, consciousness, 
complexity, sensitive, whole, spontaneous, actuality, variety, 
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richness, strength, poise, and precision'. All these words are 
associated with 'life'. Although Casey, like Richardson, would deny 
that there was any sort of strict 'entailment' between these 'criteria' 
and particular judgements, the relationship is still held to be a 
matter of 'logic', of what we have called 'quasi entailment' between 
terms in Leavis' critical 'system'. 
An elaborate defence of Leavis will not be attempted here. The 
question that, Casey's extraction of 'criteria' from Leavis' critical 
discussions poses for us, is whether such 'criteria' could be extracted 
from our discussions of various examples. We have argued that reflec-
tion upon a variety of cases might be illuminating. It might increase 
our grasp of the concept of education. But what exactly does this 
'reflection' consist of? In our discussion of examples from literature 
regular terms occur: 'knowledge, experience, freedom, strength, success, 
development, learning, revelation, seeing the light, change enlighten-
ment, wisdom, world view, and moral awareness'. It could be said that 
these terms are 'criteria' in Casey's sense. They are considerations 
which 'quasi entail' certain judgements in this case the judgement 
that we have here instances of education. It may also be possible to 
select or extract 'general criteria' from these discussions. To isolate 
such 'criteria' would be at best an idle and unilluminating act. 
But there is an alternative way of viewing our discussion of 
examples. Some credibility is given to the 'criteriological' 
interpretations mentioned above because our examples are indeterminate 
they are attempts to give brief accounts of whole novels or aspects of 
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novels. It is possible to talk of 'criteria' in connection with such 
examples but in a quite different sense. We have argued that 
Wittgenstein meant 'criteria' to be, if anything, the details of 
particular cases that we might take notice of in ordinary life. We 
made the point that there is no easy distinction between details 
which are 'criteria' and those which are not. It has also been 
stressed that details which are dissimilar may be more important than 
similarities. Once we start to pick our 'paradigmatic' terms which are 
meant to characterise certain important details of our examples, a habit 
of thought will express itself in our taking these terms to be more or 
less general 'criteria'. The qualification that they are not given in 
any ŸĚpriori way is superfluous. They will be taken as if they were. 
In defending or justifying our examples as eXample of education, 
we might proceed by pointing out certain details that might halt his 
vacillations and assuage his doubts. We could talk of these details 
as 'criteria', but even to talk of such details in this way is to 
put us back on the criteriological road. There is no need to respond 
to the sceptic in this way. We could justify an example as an example 
of education simply by proceeding from an agreed case'x' and moving 
through a consideration of cases until we get near to the case in 
question. Two examples from those presented above will serve to 
illustrate this procedure. It must be recognised that whole chapters 
could be devoted to discussing any of the examples given above. The 
outline here will of necessity be schematic. (61) Let us take as our 
examples Robinson Crusoe and Emma. These'are both illustrative of how 
a case by case procedure can throw up examples which are quite out of 
the ordinary. The former has been much maligned and a brief look at 
it will perhaps explain why. 
The continuum of cases in which Robinson Crusoe is placed stretches 
from a professor in a university engaging in a thorough study and critique 
of the whole basis of society and successfully completing his study, to 
the case of the shipwrecked mariner who survived on berries until he is 
picked up, or who simply died. At one end we have a prima facie case 
of education, while at the other we have a similar case that is not a 
case of education at all, but a case of shipwreck pure and simple. 
Somewhere on this continuum we might place Olenin and Thoreau. Faced 
with a sceptic our job is to justify Robinson Crusoe as a case more like 
the former than the latter. And we must also face the problem that the 
particularity of such cases poses for education as involving any prog-
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rammatic elements. To attempt to repeat Robinson Crusoe's experience 
would be simply to experience shipwreck. Going through cases involves 
certain elements. It will involve detailed reference to the novel and 
the construction of intermediate cases. From either end then, supposing 
we have initial agreement, we can discuss cases such as that of a 
Professor who in order to study his society, goes to live and work in 
a different society where he can view his own society from a different 
perspective. On the other hand we can think of someone who goes to 
some lonely place to find wisdom. Somewhere in the middle we will meet 
and perhaps accept the Crusoe example. If the accidental nature of 
Crusoe's shipwreck causes concern it is always possible to begin with 
examples where someone, perhaps a traveller, achieves education although 
(like Kurtz) his intentions were the opposite. 
ŸĚis perhaps a more problematic case, though this results from 
cursory textual reading rather than from a flawed text. The continuum 
would be from cases of, say, a young girl with a PhD, who spent her 
early years working as a psychologist and achieved an iconoclastic 
perspective on human relations; to the case of the spoilt brat who by 
interfering in human lives in her suburban environment causes untold 
human misery. Both these cases can be conceived to have superficially 
similar features such as social class, income, numbers in family etc. 
The move again would be through less academic cases on the one hand, 
and through less overtly malicious cases on the other, to Emma. 
The procedure outlined might seem to give comfort to the enemy in 
that both cases reference is made to a continuum which has at its 
• positive , ends two paradigma of education which might easily fit the 
text book criteria of knowledge and understanding in depth and breadth. 
But the point of this procedure is to answer the sceptic who deny that 
examples like ŸĚprovided instances of education. We could reverse 
the procedure if we were dealing with a woman like Virginia Woolf's 
Mrs. Ramsey. To someone who valued the emotions above all else we might 
find a ready acceptance of ŸĚand a rejection of Jude and Zhivago and 
indeed of the sort of 'education' we get in schools. Such a person 
would have to be argued against by putting cases like Emma next to other 
cases which moved ever closer to our textbook example. The question of 
getting agreement about a case from which to begin is a fundamental one. 
A perverse anti-educational sceptic could reject all the examples we 
presented. Someone who believed that the only form of education possible 
was that that occurred after death in a spiritual world would be less 
extreme than the sceptic we are imagining. But his position would be a 
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difficult one to defend in any detail. We would have to question him 
in depth as to whether he meant that no one had ever achieved education, 
yet, in which case we should be able to get some sort of clue from him 
as to what he means. Or he may be denying that the term'education' 
means anything now, in which case we can hope that he is a tradition-
alist, and so on. We will probably be able to pin him down, though 
that would be a task we need not attempt here. Most people would have 
some example or other that they would give as an instance of education 
and this single example would be sufficient to start our ŮŲŬȘŤTẀŲŤŸHĚ
which could be a very slow one. Of course it may be that we cannot get 
agreement about an example. This is a very difficult problem which we 
will only touch upon in the conclusion of this thesis. 
We have been trying to illustrate what a complete case by case 
procedure would look like. The hope is that such a procedure would 
illuminate the concept of education more than a criteriological approach. 
We have already seen that it can lead to the discovery of important 
connections with Wisdom and to the beginnings of a discussion of aspect 
change where this involves a change in world-view. Such insights need 
to be developed but this is not the }il.-ace- to do so. This thesis is 
concerned with correcting a misapprehension about the role of examples 
in argument, which has led to a misapprehension of the concept of 
education. In a sense the dichotomy that is being set up between a case 
by case procedure and a 'criteriological' procedure is a false one. But 
it is false only in a practical sense. In actual argument and in 
discussions of education a varied mixture of both forms of argument 
will quite naturally occur. But the point that is being made here is 
that there is no necessity for us to proceed through the giving of 
'criteria' or through a mixture of examples and 'criteria'. We can 
proceed by case by case procedure alone. The further claim is made 
that this is perfectly adeqm.te. To doubt this is to embrace the 
'criteriological' tendency. 
This brings us back, yet again, to Wittgenstein. Near the end of 
his life he discussed in Zettel the very question that is now being 
raised. Can we proceed by examples alone? He is discussing 'rules' 
and comments: 
'You must remember that there may be such a language-
game as 'continuing a series' of digits' in which no 
rule, no expression of rule is ever given, but learning 
happens only through examples. So that the idea that 
every step should be justified by something - a sort of 
pattern - our mind, would be quite alien to these people.' (62) 
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Such examples in Wittgenstein's work have a dual role. Like the tribe 
that measures wood by the amount of ground it covers etc., we are 
meant to question the possibility as well as to learn from it. There 
are differences in giving examples in this sort of case and giving 
examples of a complex concept like education. The grammar of 'education' 
is very complex and loose compared with the grammar of 'table'. By 
giving examples of the latter we might get near to a tight definition. 
It is our success in cases like this that leads to the criteriological 
tendency. The psychologistic notion of understanding what it is to 
continue a series mentioned by Wittgenstein above, is just another 
form of this tendency. 
Giving examples can by itself mislead. For it could be suggested 
that what is at work here in our advocacy of case by case procedure is 
a variant of something we have attacked. This is the notion that a 
word means an object. The denotation theory of meaning. For in this 
account of meaning it follows that giving examples is sufficient to 
explain a word's meaning because we are giving the meaning by giving 
examples. Clearly the word 'example' here does not mean something 
verbal, as it does in many of the cases we are talkingroout. It does 
not refer to a description but to a phenomenal object, something that 
can be presented toee senses. This is clearly not the point, however, 
when we are talking about 'habits of thought' might it not be that the 
idea that we can proceed by examples alone derives its credence from 
the dim awareness of this theory? This suggestion can be refuted by 
simply clarifying the difference between the denotative theory and 
case by case procedure. The denotation theory purports to be a theory 
of meaning. The case by case procedure is a procedure to be followed 
in attempting to explic"ate a concept. As was shown in Chapter One, the 
difference between induction and case by case argument isthat the latter 
can utilise fictitious examples. The denotation theory cannot do this 
without great difficulty. The case by case procedure is not empirical 
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or sensory. It would be simply to play with the word 'example' to suggest 
any connection between the theory and the procedure illustr.ated here. 
As a final objection let us take up the suggestion that to adopt a 
case by case procedure is to participate in some form of ŸĚparticularism. 
This could be called an 'argument' but it is best described as a 'feeling 
of insecurity'. It is as if the whole rigid framework supporting our 
concept has VUĿÒŸŤŪĚloose. This is a familiar suggestion which advocates 
of 'family resemblance' accounts of a concept have to face. This must 
not be taken to mean that such an account is being advocated. We 
have certainly looked at what 'family resemblance' accounts involve. 
but have argued that this amounts to no more or less than an injunction 
to consider examples. Another way of expressing this objection might 
be to say that we have upset the 'delicate balance between principles 
and cases.' (63) But whatever the 'balance' needed to teach someone 
set theory, this is of no interest to us. Indeed the very suggestion 
involves the resurrection of the Kantian view of examples. This is the 
view that to have a concept is 'to know the principle in accordance 
with which things are said to be of the relevant kind'. (64) The 
argument of this thesis has been that such an idea as embodied in the 
'criteriological' tendency has led to the misapprehension of the 
concept of education. The 'family resemblance' metaphor is an attempt 
to lead us away from looking at concepts in this way. It is not just 
a critique of empiricist views of concept formation. It is a 
critique of the search for general principles or principles of 
organisation which constitute having a concept. To put this another 
way, we might say that the metaphor is part of an attempt to show us 
that to produce a 'definition' embodying such a principle would be idle. 
Wittgenstein is concerned with the idleness of defining 'language'. 
But what he says is as true of defining 'truth', 'knowledge' or 
'education'. There is no single answer to what it is for a thing to 
be of one kind rather than another. We can only show what such things 
are by giving examples and by presenting various 'language games' in 
which these terms appear. And this is connected with what we have 
called the peculiarity of the philosophical enterprise. We are not 
trying to introduce unfamiliar concepts but are attempting to explicate 
a concept which we are very familiar with. Philosophical puzzlement 
is not like the puzzlement which we have when we come across new, 
unusual or technical terms. It is more like the puzzlement expressed 
by Augustine when he says that when we use the words 'time' and 'times' 
we understand them: 'No words could be plainer or more commonly used. 
Yet their true meaning is concealed from us we still have to find it 
out'. (65) This 'sorry state' can be ameliorated only by reflection 
upon examples. Other sorts of puzzlement might be ameliorated by 
setting out the 'mathematics' of a term but not this peculiarly 
philosophical puzzlement. We have argued at length that only a case by 
case procedure can give us increased grasp of a concept. In part this 
could be said to redress the ŸŞŠŨŠŪȘŤĚbetween principles and cases 
produced by the 'criteriological' tendency, but is more thorough going 
than this in that it constitutes a criticism of the assumptions that 
the tendency embodies. 
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Perhaps this thesis will seem a little less wild and extreme if 
it can be shown that there is a precedent for it. Hamlyn suggests 
that his comments only apply to disciplines where there can be said 
to be something approximating to a theory. Though we often talk about 
the 'theory' of education, it is notoriously difficult to specify 
anything like a theory, if by 'theory' we mean something which meets 
standard criteria for a scientific theory. This is the starting point 
of a paper by D.I. Lloyd (66) which advances an argument analogous to 
the argument of this thesis although with a slightly different intent. 
Lloyd sets out and successfully argues against Paul Hirst the following 
case: 
' ••• underlying his (Hirst's) thinking here is a desire for 
unity, for a system, for a set of principles. I want to 
question whether such a desire to tidy up our thinking and 
to provide us with a theoretical backing is either necessary 
or desirable; then to see if practice, as an alternative, is 
sufficient on its own; and finally to introduce the idea of 
reflection as against theorising which for me retains the 
link with practice without being chained to it.' (67) 
ÒŨÕXŸĚpaper essentially introduces a ȚŬŸÜĚof case by case argument. 
He says 'My case is that understanding is more likely to be acquired 
by examining particular cases.' (68) Taking the definitions of a 
theory offered by Hirst and O'Connor and developed on analogy with 
empirical science we have something like the following: 
(i) A set of UŸŮŬWUŤVŤVĚconfirmed by observation 
(ii) That are refutable 
(iii) That are explanatory 
Lloyd argues that people can learn language, and act morally without 
any knowledge of theory. In the former case the very suggestion is an 
absurdity. He mentions that the most effective teachers can be those 
with no theory. He points out that 'Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice, 
Forsters' Passage to India and Baldwin's Another Country are more 
helpful to understanding people's attitudes to immigrants in a London 
suburb than an ethnological study.' (69) This line of argument will 
now be very familiar. He fires away at various arguments produced in 
defence of theories of education in order to make us sceptical of them. 
On to this sceptical seed bed he scatters the notion of reflection on 
particular cases. This differs from practice in that it demands that 
'one stands back in order to think about what one is doing, without 
standing back so far that the detail of the picture becomes blurred 
or even lost to one's VIision (which is the hazard of theory)'. (70) 
Lloyd does not allow any of the habitual notions to reassert themselves. 
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He acknowledges that reflection may help us to see similarities but 
'it will be as likely to reveal dissimilarities which may be more 
important. ,(71) Although his paper is brief and necessarily sketchy 
he is clearly putting forward something which is analogous to the 
thesis we are arguing for. Lloyd restricts his examples to psychology 
but he admits that there are implications for the whole of educational 
thought. One of the ŴŤŸŤ£ŤVĚof his paper is that it does not tackle 
the central philosophical issues. If a plea is to be made for 
particularity then age-old philosophical habits must be tackled first. 
Showing that there is a precedent - or rather that someone is 
thinking on similar lines - does not verify an argument. Two routes 
can lead up the same blind alley. If this is a blind alley then 
documentation will have to be produced to show that it is as sterile 
a methodology as that which goes under the name of conceptual analysis. 
In Chapter One considerable documentation was produced to show that 
there was something wrong with our grasp of the concept of education. 
In Chapter Two we saw how the asking of the sorts of questions that the 
search for criteria necessitated us asking, lead to several dead ends. 
In Chapter Four and Five we explored several ways in which we could 
consider examples. What is sketched is a methodology which must prove 
itself in consideration of other concepts and problems. It was 
essential at the outset to challenge the analyses of the concept of 
education put about by contemporary philosophers of education. People 
are very dissatisfied with the answers they are pressed to accept when 
they are made to reflect upon the question 'What is education?' They 
ȚŤŸŨHĚ intuitively perhaps, that there is something not quite right in 
the way they are asked to proceed in their enquiries. 'Why are the 
answers we are given so platitudinous?' 'Why must we accept such and 
such a definition - even to the extent that if we do not we are held 
to be only partially human?' These objections which are, I believe, 
at the bottom of many teachers cynical attitudes towards philosophy 
are not shallow objections. They are not made just because teachers 
are excessively concerned with practical issues. They are not a result 
of sheer woolly-mindedness. They may be a result of a lack of philosoph-
ical training. But I submit that this merely explains why objections 
to philosophy of education are couched in pragmatic and functional 
language. An understanding of philosophy - as distinct from philosophy 
of education - would lead many teachers and others to an understanding 
that what they are being fed in philosophy of education is simply a 
one-sided diet. That there are other forms of philosophising is some-
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thing that is not acknowledged. 
If we are right then the arguments presented here for a case by 
case procedure may open up a new approach to some old questions. Concern 
about the criteriological method of philosophising is not an irrationalism 
it reflects not a rejection of reason but a deep disquietude about what 
is presented as rationality. We began by suggesting that what was at 
issue in this thesis was a radical form of scepticism. A scepticism 
about all thought. In presenting an argument for reflection upon case 
after case after case we have been battling this scepticism. But we 
have also been concerned with reflection upon the concept of education. 
We have been pursuing a methodological question, and illustrating it 
with one particular example. There are important reasons why this has 
been our procedure. In most of the work done on the philosophy of 
education philosophical positions are assumed rather than made explicit. 
(Here one thinks of O'Connor's strangely anachronistic little book 
putting forward a positivist philosophy for teachers.) This is often 
done for the best of reasons. The audience of such books is not made 
up of philosophers. There is an urge to get down to the nitty gritty 
of the concepts we actually are interested in. But this short cut is 
essentially unphilosophical. Too many things slide past and an inevit-
able logic seems to take us to conclusions we do not want to endorse. 
ĻVVẀÜŮWÙŸŪVĚabout 'criteria','rules ' , 'definitions' and examples have 
proved very confusing. The number of shifts of position and half 
shifts we have documented point to the need for a radical re-think of 
the approach to the disciplfne rather than to a consideration of 
different problems in the old way. Some people researching into 
philosophy of education are now considering topics such as 'death 
education'. It can only be suggested, yet again, that understanding 
is more likely to come from reflection upon particular cases than from 
any other approach. What would be more illuminating than a study of 
The Death of Ivan Ilych, The Outsider, Darkness at Noon, Tess of the 
MŸŞŤŲẂŸVHĚThe Trial, Death of a Salesman, King Lear, Mother Courage, 
and Murder in the Cathedral? 
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Chapter Six CONCLUSION 
Logic is the study of the form of arguments. It must be disting-
uished from the study of arguments which lack form. Case by case 
procedures may seem to be 'argument' which makes a virtue of formless-
ness. It is 'argument' without form but it is nevertheless reasoning. 
In all subjects we meet both concrete and abstract reasoning. It is 
a philosophical prejudice to prefer one over the other. 
In a recent book Langford has looked again at the question 'What 
is education?' (1) He suggests that just to ask the question is to 
(2) leave it 'ambiguous between a particular question or questions ••• ' 
Thus if asked in the context of the activity of teaching it can be 
empirical or it can be prescriptive. It becomes philosophical when it 
embodies 'a request for the principle of identity according to which 
we recognise different educational traditions as instances of the same 
kind of thing.,(3) Those who employ this 'principle' possess a 
'higher order' concept of education, which like the laws of economics, 
apply to any tradition or alien culture. How would such an 'eternal' 
or 'abstract' principle help us at all? How would it increase our 
grasp of the ȘŬŪŸĚof education? Is the uncovering of such a 
principle of philosophical interest? Is 'education' a 'higher order' 
concept which embodies a principle which is as generally applicable as 
the laws of economics? Langford's analogy fails him disast Y.. ously. 
Talking of the common characteristics of all 'epochs' of production 
Marx writes: 
'Some determinations belong to all epochs others only to 
a few. Some determinations will be shared by the most 
modern epoch and the most ancient. No production will be 
thinkable without them; however, even though the most 
developed languages have laws and characteristics in common 
with the least developed, nevertheless, just those things 
which determine their development, i.e. the elements which 
are not general and common, must be separated out from the 
determinations valid for production as such, so that in 
their unity - which arises already from the identity of the 
subject, humanity, and of the object, nature - their 
essential difference is not forgotten. The whole profundity 
of those modern economists who demonstrate the eternity 
and harmoniousness of existing social relations lies in 
this forgetting.' (4) 
The economists real concern is not the general part. A case by 
case procedure forces us to concentrate on the essential differences 
rather than similarities. In doing so it may increase our grasp of the 
concept of education. The dissimilarities are more important than the 
similarities: 'The whole profundity of modern philosophers of education 
who demonstrate the eternity and harmoniousness of the concept of 
education lies in this forgetting'. 
6.1. Breaking a Habit of Thought 
We have been concerned in this thesis with two things. Firstly, 
we have been trying to establish that our grasp of the concept of 
education is weakened by a failure to appreciate the role of examples. 
More generally we have been concerned w·j -t::h the neglect of case by 
case argument in contemporary educational thought. Secondly, we have 
been concerned to increase our grasp of the concept of education through 
examples, that is by trying to give something like a VȘUŤŸȘȘŠVŤĚby 
case treatment of the concept. We have considered case after case of 
education. It may be that someone would deny that many of the instances 
which I have referred to are valid examples of education. This does 
not matter. For it cannot be denied that in giving examples and in 
discussing them that what was going on was reasoning. That there may 
be dispute and disagreement about certain examples does not mean that 
there has been no increase in grasp of the concept of education. As 
Wisdom put it when discussing legal cases where a judge or jury is 
called upon to make a decision about a case: 
' ••• if it should happen that neither the answer ''Yes'' nor 
the answer "No" comes out unhesitatingly, this isn't the 
slightest indication that we haven't gained an extra grasp 
of the situation - the degree to which the classifying 
word is applicable is not correlated with the gain in 
grasp.' (VL III 5) 
The case of the concept of education is similar. Looking at cases and 
reflecting upon them may give increased grasp. However doubts may still 
linger. To return to the more general point. Looking at case by case 
argument may incline us towards a greater grasp of what it is to reason 
and argue even though doubts may linger. There is a reason for this 
persistent doubt. We have been concerned to combat what Wisdom called 
a 'habit of thought' what we have more specifically labelled the 
'criteriological tendency.' Words like 'habit' and 'tendency', as we 
have said, 'are meant to indicate how insidious certain ways of thinking 
are. They are not just sloppy or emotive terms. They are meant to 
suggest something that is essentially unreflective. What we are dealing 
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with is a sort of ĦŮUÙŸUÙȘŠŨĚhydra, an inadequate notion of what 
it is to reason, to argue, to prove something. Cut off one of the 
heads and the tendency appears in a different guise. Again and again 
in his Virginia Lectures Wisdom, in discussion, came up against the 
almost spontaneous regeneration of the cramped notions of reasoning 
that he was trying to alleviate. As we saw, he expresses this in a 
suitably Kantian way: 
'Unless one has a criterion that things are of a certain 
kind, then one cannot have a rational claim that a thing 
is of that kind or for a claim that it is not of that 
kind.' (VL. XII p.1) 
The doubt we are discussing is just a further manifestation of this 
tendency. The doubt also takes another form. The very suggestion 
that we have any sort of grasp can be questioned. Thus the tendency 
finds expression in questions like 'How do we know when we have this 
grasp?' Wisdom replies to a similar question so well that it is 
worth quoting his answer at length: 
'You perhaps think that an answer should take the form "When 
conditions C1 ••• Cn are fulfilled". If so, the matter could 
be represented deductively. See how it creeps into the mind, 
this habit of thought. "Could you define the word?" --
implying that he doesn't know what he means (people seem to 
be taught that this can be asked in any intellectual company). 
As though W1 should be defined in terms of W2 and that in 
terms of \013 and so on and on. The habit of thinking that one 
doesn't understand a word unless one can define it ties our 
hands. People can have a grasp of usage without any criterion 
at all. 
It is in fact instances which show what a persons grasp is. 
compare the court case (Vias it negligence?) with the 
situation at the end; at the end if the counsel have done 
their job well, you don't want to go on with it - you may 
feel inclined to flip a coin for the answer, but that it 
reaches this in the end doesn't mean that it was to be 
settled that way in the beginning. One may detect increased 
grasp.' (VL III 6) 
The hold of this habit of thought is very hard to break. It may be that 
we have not succeeded in breaking the hold of it even on one small and 
over-worked corner of the philosophy of education. It may be that after 
reading this someone will still search for criteria for education. As 
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we have said several times this may not be an unillumiB3ting thing to do. 
It may also lead to insights. But no one reading this thesis and following 
the arguments presented could go away without increased grasp of case by 
case argument and of the way in which the role of examples is underplayed 
in philosophy of education. 
There is a further complication which we mentioned earlier which 
comes in with the question of what we do when someone does not take the 
examples given in the way we intend. It may be that such a negative 
response to the examples presented here would reduce the effectiveness 
of my defenGe of case by case argument. The problem is a general one 
not solely associated with the giving of examples, but one which is seen 
most clearly when examples are involved. The problem is best set out 
by applying one of Wittgenstein's great arguments to his own technique 
of giving examples. 
6.2. Wittgenstein's Full Stop 
Of the notion that we must always postUlate some intermediary to 
explain something else - for example 'understanding' - whether it be an 
image or an idea, or whatever, Norman Malcolm makes the point that there 
is always the great criticism of Wittgenstein to be met: 'namely, his 
point that no matter what kind of state, paradigm, sample, structure, 
or rule is conceived of as giving us the necessary guidance, it could 
be taken, or understood, as indicating a different direction than the 
one in which we actually did go.,(5) Whether we give general criteria 
or definitions or examples these can always be misunderstood. 
D.Z. Phillips has recently discussed this criticism as far as it applies 
to examples. No matter how we present them, he argues, 'Examples may 
not be taken in the way we liked,.(6) Some philosopher or other may 
just nat see their implications. At this point 'discussion may come 
to a full stop.' (7) The reason for this is that we all bring 
different knowledge and experience to each example and it is quite 
possible that given the same example 'one philosopher may say his 
(8) 
spade is turned and another may go on.' These remarks of Phillips' 
mean that there is nothing 'about an example per se which makes us take 
it as an example of one thing rather than another. The examples which 
have been given as examples of education can easily be trucen to be 
examples of something else. No amount of discussion may influence our 
UŸUŤWÙȘŠŨĚphilosopher. In going over such examples all that can be 
done is to try to bring to bear (using case by case procedure) aspects 
of experience which might incline our philosopher to take them in the 
way desired. Whether they will be or not depends largely on the 
individual who is examining the examples. Perhaps the consideration 
of examples in this thesis will have brought most people to a full 
I t t . t d (9) stop, but they may a so promo e a cer a1n movemen onwar s. 
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